New York Law Review

Tag: Parole Revocation

  • People ex rel. Lopez v. Division of Parole, 19 N.Y.3d 202 (2012): Due Process and Parole Revocation for Mentally Incompetent Parolees

    19 N.Y.3d 202 (2012)

    A parole revocation hearing cannot proceed against a parolee who has been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent because it violates due process.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that it is a violation of due process to conduct a parole revocation hearing for a parolee who has been found mentally incompetent. Edwin Lopez, a parolee, was found unfit to stand trial on assault charges due to dementia. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) initiated parole revocation proceedings based on the same incident. The court found that proceeding with the revocation hearing violated Lopez’s due process rights because his mental incapacity prevented him from understanding the proceedings or assisting in his defense. The court overruled prior precedent, emphasizing the importance of fairness and accuracy in parole revocation hearings and highlighted the practical implications of its ruling, including the need for legislative action to address the treatment of mentally incompetent parolees.

    Facts

    Lopez, convicted of murder, was released on lifetime parole in 1999. In 2003, he was charged with assault and found unfit to stand trial, being committed to the custody of the Office of Mental Health (OMH). The assault charges were dismissed. In 2008, Lopez, while still in OMH custody, attacked a fellow patient and was again charged with assault and harassment. He was deemed unfit to stand trial due to dementia and the charges were dismissed. DOCCS initiated parole revocation proceedings based on the 2008 incident, charging him with violating parole. Despite counsel’s request for an adjournment to assess Lopez’s mental condition, the hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of a parole violation. The Division of Parole adopted the recommendation of parole revocation and Lopez was incarcerated.

    Procedural History

    Lopez commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking to annul the parole revocation and obtain release. The Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, citing precedent that a finding of mental incompetence did not bar parole revocation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that due process precluded the revocation hearing because of Lopez’s mental incompetence. The Division of Parole appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether conducting a parole revocation hearing against a parolee who has been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent violates the parolee’s right to due process.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a parole revocation hearing cannot proceed against a parolee who has been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent because it violates due process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the requirements of due process, as established in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, apply to parole revocation hearings. The court balanced the state’s interest in efficiently managing parole with the parolee’s right to defend himself. It emphasized that truth and fairness must not be sacrificed for administrative convenience. The court recognized that an incompetent parolee cannot understand the proceedings or assist in their defense, thereby undermining the accuracy of the fact-finding process and the ability to exercise crucial rights such as the right to testify and confront witnesses. The court distinguished parole revocation proceedings from criminal trials, but noted that the concerns regarding fundamental fairness and the accuracy of the proceedings were substantially similar. The court specifically overruled prior precedent, such as People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, which held that incompetency was a mitigating factor but not a bar to the proceeding. The court pointed out practical problems with the ruling and suggested that the legislature should take action to address the situation. The court emphasized the importance of a parolee’s ability to participate in his own defense for a fair proceeding.

    Practical Implications

    This case significantly impacts how parole revocation hearings are conducted in New York for individuals with mental incompetence. It mandates that such hearings be suspended or dismissed when a parolee’s mental capacity is at issue, as determined by prior judicial findings of incompetence. This decision forces the state to re-evaluate whether to proceed with revocation hearings when a parolee’s mental health is compromised. Attorneys must now raise the issue of mental incompetence as a preliminary matter in any parole revocation proceedings if the client has a history of mental illness or has been found incompetent in a related criminal proceeding. It highlights a gap in the system, as mentally incompetent parolees may not be easily committed for treatment. The court’s decision also prompts legislative consideration to address the gap in the law regarding the treatment and management of mentally incompetent parolees who violate parole. Future cases will likely focus on establishing clear standards for determining mental incompetence in the context of parole revocation proceedings, absent a prior judicial determination, and the specific procedures for addressing such cases.

  • People ex rel. Grimmick v. New York State Div. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 306 (1988): Parole Revocation Hearings and Out-of-State Felony Convictions

    People ex rel. Grimmick v. New York State Div. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 306 (1988)

    A New York parolee convicted of a felony in another state and sentenced to a determinate term is entitled to a final parole revocation hearing in New York, as the statutory exemption from such a hearing applies only when the parolee receives a new indeterminate sentence in New York.

