New York Law Review

Tag: paternity

  • Matter of Kenneth J. v. Allana L., 15 N.Y.3d 14 (2010): Equitable Estoppel in Paternity Cases

    Matter of Kenneth J. v. Allana L., 15 N.Y.3d 14 (2010)

    A biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense in paternity and child support proceedings to protect an existing parent-child relationship between the child and another father figure.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a biological father can use equitable estoppel to avoid paternity and child support obligations when another man has acted as the child’s father. The New York Court of Appeals held that under certain circumstances, specifically where another father figure is present in the child’s life, the biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense. This defense aims to protect the child’s best interests by preventing the disruption of a stable and recognized parent-child relationship. The court emphasized that equitable estoppel could prevent a mother from asserting paternity when it disrupts a beneficial relationship with another father figure.

    Facts

    Allana L. gave birth to A. in 1994 while living with Raymond S., who was listed as A.’s father on her birth certificate. Raymond had other children with Allana, both before and after A.’s birth. When A. was seven, she learned that Raymond might not be her biological father. Allana contacted Kenneth J. in Florida, who spoke briefly with A. Raymond then forbade Kenneth from contacting A. again. In 2006, when A. was 12, Allana filed a petition against Kenneth, seeking a filiation order and child support. Genetic testing indicated a 99.99% probability that Kenneth was A.’s biological father.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially heard the case with a Support Magistrate, who ordered genetic testing. After the tests confirmed Kenneth’s likely paternity, the case was transferred to a Family Court judge to address Kenneth’s equitable estoppel defense. The Family Court determined Kenneth was the father and entered an order of filiation. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating equitable estoppel was generally unavailable to avoid child support obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kenneth could raise an equitable estoppel claim and remanding the case for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a biological father can assert equitable estoppel as a defense in paternity and child support proceedings when another man has acted as the child’s father?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because equitable estoppel may be invoked by a purported biological father to prevent the child’s mother from asserting biological paternity when the mother has acquiesced in the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure, and it would be detrimental to the child’s interests to disrupt that relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., stating that equitable estoppel prevents a person from asserting a right after leading another to believe the right would not be asserted, resulting in prejudice. The paramount concern is the child’s best interests. The court distinguished the case from situations where a man misrepresented himself as the father to avoid support obligations. Here, Kenneth argued that it was not in A.’s best interest to disrupt her existing family with Raymond. The court held that Kenneth could raise an equitable estoppel claim to protect the existing parent-child relationship between A. and Raymond. The court stated, “The same best-interests considerations that justify estopping a biological father from asserting his paternity may justify preventing a mother from asserting it.” The court emphasized that equitable estoppel, whether used offensively or defensively, must serve the child’s best interests. The case was remanded to Family Court for a hearing to determine if applying equitable estoppel would be in A.’s best interests, with Raymond joined as a necessary party. The court also noted concerns regarding the Support Magistrate’s failure to advise Kenneth of his right to counsel before genetic testing and counsel’s failure to consult with Kenneth before a hearing.

  • Clara C. v. William L., 96 N.Y.2d 244 (2001): Enforceability of Child Support Agreements and Judicial Review

    96 N.Y.2d 244 (2001)

    A support agreement between a mother and a putative father of a nonmarital child is only binding if the court determines that adequate provision has been made for the child’s support, ensuring the child’s needs are met and not contracted away.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a father can use Family Court Act § 516 to prevent a mother from seeking more child support when their agreement was court-approved without considering the child’s needs. Clara C. sought additional support from William L. for their child, Thomas, years after a settlement agreement was approved. The Court of Appeals held that William could not bar Clara’s claim because the initial agreement lacked judicial review regarding the adequacy of support for Thomas. The court emphasized the statutory requirement for judicial determination of adequate provision for the child, protecting nonmarital children’s welfare. This decision underscores the importance of judicial oversight in child support agreements to ensure children’s needs are prioritized. The ruling reverses the lower court’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.

