Tag: People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden

  • People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984): Effect of Parolee’s Waiver on Hearing Obligations

    People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984)

    When a parolee knowingly and intelligently waives their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and the right to be present at the final hearing, the parole board is required to proceed with the final hearing in the parolee’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Summary

    Benedetti, while on parole in New York, absconded to Mississippi and was imprisoned there. A parole violation warrant was lodged against him. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence. The parole board tried to secure his return from Mississippi, but failed. After Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York, Special Term annulled the parole violation warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Benedetti waived his rights, the parole board should have proceeded with the hearing in his absence within the statutory time frame. Failure to do so required dismissal of the warrant, regardless of whether Benedetti was within the board’s convenience and practical control.

    Facts

    Benedetti was on parole in New York State.
    He absconded to Mississippi, where he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
    On January 15, 1982, a parole violation warrant was lodged against Benedetti by the respondent.
    By letter dated February 1, 1982, Benedetti waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and his right to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence.
    The parole board corresponded with Mississippi officials for four months to try to secure Benedetti’s return for a hearing.
    Mississippi officials required an executive agreement between the Governors of New York and Mississippi, with New York paying for Benedetti’s transport and return to Mississippi.
    No further action was taken until May 1983, when Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    Benedetti applied on June 2, 1982, to have the parole violation warrant annulled and vacated.
    Special Term granted the application.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim, holding that the respondent had not shown that Benedetti was not within its convenience and practical control.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the parole board was required to proceed with a final parole revocation hearing in the absence of the parolee after the parolee knowingly and intelligently waived their right to be present at the hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because Benedetti waived his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, and there was nothing to indicate that the waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the parole board was required to proceed with the hearing in Benedetti’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Benedetti’s waiver of his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing was effective because there was no indication that it was not made knowingly and intelligently. Therefore, the parole board was obligated to proceed with the final hearing in Benedetti’s absence.
    The court emphasized that the parole board’s failure to conduct the hearing within the time period prescribed by Executive Law § 259-i required the parole violation warrant to be dismissed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim. The court stated, “Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record to indicate that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the waiver was effective and there was nothing to prevent respondent from proceeding in petitioner’s absence. Indeed, it was required to proceed.”
    The court reasoned that because the hearing could have and should have been held in Benedetti’s absence, it was unnecessary to determine whether and when Benedetti came within the respondent’s convenience and practical control.