New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Acevedo

  • People v. Acevedo, 17 N.Y.3d 297 (2011): Resentencing and Predicate Felony Status

    17 N.Y.3d 297 (2011)

    A resentencing sought by a defendant to correct an illegally lenient sentence (e.g., omission of mandatory post-release supervision) does not automatically alter the original sentencing date for the purposes of determining predicate felony status in a subsequent conviction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a resentencing to correct an illegally lenient sentence (specifically, the omission of mandatory post-release supervision (PRS)) could be used to retroactively alter the sentencing date and nullify the prior conviction’s status as a predicate felony. Defendants Acevedo and Collado sought resentencing on prior convictions to eliminate them as predicates for later felony offenses. The Court of Appeals held that resentencing to correct a lenient sentence, particularly where the original sentence had been fully served, does not alter the original sentencing date for predicate felony purposes. The Court reasoned that resentencing should not be used as a tactic to evade enhanced punishment for reoffending.

    Facts

    In People v. Acevedo, Acevedo was convicted in 2006 of drug offenses and sentenced as a second felony drug offender. His predicate conviction was for a 2001 attempted robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a determinate term without the statutorily required PRS. After completing the 2001 sentence, Acevedo moved for resentencing in 2008 to add the PRS term, which was granted. He then argued that because the resentencing occurred after the 2006 drug offense, the 2001 conviction could no longer serve as a predicate. In People v. Collado, Collado was convicted in 2005 of robbery and sentenced as a second violent felony offender, based on a 2000 attempted robbery conviction that also lacked a PRS term. After his 2005 conviction was affirmed, Collado moved for resentencing on the 2000 conviction to add the PRS term, arguing this invalidated its predicate status.

    Procedural History

    In Acevedo, the motion court denied vacatur of the 2006 predicate adjudication. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the 2001 sentence was vacated and resentenced, and therefore did not qualify as a predicate. In Collado, the motion court resentenced Collado on both the 2000 and 2005 convictions, rejecting his argument that the 2009 resentencing invalidated the predicate status of the 2000 conviction. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on its decision in Acevedo. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a resentencing sought by a defendant to correct an illegally lenient sentence (i.e., one lacking mandatory post-release supervision) is effective to retroactively alter the original sentencing date for purposes of determining predicate felony status in a subsequent conviction?

    Holding

    No, because resentencing to correct a lenient sentence, particularly where the original sentence has been fully served, does not alter the original sentencing date for predicate felony purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the decisive factor was that the sentencing errors were in the defendants’ favor. The Court emphasized that resentencing is not a device to be used to simply alter a sentencing date in order to affect the utility of a conviction as a predicate for enhanced punishment. The Court distinguished People v. Sparber, noting that while Sparber held that the sole remedy for failure to pronounce PRS is resentencing, the resentencing sought by the defendants in these cases was an attempt to evade the consequences of reoffending, not a genuine attempt to correct an illegal sentence. The Court stated that “[r]esentence is not a device appropriately employed simply to alter a sentencing date and thereby affect the utility of a conviction as a predicate for the imposition of enhanced punishment.” The concurring opinion argued that the underlying conviction remains undisturbed during a Sparber resentencing, as the resentencing court lacks the power to reconsider either the conviction or the incarceration component of the original sentence. The dissent argued that because Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (ii) requires the sentence upon the prior conviction to have been imposed before commission of the present felony, and the resentencing occurred after the commission of the subsequent felony, the defendants could no longer be classified as second felony offenders. The majority rejected this argument, emphasizing the manipulative nature of the defendants’ attempts to exploit the Sparber remedy.

  • People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010): Limits on Resentencing Authority Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010)

    A court resentencing a defendant under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) does not have the authority to modify the original sentencing court’s determination regarding whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of drug and weapon offenses and sentenced to consecutive terms for the drug and weapon charges. Subsequently, he sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004. The resentencing court reduced his drug sentence but maintained the original sentencing court’s directive that the weapon possession sentences run consecutively to the drug sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DLRA allows for alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law, but does not empower a resentencing court to alter the consecutive or concurrent nature of the original sentences. The court clarified that DLRA resentencing does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” allowing modification of the original sentencing structure.