    Facts

    In 1983, Clara C. gave birth to Thomas L.C. In 1986, Clara initiated a paternity suit against William L., Thomas’s biological father. Blood tests showed a 99.9% probability of William’s paternity. The parties entered into a settlement agreement under Family Court Act § 516. William agreed to pay $275 monthly until Thomas turned 21 and maintain a life insurance policy. Clara agreed to drop the paternity suit and refrain from future support proceedings if William complied. The Family Court approved the agreement without determining if the support was adequate for Thomas’s needs.

    Procedural History

    Ten years later, Clara sought a paternity declaration and increased support for Thomas’s education. A Hearing Examiner dismissed the proceeding, citing the § 516 agreement. Family Court appointed a law guardian for Thomas and upheld the dismissal, finding any noncompliance immaterial and the agreement final. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. Clara appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a putative father can invoke Family Court Act § 516 to bar a mother from seeking additional child support when the initial support agreement was approved by the court without a determination of whether adequate provision had been made for the child’s needs.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court Act § 516 requires a court to determine that adequate provision has been made for the child’s support before a support agreement is binding, and in this case, the Family Court failed to make such a determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Family Court Act § 516 requires judicial review and a determination of adequacy for child support agreements to be binding. The statute’s language explicitly states that an agreement is binding “only when the court determines that adequate provision has been made.” The purpose of this requirement is to protect the welfare of nonmarital children, ensuring their needs are adequately met. The court stated that absent judicial review and approval, the agreement will not be enforced to preclude a later modification of support. In this case, the Family Court’s approval was perfunctory, with no consideration of the parties’ financial situation or Thomas’s needs. The court emphasized that Clara’s failure to object earlier does not validate an agreement that lacked the required judicial determination of adequacy. Because the agreement failed to comply with § 516, William could not bar Clara’s petition for increased support. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of § 516. A concurring opinion argued that § 516, as applied, violates equal protection because it treats nonmarital children differently from marital children regarding support rights, but the majority found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question given the statutory grounds for the decision.

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983): Credibility and Paternity Inferences

    59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983)

    In paternity proceedings, the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility is given great weight, and a respondent’s refusal to testify allows the strongest inferences against him, provided those inferences are supported by the opposing evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns a paternity dispute. The Commissioner of Social Services, on behalf of the petitioner, initiated proceedings to establish the respondent as the father of her child. Conflicting evidence existed regarding the date of conception. The petitioner had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981, but also admitted to intercourse with another man on October 9, 1981. She testified to a normal menstrual period between November 1-5, 1981. Medical testimony indicated the child was born prematurely, approximately four weeks early. The respondent did not testify. The Family Court found the respondent to be the father. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Family Court order. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing credibility and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s silence in the face of opposing evidence.

    Facts

    On July 9, 1982, the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock. The attending physician testified the child was born approximately four weeks prematurely, setting the expected birth date around August 4, 1982. Hospital records supported the premature birth. The petitioner testified she first had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981. She also admitted to having intercourse with another individual on October 9, 1981. She testified that her last normal menstrual period occurred between November 1 and November 5, 1981. The respondent chose not to testify at trial.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Social Services initiated the paternity proceeding in Family Court. The Family Court adjudicated the respondent as the father. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision. The Commissioner of Social Services appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court’s determination that the respondent was the father of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence, considering the conflicting dates of possible conception and the respondent’s refusal to testify.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial judge’s assessment of the petitioner’s credibility, along with the medical testimony regarding prematurity and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s refusal to testify, provided clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court’s finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the significant weight given to the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court noted the rule that a respondent’s refusal to testify in a paternity proceeding allows the strongest inferences against him, provided that the opposing evidence permits such inferences. The court cited Noce v. Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347 and Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Patricia A.] v. Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137 in support. The court reasoned that the combination of the petitioner’s testimony regarding her menstrual cycle, the medical testimony confirming the child’s premature birth, and the respondent’s silence, supported the Family Court’s conclusion. The court highlighted that the medical testimony placed the date of intercourse with the respondent within an accepted gestational period. Because the respondent did not testify to offer an alternative explanation or to contradict the petitioner’s testimony, the court found that the Family Court’s conclusion was supported by the evidence. The court implicitly applied a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to determine whether clear and convincing evidence existed, giving substantial deference to the lower court’s findings. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of a party’s decision to testify or remain silent, particularly when faced with adverse evidence. It also clarifies that while negative inferences are permissible, they must be grounded in and supported by the other evidence presented.

