New York Law Review

Tag: Penal Law 70.30

  • People v. Brinson, 20 NY3d 492 (2013): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing for Postrelease Supervision

    People v. Brinson, 20 N.Y.3d 492 (2013)

    Resentencing a defendant to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after the original determinate sentence was served, but while the defendant is still incarcerated serving an aggregated sentence, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant lacks a legitimate expectation of finality until the entire aggregated sentence is completed.

    Summary

    Defendants Brinson and Blankymsee were resentenced to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after their original sentences omitted it. They argued this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as they had already served their determinate sentences. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy because the defendants were still serving their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30. The Court reasoned that defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until their entire aggregated sentence is completed. This decision clarifies when resentencing for PRS is permissible without violating double jeopardy protections.

    Facts

    Christopher Brinson was arrested on December 8, 1998, and sentenced on July 14, 2000, to a determinate term of 10 years for second-degree robbery, an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years for third-degree robbery, and an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years for fourth-degree grand larceny. The indeterminate terms ran concurrently but consecutively to the determinate term. On April 28, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate count.

    Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced on May 20, 2004, as a second felony offender, to seven concurrent prison terms, including determinate sentences of five years for two counts of loaded firearm possession and indeterminate sentences for other crimes. On October 20, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate sentences for firearm possession.

    Procedural History

    In separate appeals, the Appellate Division affirmed the resentences, holding that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their determinate sentences because they had not completed their properly aggregated sentences before resentencing. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) at resentencing violates the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has completed the determinate sentence for the count subject to PRS, but is still incarcerated serving an aggregate sentence calculated under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until they have completed their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same crime, preventing a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. However, defendants are presumed to know that a determinate sentence without PRS is illegal, and courts have the authority to correct illegal sentences. The Court emphasized that this opportunity to correct illegality is not without end, stating, “there must be a temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant since criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts.” That temporal limitation occurs once the sentence is served and the appeal is completed, or the time for such appeal has expired.

    The Court relied on Penal Law § 70.30, which establishes the methodology for calculating a defendant’s multiple terms of imprisonment. In People v. Buss, 11 NY3d 553 (2008), the Court held that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and concurrent sentences are merged or aggregated and thus “made into one.” Therefore, the Court concluded that defendants Brinson and Blankymsee would only have a legitimate expectation of finality upon completion of their respective aggregated sentences. Until that time, resentencing for the purpose of correcting their illegal determinate sentences does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

  • Matter of Ganci v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 942 (1988): Calculation of Aggregated Sentences After Parole Revocation Set Aside

    Matter of Ganci v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 942 (1988)

    When a parole revocation is set aside due to procedural defects, the inmate’s maximum potential time under custody should not be increased by the sentence time owed on the prior sentence, and the aggregated sentence should be calculated to avoid additional incarceration for the unrevoked parole sentence.

    Summary

    Ganci, paroled from a 1980 sentence, was arrested in 1984 for burglary and sentenced to a 3-to-6-year term. His parole was initially revoked, but the revocation was later set aside due to improper notice. The New York State Board of Parole then recalculated Ganci’s aggregated sentence, leading to an increase in his potential time in custody. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the parole revocation was set aside, Ganci’s maximum time under custody should not be increased by the time owed on his 1980 sentence. The court directed the Board to recompute the aggregated sentence, ensuring Ganci would not be subjected to additional incarceration for the unrevoked parole sentence, crediting him with jail time.

    Facts

    In 1980, Ganci received consecutive sentences. He was paroled in 1984. Later in 1984, Ganci was arrested for burglary. He was convicted and received a 3-to-6-year sentence. His parole from the 1980 sentence was revoked due to the burglary charges. A stipulation later set aside the revocation because of improper notice. The Board of Parole recalculated Ganci’s term of imprisonment, aggregating his 1980 and 1984 sentences.

