New York Law Review

Tag: Penal Law § 70.30

  • Matter of Anderson v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 N.Y.2d 979 (1986): Credit for Parole Time After Sentence Vacatur

    68 N.Y.2d 979 (1986)

    When a sentence is vacated on appeal and a new sentence is imposed, the defendant is not entitled to credit for parole time served after the original sentence was vacated but before resentencing.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a petitioner is entitled to credit for time spent on parole between the vacating of his initial sentence and his discharge from parole before resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was not entitled to such credit. The court reasoned that the Appellate Division’s vacatur of the original sentence legally interrupted it, negating any credit for parole time served after the vacatur. Penal Law § 70.30(5) only allows credit against a new sentence for time credited against the vacated sentence, and since no credit was warranted during the interruption, none could be applied to the new sentence. The court also rejected the argument that a stay of execution pending reargument entitled the petitioner to additional parole credit, as Penal Law § 70.40, concerning parole eligibility, was inapplicable because the new sentence had not yet commenced.

    Facts

    The petitioner was originally sentenced for a crime. The People appealed, arguing that the petitioner should have been sentenced as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division vacated the original sentence and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for resentencing as a second felony offender. During the period between the vacatur of the original sentence and resentencing, the petitioner remained on parole. After resentencing, execution of the new sentence was stayed pending reargument of the appeal, and the petitioner remained on parole for an additional period before being returned to prison.

    Procedural History

    The People appealed the original sentence. The Appellate Division vacated the sentence and remitted the matter for resentencing. The petitioner then brought an Article 78 proceeding arguing he was entitled to credit for time spent on parole after his first sentence was vacated. The lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to credit for time spent on parole from the day his first sentence was vacated until the day he was discharged from parole, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.30(5)?

    2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to sentence credit under Penal Law § 70.40 for the additional period he spent on parole after resentencing and before he was returned to prison, due to the stay of execution on his new sentence?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division’s vacatur legally interrupted the original sentence, and Penal Law § 70.30(5) only allows credit against a new sentence for time credited against the vacated sentence.

    2. No, because Penal Law § 70.40 applies only to prisoners who have served their minimum sentence, and the petitioner had not yet started serving his new sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 430.10 states a sentence may not be changed, suspended, or interrupted once the term has commenced, “except as otherwise specifically authorized by law.” The Appellate Division’s vacatur of the petitioner’s original sentence constituted such a legal interruption, authorized by CPL 470.15(2). The court distinguished this case from situations where sentences are not legally interrupted. Because the sentence was legally interrupted, the petitioner was not entitled to credit for parole time served after the vacatur. The court emphasized that Penal Law § 70.30(5) allows credit against a new sentence only for time credited against the vacated sentence; since the petitioner was not entitled to credit during the interruption, it could not be applied to the new sentence. Regarding the petitioner’s claim for additional parole credit under Penal Law § 70.40, the court held that this section was inapplicable because it concerns prisoners who have served their minimum sentence, and the petitioner had not even started serving his new sentence. The court stated, “(a)n indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in an institution”.

  • Kalamis v. Smith, 42 N.Y.2d 191 (1977): Calculating Jail Time Credit for Concurrent Sentences

    42 N.Y.2d 191 (1977)

    When a defendant receives multiple concurrent sentences, jail time credit is applied to each sentence, but time already credited to a previously imposed sentence cannot be credited again to a later sentence.

    Summary

    This case clarifies how jail time credit is calculated when a defendant receives multiple concurrent sentences at different times. The Court of Appeals held that while jail time generally applies to each concurrent sentence, time already credited to a previously imposed sentence cannot be credited again to a subsequent sentence. The court distinguished between time served before any sentence is imposed, which can be credited to a later sentence, and time served while already serving a sentence, which cannot be re-credited. The decision emphasizes the importance of the timing of sentences and the specific language of Penal Law § 70.30 in determining jail time credit.

    Facts

    Kalamis faced charges in three counties. On November 14, 1973, he was sentenced in Nassau County. On January 2, 1974, Suffolk County filed a warrant against him while he was in Nassau County jail. On January 16, 1974, he was sentenced in New York County, to run concurrently with the first sentence. On January 30, 1974, he was sent to Green Haven and then transferred to Clinton. On February 20, 1974, he was sent to Suffolk County jail and sentenced on December 9, 1974, to run concurrently with the prior sentences. The core dispute revolved around whether Kalamis should receive jail time credit against the Suffolk County sentence for the time spent in custody between January 2, 1974 (Suffolk warrant) and December 19, 1974 (return to state prison).

    Procedural History

    Kalamis initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking jail time credit. The lower courts granted him credit for 28 days. Kalamis appealed, seeking additional credit. The Appellate Division affirmed in part. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case to determine whether additional jail time credit was warranted.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the time spent in custody between the first sentence and a later concurrent sentence can be credited against the later sentence under Penal Law § 70.30(3), if that time has already been credited to the first sentence.

    Holding

    No, because under Penal Law § 70.30(3), time already credited against a previously imposed sentence cannot be credited again against a later sentence, even if the sentences run concurrently.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the language of Penal Law § 70.30(3), which allows credit for time spent in custody before a sentence commences as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence. However, the statute explicitly states that credit shall not include any time that is credited against a previously imposed sentence. The court relied on Matter of Canada v. McGinnis, (36 AD2d 830, affd 29 NY2d 853), where it was held that time served under a prior conviction cannot be credited against a subsequent sentence. The court distinguished People ex rel. Middleton v. Zelker, (36 NY2d 691), noting that Middleton applied to time in custody before any sentence was imposed. The Court reasoned that once Kalamis began serving his first two sentences, all subsequent time in custody was credited against those sentences and could not be re-credited against the Suffolk County sentence. Even if Kalamis was in the constructive custody of Suffolk County, the time could not be credited because it had already been applied to the prior sentences. The court stated, “Here however Kalamis claims credit for time in custody after he had begun the first two sentences. Since that time was already being credited against the first two sentences, it could not also be credited as jail time against the third.” The court emphasized that any changes to this statutory scheme should be addressed by the Legislature.