New York Law Review

Tag: parental liability

  • Rios v. Smith, 95 N.Y.2d 647 (2001): Parental Liability for Negligent Entrustment of Dangerous Instruments

    Rios v. Smith, 95 N.Y.2d 647 (2001)

    A parent may be liable for negligently entrusting a dangerous instrument to their child if the parent knew or should have known that the child’s use of the instrument could create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, even if the child allows a third party to use the instrument.

    Summary

    Desiree Rios sued Theodore Persico, Jr., among others, for injuries sustained while riding an ATV driven by Frank Smith, Jr. Rios was injured when the ATV Smith was driving crashed into a tree. The claim against Persico, Sr. was for negligent entrustment, alleging he negligently allowed his son to use the ATV, which was then used by Smith. The New York Court of Appeals held that Persico, Sr. could be liable for negligently entrusting the ATVs to his son, even though the injury occurred while a third party (Smith) was operating the vehicle, because Persico, Sr. was aware that his sons shared the ATV with friends. The Court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that Persico, Sr. created an unreasonable risk of harm.

    Facts

    In 1983, Desiree Rios, then 17, accompanied her sister to a farm owned by Alphonse Persico. Theodore Persico, Jr., Persico’s son, also 17, owned two ATVs kept at the farm. On the day of the accident, Persico, Jr. and Frank Smith, Jr., each operating an ATV, invited Rios and her sister for a ride. Rios rode with Smith. While racing, Smith drove the ATV off a path and crashed into a tree, causing severe injuries to Rios. Persico, Sr. was not present at the farm on the day of the accident. Persico, Sr. was aware his sons used the ATVs with passengers and performed “wheelies.” He did not restrict his sons’ ATV use or their ability to lend them to others.

    Procedural History

    Rios sued Persico, Sr. for negligent entrustment. The jury found Persico, Sr. 35% at fault. The trial court denied Persico’s motion to set aside the verdict on liability. The Appellate Division upheld the liability finding but reduced the damages award. The New York Court of Appeals granted Persico leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parent can be liable for negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to their child when a third party is injured while using the instrument with the child’s permission?

    Whether an ATV constitutes a dangerous instrument as a matter of law?

    Holding

    Yes, because a parent owes a duty to protect third parties from harm that is clearly foreseeable from the child’s improvident use or operation of a dangerous instrument, where such use is found to be subject to the parent’s control.

    No, because under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the issue of whether the ATV was a dangerous instrument was a question of fact properly submitted for jury determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior precedents, particularly Nolechek v. Gesuale and LaTorre v. Genesee Mgt., to reaffirm the principle that parents have a duty to protect third parties from harm resulting from a child’s improvident use of a dangerous instrument when the parent is aware of and capable of controlling its use. The court emphasized that Nolechek provides a “very specific and narrow complement to the predominant Holodook principle.”
    The court rejected Persico’s argument that liability only applies when the child directly causes the harm, clarifying that the duty extends to foreseeable situations where the child allows a third party to use the instrument. Persico’s deposition testimony was critical. “His testimony revealed that he was aware that his sons had driven the ATVs in the past with passengers on the vehicles and it was likely that his sons had performed “wheelies” while riding the ATVs. He further acknowledged that Smith had probably driven one of the ATVs on prior occasions as he had been a frequent visitor to the farm. Pérsico admitted that he established no rules regarding his sons’ use of the ATVs, and did not limit his sons’ ability to lend the ATVs to others. The operation of the ATVs was not restricted to particular areas on the farm either.” The court found that, based on the evidence, Persico could have foreseen that his son would lend the ATV to a friend, creating a risk of harm to passengers. As to whether an ATV is a dangerous instrument, the court stated, “Whether a particular object qualifies as a dangerous instrument depends on the nature of the instrument and the facts pertaining to its use, including the particular attributes of the minor using or operating the item.” Because Persico knew his sons operated the vehicles with passengers and performed wheelies, it was proper for the trial court to submit the issue to the jury for resolution.

  • La Torre v. Genesee Management, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 578 (1997): Parental Duty to Supervise Adult Child with Disabilities

    La Torre v. Genesee Management, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 578 (1997)

    A parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless the parent has specific knowledge of the child’s dangerous propensities and the ability to control their conduct.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant can maintain a claim for negligent supervision against the mother of an adult plaintiff with developmental disabilities who allegedly caused them damages. The plaintiff, LaTorre, sued the defendant, Genesee Management, after a physical altercation with security personnel at a mall. Genesee then filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint, holding that absent specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and an ability to control the adult child’s conduct, a parent is not liable to third parties for negligent supervision. This decision reinforces the principle that parental duties primarily run to the child, not to the general public, and emphasizes the importance of avoiding undue intrusion into family relationships.