    Summary

    Grimmick, a New York parolee under supervision in California, was convicted of rape in California and sentenced to a three-year term. New York revoked his parole without a final hearing, relying on a statute that allows revocation without a hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term. The New York Court of Appeals held that this exemption applies only to new indeterminate sentences imposed in New York. Because Grimmick’s California sentence was determinate, he was entitled to a final revocation hearing in New York.

    Facts

    Grimmick was paroled in New York in 1982, with a remaining indeterminate sentence of 5 to 15 years for a 1969 burglary conviction. He moved to California in 1983 and was supervised by California parole authorities under the Interstate Parole Compact. In 1985, he was convicted of forcible rape in California and sentenced to a three-year prison term. After receiving credit for good conduct and time in custody, he was released to California parole supervision in April 1987. A preliminary parole revocation hearing was held concerning his New York parole status. He was then returned to New York, and the New York State Parole Board revoked his parole without a final revocation hearing based on the California felony conviction and sentence.

    Procedural History

    Grimmick filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was wrongly denied a final parole revocation hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ, holding that Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii) authorized revocation without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii), which dispenses with the final parole revocation hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term, applies to a parolee convicted of a felony and sentenced to a determinate term in another state.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s plain language and legislative intent limit the exemption to parolees sentenced to a new indeterminate term in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the statute plainly requires an “indeterminate” sentence for the exemption from the final revocation hearing to apply. Grimmick’s California sentence was a determinate three-year term, not an indeterminate sentence as defined under New York law. The court stated, “When its language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of its words.”

    The court rejected the Division of Parole’s argument that the California sentence should be treated as if it were a New York indeterminate sentence, noting that such an interpretation is not supported by the statute’s language, purpose, or legislative history. The purpose of the exemption is to avoid redundant hearings when a parolee’s violation has already been established by a New York felony conviction and indeterminate sentence, which automatically fixes the parolee’s reappearance before the Board. The court reasoned that, unlike a new New York indeterminate sentence, the California determinate sentence does not automatically fix the parolee’s reappearance date before the board, making a final revocation hearing necessary to determine that date.

    The court also pointed out that the Division of Parole had itself recognized this statutory gap and proposed legislation to extend the exemption to out-of-state felony convictions. The court concluded, “A significant change of the kind urged by respondents, expanding such an exemption from the usual statutorily mandated hearing requirement, should come from the Legislature.” Because Grimmick was denied a timely final revocation hearing, the court ordered him restored to parole status, as ordering a hearing at this stage would render the timeliness requirement meaningless.

  • Matter of Ganci v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 942 (1988): Calculation of Aggregated Sentences After Parole Revocation Set Aside

    Matter of Ganci v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 942 (1988)

    When a parole revocation is set aside due to procedural defects, the inmate’s maximum potential time under custody should not be increased by the sentence time owed on the prior sentence, and the aggregated sentence should be calculated to avoid additional incarceration for the unrevoked parole sentence.

    Summary

    Ganci, paroled from a 1980 sentence, was arrested in 1984 for burglary and sentenced to a 3-to-6-year term. His parole was initially revoked, but the revocation was later set aside due to improper notice. The New York State Board of Parole then recalculated Ganci’s aggregated sentence, leading to an increase in his potential time in custody. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the parole revocation was set aside, Ganci’s maximum time under custody should not be increased by the time owed on his 1980 sentence. The court directed the Board to recompute the aggregated sentence, ensuring Ganci would not be subjected to additional incarceration for the unrevoked parole sentence, crediting him with jail time.

    Facts

    In 1980, Ganci received consecutive sentences. He was paroled in 1984. Later in 1984, Ganci was arrested for burglary. He was convicted and received a 3-to-6-year sentence. His parole from the 1980 sentence was revoked due to the burglary charges. A stipulation later set aside the revocation because of improper notice. The Board of Parole recalculated Ganci’s term of imprisonment, aggregating his 1980 and 1984 sentences.

    Procedural History

    Ganci commenced a proceeding arguing his sentences should not be aggregated and he was entitled to jail time credit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Ganci was entitled to jail time credit but agreed that the sentences had to be aggregated. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the sentences had to be aggregated but disagreed as to the method used.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Parole properly calculated Ganci’s aggregated sentence, considering his parole revocation from a prior sentence was set aside due to procedural defects.

