New York Law Review

Tag: Parole Revocation Hearing

  • People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 65 N.Y.2d 145 (1985): Admissibility of Statements at Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 65 N.Y.2d 145 (1985)

    A statement obtained from a parolee in violation of their right to counsel may be admissible at a parole revocation hearing, even if it would be inadmissible in a criminal trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a statement obtained from a parolee after he requested counsel, but before counsel was present, was admissible at his parole revocation hearing. Maiello, on parole for robbery, was arrested and informed his parole officer of the arrest, admitting to parole violations despite his lawyer’s advice. The Court held that the statement was admissible at the revocation hearing, distinguishing between the rules of evidence in criminal trials and administrative proceedings like parole revocation hearings. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the hearing is to determine if the parolee violated the terms of parole, a determination distinct from guilt or innocence in a criminal trial.

    Facts

    Ralph Maiello was on parole after being convicted of robbery in the second degree.

    He was arrested for attempted burglary and possession of a weapon.

    Maiello’s Legal Aid counsel advised him to report the arrest to his parole officer and informed him that Legal Aid would represent him at any parole revocation hearing.

    When reporting the arrest, Maiello informed his parole officer that his counsel advised him not to give any details.

    The parole officer urged Maiello to speak, and he admitted to violating the conditions of his parole.

    This admission was introduced at Maiello’s final revocation hearing.

    Procedural History

    The statement was admitted at relator’s final revocation hearing which resulted in a finding that he had violated the terms of his parole and his being remanded for one year or in accordance with any new sentence imposed.

    The lower courts determined that Maiello’s statement was admissible at his final revocation hearing.

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement obtained from a parolee, potentially in violation of his right to counsel, is admissible at a final parole revocation hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because a parole revocation hearing is an administrative proceeding distinct from a criminal trial, and different evidentiary rules apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between criminal trials and parole revocation hearings. It stated that revocation hearings are administrative proceedings to determine if a parolee violated the terms of parole, not to determine guilt or innocence as in a criminal trial. The Court relied on People ex rel. Piccarillo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76.

    The Court acknowledged that a violation of a constitutional right might have different consequences depending on whether the evidence is used in criminal or non-criminal proceedings. They cited People v. Ronald W., 24 N.Y.2d 732, holding that statements given to a probation officer without Miranda warnings were admissible in a probation revocation proceeding.

    The Court distinguished People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 815, where statements made to a parole officer were deemed inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution. This distinction highlighted that the use of the statement was restricted to the revocation hearing and not a new criminal prosecution.

    The court explicitly limited its holding: “We are here not presented with the issue of the permissible uses, if any, of relator’s statements in other proceedings.”

  • Matter of Saladeen v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 883 (1979): Timely Parole Revocation Hearings

    Matter of Saladeen v. Smith, 46 N.Y.2d 883 (1979)

    A parole eligibility hearing does not substitute for a timely final parole revocation hearing, and failure to hold such a hearing requires dismissal of parole violation charges.

    Summary

    Saladeen commenced an Article 78 proceeding to vacate parole violation charges. Although the violations allegedly occurred in 1973, no final revocation hearing was held by 1977 when the proceeding began. An eligibility hearing on a new conviction occurred in 1977, over four years after the alleged parole violations. The Court of Appeals held that the parole eligibility hearing did not render the failure to hold a final revocation hearing academic, as the eligibility hearing’s nature and scope differed significantly from a revocation hearing, and the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing mandated the dismissal of the parole violation charges.

    Facts

    The petitioner, Saladeen, was accused of parole violations in 1973.

    As of 1977, no final parole revocation hearing had been conducted regarding the 1973 alleged violations.

    In 1977, a parole eligibility hearing was conducted concerning a new conviction, more than four years after the initial alleged parole violations.

    Procedural History

    Saladeen initiated an Article 78 proceeding to vacate the parole violation charges.

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parole eligibility hearing conducted on a new conviction can serve as a substitute for a final parole revocation hearing regarding earlier alleged parole violations.

