New York Law Review

Tag: Parental Support

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 44 N.Y.2d 166 (1978): Parental Support Obligations and Emancipation

    Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 44 N.Y.2d 166 (1978)

    A parent is not automatically obligated to support a child over 18 who voluntarily leaves home against the parent’s wishes to live with a paramour, even if the child receives public assistance; the court retains discretion based on family dynamics and potential injustice.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a father can be compelled by the Department of Social Services to support his 18-year-old daughter who voluntarily left home against his wishes to live with her boyfriend and have a child, subsequently receiving public assistance. The court held that the father was not obligated to provide support under these circumstances. The decision emphasizes the importance of considering the family relationship and potential injustice when determining parental support obligations, even when public assistance is involved, recognizing the daughter’s voluntary abandonment of parental control.

    Facts

    The respondent’s daughter, born in 1956, lived with her father after her parents’ divorce. In early 1974, she told her cousin she planned to leave home, live with her boyfriend, and have a child, intending to support herself through public assistance. She left home shortly after turning 18 in October 1974. After a brief return home, she eventually moved in permanently with her unemployed boyfriend in the spring of 1975. She gave birth to a child out of wedlock in the fall of 1975 and subsequently applied for and received public assistance for herself and her child.

    Procedural History

    In February 1976, the Commissioner of Social Services of Orange County initiated a proceeding in Family Court to compel the respondent to contribute to his daughter’s support, pursuant to Social Services Law § 101-a(3). The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding the daughter had emancipated herself. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, citing Matter of Roe v Doe. The Commissioner of Social Services then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Department of Social Services can compel a father to support his daughter, who is over 18 and receiving public assistance, after she voluntarily left home against his wishes to live with her paramour and have a child.

    Holding

    No, because the court retains discretion in determining support obligations, considering the impact on the family relationship and potential for injustice, and because the daughter voluntarily abandoned the parent’s home against the father’s reasonable wishes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Social Services Law generally obligates parents to support children until age 21, this obligation is not absolute when the child is receiving public assistance. Citing Family Court Act § 415, the court emphasized its discretionary power to determine a fair and reasonable contribution for support, considering the needs of the petitioner and the circumstances of the case. The court distinguished this case from situations involving abandoned or abused children, highlighting that the father had consistently supported his daughter, encouraged her education, and accepted her back after absences. The court noted that the daughter’s choice to leave home against her father’s wishes to pursue a particular lifestyle did not automatically obligate him to financially support that choice. The court stated, “We simply hold that under these circumstances the courts below could properly refuse to compel him to pay for her support when she chose to leave home to live with her paramour.” The decision also referenced the state’s policy of fostering family integrity, which would be undermined by forcing the father to underwrite a lifestyle his daughter chose against his reasonable wishes.

  • Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971): Parental Support Obligations and Emancipation Through Voluntary Abandonment

    Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971)

    A minor child of employable age who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home without cause, against the will of the parent, and to avoid parental control forfeits the right to demand support.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of a parent’s obligation to support a minor child. The father of a 20-year-old college student ceased providing support after she moved into an off-campus apartment against his wishes. The daughter’s guardian initiated support proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that the father was not obligated to support his daughter because she had voluntarily abandoned his home to avoid parental control. The court reasoned that a parent has a right to impose reasonable regulations on a child in return for support, and a child who abandons the home to avoid those regulations forfeits the right to support.

    Facts

    The respondent, a prominent New York attorney, had been fully supporting his 20-year-old daughter, who was attending the University of Louisville. The daughter, without her father’s knowledge or consent, moved out of the college dormitory and into an off-campus apartment with a classmate. Upon learning of this, the father terminated all further support and instructed her to return to New York. The daughter sold her car (a gift from her father) to fund her continued residence at the university. The daughter had a history of academic probation and experimentation with drugs. Tuition payments were past due, prompting the guardian to commence support proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially issued a temporary order requiring the father to pay tuition and medical expenses and later issued a final order requiring him to pay $250 per month in support until the daughter’s 21st birthday, along with tuition payments. The father was also held in contempt for failing to comply with the temporary order. The Appellate Division modified the temporary order, directing the father to pay only bills rendered before November 30, 1970, and reversed the final order entirely. The guardian appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a minor child of employable age who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, forfeits the right to demand support from the parent.

    Holding

    Yes, because where a minor of employable age voluntarily abandons the parent’s home without cause, against the will of the parent, and to avoid parental control, that child forfeits the right to demand support.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental policy that a father is responsible for the discipline and support of his minor child. However, this duty is reciprocal, with the father having the right to establish reasonable regulations in return for maintenance and support. The court adopted the view that a child who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home to avoid parental discipline forfeits the claim to support. The court reasoned that allowing a minor to deliberately flout the legitimate mandates of her father while requiring support would be unjust. The court stated that it is a parent’s natural and legal duty to care for, control, and protect a child from potential harm and that courts should not interfere with this responsibility absent misfeasance, abuse, or neglect. The court found that the father’s request that his daughter reside in the dormitory or return home was reasonable, given her past behavior and “the temptations that abound outside.” The court quoted Stant v. Lamberson, stating that the obligations of parenthood require of the child “‘submission to reasonable restraint, and demands habits of propriety, obedience, and conformity to domestic discipline.’” The court concluded that while a minor may choose to abandon the home rather than submit to proper discipline, she cannot then enlist the court’s aid in frustrating parental authority by requiring the father to underwrite her chosen lifestyle. The court emphasized that it was not dealing with a case where a father was casting a helpless daughter out into the world but rather a situation where the daughter was asserting independence in a manner inconsistent with parental control.