New York Law Review

Tag: partition action

  • Franza v. State, 43 N.Y.2d 102 (1977): State’s Waiver of Immunity in Real Property Actions

    Franza v. State, 43 N.Y.2d 102 (1977)

    The State waives its immunity from suit and may be joined as a defendant in actions brought under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) to determine claims to real property, including actions seeking to establish easements and related damages.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, distributees of a deceased joint owner, sued the State in Supreme Court (later transferred to Surrogate’s Court) seeking partition of property and determination of easement rights after a state appropriation allegedly landlocked a portion of the original property. They claimed the State failed to provide promised access. The Court of Appeals held that the State, through RPAPL § 1541 and § 904, waived its sovereign immunity regarding actions to determine adverse claims to real property and partition actions, allowing the suit to proceed in a forum other than the Court of Claims. However, causes of action seeking rescission or reformation of the compensation agreement required a specific waiver of immunity not demonstrated here.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, as distributees, brought an action in Surrogate’s Court regarding real property. A portion of the property was appropriated by the State in 1967. The plaintiffs contended that the appropriation created an easement of access over the taken parcel for the benefit of the remaining landlocked segment of the original property. The landowners allegedly entered into a compensation agreement with the State, with the understanding that the State would provide access to public highways for the landlocked segment. The State allegedly failed to provide the promised easement.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs filed suit in Supreme Court seeking partition, later amended to include claims against the State. The case was transferred to Surrogate’s Court. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims. The Surrogate denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the Surrogate’s order by dismissing the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State has waived its immunity from suit and may be joined as a defendant in an action brought under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law to determine adverse claims to real property, including the establishment of an easement and related damages, in a forum other than the Court of Claims.
    2. Whether the State has waived its immunity from suit in an action for partition of real property where the State owns a portion of the property subject to the partition action.
    3. Whether claims for rescission or reformation of a compensation agreement with the State, or for specific performance requiring the State to provide an easement, can be brought outside the Court of Claims absent a specific waiver of immunity.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because RPAPL § 1541 expressly authorizes the joinder of the State as a defendant in actions to determine adverse claims to real property, constituting a waiver of immunity.
    2. Yes, because RPAPL § 904 designates the State as a permissible defendant in an action for partition, thereby waiving immunity for such actions.
    3. No, because actions seeking rescission or reformation of agreements with the State, or specific performance compelling State action, require a specific waiver of immunity not demonstrated here, and thus must be brought in the Court of Claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that RPAPL § 1541 explicitly allows the State to be joined in actions to determine adverse claims to real property. This statutory provision acts as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity. The relief available under Article 15 includes declarations of validity of claims, cancellation or reformation of instruments, awards of possession, and damages. The court emphasized that whether the plaintiffs actually possessed an easement was the very issue to be resolved, and dismissing the claim prematurely would deny them the opportunity to prove their case. Citing RPAPL § 904, the court stated that the State is a permissible defendant in partition actions, resulting in a waiver of immunity regarding such actions. However, the court found no statutory basis for suing the state outside of the Court of Claims for actions seeking rescission/reformation of the compensation agreement or specific performance, noting, “For actions of such a nature no waiver of the State’s immunity permitting suit outside the Court of Claims has been demonstrated.”

  • Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N.Y. 348 (1882): Partition Action Allowed Despite Co-Tenant’s Adverse Possession

    Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N.Y. 348 (1882)

    A co-tenant can maintain a partition action even if another co-tenant is in adverse possession of the property, provided the plaintiff has a present right to possession; the court can resolve title disputes within the partition action itself.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a co-tenant can bring a partition action when another co-tenant is in adverse possession of the property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the action can be maintained. The court reasoned that Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorized the court to resolve all disputes involving the parties’ respective titles and rights of possession within the partition action. This effectively abrogated the prior rule requiring a tenant out of possession to regain possession via ejectment before seeking partition. The court emphasized the importance of avoiding circuity of action and resolving all issues in one proceeding. The decision clarifies that a present right to possession, rather than strict physical possession, is sufficient to maintain the action.

    Facts

    The appellants (defendants) owned an undivided three-fourths interest in the property. They claimed to have been in actual and exclusive possession of the entire property for over twenty years, asserting ownership and holding it adversely to the plaintiff and all others. The plaintiff claimed title to the remaining one-fourth interest. The trial court found that the appellants were in possession, holding adversely to the plaintiff, but that such adverse possession began less than nine years before the commencement of the action.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a partition action. The trial court found that the appellants’ adverse possession was not sufficient to establish title to the entire property, but held that the adverse possession, even if not long enough to ripen into title, did not bar the partition action. The General Term affirmed, holding that under Section 1543 of the Code, an adverse holding insufficient to presume a grant could not defeat the action. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adverse possession by a co-tenant for a period less than that required to bar a possessory action is a valid defense to an action for partition.

    Holding

    No, because Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to try and determine all disputes which may arise between the plaintiff and their co-tenants involving their respective titles and rights of possession to the property, thus allowing the partition action to proceed despite the adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the prior rule that a plaintiff whose title or right to possession was disputed or who had been ousted by a co-tenant could not maintain a partition action until regaining possession in an ejectment action. However, the court found that Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure changed this rule. The court reasoned that this section was intended to confer authority on the court to try and determine all disputes between the plaintiff and co-tenants regarding their titles and rights of possession. The court stated that “[t]heretofore nothing could be tried, if the bare fact of the common holding or tenancy was disputed.” The court emphasized the legislative intent to effect a “radical change” in the existing law, allowing for the resolution of all title issues within the partition action itself. The court also noted that Section 1544, which is new, provided the option of trial by jury, thus preserving constitutional guarantees. The court interpreted Section 1532, requiring tenants to “hold and be in possession,” to mean a present right to possession, not strict physical possession. The court held that this interpretation aligns with the overall purpose of the Code to avoid circuity of action and multiplicity of suits. The court quotes *Parker v. Kane* to illustrate how other states with combined law and equity courts handle such cases. The court mentions that the commissioners wanted to extend the principle embodied in section 1537 (dealing with heirs and devisees) to all cases through the provisions of section 1543.