  • Jane PP v. Paul QQ, 64 N.Y.2d 15 (1984): Appealability of Filiation Orders in Support Proceedings

    Jane PP v. Paul QQ, 64 N.Y.2d 15 (1984)

    A filiation order is not separately appealable as of right when support is sought in the paternity proceeding, even if commenced via a separate petition.

    Summary

    This case addresses the appealability of filiation orders (establishing paternity) when support is also sought. The mother filed separate petitions for paternity and support. The Court of Appeals held that when a paternity proceeding seeks support, the filiation order is not appealable as of right, even if a separate support petition is filed concurrently. This prevents piecemeal appeals and conserves judicial resources, while still allowing for appeal by permission under Section 1112 of the Family Court Act.

    Facts

    The petitioner (mother) filed two separate petitions against the respondent: one to establish paternity and another for support. The paternity petition requested a declaration of paternity, a support order, and further relief. The support petition referenced the paternity petition. The Family Court declared the respondent to be the father and issued a temporary support order and awarded counsel fees, referencing both Section 536 and 438 of the Family Court Act. Subsequently, a permanent support order was entered.

    Procedural History

    The respondent appealed from the permanent support order. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the respondent was collaterally estopped from challenging the paternity determination because he didn’t appeal the initial filiation order. Two justices dissented, arguing the paternity issue should be reviewed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the paternity issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a filiation order, issued in a case where support is sought in the paternity proceeding (even if through a separate petition filed simultaneously), constitutes an appealable order as of right under Section 1112 of the Family Court Act.

    Holding

    No, because when support is sought in a paternity proceeding, the filiation order is not appealable as of right. Appeal by permission is available under section 1112 if cause for a separate appeal of the filiation order is shown.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that allowing separate appeals for filiation orders when support is also being sought would lead to piecemeal appeals and waste judicial resources. It emphasized that recent statutory changes allow mothers, putative fathers, and welfare officials to initiate support proceedings independently. The Court distinguished situations where the paternity proceeding *only* seeks a declaration of paternity. When support is also at issue, the focus shifts to the comprehensive resolution of the support obligation. The court also noted the reality of Family Court practice, where litigants often appear *pro se* and rely on court staff to complete forms, making it unfair to penalize litigants for filing separate petitions when only one might be necessary. The Court stated: “So to hold conserves judicial resources by making piecemeal appeals unnecessary and does not adversely affect any party to the filiation proceeding because under section 1112 of the Family Court Act, appeal by permission is available when cause for a separate appeal of the filiation order is shown.” They reversed, remitting for consideration of the paternity issue.
    A footnote acknowledges that while the respondent was represented by counsel who could have appealed the filiation order, existing precedent suggested that the filiation order was reviewable on appeal from the support order.

  • Jane PP v. Paul QQ, 64 N.Y.2d 806 (1985): Res Judicata and Paternity Suits

    Jane PP v. Paul QQ, 64 N.Y.2d 806 (1985)

    A dismissal of a paternity suit brought by a Department of Social Services does not bar a subsequent paternity suit brought by the mother and child themselves.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prior paternity proceeding initiated by the Department of Social Services (DSS) bars a later paternity suit brought by the mother and child. The New York Court of Appeals held that the dismissal of the DSS proceeding did not preclude the mother and child from bringing their own action. The court reasoned that traditionally, paternity suits were primarily for support, and determinations of paternity were incidental. Furthermore, the mother and child were not parties to the DSS proceeding, so they are not bound by its outcome. Recent changes in law now allow mothers, alleged fathers, and public welfare officials to commence separate proceedings. Even if support isn’t the primary issue, establishing paternity grants inheritance rights and other benefits, making a filiation order important.

