People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253 (1963)

A defendant’s right to be present at their felony trial extends only to situations where their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of their opportunity to defend against the charges; absence during arguments on motions unrelated to direct evidence or jury instruction does not automatically void a conviction.

Summary

The case addresses whether a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was absent from the courtroom during his counsel’s motion for a mistrial. The motion, based on the argument that further jury deliberation would be coercive, was denied, and the defendant was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s absence during this particular stage of the trial did not violate his rights. The court reasoned that due process requires the defendant’s presence only when it’s necessary for a fair and just hearing, specifically when it impacts his opportunity to defend against the charges. The court affirmed the dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus.

Facts

After the jury in Lupo’s grand larceny trial deliberated for hours, they indicated difficulty reaching a verdict around midnight. The trial judge instructed them to continue deliberations and arranged for hotel accommodations. Following the jury’s departure, Lupo’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that continued deliberation would be coercive. Lupo was not present in the courtroom during this motion. The motion was denied. The jury resumed deliberations the next morning, requested further instructions around noon, and ultimately returned a guilty verdict late in the afternoon.

Procedural History

Lupo was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (13 A.D.2d 684). Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Lupo then sought habeas corpus relief, arguing his absence during the motion for a mistrial warranted the writ. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dismissed the writ. Lupo appealed this dismissal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was absent from the courtroom while his counsel argued a motion for a mistrial based on potentially coercive jury deliberation.

Holding

No, because the defendant’s absence from the courtroom during his counsel’s argument for a mistrial did not affect any substantial right of his and did not invalidate the subsequent judgment of conviction.

Court’s Reasoning

The court relied on Section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates the defendant’s personal presence during a felony trial to prevent secret trials and guarantee the right to be present at all important stages. However, the court clarified that this right is not absolute and must be balanced with reason. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, the court emphasized that due process requires the defendant’s presence only to the extent that it’s necessary for a fair and just hearing. Justice Cardozo’s inquiry in Snyder was adopted: whether the defendant’s presence at the particular trial stage had “a relation, reasonably substantial to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge”. The court found that Lupo’s absence during the mistrial motion, which concerned the potential coercion of the jury, did not impact his ability to defend against the charges. The court emphasized that this ruling does not change the established rule that a defendant’s presence is indispensable during testimony, summations, jury instructions, the rendering of the verdict, and sentencing. The court explicitly declined to address the issue of waiver, finding no evidence that Lupo voluntarily surrendered his right to be present.