New York Law Review

Tag: parole hearing

  • King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994): Parole Board’s Consideration of Improper Factors

    King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)

    A parole board must provide an inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant statutory guidelines are considered when determining whether to grant discretionary release to parole supervision.

    Summary

    King sought release to parole supervision after being resentenced for the shooting death of an off-duty police officer. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand the matter for a new hearing after the Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that King was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i, which governs parole decisions. The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must adhere to the statutory guidelines and not consider unauthorized factors like penal philosophy or the death penalty.

    Facts

    King was convicted of fatally shooting an off-duty police officer during a fast-food restaurant robbery in 1970 and sentenced to 25 years to life. In 1987, the Second Circuit determined the original sentence was constitutionally invalid due to the sentencing judge’s misunderstanding of parole eligibility. King was resentenced to 20 years to life, making him eligible for parole supervision in 1990. He applied for parole three times, and this case concerned the denial of his most recent request.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King to parole supervision. The Appellate Division reversed that portion of the order requiring release and remanded the case for a de novo hearing. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner was afforded a proper hearing prior to the denial of his application for release to parole supervision, considering that a commissioner considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i.

    Holding

    No, because the record showed that one of the Parole Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Executive Law article 12-B (§ 259 et seq.), particularly § 259-i (2) (c), which outlines the procedures governing parole. This section dictates that discretionary release should not be a mere reward for good behavior but based on whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must consider guidelines such as the inmate’s institutional record, participation in temporary release programs, and release plans, along with the seriousness of the offense and prior criminal record. The court stated that while a Parole Board need not expressly discuss each of these guidelines in its determination, it must provide the inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant guidelines are considered, citing People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 132. The Court found that the Commissioner’s consideration of factors like penal philosophy and the death penalty was not authorized by Executive Law § 259-i, thus invalidating the hearing. The court implies that adherence to the statute’s guidelines is essential for a fair parole hearing, underscoring the importance of procedural regularity in parole decisions.

  • People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971): Right to Counsel at Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971)

    Due process under the New York State Constitution requires that a parolee be represented by counsel at parole revocation hearings, as the outcome of the hearing directly impacts the individual’s liberty.

    Summary

    Menechino, imprisoned for murder, had his parole revoked for technical violations: associating with ex-convicts and providing false information to his parole supervisor. He was not represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. The New York Court of Appeals held that parolees are constitutionally entitled to counsel at revocation hearings. The court reasoned that a parole revocation hearing is an accusatory proceeding where the parolee’s liberty is at stake, necessitating the assistance of counsel to ensure a fair determination of the facts. This right is grounded in due process, guaranteeing a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

    Facts

    In 1947, Menechino was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 years to life. He was paroled in 1963 after serving 16 years.
    In December 1964, he was declared delinquent for violating parole conditions.
    In March 1965, he was taken into custody.
    In April 1965, a parole revocation hearing was held where he was charged with associating with individuals having a criminal record and giving false information to his parole supervisor.
    Menechino, without counsel, admitted to the charges.
    His parole was revoked, and he was barred from reconsideration for at least two years.

    Procedural History

    Menechino initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of his right to counsel and other procedural safeguards at the revocation hearing; it was dismissed as untimely.
    He then filed a habeas corpus proceeding in Dutchess County, arguing deprivation of due process rights at the revocation hearing.
    Special Term dismissed the writ.
    Menechino appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parolee is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at a parole revocation hearing under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, because a parole revocation hearing involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or be imprisoned, which falls within the due process provision of the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the principle in Mempa v. Rhay sufficiently broad to encompass parole revocation, stating that, “the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case * * * is apparent.”
    The court emphasized that a parole revocation hearing is an accusatory proceeding where the parolee’s liberty is at stake, requiring a factual determination regarding alleged misconduct.
    “When all the legal niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke parole involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or to be imprisoned. It involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the original criminal action and * * * falls within the due process provision of section 6 of article I of our State Constitution.”
    The court rejected the argument that parole is a mere privilege, asserting that once a state undertakes proceedings affecting liberty, it must do so consistently with constitutional privileges.
    The court highlighted the importance of counsel in ensuring a fair and accurate factual presentation, particularly in refuting ambiguous charges.
    The court found that the right to be heard would be “of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
    The court determined that Menechino’s failure to request counsel at the hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel because he was not advised of that right.
    The court stated that requiring obedience to the demands of due process and granting parolees a hearing at which they will be represented by counsel will further the purpose of the parole system, which is to rehabilitate convicted criminals, by creating a belief in a fair and objective parole procedure.