10 N.Y.3d 73 (2008)

A municipal ordinance prohibiting roadside solicitation from vehicle occupants is constitutional if it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leaves open ample alternative communication channels.

Summary

The City of Rochester enacted a law prohibiting solicitation from vehicle occupants on roadways. Defendant Barton was ticketed for violating this ordinance. He argued the law was overbroad, violating free speech protections. The City Court agreed, but the County Court reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, holding that the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. The Court found the ordinance content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest of traffic safety, and that it left open alternative means of communication.

Facts

Michael Barton was ticketed for violating Rochester City Code § 44-4(H), which prohibits soliciting from occupants of motor vehicles on a street or public place. The ordinance defines “solicit” as spoken, written, or gestured requests for money or anything of value. The City Council enacted the ordinance to protect people from harassment, maintain safe public spaces, ensure the free flow of traffic, and promote tourism and business, addressing increased panhandling and citizen complaints.

Procedural History

Barton moved to dismiss the charges in City Court, arguing the ordinance was overbroad and violated free speech rights. The City Court agreed and dismissed the charges. The County Court reversed, upholding the ordinance’s constitutionality. Barton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether Rochester City Code § 44-4(H), prohibiting solicitation from vehicle occupants, is an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on free speech.

Holding

No, because the ordinance is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on speech that is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals analyzed the ordinance as a time, place, and manner restriction on speech. The court assumed, without deciding, that panhandling is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The court stated that even if Barton’s conduct was not protected, he could still challenge the law as overbroad on behalf of others whose protected expression might be chilled. The court found the law content-neutral because it was justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, promoting traffic safety by preventing driver distraction. The court emphasized the City Council’s intent to promote the free and safe flow of traffic, and the ban applied regardless of the solicitor’s message. The court stated that the ordinance was narrowly tailored, designed to address the specific problem of individuals seeking handouts from drivers, creating a hazard and slowing traffic. "[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation… So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Finally, the Court noted that the ordinance left open ample alternative channels of communication, as it did not prohibit requests for things other than handouts or non-aggressive solicitation directed at pedestrians.