Tag: People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith

  • People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477 (1979): Collateral Estoppel in Parole Revocation Hearings After Entrapment Defense

    People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477 (1979)

    A prior acquittal based on the defense of entrapment in a criminal proceeding collaterally estops the Board of Parole from revoking parole on the basis of the transactions proved and admitted in the criminal action.

    Summary

    Dowdy, a parolee, was arrested and charged with drug offenses. He was also served with a parole violation notice based on the same offenses. At his criminal trial, Dowdy successfully argued an entrapment defense and was acquitted. Subsequently, at his parole revocation hearing, Dowdy argued that his acquittal collaterally estopped the Parole Board from revoking his parole. The Parole Board rejected this argument, but the Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the successful entrapment defense in the criminal trial precluded the Parole Board from revoking parole based on the same conduct. This was because the prior acquittal, specifically based on entrapment which Dowdy had the burden of proving, barred relitigation of that issue.

    Facts

    Relator Dowdy was on parole for robbery and weapons possession.
    He was arrested and indicted on charges related to the sale and possession of controlled substances.
    He received a parole violation notice based on the same drug offenses, alleging violation of parole rule 12 (prohibiting illegal drug use/possession).
    At the criminal trial, Dowdy asserted the affirmative defense of entrapment.
    The jury acquitted Dowdy on all counts.

    Procedural History

    Dowdy faced a parole revocation hearing where he argued that the criminal acquittal based on entrapment collaterally estopped the parole revocation.
    The Parole Board rejected Dowdy’s collateral estoppel argument and sustained the parole violations.
    Dowdy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus; the Supreme Court granted the writ, upholding Dowdy’s collateral estoppel defense.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior acquittal in a criminal proceeding, based on the affirmative defense of entrapment, collaterally estops the Board of Parole from revoking parole based on the same conduct.
    Whether entrapment is a valid defense to an alleged violation of a parole rule prohibiting the use, possession, or purchase of illegal drugs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the successful assertion of the entrapment defense in the criminal trial precludes the Parole Board from relitigating the issue of whether the parolee’s actions were induced by law enforcement.
    Yes, because fundamental fairness dictates that a parolee’s possession or sale of drugs induced by law enforcement officials cannot be the basis for parole revocation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel in this case. The court found identity of parties sufficient because “the People as prosecutors in the criminal action stood in sufficient relationship with the Division of Parole in the parole proceeding”.

    Regarding the identity of issues, the court stated, “the criminal acquittal in this case constituted a conclusive finding that relator’s conduct was induced by entrapment.” The court reasoned this was a case of “issue preclusion.” Having had “a full and fair opportunity to contest” the claim that relator’s possession and sale of drugs was induced by law enforcement, the People are bound by the prior adverse factual determination. Any difference in the objectives of the two proceedings does not change the application of collateral estoppel.

    The court distinguished this case from others where criminal acquittals did not bar parole revocation. In those cases, the criminal acquittal merely indicated a failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while the parole revocation proceeding had a lower burden of proof. In this case, Dowdy had the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of evidence in the criminal trial and he succeeded. In the parole revocation hearing, the state had the burden of proving the violation.

    As to whether entrapment is a defense to a parole violation, the court stated, “If the particular possession or sale of the drugs has been induced by the conduct of law enforcement officials, any standard of elemental fairness would dictate that possession or sale so induced may not be made the basis for revocation of parole.”