Parker v. City of Cohoes, 73 N.Y.2d 251 (1996)

A municipality can be held liable for failure to provide police protection when a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party, particularly when an order of protection is in place and the police have direct contact with and make assurances to the victim.

Summary

This case concerns the liability of a municipality for failing to protect a woman who was murdered by her husband after police officers responded to a 911 call about a violation of an order of protection. The New York Court of Appeals held that a special relationship existed between the police and the victim, creating a question of fact as to whether the police acted reasonably under the circumstances. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the existence of the order of protection, direct contact between the police and the victim, and the victim’s justifiable reliance on the officers’ affirmative undertaking established the special relationship.

Facts

The decedent, Mrs. Parker (Swiggett), had an order of protection against her estranged husband, Anthony Swiggett, due to a history of abuse. On September 5, 1985, she called 911 to report that her husband had violated the order by entering her residence and throwing furniture into the yard. Police officers responded and found the husband at a neighbor’s house. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. The husband denied entering the residence. The officers contacted their supervisor and were advised that they needed to see the husband inside the premises to arrest him for violating the order of protection. The officers told the decedent that they could not arrest her husband based on the information they had but assured her they would act if further problems arose. After the officers left for a meal break, the decedent was fatally stabbed by her husband. He was later found covered in blood with a copy of the order of protection in his pocket.

Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding sufficient evidence of an affirmative duty to act, knowledge that inaction could lead to harm, and justifiable reliance on the defendants’ affirmative undertaking. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the defendants did not owe a special duty to the decedent and that the police department’s actions were reasonable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a special relationship existed between the Suffolk County Police Department and the decedent, creating a duty of care.

2. Whether a question of fact exists regarding the reasonableness of the police department’s actions in securing protection for the decedent.

Holding

1. Yes, because the existence of an order of protection, direct contact between the police and the decedent, and the decedent’s justifiable reliance on the officers’ affirmative undertaking established a special relationship.

2. Yes, because the evidence, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, raised a question of fact regarding the reasonableness of the officers’ actions in securing protection for the decedent.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in Cuffy v. City of New York, which outlined the elements of a special relationship: (1) an assumption by the municipality of an affirmative duty to act, (2) knowledge that inaction could lead to harm, (3) direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party, and (4) justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking. The court reasoned that the order of protection satisfied the first two elements, as it constituted an assumption of an affirmative duty of protection and an awareness that inaction could lead to harm. The Court stated, “The order evinces a preincident legislative and judicial determination that its holder should be accorded a reasonable degree of protection from a particular individual” and “is presumptive evidence that the individual whose conduct is proscribed has already been found by a court to be a dangerous or violent person”. The direct contact requirement was met by the officers’ response to the 911 call. The court also found that the officers’ assurances to the decedent, coupled with their presence at the scene, supported a finding of justifiable reliance. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the officers’ actions was a question of fact for the jury, stating that such questions “concerning reasonableness are properly left for the fact finder under an examination of all the evidence.” The court distinguished this case from others where a general duty of police protection was alleged, clarifying that the specific circumstances created a special duty to the victim.