    Facts

    Acevedo was convicted in County Court on November 7, 1997, of multiple drug and weapon offenses. He received sentences that included an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The sentencing court ordered the sentences for the weapon possession convictions to run consecutively to the drug convictions.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed Acevedo’s convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. In 2005, Acevedo moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004, arguing for a reduced sentence on the drug felony and for concurrent sentences on the weapon charges. The County Court reduced the drug sentence but declined to change the consecutive nature of the weapon sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the resentence. The Court of Appeals granted Acevedo leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court, when granting a defendant’s application for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, has the authority to modify the conditions of a sentence by changing its terms from consecutive to concurrent.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate harsh sentences, not to grant resentencing courts the power to modify the original sentencing court’s determinations regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that reliance on Penal Law § 70.25 (1) and Matter of Murray v. Goord was misplaced. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the DLRA is to address the severity of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by allowing for a reduced sentence. However, reducing a sentence under the DLRA does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” under Penal Law § 70.25 (1), which would trigger the court’s discretion to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. The court distinguished the DLRA proceeding from a typical resentencing, stating that the DLRA proceeding is designed to “effect an alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law.” The Court cited People v. Vaughan, stating that “a court that resentences a defendant pursuant to the 2004 DLRA does not possess the authority, conferred by Penal Law § 70.25 (1), to determine whether the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences.”

  • People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478 (1987): Collateral Estoppel Extends to Evidentiary Facts in Criminal Cases

    People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478 (1987)

    Collateral estoppel in criminal cases can bar the relitigation of evidentiary facts, as well as ultimate facts, necessarily decided in a defendant’s favor at a prior trial.

    Summary

    Acevedo was tried for two robberies. He was acquitted in the first trial (Jakiela robbery). At the second trial (Nello robbery), the prosecution introduced evidence related to the first robbery, which Acevedo argued was barred by collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel can apply to evidentiary facts, not just ultimate facts, and that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided key factual issues in Acevedo’s favor, precluding their relitigation in the second trial. The court reversed Acevedo’s conviction, finding that the introduction of Jakiela’s testimony was prejudicial error.

    Facts

    Acevedo was charged with robbing Mark Jakiela and William Nello in separate incidents occurring on the same day and within a few blocks of each other. At the Jakiela trial, Jakiela testified that Acevedo robbed him at a gas station. Acevedo testified that he encountered Jakiela in a park and rejected his sexual advance. Acevedo was acquitted of the Jakiela robbery. At the Nello trial, the prosecution called Jakiela to testify that he saw Acevedo driving near Nello’s house shortly before the Nello robbery. Acevedo argued that this testimony was barred by collateral estoppel.

    Procedural History

    Acevedo was acquitted of the Jakiela robbery in the first trial. He was convicted of the Nello robbery in the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to issues of “evidentiary” fact in a criminal prosecution?

    2. Whether, on the present record, such fact issues were necessarily established in defendant’s favor at his first trial, so as to preclude their further litigation in defendant’s second trial?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because collateral estoppel is not limited to ultimate facts; it can also apply to evidentiary facts.

    2. Yes, because the jury’s verdict in the first trial necessarily decided that Acevedo’s encounter with Jakiela occurred in the park, not at the gas station, precluding relitigation of that issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues already decided in a defendant’s favor to conserve judicial resources and ensure fairness. While previous cases like Ashe v. Swenson discussed collateral estoppel in terms of “ultimate facts,” they did not explicitly restrict the doctrine to only those facts. The court found no meaningful difference in the unfairness to a defendant when the state relitigates a settled fact issue, whether it is an ultimate or evidentiary fact. The court emphasized that a defendant faces the burden of defending against charges or factual allegations they overcame in an earlier trial, regardless of whether the fact is ultimate or evidentiary. In this case, the court determined that the first jury necessarily decided that Acevedo’s encounter with Jakiela occurred in the park, not at the gas station. The court pointed to the all-or-nothing nature of the case presented at the first trial, where the jury had to choose between Jakiela’s version of the events and Acevedo’s version. The prosecution argued, “if Mr. Jakiela’s testimony is to be believed, the Defendant is guilty, [his counsel] makes no bones about that”. The court reasoned that by acquitting Acevedo, the jury must have found Jakiela’s testimony incredible. Therefore, collateral estoppel foreclosed relitigation of those issues of evidentiary fact at Acevedo’s second trial, and it was prejudicial error to allow Jakiela’s testimony.

