Patricia A. v. Philip De G., 49 N.Y.2d 162 (1980)

In paternity proceedings, hospital records containing diagnoses and observations made by medical professionals are admissible as prima facie evidence, and the court may draw the strongest possible inference against a party who fails to testify when faced with opposing evidence.

Summary

This case concerns the admissibility of hospital records and the implications of a defendant’s silence in paternity suits. The New York Court of Appeals held that uncertified hospital records, specifically doctors’ diagnoses and nurses’ entries, are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, provided they are records kept in the regular course of business. Furthermore, the court clarified that while a respondent in a paternity suit cannot be compelled to testify, their silence allows the court to draw the strongest inference against them that the opposing evidence permits. This case underscores the importance of medical records as corroborating evidence and clarifies the evidentiary weight of a party’s decision not to testify.

Facts

Patricia A. claimed that Philip De G. was the father of her child, born on January 9, 1978. She testified that she and Philip had sexual relations from April 1977 until March 1978, and that she had no relations with anyone else during that time. Patricia stated that the child was born prematurely and weighed 4 pounds 13 ounces. She also testified that Philip visited her after the delivery, brought her home, gave gifts for the baby, and referred to the child as “his baby.” To corroborate the premature birth, Patricia submitted the hospital record of her confinement at delivery.

Procedural History

The Family Court adjudicated Philip De G. as the father and ordered him to pay support. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence of paternity insufficient as a matter of law. Patricia A. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether uncertified hospital records, specifically diagnoses and observations by medical staff, are admissible as evidence to corroborate the mother’s testimony of premature birth in a paternity proceeding.
2. Whether an adverse inference can be drawn against a respondent in a paternity proceeding for failing to testify.

Holding

1. Yes, because diagnoses of doctors and entries of nurses recorded in hospital records are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein under CPLR 4518(c).
2. Yes, because in civil proceedings, including paternity suits, the trier of fact may draw the strongest inference against a party that the opposing evidence in the record permits if that party chooses not to testify.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the hospital records, containing the attending doctor’s diagnosis and the nurses’ entries, constituted prima facie evidence of the child’s premature birth. The court cited CPLR 4518(c) and prior case law, including Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283 (1955), to support the admissibility of such records as business records. Because the hospital record indicated that the child was born at 35 weeks gestation, this corroborated the mother’s testimony that the baby was premature and placed the conception in early May, during a period when she testified she had sexual relations exclusively with the respondent.

Regarding the respondent’s failure to testify, the court acknowledged the conflicting precedents among the Appellate Divisions but aligned itself with the majority view. The court emphasized that paternity proceedings are civil in nature and that, in civil cases, an adverse inference can be drawn when a party fails to testify. The court cited Marine Midland Bank v. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31 (1980), and noted that the respondent’s silence does not allow speculation or require an adverse inference. However, it does permit the trier of fact to draw the strongest inference against him that the opposing evidence in the record allows. The court explicitly stated that “[t]he failure of respondent to testify does not permit the trier of the fact to speculate about what his testimony might have been nor does it require an adverse inference. It does, however, allow the trier of fact to draw the strongest inference against him that the opposing evidence in the record permits”.

The court noted that the petitioner must still meet the “clear and convincing” evidence standard to establish paternity. However, because there was evidence in the record that could satisfy this standard, the Appellate Division’s order was reversed and the matter was remitted for factual determination consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion.