New York Law Review

Tag: Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association

  • Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006): Collective Bargaining and Police Discipline

    Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006)

    When the legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials through specific statutes or charters, police discipline is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law, even if it concerns “terms and conditions of employment.”

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between New York’s strong policy supporting collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and the policy favoring local control over police discipline. The Court of Appeals held that when specific legislation, such as the New York City Charter or the Rockland County Police Act, expressly grants disciplinary authority to local officials, this legislation takes precedence. Consequently, police discipline in those jurisdictions is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining, despite the Taylor Law’s broad mandate to negotiate terms and conditions of employment.

    Facts

    The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York (NYCPBA) challenged a decision that the City didn’t have to bargain over five subjects related to police discipline, which had been included in a previous agreement. Similarly, the Town of Orangetown sought to prevent arbitration of a police disciplinary dispute, arguing that the collective bargaining agreement’s disciplinary procedures were invalid. The specific disciplinary issue in Orangetown became moot but the underlying dispute regarding the validity of the disciplinary procedures in the collective bargaining agreement remained.

    Procedural History

    In the NYC case, the Supreme Court upheld the PERB decision. The Appellate Division affirmed. In the Orangetown case, the Supreme Court granted the stay of arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases due to the similar legal issue. The Orangetown matter was converted into a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of the disputed provision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police discipline is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials through statutes or charters?

    Holding

    No, because specific legislation granting disciplinary authority to local officials takes precedence over the general policy favoring collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the tension between the Taylor Law, which generally requires collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, and the need for strong disciplinary control over police forces. While the Taylor Law has a strong presumption favoring collective bargaining, this presumption can be overcome by ” ‘plain and clear, rather than express, prohibitions in the statute or decisional law’ ” or by strong public policy considerations, whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law. The Court distinguished its prior holding in Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, where police discipline was deemed a subject of collective bargaining because no specific legislation vested disciplinary authority in local officials. However, in cases where such legislation exists, like the New York City Charter § 434 (a) which gives the police commissioner “cognizance and control of the … discipline of the department” and New York City Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) which empowers the commissioner to punish officers, the policy favoring local control prevails. Similarly, the Rockland County Police Act § 7 grants the town board the power to make rules for disciplinary proceedings. These specific grants of authority demonstrate a legislative intent to prioritize local control over police discipline, overriding the collective bargaining mandate of the Taylor Law. The Court emphasized that while the statutes predated the Taylor Law, the key question is whether they express a policy so important that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way. The Court concluded that they do, especially considering the quasi-military nature of police forces and the importance of maintaining discipline and morale, quoting People ex rel. Masterson v French, 110 NY 494, 499 (1888) emphasizing that “a question pertaining solely to the general government and discipline of the force . . . must, from the nature of things, rest wholly in the discretion of the commissioners”. The Court thus affirmed the Appellate Division’s holdings, finding that the specific legislation in question removed police disciplinary procedures from the scope of collective bargaining. This decision reinforces the principle that general laws can be superseded by specific statutes addressing particular issues or circumstances, particularly when strong public policy considerations are at stake.

  • Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001): Home Rule and Public Employee Collective Bargaining

    97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001)

    A state law affecting local government is constitutional without a home rule message if it addresses a substantial state concern, and when a police or fire union opts for state-level impasse resolution, the state Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) gains jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues necessary to resolve the impasse.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) and the City of New York regarding collective bargaining. The core issue is whether a state law (chapter 641) allowing police and fire unions to seek impasse resolution from the state Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) violates the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law is constitutional because it serves a substantial state concern (public safety). It also clarified that PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues when resolving impasses, but the city’s Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB) retains jurisdiction in other contexts.

    Facts

    The PBA and the City were in a collective bargaining dispute. The City challenged some of the PBA’s bargaining demands, arguing they weren’t mandatory subjects of bargaining. The PBA argued that PERB, not the BCB, had the final say on the scope of mandatory bargaining. The PBA declared an impasse and sought PERB’s intervention. The City filed an improper practice charge with BCB.