  • People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Demonstrations

    People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976)

    A trial court has discretion to exclude in-court demonstrations or experiments if they are not sufficiently similar to the actual events at issue or if their probative value is outweighed by the potential for prejudice, confusion, or delay.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of robbery based largely on voice identification by a hotel employee, Skolnick, who had extensive prior interactions with him. The defense sought to conduct an in-court experiment where Skolnick would be blindfolded and asked to identify Acevedo’s brother’s voice uttering phrases from the robbery. The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that the proposed experiment did not replicate the conditions under which Skolnick identified Acevedo’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division by reversing the conviction of grand larceny in the third degree, determining that it was a lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Judith Skolnick, an assistant hotel manager, was accosted by a masked robber who forced her to open the manager’s office at gunpoint. The robber, familiar with the office layout, spoke frequently during the 20-25 minute robbery, both in Spanish to his accomplice and in English to the victims. Skolnick recognized the robber’s voice as that of Agilio Acevedo, a hotel security guard she had known and spoken with extensively for nearly two years. Acevedo had a slight speech impediment, particularly noticeable in his pronunciation of the word “security,” which further solidified her identification. Immediately after the robbery, Skolnick confidently identified Acevedo as the robber.

    Procedural History

    Acevedo was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to allow an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Acevedo then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to conduct an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness.
    2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for grand larceny in the third degree was proper given the convictions for robbery in the first and second degrees.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proposed experiment did not sufficiently replicate the conditions under which the witness identified the defendant’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury.
    2. No, in part, because grand larceny in the third degree is a lesser included offense under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while demonstrative evidence can be convincing, trial courts have broad discretion to exclude tests or demonstrations that are not properly relevant or that could mislead the jury. The proposed voice identification test was deemed dissimilar to the actual circumstances of Skolnick’s identification: her familiarity with Acevedo’s voice was extensive and recent, whereas her familiarity with his brother’s voice was limited and dated. The court noted, “The voice identification test proposed by the defendant in the case before us patently would not have duplicated the circumstances which surrounded Ms. Skolnick’s voice identification of the defendant.” The court also noted the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate the witness’s description of the defendant’s speech impediment. Finally, regarding the multiple convictions, the court noted that one crime is only included within another when it is impossible to commit the crime in the greater degree without also committing “by the same conduct” a crime in the lesser degree. The court reversed the conviction for larceny in the third degree holding that it was a lesser included offense in these circumstances.

  • People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 640 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Demonstrations

    People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 640 (1976)

    A trial court has broad discretion to permit in-court demonstrations using physical exhibits, even if conditions are not identical to those at the scene of the event, as long as the demonstration is not deceptive, sensational, disruptive, or purely conjectural, and the opposing party has an opportunity for cross-examination.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of an in-court demonstration. An infant plaintiff was injured when a street sign fell on him. At trial, the defendant town introduced a model pole, and defense counsel demonstrated that striking the pole did not dislodge the sign. The plaintiffs objected. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstration because the plaintiffs had the opportunity to cross-examine and highlight the differences between the model and the original, and the demonstration itself was not misleading.

    Facts

    An infant plaintiff was injured when a dual street sign fell on his head. The sign was allegedly dislodged when the plaintiff’s companion struck the pole supporting the sign. The street sign was recovered by the plaintiff’s father and retained in counsel’s custody. The town introduced a model metal pole, which was shorter than the original and embedded in a movable concrete block, unlike the original which was in stationary blacktop.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial where the street sign was admitted as evidence. The defendant town introduced a model pole. The plaintiffs objected to any courtroom demonstration using the model. The trial court admitted the model, and defense counsel demonstrated that striking the pole did not dislodge the sign, over the plaintiff’s objection. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting defense counsel to conduct an in-court demonstration using a physical exhibit introduced by the plaintiffs and a model introduced by the defendants, despite differences between the model and the original.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court has broad discretion in such matters, and the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine and highlight the dissimilarities between the model and the original. Also, the demonstration was not deceptive, sensational, disruptive, or purely conjectural.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to allow in-court demonstrations. The court acknowledged that the trial court could have forbidden the demonstration because the conditions in the courtroom were not identical to the scene of the accident. However, the court held that it was not an error as a matter of law to allow the demonstration, because plaintiffs had unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine and expose the differences between the model and the original. By highlighting the dissimilarities, plaintiffs could minimize the significance of the demonstration.

    The court reasoned that the physical features of the sign assembly and the mechanics of the demonstration were within the comprehension of the average juror, allowing them to independently weigh the probative value. Crucially, the court noted that the demonstration was not “deceptive, sensational, disruptive of the trial, or purely conjectural.” The court emphasized the importance of allowing the opposing party an opportunity to address any concerns through cross-examination. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding the jury verdict for the defendants.