    Facts

    Jane PP, an unwed mother, and her son initiated a Family Court proceeding against Paul QQ, the alleged father, seeking a declaration of paternity and support. Prior to this, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) had brought two separate support proceedings against Paul QQ. The first DSS proceeding was dismissed due to the mother’s failure to appear. The second DSS proceeding was dismissed because of the prior dismissal. Jane PP and her son then initiated their own proceeding, which the Family Court dismissed based on the prior DSS proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed Jane PP and her son’s paternity petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dismissal of prior support proceedings instituted by the Suffolk County Department of Social Services precludes a subsequent paternity proceeding instituted by the mother and child.

    Holding

    No, because the petitioners were not parties to the prior proceedings brought by the Department of Social Services, and the child is in no way bound by those proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the dismissal of the DSS proceeding did not preclude the mother and child from bringing their own action. The Court emphasized that traditionally, paternity proceedings were primarily focused on establishing the father’s obligation to provide support. A determination of paternity or order of filiation was incidental and not binding on the child. Citing Commissioner of Public Welfare v Koehler, 284 NY 260, 266-267, the court noted that the mother was not even a necessary party and was not bound by the result of the action when the paternity proceeding was brought by welfare officials. However, the court recognized that statutory developments and case law have eroded this dichotomy. Section 522 of the Family Court Act allows the mother, the putative father, or a public welfare official to commence a separate proceeding. The court stated, “Even if support is not at issue, the mother, the putative father and child all have an interest in a filiation order because it declares paternity (Family Ct Act, § 542) and establishes rights of inheritance (EPTL 4-1.2, subd [a], par [2]); the right to recover benefits under subdivision 11 of section 2 of the Workers’ Compensation Law and numerous Federal laws; and the right to notice of adoption proceedings (Domestic Relations Law, § 111-a, subd 2, par [a]).” The Court concluded that because neither the mother nor the child was a party to the prior DSS proceedings, they were not bound by its outcome. As the court stated, “Neither petitioner was a party to the prior proceedings brought by the Department of Social Services, and certainly the child is in no way bound by those proceedings.”

  • Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305 (1982): Appellate Review Limited by Affirmed Findings of Fact

    Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305 (1982)

    When the Appellate Division affirms findings of fact, those findings are generally beyond further review by the Court of Appeals if there is evidence in the record to support them.

    Summary

    This case concerns the limits of appellate review in New York. The Court of Appeals held that an affirmed finding of fact by the lower courts, if supported by evidence, is beyond the scope of its review. Specifically, the Court declined to review a finding that the respondent furnished support for a child, which tolled the statute of limitations in a paternity action, because the Appellate Division had affirmed this finding and there was evidence in the record to support it.

    Facts

    The underlying facts relate to a paternity action. The Family Court Act established a two-year limitation period for such actions. However, this period could be tolled if the respondent furnished support for the child. The Family Court found that the respondent had provided support, thus tolling the statute of limitations. This finding was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially made a finding regarding the respondent’s support of the child, thereby tolling the statute of limitations and allowing the paternity action to proceed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals can review a finding of fact (specifically, whether the respondent furnished support for the child, tolling the statute of limitations) when that finding has been affirmed by the Appellate Division and there is a basis for it in the record.

    Holding

    No, because the limitations issue is beyond the Court of Appeals’ review when there is an affirmed finding that respondent furnished support for the child and a basis in the record for that finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that appellate review is limited when lower courts have already made and affirmed factual findings. The Court cited Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 NY2d 305, 311-312, to support this proposition. The Court stated: “There is an affirmed finding that respondent furnished support for the child…There is also a basis in the record for that finding. The limitations issue is, therefore, beyond our review.” The Court emphasized that if the Appellate Division affirms a finding of fact, and some evidence supports that finding, the Court of Appeals will not re-examine it. The court also noted agreement with the Appellate Division that paternity was established by clear and convincing evidence, noting that respondent’s failure to testify allowed the court to draw “the strongest inference against [respondent] that the opposing evidence in the record permits”.

