People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966)

Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that a relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

Summary

Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his imprisonment was illegal because the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior conviction before the jury, violating his due process rights and privilege against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy. The court held that habeas corpus is available to test claims of imprisonment following deprivation of fundamental constitutional or statutory rights. However, the court affirmed the denial of the writ on the merits, finding that Keitt had not been deprived of any constitutional right due to his own conduct at trial.

Facts

Keitt was indicted for robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of Keitt’s prior conviction for attempted robbery after Keitt stood mute on the matter. This was done pursuant to Section 275-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Keitt’s counsel objected. Keitt had previously stated he would testify in his defense, and he later did, admitting the prior conviction and other crimes. Keitt appealed his conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. His petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was also denied.

Procedural History

Keitt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court, Clinton County. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Keitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

Issue(s)

Whether habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test a claim that the introduction of certain evidence violated both due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, thereby depriving the relator of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right.

Holding

Yes, because habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to test a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged a subtle shift from its narrow view of habeas corpus relief, which traditionally required only that the convicting court have jurisdiction over the person, the crime, and the power to impose the sentence. Citing precedent such as People ex rel. Colan v. La Vallee, the court recognized that the use of “jurisdiction” and “void judgments” in prior cases was more about historical respect for habeas corpus than a true limitation on its scope.

The court clarified that habeas corpus is available when a prisoner claims a deprivation of a substantial constitutional right on the face of the record. However, the court cautioned that habeas corpus is not the only or preferred means of vindicating such rights, and it is not a substitute for appeal to review mere trial errors. Departure from traditional appellate processes should only occur when dictated by practicality and necessity.

Regarding the merits of Keitt’s claim, the court found that in view of Keitt’s conduct at trial, specifically his initial silence followed by his decision to testify and admit to the prior conviction, he had not been deprived of any constitutional right. The court recognized the flexibility of the writ, noting that the legislature did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available.

Judge Van Voorhis concurred, arguing the relator was not aggrieved without reaching the constitutional questions.