    Holding

    No, because the parole eligibility hearing’s nature and scope are different, it cannot serve as a substitute for a final revocation hearing, and the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing requires dismissal of the parole violation charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the appeal was not moot because the parole violation charges could affect the petitioner’s maximum parole expiration date, even after release from prison. The court emphasized the distinct nature and scope of a parole eligibility hearing compared to a final revocation hearing. The Court stated, “Due to its different nature and scope, the eligibility hearing could not serve as a substitute for the final revocation hearing.” A timely final revocation hearing is crucial for addressing alleged parole violations. The Court relied on precedent, citing Matter of Piersma v Henderson, 44 NY2d 982 and People ex rel. Walsh v Vincent, 40 NY2d 1049, to support the holding that the failure to hold a timely revocation hearing necessitates the dismissal of the parole violation charges. The court also disapproved of any interpretation of People ex rel. Schmidt v La Vallee (39 NY2d 886) suggesting otherwise.

  • People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979): Exclusionary Rule Applies to Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979)

    The exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally seized evidence, applies to parole revocation hearings in New York, preventing the use of such evidence to revoke parole.

    Summary

    Piccarillo, a parolee, was arrested for possession of a controlled substance after a police search of his car revealed amphetamine pills. At his parole revocation hearing, the evidence from the search was admitted, and his parole was revoked. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case due to an illegal search. Piccarillo then sought habeas corpus, arguing the Board of Parole should not have considered the suppressed evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation hearings, reasoning that allowing illegally seized evidence would undermine the rule’s deterrent effect and violate a parolee’s constitutional rights.

    Facts

    Piccarillo was released on parole after serving sentences for attempted robbery. He was stopped by police for driving without operational taillights. A search of his car revealed a container of pills, leading to his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. At his parole revocation hearing, this evidence was admitted. Later, in the criminal case stemming from the same incident, a court determined the search was illegal and suppressed the evidence.

    Procedural History

    A preliminary parole revocation hearing found probable cause to revoke Piccarillo’s parole. At the final revocation hearing, his motion to suppress the evidence from the car search was denied, and his parole was revoked based on that evidence. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case. Piccarillo then initiated a habeas corpus proceeding, which was initially denied by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, restoring Piccarillo to parole. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the consideration of evidence at a parole revocation hearing when such evidence has been determined by a court to be the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    Yes, because the exclusionary rule applies to administrative proceedings in New York, and a parolee’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures remains intact, even while on parole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a parole revocation hearing is administrative, the consequences for the parolee are significant. The exclusionary rule applies to administrative as well as criminal proceedings in New York. The court emphasized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence: “To the extent that the State, or its agents, can bypass the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule by using the fruits of an illegal search in a ‘civil’ or ‘administrative’ proceeding, the incentive for enforcement and investigative personnel to exceed constitutional limitations on their activity remains and the effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent is diminished.” Allowing illegally seized evidence in parole revocation hearings would undermine this deterrent effect. The court further noted that parolees do not relinquish all constitutional rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. While a parolee’s status may be considered when determining whether a search is unreasonable, it does not justify an exception to the exclusionary rule. The court rejected the argument that the Parole Board’s need for all relevant information outweighs the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, stating that the rule is addressed to the “insidiousness of unreasonable searches and seizures.” The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings upholds the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and prevents the rule’s erosion.

  • People ex rel. আলোচনা করেছি v. Warden, 43 N.Y.2d 104 (1977): Defining ‘Institution’ for Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. আলোচনা করেছি v. Warden, 43 N.Y.2d 104 (1977)

    A local correctional facility is not considered an ‘institution’ within the parole jurisdiction of the State Board of Parole, meaning the Board isn’t required to hold a final parole revocation hearing until a prisoner is returned to a state correctional institution.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a local correctional facility falls under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Parole, requiring a final parole revocation hearing to be held there. The Court of Appeals held that it does not. আলোচনা করেছি pleaded guilty to narcotics possession while on parole. The final revocation hearing was delayed. The Appellate Division ordered his release, deeming the delay a violation. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Board wasn’t obligated to hold the hearing until আলোচনা করেছি was returned to a state facility. The dissent argued that releasing a confessed parole violator was an abuse of discretion, prioritizing community safety and statutory interpretation.