    Facts

    LaTorre, a 20-year-old developmentally disabled man, accompanied his mother to a mall. While his mother shopped, LaTorre stayed in an arcade area. He became involved in an altercation with another person, prompting the arcade manager to call security. Security personnel subdued and handcuffed LaTorre, who subsequently sued Genesee Management, the security company, for physical and psychological injuries.

    Procedural History

    LaTorre sued Genesee Management in Supreme Court. Genesee filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The Supreme Court dismissed the third-party complaint, finding no actionable claim of negligent parental supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification can be maintained against the mother of an adult child with developmental disabilities, based on a theory of negligent supervision.

    Holding

    No, because a parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and the ability to control the child’s conduct are demonstrated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision primarily on the principles established in Holodook v. Spencer, which generally prohibits claims against parents for negligent supervision of their children. The court distinguished the case from Nolechek v. Gesuale, which recognized a limited duty of parents to third parties regarding a child’s use of a dangerous instrument. The Court emphasized that the allegations against LaTorre’s mother were too general and did not demonstrate specific knowledge of dangerous propensities. The court stated, “Defendants’ conclusory, generalized assertion is patently insufficient under presently governing principles to satisfy the requisite pertinent knowledge of the kind of dangerous propensities…” The court reasoned that allowing such claims would unreasonably burden parents and intrude into family relationships. The Court also noted the lack of specificity in the allegations against the mother, stating, “In order for a third-party claim of this kind against a parent or guardian to withstand the force of Holodook, negligence must be alleged and pleaded with some reasonable specificity, beyond mere generalities.” Ultimately, the court reaffirmed the importance of limiting litigation intrusions into families, stating that “[t]he mutual obligations of the parent-child relation derive their strength and vitality from such forces as natural instinct, love and morality, and not from the essentially negative compulsions of the law’s directives and sanctions.”

  • Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332 (1978): Parental Liability for Negligent Entrustment of Dangerous Instruments

    Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332 (1978)

    A parent owes a duty to third parties to shield them from harm resulting from an infant child’s improvident use of a dangerous instrument, especially when the parent is aware of and capable of controlling its use; a third-party tortfeasor may seek contribution from the parent based on the parent’s negligent entrustment.

    Summary

    Walter Nolechek sued Gesuale and Star Sand & Gravel for the wrongful death of his son, Scott, who died in a motorcycle accident. Gesuale counterclaimed, alleging the father was negligent in providing his vision-impaired son with a motorcycle. The Appellate Division dismissed the counterclaim and Nolechek’s third-party complaint against a friend of his son. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, reinstating the counterclaim. The court held that while a child cannot sue a parent for negligent supervision, a parent has a duty to protect third parties from harm caused by the child’s misuse of a dangerous instrument, especially if the parent knows and can control the use. A third party may seek contribution from the parent.

    Facts

    Scott Nolechek, 16, was blind in one eye and had impaired vision in the other. His father, Walter Nolechek, bought him a motorcycle. Scott did not have a driver’s license, and the motorcycle was unregistered and uninspected. Scott was riding a friend’s motorcycle (having switched just before the accident) on Lawrence Road when he struck a steel cable suspended across the road, resulting in his death. The cable had been in place for an extended period and was used by Gesuale and Star Sand & Gravel Co. to close off the road.

    Procedural History

    Walter Nolechek sued Gesuale and Star, among others, for negligence. Gesuale counterclaimed, alleging the father was negligent in providing the motorcycle. Nolechek filed a third-party complaint against James and Paul Neiman, the friend and his father. Special Term denied motions to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the counterclaim and third-party complaint. Gesuale and Nolechek appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an alleged tortfeasor, liable for injuries to an infant, can seek indemnity or contribution from the injured child’s parent when the injury resulted from the parent’s negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to the child?

    Holding

    Yes, because a parent owes a duty to third parties to protect them from harm resulting from a child’s improvident use of a dangerous instrument, especially when the parent is aware of and capable of controlling its use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Holodook v. Spencer, which held that a child cannot sue a parent for negligent supervision. While deciding when to allow a child to use a potentially dangerous item is a matter of parental supervision, this case involves the parent’s duty to third parties. The court reasoned that parents have a duty to protect third parties from foreseeable harm resulting from their children’s improvident use of dangerous instruments. The court stated, “It was not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye.” The court emphasized that intrafamilial considerations are subordinated to the policy interests of protecting third parties from harm. The court found that permitting the counterclaim does not unduly disrupt family harmony, especially as the child is deceased. However, the third-party claim against the Neimans was dismissed because the motorcycle exchange was not a proximate cause of the accident.