New York Law Review

Tag: Pain and Suffering

  • Celetti v. Lippman, 653 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1989): Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Factor in Pain and Suffering Damages

    Celetti v. Lippman, 653 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1989)

    Loss of enjoyment of life is not a distinct element of damages meriting a separate award, but rather a factor to be considered when assessing damages for conscious pain and suffering.

    Summary

    Elaine Celetti died from cancer nearly two years after its misdiagnosis. A malpractice suit alleged failure to properly diagnose her condition during a checkup. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could award damages for loss of enjoyment of life separately from conscious pain and suffering. The Court of Appeals held that loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages but a factor in assessing pain and suffering. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial on the issue of damages for the first cause of action.

    Facts

    Elaine Celetti discovered a painful lump in her left breast. It was later determined the lump was cancerous and had already begun to metastasize.

    Prior to the discovery, Celetti had a regular checkup approximately 10 months before the cancer was discovered.

    Celetti died on June 8, 1985, nearly two years after the cancerous lump was discovered.

    Procedural History

    Celetti’s estate commenced a malpractice action against Dr. Alan Gibstein and his professional corporation.

    The first cause of action sought damages for Celetti’s conscious pain and suffering; the second cause of action was for wrongful death.

    The defendants’ liability was established at trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the award of damages. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging only the award of damages on the first cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could make an award for the loss of enjoyment of life separate and distinct from an award for conscious pain and suffering.

    Holding

    No, because loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages deserving a distinct award but is, instead, only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain, and suffering.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in the companion case, McDougald v. Garber, which addressed the same issue. The court reasoned that while loss of enjoyment of life is a component of the overall suffering experienced by a plaintiff, it is not a distinct category of damages that warrants a separate monetary award. The court aimed to avoid potentially duplicative compensation for the same injury, ensuring that juries focus on the totality of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering when determining damages.

    The court states, “loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate element of damages deserving a distinct award but is, instead, only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain, and suffering.”

    The dissenting judges, Alexander and Titone, would have affirmed the Appellate Division order, referencing Judge Titone’s dissenting opinion in McDougald v. Garber. This suggests that the dissent believed loss of enjoyment of life should be considered a separate and compensable element of damages.

  • Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986): Contribution Allowed Under Dram Shop Act for Pain and Suffering

    Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986)

    Contribution is permissible under New York’s Dram Shop Act for claims related to pain and suffering and loss of support, even when the intoxicated individual who caused the harm is deceased and the claimant is a relative, as long as allowing contribution does not directly frustrate the Act’s policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether contribution is allowed under New York’s Dram Shop Act when the intoxicated person who caused the injury is deceased and related to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that contribution is permissible for claims of pain and suffering and loss of support. Even though allowing contribution might reduce the total recovery for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that because the reduction stems from the deceased’s death and is an indirect consequence, it does not violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act. The court emphasized the legislative intent to allow contribution unless it clearly frustrates the statute’s underlying policy.

    Facts

    An intoxicated individual (the vendee) caused injury and death. The vendee subsequently died after the accident. The injured party and the vendee were married, and the plaintiff seeking loss of support was their daughter. The plaintiff brought suit against the bar that served the vendee (Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc.) under the Dram Shop Act. The defendant bar then sought contribution from the estate of the deceased vendee.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially dismissed the third-party complaint seeking contribution from the vendee’s estate. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, thereby allowing the third-party claim for contribution to proceed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether contribution from the estate of a deceased intoxicated person is permissible under the Dram Shop Act for claims related to the pain and suffering of a deceased injured person and the loss of means of support of her daughter, when the deceased intoxicated person was the husband of the deceased injured person and the father of the plaintiff seeking loss of support.

    Holding

    Yes, because allowing contribution in this instance does not directly violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act, as the reduction in potential recovery stems from the fortuitous circumstance of the tortfeasor’s death and is an indirect consequence of allowing contribution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the legislative intent behind CPLR 1401, which favors allowing contribution unless it directly frustrates the policy of the statute violated. The court stated, “The policy of the law, as declared by the Legislature in CPLR 1401, is to allow contribution ‘unless it is clear that the legislative policy which led to the passage of the statute would be frustrated by the granting of contribution in favor of the person who violated the statute’.” The court determined that allowing contribution from the vendee’s estate, even though it might reduce the total amount available to the daughter, did not directly contravene the Dram Shop Act’s goals. The court emphasized that the reduction was an indirect result of the vendee’s death, a “fortuitous circumstance.” The court distinguished this situation from one where contribution would directly undermine the Act’s purpose of protecting innocent third parties from alcohol-related harm. The court cited previous cases (Herrick v Second Outhouse, Smith v Guli, Weinheimer v Hoffman) that established contribution between a vendor and vendee doesn’t violate the Dram Shop Act.