    Facts

    আলোচনা করেছি was on parole and arrested for a new crime.
    A preliminary parole violation hearing was held at a local correctional facility pursuant to a court order.
    আলোচনা করেছি pleaded guilty to narcotics possession while housed in the local facility.
    After serving a sentence for the new crime, আলোচনা করেছি was returned to a state correctional facility.
    A final parole revocation hearing was held three months after his return to the state facility, resulting in his re-incarceration.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially addressed the matter.
    The Appellate Division ordered আলোচনা করেছি’s release due to the delayed final parole revocation hearing.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the parole revocation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a local correctional facility is an ‘institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of correction’ as defined by Correction Law § 212, subd 7, thus requiring the State Board of Parole to conduct a final parole revocation hearing there.
    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by ordering the prisoner’s release as a remedy for the delayed hearing, given his guilty plea to a parole violation.

    Holding

    No, because the statute requires the prisoner to be returned to a state correctional facility or another place designated by the board’s rules and regulations before a final revocation hearing is mandated. Local facilities are not under the Parole Board’s jurisdiction.
    Yes, because releasing a prisoner who confessed to a parole violation punishes the community and disregards the conclusive proof of the violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Correction Law § 212, subd 7 requires the final parole revocation hearing to be held at a state correctional institution or a place designated by the Parole Board. Local detention facilities aren’t operated by the State Department of Correction and aren’t under the Parole Board’s jurisdiction.
    The court distinguished this case from Matter of Beattie v New York State Bd. of Parole, where the prisoner was in state custody, even if temporarily. Here, the city, not the state, had custody of আলোচনা করেছি while he was in the local facility.
    The court emphasized that requiring final hearings at local facilities would burden the Parole Board, requiring members to travel extensively. The dissent argued that the preliminary hearing at the local facility was court-ordered and doesn’t equate to the board having jurisdiction for final hearings.
    The dissent cited Moody v Daggett, arguing that a parolee’s liberty interest isn’t violated until they are detained specifically for parole violation. আলোচনা করেছি’s detention in the local facility was for separate criminal charges, not parole violation.
    The dissenting judge, Jasen, stated: “[T]he governing statute explicitly provides to the contrary… Rather, it appears to predicate its decision upon its own view as to what constitutes proper parole policy. I submit that these policy considerations are for the Legislature and not for the courts.”

  • People ex rel. আলোচনা v. Warden, 39 N.Y.2d 446 (1976): Parolee’s Right to Prompt Revocation Hearing

    People ex rel. আলোচনা v. Warden, 39 N.Y.2d 446 (1976)

    A parolee held on an unrelated criminal charge is entitled to a prompt final parole revocation hearing.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a parolee, detained on an unrelated criminal charge, has the right to a prompt final parole revocation hearing. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a right exists. The court reasoned that despite the lack of a fixed time for the final hearing, the Parole Board must conduct it within a reasonable time. The parolee has a right to counsel at the hearing to argue factors influencing the length of re-incarceration. The Court noted the parolee’s potential prejudice due to the parole detention preventing release even if bail were posted on the new charges.

    Facts

    The relator (parolee) was detained on an unrelated criminal charge while on parole. He sought a prompt final revocation hearing concerning his parole status. The Parole Board did not provide a prompt hearing.

    Procedural History

    The case originated as a habeas corpus proceeding. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parolee held on an unrelated criminal charge is entitled to a prompt final parole revocation hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Parole Board is required to hold such a hearing within a reasonable time, even if there is conclusive cause to believe a condition of parole has been breached.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while there is no fixed time limit for a final parole hearing, Correction Law § 212(7) requires the Parole Board to hold the hearing within a reasonable time. Citing Morrissey v. Brewer, the court emphasized the parolee’s right to a hearing, including the right to counsel, because of the factors influencing the parole decision, specifically the period to be served under the prior unexpired sentence (citing People ex rel. Donohoe v. Montanye). The court stated: “Despite conclusive cause to believe a condition of parole has been breached, the parolee is entitled to a final revocation hearing, with the right to counsel, because of the divers factors which may influence the parole decision in fixing the period, if any, to be served under the prior unexpired sentence”.

    The court dismissed the argument that the parolee should be compelled to waive his privilege against self-incrimination in the parole hearing, stating, “That is the parolee’s choice with the advice of counsel. If he wishes he may waive the hearing or seek its adjournment but where he demands a hearing, as here, he is entitled to it.”

    The Court also noted that the parolee established a basis for prejudice because posting bail on the new charge would have been futile while the parole detention remained. The court also stated that the Parole Board regulation barring the right to counsel in final revocation hearings, where the parolee has been convicted of a crime while on parole, violates the State Constitution, citing People ex rel. Donohoe v. Montanye.