People v. Voliton, 66 N.Y.2d 116 (1985)

To be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30, the arrest being resisted must be an authorized arrest.

Summary

Voliton was charged with resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and dismissed the information, holding that because the officer lacked probable cause to believe Voliton had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense, the arrest was not authorized. Consequently, Voliton could not be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. The court clarified that Penal Law § 35.27 concerns the defense of justification and does not amend § 205.30 to criminalize resisting an unauthorized arrest.

Facts

An officer attempted to detain Voliton. The People conceded the officer had no grounds to believe Voliton was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offense. Voliton struck the officer’s arm in reaction to the attempted detention.

Procedural History

The County Court of St. Lawrence County issued an order which was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant can be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30 when the arrest was not authorized due to a lack of probable cause.

Holding

No, because Penal Law § 205.30 defines resisting arrest as preventing an officer from effecting an “authorized arrest,” and an arrest without probable cause is not authorized.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court based its reasoning on the plain language of Penal Law § 205.30, which requires the arrest to be “authorized” for a resisting arrest charge to stand. The People’s concession that the officer lacked probable cause was fatal to their case. The court emphasized that Penal Law § 35.27, concerning justification, does not alter the requirement of an authorized arrest under § 205.30. The court explicitly stated that “Penal Law § 35.27, as its title indicates, is concerned with the defense of justification and does not amend Penal Law § 205.30 to make resistance to an unauthorized arrest an offense.” The court also disapproved of any prior case law that suggested otherwise, stating, “To the extent that People v Simms (36 AD2d 23) and People v Lattanzio (35 AD2d 313) may be read to indicate otherwise, they are not to be followed.” This clarification reinforces the principle that the legality of the underlying arrest is a prerequisite for a resisting arrest conviction. The dissent, if any, is not mentioned in the memorandum opinion.