New York Law Review

Tag: Penal Law § 35.20

  • People v. DeFreese, 91 N.Y.2d 714 (1998): Justifiable Use of Deadly Force in Defense Against Burglary

    91 N.Y.2d 714 (1998)

    A person in control of an occupied building may use deadly physical force when they reasonably believe another is committing a burglary and that such force is necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of the burglary.

    Summary

    DeFreese, a store employee, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after fatally stabbing an unruly customer who had been asked to leave the store but re-entered and became violent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmation of the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not charging the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary. The Court reasoned that a reasonable view of the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that the customer’s initial lawful entry became unlawful when he defied the order to leave, and his violent conduct supported the belief that deadly force was necessary.

    Facts

    Troy Alexander, heavily intoxicated, entered a convenience store where DeFreese worked. Alexander bumped into a customer, accosted another, and argued with DeFreese’s brother. Alexander physically threatened DeFreese’s brother. DeFreese escorted Alexander out, but Alexander re-entered, throwing items and threatening to kill DeFreese and his brother. Alexander punched DeFreese, who then grabbed a knife and swung it, fatally striking Alexander in the neck.

    Procedural History

    DeFreese was indicted for second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but declined to instruct on justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary. The jury convicted DeFreese of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the indictment without prejudice to the People’s application to resubmit the criminally negligent homicide charge to a grand jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force in defense of burglary, pursuant to Penal Law § 35.20, given the defendant’s claim that he reasonably believed the victim was committing a burglary.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence supported the conclusion that the victim’s initial lawful entry became unlawful when he defied the defendant’s order to leave the premises, and the victim’s violent conduct and threats supported the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that deadly physical force was necessary to prevent or terminate a burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 35.20(3), which permits the use of deadly force by a person in control of an occupied building who reasonably believes another is committing a burglary, and reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of the burglary. The court noted that burglary occurs when a person “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein” (Penal Law § 140.20). Citing People v. Brown, the Court stated that a licensee’s privilege to be on the premises is revoked when “he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person” (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]).

    The Court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Alexander’s entry became unlawful when he defied DeFreese’s order to leave. Further, Alexander’s violent conduct and threats supported the reasonableness of DeFreese’s belief that deadly force was necessary. The Court emphasized it must view the record in the light most favorable to the defendant. The Court cited People v. Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144 (1983) and People v. Torre, 42 NY2d 1036, 1037 (1977) for the standard that a reasonable view of the evidence entitles the defendant to a justification charge pursuant to Penal Law § 35.20.

    Because the defendant was convicted of a lesser-included offense, the court dismissed the indictment, allowing the prosecution to seek leave to resubmit the criminally negligent homicide charge to a grand jury.

  • People v. De Sair, 61 N.Y.2d 839 (1984): Limits on Justifiable Use of Deadly Force in Burglaries

    People v. De Sair, 61 N.Y.2d 839 (1984)

    A homeowner cannot claim justification for using deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3) when they invited the person onto their premises knowing the person intended to commit a crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The defendant, who shot and killed an acquaintance during an altercation in his home, could not invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) because he invited the acquaintance into his home knowing the acquaintance intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that the law is meant to protect victims of intrusion by individuals with criminal intent, not those who willingly participate in criminal activity. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree murder for shooting and killing Rodney Marsh during a violent altercation in the defendant’s home. The defendant testified that he and Marsh had a heated argument and agreed to settle their dispute at the defendant’s home. At Marsh’s urging, the defendant retrieved his gun from his bedroom. Marsh entered the room and approached the defendant, leading to a struggle. After the struggle, the defendant demanded Marsh leave. Marsh refused and walked toward the defendant, stating, “You got your gun, use it, if you don’t, I will.” Marsh attempted to take the defendant’s gun, but the defendant pushed him off. Marsh approached again, and the defendant shot him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but refused to instruct on justifiable use of deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3). The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on § 35.20(3). The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a homeowner who invites another onto their premises, knowing the person intends to commit a crime, can invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) to justify the use of deadly force to terminate what could technically be considered a burglary when the invited person refuses to leave.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 35.20(3) is intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent, not someone who willingly participates in the criminal endeavor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed Penal Law § 35.20(3), which authorizes the use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The court emphasized that the legislative history indicates the statute was intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent. The Court stated, “Section 35.20 (3) — as its legislative history makes clear — was intended to protect those individuals who suddenly find themselves the victim of an intrusion upon their premises by one bent on a criminal end.” However, the court found no indication that the law was meant to protect someone like the defendant, who invited another person into his home knowing they intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that such an individual is just as responsible for the invasion of security and cannot claim the protection of § 35.20(3). The court essentially applied a principle of equity, stating that one cannot benefit from a law designed to protect victims when they themselves contributed to the situation requiring the use of force. The Court emphasized that the defendant was “no less responsible for any ensuing invasion of his or her own security than the would-be burglar, and therefore cannot claim the protections of section 35.20 (3).” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted in the memorandum opinion.