  • Patricia A. v. Philip De G., 49 N.Y.2d 162 (1980): Admissibility of Hospital Records and Inferences from Silence in Paternity Cases

    Patricia A. v. Philip De G., 49 N.Y.2d 162 (1980)

    In paternity proceedings, hospital records containing diagnoses and observations made by medical professionals are admissible as prima facie evidence, and the court may draw the strongest possible inference against a party who fails to testify when faced with opposing evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of hospital records and the implications of a defendant’s silence in paternity suits. The New York Court of Appeals held that uncertified hospital records, specifically doctors’ diagnoses and nurses’ entries, are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, provided they are records kept in the regular course of business. Furthermore, the court clarified that while a respondent in a paternity suit cannot be compelled to testify, their silence allows the court to draw the strongest inference against them that the opposing evidence permits. This case underscores the importance of medical records as corroborating evidence and clarifies the evidentiary weight of a party’s decision not to testify.

    Facts

    Patricia A. claimed that Philip De G. was the father of her child, born on January 9, 1978. She testified that she and Philip had sexual relations from April 1977 until March 1978, and that she had no relations with anyone else during that time. Patricia stated that the child was born prematurely and weighed 4 pounds 13 ounces. She also testified that Philip visited her after the delivery, brought her home, gave gifts for the baby, and referred to the child as “his baby.” To corroborate the premature birth, Patricia submitted the hospital record of her confinement at delivery.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court adjudicated Philip De G. as the father and ordered him to pay support. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence of paternity insufficient as a matter of law. Patricia A. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether uncertified hospital records, specifically diagnoses and observations by medical staff, are admissible as evidence to corroborate the mother’s testimony of premature birth in a paternity proceeding.
    2. Whether an adverse inference can be drawn against a respondent in a paternity proceeding for failing to testify.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because diagnoses of doctors and entries of nurses recorded in hospital records are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein under CPLR 4518(c).
    2. Yes, because in civil proceedings, including paternity suits, the trier of fact may draw the strongest inference against a party that the opposing evidence in the record permits if that party chooses not to testify.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the hospital records, containing the attending doctor’s diagnosis and the nurses’ entries, constituted prima facie evidence of the child’s premature birth. The court cited CPLR 4518(c) and prior case law, including Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283 (1955), to support the admissibility of such records as business records. Because the hospital record indicated that the child was born at 35 weeks gestation, this corroborated the mother’s testimony that the baby was premature and placed the conception in early May, during a period when she testified she had sexual relations exclusively with the respondent.

    Regarding the respondent’s failure to testify, the court acknowledged the conflicting precedents among the Appellate Divisions but aligned itself with the majority view. The court emphasized that paternity proceedings are civil in nature and that, in civil cases, an adverse inference can be drawn when a party fails to testify. The court cited Marine Midland Bank v. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31 (1980), and noted that the respondent’s silence does not allow speculation or require an adverse inference. However, it does permit the trier of fact to draw the strongest inference against him that the opposing evidence in the record allows. The court explicitly stated that “[t]he failure of respondent to testify does not permit the trier of the fact to speculate about what his testimony might have been nor does it require an adverse inference. It does, however, allow the trier of fact to draw the strongest inference against him that the opposing evidence in the record permits”.

    The court noted that the petitioner must still meet the “clear and convincing” evidence standard to establish paternity. However, because there was evidence in the record that could satisfy this standard, the Appellate Division’s order was reversed and the matter was remitted for factual determination consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

  • Doe v. Doe, 92 A.D.2d 496 (1983): Parental Deception and Child Support Obligations

    92 A.D.2d 496 (1983)

    A parent’s misrepresentation regarding contraception does not negate the other parent’s obligation to support their child; child support is determined by the child’s needs and the parents’ financial abilities, not parental fault.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a father can avoid or reduce child support obligations based on the mother’s alleged misrepresentation about using contraception. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mother’s alleged deceit is irrelevant to the father’s support obligation. The court emphasized that child support determinations must focus on the child’s needs and the parents’ financial capabilities, not on assigning fault for the child’s conception. The decision reinforces the primacy of the child’s welfare in paternity and support proceedings.

