In re Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417 (2010)

While parental presence during the custodial interrogation of a juvenile is preferred, it is not an absolute right, and the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile’s confession was voluntary when obtained after his mother agreed to leave the interrogation room. Jimmy D., a 13-year-old, confessed to sexually abusing his nine-year-old cousin after being given Miranda warnings and after his mother agreed to let him speak to the detective alone. The Court held that while parental presence is preferred during juvenile interrogations, it is not an absolute right and the confession was voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings and the mother’s presence during the waiver of those rights.

Facts

Jimmy D., a 13-year-old, was accused of sexually abusing his nine-year-old cousin. After the cousin reported the abuse, Jimmy and his mother were taken to a child advocacy center where a detective interviewed them. Jimmy was given Miranda warnings in English, and his mother was given the warnings in Spanish, both indicating they understood their rights. The detective asked the mother for permission to speak with Jimmy alone, and after Jimmy consented, the mother agreed. The detective told Jimmy that if he told her what happened, he would get “some help.” Jimmy then confessed to the abuse in a written statement.

Procedural History

A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against Jimmy. The Family Court denied Jimmy’s motion to suppress his confession. Following a fact-finding hearing, Family Court adjudicated Jimmy a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals granted Jimmy leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the presentment agency met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of Jimmy’s confession, considering he was a juvenile interrogated without his parent present in the room.

Holding

Yes, because the totality of the circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings, the presence of his mother during the waiver of those rights, and the absence of coercive tactics, supported the lower courts’ findings that the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court recognized the need to protect the rights of minors in the criminal justice system and reiterated that when a parent is present at the location where a child under 16 is being held in custody, the parent must not be denied the opportunity to attend the custodial interrogation. The Court stated, “In practical terms, this means that the parent of the child has the right to attend the child’s interrogation by a police officer, and should not be discouraged, directly or indirectly, from doing so.” However, the Court clarified that neither the Family Court Act nor precedent gives a child under 16 the absolute right to the presence of a parent during interrogation. The determination of voluntariness is based on the “totality of circumstances.”

The Court found that Jimmy and his mother were not so isolated from one another as to affect the likelihood that his confession was voluntary. His mother was present during the Miranda waiver, and both agreed to his being questioned alone. The detective’s promise of “help” did not create a substantial risk that Jimmy might falsely incriminate himself. The Court distinguished this case from those where deception or trickery were used to prevent a parent from retaining a lawyer for the child. The court specifically rejected the argument that any post-waiver conduct can retroactively invalidate a valid Miranda waiver, holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the confession was voluntary.

The court concluded that there was evidence in the record supporting the finding that the presentment agency met its burden of proving the voluntariness of Jimmy’s inculpatory statement beyond a reasonable doubt. Because voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact, further review was beyond the court’s scope.