    Holding

    No, because Ganci’s parole from the 1980 sentence was not properly revoked, his maximum potential time under custody should not be increased by the sentence time owed on the 1980 sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the second method used by the Board in calculating the aggregated sentence was erroneous because it increased Ganci’s maximum potential time under custody by the sentence time owed on his 1980 sentence, despite the parole revocation being set aside. The court emphasized that the initial time calculation, which did not subject Ganci to additional incarceration for his unrevoked parole sentence, was proper. The court cited Matter of Concepcion v New York State Bd. of Parole, 71 AD2d 819 and similar cases. The court stated, “Petitioner is thus to serve his 1984 sentence and then serve his parole supervision time owed on his 1980 sentence.” The court’s decision gives effect to the stipulation setting aside the parole revocation and credits Ganci with the jail time he was entitled to. The Court found that the initial calculation satisfied the aggregation requirements of Penal Law § 70.30 (1)(b) while still giving effect to the stipulation setting aside his parole revocation.

  • People ex rel. Brown v. NYS Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987): Parole Revocation Hearings and Statutory Time Limits

    People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987)

    A parolee’s court appearance does not automatically excuse the Division of Parole’s failure to hold a timely revocation hearing unless the parolee deliberately manipulates the system; the Division must still demonstrate reasonable diligence within the statutory 90-day period.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the Division of Parole’s failure to hold final revocation hearings within 90 days of a probable cause determination can be excused when a parolee or their attorney is unavailable. In Brown, the parolee had a conflicting court appearance, while in Citro, the parolee’s attorney failed to appear. The court held that in Brown, the Division failed to meet its burden of showing that the parolee was not subject to its practical control, thus the delay was not excused. In Citro, the court found a portion of the delay was attributable to the parolee’s counsel’s failure to properly request an adjournment, but the remaining delay was the Division’s fault for failing to schedule the hearing on the next available date.

    Facts

    Brown: Robert Brown was paroled in April 1985, arrested in November 1985 for new crimes, and a parole violation warrant was issued. A final hearing was scheduled for February 4, 1986, then rescheduled to February 13 at the Division’s request. After another adjournment, Brown informed the Administrative Law Judge of a conflicting court appearance on February 25. The hearing was scheduled for February 24, but Brown was taken to his arraignment instead, without prior notice. The hearing was held on March 17, 1986, 108 days after the probable cause determination.

    Citro: Albert Citro was paroled in May 1983 and later charged with a parole violation. A final hearing was scheduled for August 13, 1985, but Citro was transferred facilities, leading to a rescheduled hearing on September 25, 1985 (86 days after the probable cause determination). Citro’s counsel didn’t appear on September 25, and the hearing was adjourned to October 9, 1985. Counsel claimed she notified the parole officer of the conflict but didn’t file a formal adjournment request.

    Procedural History

    Brown: The Supreme Court dismissed Brown’s habeas corpus petition challenging the timeliness of the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Citro: The Special Term granted Citro’s habeas corpus petition and restored him to parole. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, finding part of the delay chargeable to the parolee and part to the Division. The Court of Appeals granted the respondent leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Brown: Whether the Division of Parole should be excused for failing to afford the parolee a revocation hearing within the 90-day period because he was not subject to its “convenience and practical control” due to a conflicting court appearance.

    2. In Citro: Whether the adjournment of the revocation hearing from September 25, 1985, to October 9, 1985, should be chargeable to the Division of Parole, rendering the October 9, 1985, hearing untimely.

    Holding

    1. In Brown: No, because the parolee was within a facility amenable to the Division’s jurisdiction, and the Division failed to prove that the parolee’s nonappearance was attributable to any of the statutory exceptions or that the parolee was otherwise not subject to the practical control of the Division during the 90-day period.

    2. In Citro: Yes, in part. The delay from September 25 to October 2 was chargeable to the parolee, but the delay from October 2 to October 9 was chargeable to the Division, because the Division bypassed an earlier available hearing date without justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Brown: The court reasoned that a parolee is subject to the Division’s control when in the custody of a correctional facility over which the Parole Board has jurisdiction. The Division had the responsibility to coordinate the hearing within the 90-day period. While parolees cannot abuse the system, Brown’s court appearance was not a deliberate manipulation. The court stated, “Executive Law § 259-i (3) (f) (i) reflects a legislative judgment that 90 days is sufficient time to overcome unexpected contingencies, such as court appearances, so long as the parolee is subject during that time to the Division’s practical control. The Division is not entitled to an extension based simply on a showing of its lack of fault.”