    Facts

    The Family Court established the respondent as the father of the petitioner’s child. The respondent then argued that the petitioner intentionally misrepresented that she was using contraception to induce him to have unprotected sex. The petitioner conceded that she wasn’t using contraception but denied any conversation about it took place.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially ruled in favor of the father, reducing his support obligation due to the mother’s alleged deceit. The Appellate Division reversed, striking the defense of fraud and deceit and increasing the child support award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mother’s alleged misrepresentation regarding her use of contraception can be asserted as a defense against the father’s child support obligation.

    Holding

    No, because the child’s welfare is the paramount concern, and support obligations are based on the child’s needs and the parents’ financial abilities, not on parental fault or alleged deceit during conception.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that paternity proceedings aim to ensure adequate provision for the child’s needs based on the parents’ means. Section 545 of the Family Court Act mandates consideration of the child’s needs and the parents’ financial ability. The Court explicitly stated that the statute does not permit consideration of parental “fault” or wrongful conduct related to conception. “The purpose of the paternity proceeding and the imposition of support obligations being the protection of the child, the Family Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, is simply not the proper forum for adjudicating disputes existing solely between the parents.”

    The Court also addressed the father’s argument that the mother’s misrepresentation violated his constitutional right to decide whether to father a child. While acknowledging the right to avoid procreation, the Court clarified that this right primarily protects against governmental interference, such as restrictions on access to contraception. This right does not extend to regulating the conduct of private actors or relieving a parent of support obligations because another person didn’t fully respect their desires regarding procreation. The court stated that the father’s “constitutional entitlement to avoid procreation does not encompass a right to avoid a child support obligation simply because another private person has not fully respected his desires in this regard.”

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Kenneth Lawrence, 47 N.Y.2d 426 (1979): Statute of Limitations in Paternity Cases After Acknowledgment

    Commissioner of Social Services v. Kenneth Lawrence, 47 N.Y.2d 426 (1979)

    When a putative father has acknowledged paternity either in writing or through furnishing support payments, there is no statutory time limit to bring a paternity proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the statute of limitations for paternity suits in New York when the putative father has acknowledged paternity through written acknowledgment or support payments. The Court of Appeals held that once paternity is acknowledged in such a manner, there is no statutory time limit for initiating a paternity proceeding. The court reasoned that the statute’s plain language makes an exception for acknowledged paternity, and public policy favors obligating parents to support their children. Concerns about stale claims are mitigated by the requirement of clear and convincing evidence of acknowledgment and modern blood typing defenses.

    Facts

    The petitioner commenced a paternity proceeding in July 1978, six and a half years after her child’s birth. Between February 1974 and October 1975, the respondent made 39 separate support payments.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the matter as untimely. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion, holding the proceeding was barred because it was not commenced within two years of the last support payment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for paternity proceedings begins anew with each acknowledgment of paternity (either written or through support) by the putative father, such that the proceeding must be brought within two years of the last acknowledgment; or whether the acknowledgment removes any statutory time limit for commencing a paternity proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because the statute explicitly excepts situations where paternity has been acknowledged from the general two-year limitations period, and there is no additional time limit imposed in cases of acknowledgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of Family Court Act § 517(a), which states that proceedings can be instituted after the child’s birth but no more than two years after unless paternity has been acknowledged. Unlike the exception for mothers under 18, no new time limit is stated when the extension is based on the father’s acts of acknowledgment.

    The court rejected the analogy to part payment of a debt, which restarts the statute of limitations in contract actions because it implies a new promise to pay. While acknowledging paternity revives the opportunity to prosecute a claim, the court found no legislative directive limiting the time for the revived proceeding. Moreover, the strong public policy obligating parents to support their children weighs against imposing a renewed statute of limitations. The court cited Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411 to reinforce the public policy argument.

    The court addressed concerns about stale claims by noting that the mother must present clear and convincing evidence of acknowledgment to avoid the statute of limitations. The putative father can controvert the basis for the payments. Additionally, advances in blood typing provide strong defenses. The court referenced Matter of Dorn “HH” v. Lawrence “II”, 31 N.Y.2d 154, 158, 4 regarding the evidentiary standard for proving acknowledgement.

    The court stated, “To avoid the Statute of Limitations, a mother must establish by clear and convincing evidence that paternity has been acknowledged”.