New York Law Review

Tag: Parental Obligation

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Segarra, 78 N.Y.2d 22 (1991): Extent of Parent’s Support Obligation for Child Receiving Public Assistance

    Commissioner of Social Services ex rel. Wandel v. Segarra, 78 N.Y.2d 22 (1991)

    A parent’s obligation to support a child receiving public assistance is not limited to the child’s share of the public assistance grant but is based on the child’s needs and the parent’s means.

    Summary

    The Commissioner of Social Services initiated a child support proceeding against Arnaldo Segarra, the father of a child receiving public assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The Commissioner sought a support order retroactive to the child’s birth, arguing that the father’s obligation should be based on the child’s actual needs and the father’s financial means, not merely the child’s share of the AFDC grant. The lower courts limited the father’s obligation to the child’s share of the monthly AFDC payment plus $50. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Family Court Act § 415 does not limit a parent’s support obligation to the amount of the public assistance grant. The court emphasized that a parent’s duty is determined by the child’s needs and the parent’s ability to pay.

    Facts

    A paternity proceeding was initiated against Arnaldo Segarra by the Commissioner of Social Services. Segarra was determined to be the father of a child. Christine Wandel and her child were recipients of public assistance under the AFDC program. The Commissioner commenced a proceeding seeking a support order against Segarra, retroactive to the child’s birth, based on Segarra’s financial ability.

    Procedural History

    The Hearing Examiner awarded child support of $269.50 per month, representing the child’s share of the monthly AFDC payment plus $50. Family Court rejected the Commissioner’s objection, limiting the support obligation to reimbursement for government expenditures. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a child support proceeding commenced by the Commissioner of Social Services pursuant to Family Court Act § 415, the obligation of a father for the support of his child receiving public assistance is limited to the amount of the child’s share of the monthly public assistance rather than being based on the child’s actual needs and the father’s means.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court Act § 415 does not limit a parent’s obligation to support a child to the amount of the public assistance grant. The obligation is based on the child’s reasonable needs and the parent’s financial means.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court Act § 415 allows consideration of a noncustodial parent’s means when determining child support payments, authorizing the court to require a fair and reasonable sum for support. The court cited Family Court Act § 413, which obligates parents to support their children under 21 and to pay a fair and reasonable sum if they have sufficient means. The Court noted that a 1990 amendment to § 413 clarified that a parent’s pro rata share of support is not unjust simply because it exceeds the child’s share of public assistance. The Court stated, “with respect to a parent’s child support obligation, Family Court Act § 415 merely supplements existing law by making it clear that a parent’s duty to support is not abrogated by a child’s receipt of public assistance; it does not limit that obligation to the amount of the public assistance grant.”

    The Court further clarified the Commissioner’s right to seek support payments on behalf of an AFDC recipient. “Limiting the Commissioner’s right to collect support by the amount of an AFDC payment defeats the legislative intent embodied in Family Court Act §§ 413 and 415 that a parent provide for the support of a child commensurate with the child’s needs and the parent’s ability.” The Court also emphasized that a construction limiting support to the AFDC grant would create a disincentive for affluent noncustodial parents to make voluntary payments.

    The court emphasized that requiring courts to consider the financial means of a noncustodial parent of a child receiving public assistance benefits the child and potentially frees up state resources for other recipients. The noncustodial parent is not adversely affected because the support obligation is based on the parent’s means and the child’s needs. “We hold therefore that the Commissioner, as assignee of the rights of an AFDC dependent, is entitled to seek a child support award based upon the child’s needs and the noncustodial parent’s means and that the noncustodial parent’s obligation is not limited to the child’s share of the monthly public assistance grant.”

  • Gelman v. Seiferts, 85 N.Y.2d 1023 (1995): Limiting Recovery in Wrongful Birth Actions to Minority Expenses

    Gelman v. Seiferts, 85 N.Y.2d 1023 (1995)

    In a wrongful birth action, parents can only recover the increased financial obligations arising from the extraordinary medical treatment required by a child with disabilities during their minority, as there is no legal obligation for parental support after the child reaches the age of 21.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of damages recoverable in a “wrongful birth” action. The New York Court of Appeals held that parents could not recover from the defendant doctor’s estate the costs of extraordinary expenses for the support and care of their son, born with thalassemia major, after he reached 21 years of age. The court reasoned that under New York law, parents have no legal obligation to support a child after they reach the age of majority. The court emphasized that any extension of liability for post-majority expenses should be addressed by the legislature.

    Facts

    The plaintiff brought a “wrongful birth” action against the estate of the defendant doctor, seeking to recover costs associated with raising their son, who was born with thalassemia major, a serious genetic blood disorder. The plaintiffs sought to recover expenses incurred during the child’s minority and those expected to be incurred after the child reached the age of 21.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held that the plaintiff could not recover expenses related to the care of their child after the age of 21. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a wrongful birth action, parents can recover the costs of extraordinary expenses for the support and special care of a child with a disability after the child reaches the age of 21, when there is no legal obligation for such support under New York law?

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, a parent has no legal obligation to continue the support of a child after the age of majority. Therefore, recovery is limited to the increased financial obligations arising from extraordinary medical treatment during the child’s minority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the established principle that parental legal obligations to support a child cease when the child reaches the age of majority. The court cited various provisions of New York law, including the Family Court Act § 413(1), Domestic Relations Law § 32(3), and Social Services Law § 101(1), to support this principle. The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s assertion of a moral obligation to support their child beyond the age of 21 but emphasized that the scope of legally cognizable injury is limited to the period of legal obligation. The court stated that “plaintiff may be compensated only in the amount that represents his legally cognizable injury, namely the increased financial obligation arising from the extraordinary medical treatment rendered the child during minority.” The court referenced prior decisions, including Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979 and Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, to reinforce this limitation on damages in wrongful birth actions. The court explicitly deferred to the legislature on any potential expansion of liability, stating, “The argument that public policy is better served by permitting plaintiff to recover the cost of his son’s postmajority extraordinary expenses is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.”