    Citro: The court held that the initial delay was due to counsel’s failure to comply with regulations for requesting an adjournment. However, the Division could not bypass an earlier available hearing date (October 2) without justification. Since the notice of the rescheduled hearing wasn’t mailed until October 2, counsel had no opportunity to obtain a shorter adjournment. The court stated that the Division cannot bypass an earlier available date at which a parolee’s counsel is willing and ready to proceed without establishing any justification for doing so.

  • People ex rel. Robertson v. New York State Division of Parole, 67 N.Y.2d 197 (1986): Habeas Corpus Requires Court Determination of Parole Violation Issues

    67 N.Y.2d 197 (1986)

    In a habeas corpus proceeding challenging parole revocation, issues of fact impacting the legality of detention must be determined by the court issuing the writ, not the Parole Board.

    Summary

    Robertson, a parolee, sought habeas corpus relief, alleging his detention for parole violation was illegal. The Supreme Court initially scheduled a hearing but later transferred the matter to the Parole Board for determination. Robertson appealed, arguing the transfer was improper. The New York Court of Appeals held that factual issues in habeas corpus proceedings must be resolved by the court, not delegated to the Parole Board. Transferring the matter to the Parole Board was an appealable final order, and the case was remitted for a court hearing on the factual disputes.

    Facts

    Robertson was paroled in 1977 after serving time for manslaughter. In 1981, he was arrested on felony charges and indicted for weapons possession, leading to a parole violation warrant. He waived his right to a preliminary parole hearing. He was later acquitted of the weapons charges but remained incarcerated. He filed a civil suit against the city and arresting officers. Robertson then filed a habeas corpus petition arguing the warrant was issued in bad faith as retaliation for his civil suit, his waiver of the preliminary hearing was involuntary and that his final revocation hearing was untimely.

    Procedural History

    Robertson filed a habeas corpus petition in Supreme Court, Queens County. After initially setting the matter for a hearing, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Parole Board based on an Appellate Division decision. Robertson’s request for subpoenas duces tecum was denied, subject to renewal before the Parole Board. The Appellate Division dismissed Robertson’s appeals from both orders as non-appealable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging parole revocation, the court can transfer the determination of factual issues regarding the legality of detention to the Parole Board, or whether the court itself must resolve those issues.

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 7009(c) directs the court to hear the evidence and proceed in a summary manner, and CPLR 410 requires that triable issues of fact be tried by the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the summary nature of habeas corpus proceedings, designed to swiftly address unlawful detention. The court cited CPLR 7009(c), stating that the court must “hear the evidence produced in support of and against detention and to dispose of the proceeding as justice requires.” The Court further reasoned that designating habeas corpus as a special proceeding invokes CPLR 410, mandating that “if triable issues of fact are raised they shall be tried forthwith and the court shall make a final determination thereon”. The court criticized delegating fact-finding to the Parole Board as contrary to statutory directives and established practice. The Court highlighted that such delegation improperly changes the standard of judicial review from weight of the evidence to whether substantial evidence existed before the Parole Board. The Court stated, “The delegation to the Parole Board of the fact-finding function on which turns release on habeas corpus or dismissal and further detention was, thus, improper for at least three reasons. First, it was contrary to the statutory directions that ‘[t]he court * * * hear the evidence’ and ‘proceed in a summary manner’ (CPLR 7009 [c] [emphasis supplied]). Second, it injects a procedure neither contemplated by the statute, which calls for either judgment of discharge (CPLR 7010 [a]) or remand of the person detained (CPLR 7010 [c]), nor recognized by prior precedent. Third, and most importantly, it changes the process from one in which the factual determination is made by a Trial Judge, reviewable as to the weight of the evidence by the Appellate Division and, when that body disagrees with the trial court, by this court as well, to one in which the only questions to be decided by any of the courts are whether there was substantial evidence before the Parole Board to support its determination and whether required procedural rules were followed”. The court clarified that an evidentiary hearing is not automatically required; it is unnecessary if no triable issues of fact exist, but that the determination must be made by the Supreme Court, not the Parole Board.

  • People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 62 N.Y.2d 317 (1984): Parole Revocation & Right to Confront Witnesses

    People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 62 N.Y.2d 317 (1984)

    At a parole revocation hearing, a parolee has a right to confront adverse witnesses, but this right is not absolute and may be dispensed with upon a specific finding of good cause by the hearing examiner, based on a careful balancing of the parolee’s rights, the nature of the evidence, the utility of cross-examination, and the State’s burden in producing the witness.

