New York Law Review

Tag: overbreadth

  • People v. Brown, 96 N.Y.2d 80 (2001): Severability of Overbroad Search Warrants & Plain View Doctrine

    96 N.Y.2d 80 (2001)

    When a search warrant contains both particularized and overbroad directives, the overbroad portion can be severed, and evidence seized in plain view during the execution of the valid portion of the warrant is admissible if the officers were lawfully present.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence seized under a search warrant containing an overbroad clause. Police obtained a warrant to search for specific items related to a stolen tractor but also included “any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband.” During the search, they found unregistered weapons in plain view. The court held that the overbroad clause could be severed from the valid parts of the warrant, and the plain view doctrine applied. The weapons were admissible because the officers were lawfully on the property executing the valid parts of the warrant when they discovered the weapons.

    Facts

    Defendant allegedly stole a tractor and sought assistance from an acquaintance, DiDominico, to sell it. The defendant planned to switch VIN plates with DiDominico to transport the tractor undetected. DiDominico informed the police, who inspected the tractor with his consent and confirmed it was stolen. Police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s property for the tractor’s ignition key, VIN plate, a steel chain, a top link bar, and “any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband.” DiDominico also told the police the defendant had firearms on his property and that two handguns were unregistered. During the search, police found unregistered, loaded guns and blasting caps, but none of the items listed in the warrant.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted and moved to suppress the guns and blasting caps, arguing the warrant was overbroad and the plain view doctrine inapplicable. The Supreme Court denied the motion, severing the overbroad language and applying the plain view doctrine. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a search warrant authorizing a search for specifically described items and also “any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband” is unconstitutionally overbroad?

    2. Whether an overbroad directive in a search warrant invalidates the entire warrant, preventing the application of the severability doctrine?

    3. Whether the plain view doctrine applies to the seizure of items not listed in a warrant when the warrant contains an overbroad directive?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the warrant granted the executing officers unfettered discretion to seize anything they thought “would be considered contraband.”

    2. No, because the severability doctrine allows the valid, particularized portions of the warrant to remain in effect.

    3. Yes, because after severing the invalid directive, the plain view doctrine can apply if the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the items was immediately apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment requires warrants to particularly describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized, preventing general exploratory searches. The warrant’s directive to search for “any other property the possession of which would be considered contraband” was deemed overbroad because it gave officers too much discretion. However, citing People v. Hansen, the Court reaffirmed the severability doctrine, stating that partially invalid warrants do not necessarily invalidate the entire warrant; only the fruits of the invalid portion must be suppressed.

    The Court explicitly rejected the argument that any warrant containing an overbroad directive should result in the suppression of all evidence seized. Instead, it stated that courts should sever the unconstitutionally overbroad directives while upholding seizures made under the remaining particularized portions of the warrant. The Court stated, “The better approach is to sever the invalid directive and apply the plain view doctrine to the valid remainder. Thus, if at the time of seizure, the executing officers were not intruding upon the individual’s expectation of privacy more than was necessary to execute the valid portion of the warrant, the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression.”

    Applying the plain view doctrine, the Court emphasized that the officers must be lawfully in a position to observe the item, have lawful access to it, and the incriminating character of the item must be immediately apparent. The Court found that, because the officers were legitimately searching for the tractor ignition key and VIN plate, they were lawfully present in the defendant’s home and the plain view doctrine applied. The Court cautioned against the use of phrases like “any contraband” in search warrants because they are “obnoxious to the principles of the Fourth Amendment and has no valid place in search warrants.” The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

  • People v. Bakolas, 59 N.Y.2d 51 (1983): Constitutionality of “Unreasonable Noise” Statutes

    59 N.Y.2d 51 (1983)

    A statute prohibiting “unreasonable noise” with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm is constitutional, both for vagueness and overbreadth, if it is construed to describe noise that a reasonable person would not tolerate under the circumstances and requires a public intent or risk.

    Summary

    Ioannis and Evangelos Bakolas were arrested and charged with violating a New York Penal Law prohibiting unreasonable noise. The Rochester City Court initially dismissed the charge, finding the term “unreasonable noise” unconstitutionally vague. The County Court reversed, reinstating the charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the culpability requirement (intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm) narrowed the definition of “unreasonable noise” to that which a reasonable person would not tolerate and prevented inadvertently disturbing acts from being punished.

    Facts

    Ioannis Bakolas was stopped for a traffic violation and became abusive, yelling and threatening the officer. He refused to return to his vehicle and stood in the roadway, causing traffic to swerve. Evangelos Bakolas was observed yelling at the same officer while standing in the westbound traffic lane, refusing to desist or move from the roadway.

    Procedural History

    The Bakolases were charged in Rochester City Court with violating subdivisions of section 240.20 of the Penal Law. The City Court upheld some charges but ruled subdivision 2, regarding “unreasonable noise,” unconstitutionally vague and dismissed it. The County Court of Monroe County reversed, reinstating the subdivision 2 charges. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivision 2 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law, prohibiting “unreasonable noise,” is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

    Holding

    No, because the term “unreasonable noise” is capable of definition and the statute requires intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, thus narrowing its scope to conduct that is publicly offensive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “unreasonable noise” describes a noise of a type or volume that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not tolerate. The statute’s requirement of intent to cause or recklessly create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm narrows the definition, ensuring that no inadvertently disturbing act may be punished. The court distinguished this case from People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., noting that the ordinance in that case had a subjective standard (annoyance of “a person”) and was capable of ad hoc enforcement. The court stated, “the objective standard of public disturbance, the requirement of unreasonableness, and the narrowing effect of the fact that all of the other acts proscribed by the section are publicly offensive, permit, if they do not require, the construction above set forth.” The court also noted that similar statutes in other states have been upheld against vagueness arguments. Regarding the overbreadth argument, the court stated, “Although the facts recited in the information involve speech, protected speech may be restricted as to time, place and manner… The activity prohibited by section 240.20 is speech so unreasonably noisy as ‘to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm’. Such a prohibition is not on its face impermissibly overbroad.”