    Procedural History

    Ganci commenced a proceeding arguing his sentences should not be aggregated and he was entitled to jail time credit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Ganci was entitled to jail time credit but agreed that the sentences had to be aggregated. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the sentences had to be aggregated but disagreed as to the method used.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Parole properly calculated Ganci’s aggregated sentence, considering his parole revocation from a prior sentence was set aside due to procedural defects.

    Holding

    No, because Ganci’s parole from the 1980 sentence was not properly revoked, his maximum potential time under custody should not be increased by the sentence time owed on the 1980 sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the second method used by the Board in calculating the aggregated sentence was erroneous because it increased Ganci’s maximum potential time under custody by the sentence time owed on his 1980 sentence, despite the parole revocation being set aside. The court emphasized that the initial time calculation, which did not subject Ganci to additional incarceration for his unrevoked parole sentence, was proper. The court cited Matter of Concepcion v New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 AD2d 819 and similar cases. The court stated, “Petitioner is thus to serve his 1984 sentence and then serve his parole supervision time owed on his 1980 sentence.” The court’s decision gives effect to the stipulation setting aside the parole revocation and credits Ganci with the jail time he was entitled to. The Court found that the initial calculation satisfied the aggregation requirements of Penal Law § 70.30 (1)(b) while still giving effect to the stipulation setting aside his parole revocation.

  • People ex rel. Davis v. Arnette, 44 N.Y.2d 877 (1978): Jail Time Credit Against Multiple Charges

    People ex rel. Davis v. Arnette, 44 N.Y.2d 877 (1978)

    When a prisoner is held under several charges, jail time must be credited against all of them until there is a commencement of imprisonment upon sentencing.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that when a defendant is held on multiple charges, jail time credit must be applied to all charges until a sentence is imposed. The court reasoned that the application of jail time to one charge (resulting in a “time served” sentence) does not preclude its application to other pending charges. This is because until a sentence is imposed on a particular charge, the jail time is attributable to all outstanding charges, preventing the jail time from becoming a “previously imposed sentence” that would bar its use as jail time credit against other sentences.

    Facts

    The relator was arrested on September 27, 1974, and held under three outstanding warrants: one for a 1972 robbery, one for a 1974 burglary, and one for an unrelated 1974 misdemeanor. On November 25, 1974, he was sentenced to “time served” on the misdemeanor charge. On February 6, 1975, he received a sentence of zero to three years on the robbery charge. On October 15, 1975, he was sentenced to one and a half to three years for the burglary charge, to run concurrently with the robbery sentence.

    Procedural History

    The case originated as a habeas corpus proceeding. The specific procedural history prior to the Court of Appeals decision is not detailed in the memorandum opinion, but the Court of Appeals reviewed and affirmed the decision of the lower court (Appellate Division).

    Issue(s)

    Whether jail time credit, already applied to satisfy a “time served” sentence on one charge, can also be applied as jail time credit against other pending charges arising from separate incidents.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a prisoner is held under several charges, jail time must be credited against all of them until there is a commencement of imprisonment upon sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decisions in Matter of Collins v. Vincent, 42 N.Y.2d 191 (1977), and Matter of Manning v. Vincent, 37 N.Y.2d 724 (1975), stating: “When a prisoner is held under several charges, jail time must be credited against all of them until there is a commencement of imprisonment upon sentencing.” The court reasoned that applying jail time to the misdemeanor charge did not transform it into a “previously imposed sentence” under Penal Law § 70.30(3). Therefore, the time spent in custody between September 27 and November 25, 1974, could be credited against the robbery and burglary sentences as well. The court distinguished this situation from one where a sentence has already been imposed and served before the subsequent charges. The key factor is that the jail time was incurred while the relator was being held on multiple charges, and no sentence had yet been imposed on the robbery and burglary charges. The Court’s decision ensures that defendants receive proper credit for time served while awaiting trial and sentencing on multiple charges, preventing the unjust denial of credit simply because one charge was resolved quickly.