    Summary

    McGee’s parole was revoked based on a parole officer’s report stating that McGee failed to report as required. The parole officer who prepared the report had left the Division of Parole, and the report was admitted as a business record without allowing McGee to cross-examine the author. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the report was admissible as a business record, the failure to allow McGee to confront the former parole officer without a specific finding of good cause violated McGee’s due process rights. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the right to confrontation with the practical burdens on the state.

    Facts

    McGee was on parole and required to report to his parole officer every two weeks. He allegedly failed to report on July 9, 1980, and all subsequent dates until December 3, 1980. A parole violation report was prepared by McGee’s parole officer. Prior to the parole revocation hearing, the parole officer who prepared the report left the Division of Parole. At the hearing, the report was introduced as evidence of the violation, with the current parole officer laying the foundation. McGee was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author of the report.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding the parole violation report was improperly admitted and that McGee’s due process rights were violated. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the report was inadmissible as a business record. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the parole violation report was properly admitted as a business record under CPLR 4518.
    2. Whether McGee’s due process rights were violated when the parole violation report was admitted without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the report’s author.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was a continuing violation of the terms of parole up to the time that the report was prepared, providing substantial evidence that the report was made within a reasonable time of the violation.
    2. Yes, because the hearing officer did not make a specific finding of good cause to dispense with the need to produce the witness whose statements comprised the only evidence offered by the State, violating McGee’s due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the parole violation report was admissible as a business record since the violation was ongoing up to the report’s creation. However, it affirmed the granting of habeas corpus relief on due process grounds, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which establishes the minimum due process requirements for parole revocation hearings, including the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless good cause is specifically found for not allowing confrontation. The court emphasized that “in almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” While acknowledging that parole revocation hearings are not equivalent to criminal trials, the court stressed the importance of the confrontation right in enhancing the fact-finding process. The hearing officer must carefully weigh the preference for confrontation, whether confrontation would aid the fact-finding process, and the burden on the State in producing the witness. The court noted that the State’s only reason for not producing the parole officer was that he was no longer employed by the Division of Parole, which, without further consideration, did not constitute good cause. Because the hearing officer failed to make a specific finding of good cause to dispense with the production of the witness, a due process violation was presumed.

  • People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984): Effect of Parolee’s Waiver on Hearing Obligations

    People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984)

    When a parolee knowingly and intelligently waives their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and the right to be present at the final hearing, the parole board is required to proceed with the final hearing in the parolee’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Summary

    Benedetti, while on parole in New York, absconded to Mississippi and was imprisoned there. A parole violation warrant was lodged against him. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence. The parole board tried to secure his return from Mississippi, but failed. After Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York, Special Term annulled the parole violation warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Benedetti waived his rights, the parole board should have proceeded with the hearing in his absence within the statutory time frame. Failure to do so required dismissal of the warrant, regardless of whether Benedetti was within the board’s convenience and practical control.

    Facts

    Benedetti was on parole in New York State.
    He absconded to Mississippi, where he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
    On January 15, 1982, a parole violation warrant was lodged against Benedetti by the respondent.
    By letter dated February 1, 1982, Benedetti waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and his right to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence.
    The parole board corresponded with Mississippi officials for four months to try to secure Benedetti’s return for a hearing.
    Mississippi officials required an executive agreement between the Governors of New York and Mississippi, with New York paying for Benedetti’s transport and return to Mississippi.
    No further action was taken until May 1983, when Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    Benedetti applied on June 2, 1982, to have the parole violation warrant annulled and vacated.
    Special Term granted the application.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim, holding that the respondent had not shown that Benedetti was not within its convenience and practical control.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the parole board was required to proceed with a final parole revocation hearing in the absence of the parolee after the parolee knowingly and intelligently waived their right to be present at the hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because Benedetti waived his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, and there was nothing to indicate that the waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the parole board was required to proceed with the hearing in Benedetti’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Benedetti’s waiver of his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing was effective because there was no indication that it was not made knowingly and intelligently. Therefore, the parole board was obligated to proceed with the final hearing in Benedetti’s absence.
    The court emphasized that the parole board’s failure to conduct the hearing within the time period prescribed by Executive Law § 259-i required the parole violation warrant to be dismissed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim. The court stated, “Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record to indicate that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the waiver was effective and there was nothing to prevent respondent from proceeding in petitioner’s absence. Indeed, it was required to proceed.”
    The court reasoned that because the hearing could have and should have been held in Benedetti’s absence, it was unnecessary to determine whether and when Benedetti came within the respondent’s convenience and practical control.