  • People v. Harris, 36 N.Y.2d 36 (1974): Constitutionality of Election Law Provision on Affecting Election Results

    People v. Harris, 36 N.Y.2d 36 (1974)

    A statute prohibiting acts tending to affect election results is not unconstitutionally vague if it provides sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct to a person of ordinary intelligence.

    Summary

    The defendant, an attorney, was convicted of attempting to violate a section of the Election Law by offering money to a potential candidate to withdraw from a primary election. She challenged the statute’s constitutionality, arguing it was both vague and overbroad. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that paying a candidate to withdraw constitutes a fraudulent act tending to affect the primary, and the statute wasn’t overly broad, therefore it was constitutional.

    Facts

    The defendant, affiliated with incumbent Democratic officeholders, contacted Thomas Patton, who intended to run in the Democratic primary for City Council. At a meeting, Patton indicated reservations about running and the defendant offered him jobs, which he declined. The defendant then offered Patton money to withdraw from the race. Patton agreed to accept $1,000, with $500 paid upfront and $500 after the primary election. The defendant’s secretary delivered an envelope containing $500 to Patton, which was photographed by witnesses.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in Nassau County Court of attempting to violate subdivision 5 of section 421 of the Election Law. The Appellate Term modified the judgment by deleting a 15-day jail sentence but affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether subdivision 5 of section 421 of the Election Law is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited.
    2. Whether subdivision 5 of section 421 of the Election Law is void for overbreadth because it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that offering money to a potential candidate to withdraw from a primary election constitutes a fraudulent act tending to affect the primary.
    2. No, because the statute is a reasonable restriction upon an individual for the public good and is not overly broad.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on established principles that statutes creating crimes must be definite in specifying prohibited conduct, affording a comprehensible guide to ordinary members of society. The court also noted the presumption of a statute’s constitutionality, which is only overcome when invalidity is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.

    The Court stated that subdivision 5 of section 421 of the Election Law was enacted to prevent corrupt bargaining for public office and unfair primary election practices. While acknowledging the statute’s flexibility, the court found it readily apparent that the enactment is designed to outlaw any fraudulent or wrongful act tending to affect the result of a primary election. The court reasoned that “Fraudulent,’ the crucial word of subdivision 5 of section 421 of the Election Law obviously connotes the idea of a deliberate deception (to be committed upon the electorate) and a corrupt act to prevent a free and open election.” The court recognized the legislature’s difficulty in articulating every prohibited transaction due to the numerous methods of tampering with a primary election.

    The court emphasized that an individual of ordinary intelligence would understand that paying a prospective political candidate not to run in a primary election would constitute a fraudulent act. The fact that the defendant was an attorney further weakened her argument that she failed to appreciate that such conduct was forbidden. The court also declined to consider alleged errors in the trial court’s charge to the jury because the defense counsel failed to object during the trial.

  • Gubelman v. Bennett, 2 N.Y.2d 672 (1957): Limits on Municipal Regulation of Licensed Activities

    Gubelman v. Bennett, 2 N.Y.2d 672 (1957)

    A municipal regulation exceeding the scope of its enabling statute and imposing unduly oppressive restrictions on a lawful activity is invalid.

    Summary

    Gubelman, a licensed New York City ticket broker, challenged a regulation prohibiting licensed brokers from selling tickets to unlicensed persons for resale. This effectively barred sales to out-of-state brokers. The Court of Appeals held the regulation invalid, reasoning that it exceeded the authority delegated to the Commissioner of Licenses and placed unduly burdensome restrictions on a lawful activity. The court emphasized that regulations must be reasonably related to addressing specific abuses and cannot be overly broad or oppressive.

    Facts

    The petitioner, Gubelman, was a licensed New York City ticket broker who had been selling theatre tickets to a Washington, D.C. ticket agency for over 15 years. These sales were legal under New York law. The Washington agency’s resale practices were not alleged to be unlawful. Regulation 6(f) of the Department of Licenses prohibited licensed brokers from selling tickets to any “unlicensed person” for resale.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner challenged the validity of Regulation 6(f). The lower courts upheld the regulation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, annulling the Commissioner’s determination. The matter was remitted to Special Term for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Regulation 6(f), prohibiting licensed ticket brokers from selling tickets to unlicensed persons for resale, exceeds the authority delegated to the Commissioner of Licenses and imposes unduly oppressive restrictions on a lawful activity.

    Holding

    Yes, because the regulation effectively prohibits trade with out-of-state agencies without demonstrating a reasonable relation to preventing fraud, extortion, or exorbitant rates within New York City.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that local laws must have a substantial relation to matters within the legislative power of the local body and be reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate public purpose. Regulations cannot be unduly oppressive or aimed at prohibiting a lawful activity through onerous restrictions. The court found that Regulation 6(f) was too broad and exceeded the authority granted to the Commissioner of Licenses under General Business Law § 169-b, which allows for rules necessary to protect the public against “fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses” (General Business Law, § 167). The court stated: “An ordinance will be invalidated purporting to regulate a lawful activity… where its purpose is ‘to prohibit by onerous and exasperating restrictions, under the guise of regulation’.” The court acknowledged the potential for abuse if out-of-state brokers resold tickets at inflated prices to New York City residents. However, the court held that a blanket prohibition on sales to all out-of-city brokers was not justified without evidence of such abuse. The court concluded that the regulation was akin to “use a cannon to kill a butterfly,” suggesting a disproportionate response to a potentially localized problem. The regulation’s overbreadth rendered it invalid. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.