    Procedural History

    The PBA and the City filed separate declaratory judgment actions, which were consolidated. The Supreme Court granted the PBA’s motion, upholding the statute’s constitutionality. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998 violates the home rule provisions of the New York Constitution.
    2. Whether PERB or the BCB has jurisdiction to determine the scope of mandatory collective bargaining in negotiations between the City and the PBA.

    Holding

    1. No, because chapter 641 is a special law that serves a substantial state concern (public safety), the home rule requirements were not implicated.
    2. PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues to the extent necessary to resolve impasses when a police or fire union opts to utilize PERB’s impasse resolution procedures, but it does not otherwise divest the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York of scope of bargaining jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while chapter 641 is a special law (affecting specific localities), it addresses a substantial state concern: fostering orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire unions to enhance public safety. The Court relied on the legislative history indicating this intent. The Court distinguished this case from City v. PBA (89 NY2d 380 (1996)), where a similar law was struck down because it targeted only New York City without a clear state concern. Chapter 641, by contrast, applies to all local governments. The Court emphasized that fulfillment of this legislative purpose is rationally served by chapter 641, which mandates that all local governments allow their police and fire unions access to PERB impasse procedures in resolving public sector labor disputes.

    Regarding jurisdiction, the Court clarified that PERB’s authority over scope of bargaining is limited to situations where it is resolving an impasse. The BCB retains jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues in other contexts, such as improper practice proceedings. The Court acknowledged that this might lead to venue shopping but stated that any changes to the statutory framework must come from the Legislature. “The duty to bargain exists only as to mandatory subjects, which are defined by law, and in the absence of an agreement, only mandatory subjects can be submitted to an impasse panel.”

  • Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205 (1976): Statute’s Reach Does Not Extend to Prior Judgments

    Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205 (1976)

    A statute suspending wage increases pursuant to collective bargaining agreements does not apply to wage increases mandated by a prior judicial judgment.

    Summary

    The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) sought to enforce a judgment requiring New York City to pay a 6% salary increase. The City argued that a subsequent state law freezing wages prohibited this payment. The Court of Appeals held that the wage freeze legislation, which suspended wage increases pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, did not apply to the PBA’s salary increase, as that increase was mandated by a judicial judgment predating the legislation. The Court reasoned that the statute’s language did not explicitly include judicial judgments and that the Legislature was aware of the judgment when enacting the wage freeze.

    Facts

    The PBA and New York City, unable to agree on a collective bargaining agreement, submitted their dispute to an impasse panel. The panel recommended an 8% salary increase for the first year and 6% for the second year. Both parties accepted the findings, and they were incorporated into a tentative agreement. The City refused to sign the agreement, citing financial difficulties. The PBA then sought to confirm the impasse panel’s award via a CPLR Article 75 proceeding. The City’s motion to dismiss was denied, and the petition was granted upon default on July 1, 1975. The City began paying the retroactive salary increase. In September 1975, the state enacted wage freeze legislation, and the City stopped paying the 1975-1976 increase.

    Procedural History

    The PBA moved to compel the City to comply with the July 1, 1975 judgment. The lower court found the wage freeze inapplicable but stayed enforcement of its judgment. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Division also found the wage freeze inapplicable to judgments and removed the stay. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a state statute suspending wage increases pursuant to collective bargaining agreements or other analogous contracts applies to a wage increase mandated by a judicial judgment entered before the statute’s enactment.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s language does not explicitly include judicial judgments, and the legislative history does not indicate an intent to encompass such judgments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that statutory interpretation should effectuate the Legislature’s intent, and clear, unambiguous language should be given its plain meaning. The statute suspended wage increases “pursuant to collective bargaining agreements or other analogous contracts.” The Court found that the wage increase in this case resulted from a judicially mandated remedy, not a collective bargaining agreement. There was no language suggesting a legislative intent to suspend judgments. The Court stated, “[A]n irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” The Legislature was aware of the July 1 judgment when enacting the wage freeze. Other statutes enacted at the same time specifically applied to judgments, demonstrating that the Legislature knew how to include judgments when it intended to do so. The Court also noted that a judgment entered upon the confirmation of an arbitral award has the same force and effect as a judgment in an action. Finally, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the lower court lacked the power to stay enforcement of its order. The Court found no merit in the City’s other arguments.