  • Matter of Biondo v. New York State Board of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 832 (1983): Statute of Limitations Tolled Until Notice of Determination

    Matter of Biondo v. New York State Board of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 832 (1983)

    The statute of limitations for challenging an administrative determination does not begin to run until the petitioner receives notice of the determination, as the petitioner is not “aggrieved” until they are aware of it.

    Summary

    Biondo, a parolee, sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision to dismiss his appeal as moot after his sentence expired while the appeal was pending. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations for challenging the board’s determination did not begin to run until Biondo received notice of the determination. The court reasoned that a petitioner cannot be considered “aggrieved” by a determination until they are aware of it. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a hearing to determine when Biondo was informed of the appeal board’s decision, and clarified that because Biondo was found to have been a parole violator, which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence, the proceeding was not moot.

    Facts

    Biondo was a parolee whose sentence expired while his appeal to the New York State Board of Parole was pending. The Board of Parole dismissed Biondo’s appeal as moot, presumably because his sentence had expired.

    Procedural History

    Biondo sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision via an Article 78 proceeding. The lower courts concluded that the four-month statute of limitations began to run immediately upon the issuance of the Parole Board’s determination, and thus dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Biondo received notice of the Board’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the four-month statute of limitations for challenging an administrative determination begins to run upon the issuance of the determination, or upon the petitioner’s receipt of notice of the determination.

    2. Whether the proceeding was rendered moot after the sentence expired while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board.

    Holding

    1. No, because the petitioner is not “aggrieved” by the determination until they receive notice of it.

    2. No, because the petitioner was found to have been a parole violator, which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the four-month statute of limitations does not begin to run until the petitioner receives notice of the appeal board’s determination. The court stated, “the running of the statutory period began to run immediately upon the issuance of the determination, overlooks the additional requirement that the petitioner be ‘aggrieved’ by the determination.” The court referenced Matter of Martin v. Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 381, and further explained, “We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final.” The court found a similar principle should apply when the petitioner has received no notice. The Court emphasized fairness, stating, “fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware.” The Court held that the sentence expiring while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board did not render the proceeding moot, since “petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.”

  • People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 56 N.Y.2d 95 (1982): Adjournment of Parole Revocation Hearings and Due Process

    People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 56 N.Y.2d 95 (1982)

    A parole revocation hearing adjournment is not required unless the parolee demonstrates that a pending criminal case implicates their constitutional rights or raises an issue that, if resolved in their favor in the criminal proceeding, would necessarily preclude a finding of parole violation.

    Summary

    Maiello, a parolee arrested on new criminal charges, sought an adjournment of his parole revocation hearing pending the outcome of the criminal case, arguing collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that the hearing officer did not abuse discretion in denying the adjournment. The Court clarified that an adjournment is only required when the parolee shows that the criminal case involves issues (like affirmative defenses or suppression motions) that, if resolved in their favor, would preclude a parole violation finding. Maiello failed to raise such issues, relying solely on a general collateral estoppel argument. The court emphasized the parolee’s responsibility to alert the hearing officer to potential conflicts between the proceedings.

    Facts

    Maiello was paroled in July 1980 after serving part of a robbery sentence. In September 1980, he was arrested and charged with assault, resisting arrest, and marijuana possession. A parole violation warrant was issued based on these charges and for leaving New Jersey without permission. At the parole revocation hearing, Maiello’s counsel requested an adjournment pending the outcome of the criminal charges, arguing that an acquittal would collaterally estop the parole board from proceeding. The hearing officer denied the request, and ultimately found Maiello guilty of violating parole based on the assault and resisting arrest charges. Subsequently, the criminal charges were dismissed.

    Procedural History

    After the parole revocation, Maiello filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Maiello was not denied due process. Maiello then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of Maiello’s request to adjourn his final parole revocation hearing until the disposition of pending criminal charges was an abuse of discretion or a violation of his right to due process.

    Holding

    No, because Maiello failed to demonstrate that the pending criminal case implicated his constitutional rights or raised an issue that, if resolved in his favor, would preclude a finding of parole violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the decision to grant an adjournment is within the hearing officer’s discretion. The court clarified its prior holding in People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, stating that collateral estoppel only applies when a defendant successfully raises an affirmative defense in the criminal trial. In such a case, the defendant has already proven by a preponderance of the evidence an issue that would preclude a finding of parole violation. The Court reasoned that a general acquittal, where the defendant does not bear a burden of proof, only means the prosecution failed to meet the higher burden of proof required in a criminal trial. The court noted, “[i]f, however, the defendant raises an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant either at trial or at the hearing to establish that affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”

    The Court extended this principle to other situations where a defendant affirmatively raises an issue, such as a suppression motion. If a parolee seeks to suppress evidence that is the subject of a motion before a criminal court, an adjournment may be proper. “The underlying rationale is, of course, to insure that the parolee’s constitutional rights are protected… the revocation of parole has the effect of depriving a person of his liberty, albeit a restricted form of liberty, he has a substantial enough interest to justify some form of due process although not the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

    Here, Maiello only argued that a dismissal or acquittal would automatically estop the parole board. He did not raise any other constitutional claims or indicate that the criminal case would resolve any issue that would necessarily preclude a finding of parole violation. Thus, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in denying the adjournment. The court emphasized that the parolee has the obligation to alert the hearing officer to potential conflicts between the parole revocation hearing and the criminal proceeding.

  • People ex rel. Wilson v. Dalsheim, 61 N.Y.2d 690 (1984): Parole Revocation Hearings and Interstate Detainers

    61 N.Y.2d 690 (1984)

    When a parolee is incarcerated in another state, the burden rests on New York parole authorities to demonstrate that they were unable to conduct timely parole revocation hearings because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, regardless of whether the Interstate Compact for parole supervision was formally invoked.

    Summary

    Wilson, a New York parolee, was incarcerated in Connecticut for a robbery conviction. New York issued a parole violation warrant but delayed the revocation hearing until after Wilson completed his Connecticut sentence. Wilson argued he was denied a timely hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the parole authorities had the burden to prove Wilson was not under their practical control, irrespective of formal Interstate Compact supervision. The case was remitted to determine if Wilson was subject to New York’s control while in Connecticut custody.

    Facts

    In 1976, Wilson was sentenced in New York for criminal sale of a controlled substance and paroled in 1977.
    In 1979, he was arrested and convicted of robbery in Connecticut, receiving a prison sentence.
    New York issued a parole violation warrant in July 1979 and sent it to Connecticut authorities.
    The New York parole board declared Wilson delinquent in October 1979, requesting his return upon release from Connecticut custody.
    No parole revocation hearings were held until after Wilson’s Connecticut parole in March 1982.

    Procedural History

    Wilson commenced an Article 78 proceeding in September 1981, arguing denial of a timely parole revocation hearing.
    Special Term dismissed the petition, finding Wilson not subject to New York parole authorities’ control because Connecticut had not accepted him for parole supervision under the Interstate Compact.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, distinguishing People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, 52 N.Y.2d 9 (1980).
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York parole authorities have a duty to provide a timely parole revocation hearing to a parolee incarcerated in another state, even if that state has not formally accepted supervision of the parolee under the Interstate Compact.
    Whether the burden rests on the parole authorities to demonstrate that a timely hearing was not possible because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control.

    Holding

    Yes, because the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, irrespective of formal acceptance under the Interstate Compact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on its prior holding in People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, emphasizing that the parole authorities bear the burden of proving they could not conduct timely hearings because the parolee was not under their control. The court stated that “the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control. A presumption alone cannot satisfy that burden.” The court rejected the argument that formal acceptance of supervision under the Interstate Compact was a prerequisite for triggering the duty to provide a timely hearing. The critical factor is whether the parolee was, in reality, subject to the convenience and practical control of New York parole authorities. Because no final judgement had been issued against the petitioner before Gonzales was handed down, Gonzales thus controls. The case was remitted to determine whether, despite the lack of formal Interstate Compact supervision, Wilson was nonetheless subject to New York’s control while incarcerated in Connecticut. This decision ensures that parolees are not denied their right to a timely hearing simply because of their incarceration in another state, placing the onus on parole authorities to actively demonstrate their inability to act promptly.