New York Law Review

Tag: Out-of-State Conviction

  • People v. Yusuf, 18 N.Y.3d 318 (2012): Use of Out-of-State Convictions for Enhanced Sentencing

    People v. Yusuf, 18 N.Y.3d 318 (2012)

    For purposes of enhanced sentencing as a second felony drug offender, New York courts may consider prior violent felony convictions from other jurisdictions, but the sentencing court cannot examine the indictment underlying the out-of-state conviction to ascertain whether the defendant’s intent satisfies New York’s intent element for the equivalent crime.

    Summary

    Malik Yusuf was convicted of drug crimes in New York. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution sought to have him sentenced as a second felony drug offender based on a prior North Carolina conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Yusuf challenged the use of the out-of-state conviction for enhanced sentencing. The New York Court of Appeals held that out-of-state violent felony convictions can be considered for enhanced sentencing under Penal Law § 70.70(4). However, the Court also found that the sentencing court erred by examining the indictment underlying the North Carolina conviction to determine if Yusuf’s intent satisfied the elements of a New York robbery offense; this is impermissible because the comparison must be statute-to-statute, except in limited circumstances.

    Facts

    Police executed a no-knock search warrant at Yusuf’s apartment, leading to his arrest and conviction for drug crimes. The prosecution filed statements alleging Yusuf had a prior conviction in North Carolina for “Robbery with [a] Dangerous Weapon,” and “Possession with Intent to Sell and Deliver a Controlled Substance.” The prosecution sought to classify Yusuf as a second felony drug offender, triggering an enhanced sentence.

    Procedural History

    Yusuf challenged the statements, arguing against the use of the North Carolina conviction for enhanced sentencing. The Supreme Court held that Penal Law § 70.70(4) authorized enhanced sentencing based on the out-of-state conviction, and that Yusuf’s North Carolina conviction was equivalent to robbery under New York law after examining the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 70.70(4) allows for the consideration of out-of-state violent felony convictions when sentencing a defendant as a second felony drug offender.
    2. Whether, when determining if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony, a sentencing court may examine the indictment underlying the foreign conviction to ascertain if the defendant’s intent satisfies New York’s intent element for the equivalent crime.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Penal Law § 70.70(4), when read in conjunction with Penal Law § 70.06(1) and CPL 400.21, indicates that the Legislature intended for foreign violent felony convictions to be considered when determining a defendant’s sentencing status.
    2. No, because the court’s inquiry is generally limited to comparing the elements of the crimes as defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes; examining the indictment to ascertain intent is impermissible in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.70(4) applies to second felony drug offenders whose prior conviction was a violent felony. The definition of a second felony drug offender in Penal Law § 70.70(1)(b) cross-references Penal Law § 70.06(1), which includes out-of-state felonies. Furthermore, CPL 400.21 instructs the prosecutor or court to determine whether a defendant has been convicted of a qualifying foreign crime.
    The Court stated, “Considering section 70.70 (4) in light of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) and CPL 400.21 (2), (4) and (7) (c), we conclude that the Legislature meant for prosecutors and sentencing courts to take foreign violent felony convictions into account when determining a defendant’s sentencing status.” This interpretation aligns with the policy underlying the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004, which aimed to distinguish between non-violent and violent drug offenders.
    Regarding the use of the indictment, the Court emphasized that, “As a general rule, [the court’s] inquiry is limited to a comparison of the crimes’ elements as they are respectively defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes.” The Court cited People v. Gonzalez, 61 NY2d 586, 589 (1984) and People v. Muniz, 74 NY2d 464, 467-468 (1989) to support this conclusion. It further stated that examining the indictment to ascertain Yusuf’s intent was impermissible because it went beyond the statutory elements of the crime, which runs counter to established precedent.

  • People v. Ballman, 15 N.Y.3d 68 (2010): Use of Out-of-State Convictions for Felony DWI Charges

    15 N.Y.3d 68 (2010)

    New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8), as amended in 2006, only allows out-of-state convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) occurring on or after November 1, 2006, to be used to elevate a subsequent New York DWI offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a prior out-of-state DUI conviction could be used to elevate a current DWI charge to a felony. The defendant was charged with felony DWI based on a 1999 Georgia conviction. The court held that the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8) only applies to out-of-state convictions occurring after November 1, 2006. The Court reasoned that the legislative intent was to address the discrepancy in treatment between in-state and out-of-state convictions prospectively, and the enabling language supported this interpretation. Thus, the defendant’s prior Georgia conviction could not be used to elevate the current DWI charge to a felony.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on February 22, 2007, and indicted for felony DWI and obstructing governmental administration. The felony DWI charge was predicated on a 1999 Georgia conviction for driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration, which would have been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) if it had occurred in New York. The defendant moved to dismiss the felony DWI charge, arguing that the Georgia conviction predated the effective date of the relevant statute.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s decision on the felony DWI charge, vacated the plea, and dismissed that count of the indictment. The People and the defendant were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8), as amended in 2006, permits the use of an out-of-state DUI conviction occurring before November 1, 2006, to elevate a subsequent DWI offense in New York from a misdemeanor to a felony.

    Holding

    No, because the enabling language of the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8) specifies that it applies only to convictions occurring on or after November 1, 2006, and this applies to both in-state and out-of-state convictions used for enhancement purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on interpreting the legislative intent behind the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8). The court acknowledged the ambiguity in the enabling language and examined the statute’s legislative history. The court noted that the purpose of the amendment was to eliminate the loophole that allowed repeat DWI offenders to face lesser penalties simply because prior convictions occurred out of state. The court reasoned that the Legislature intended to remedy the differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state convictions prospectively, by applying the amended statute only to out-of-state convictions occurring after November 1, 2006. The court stated, “The most sensible interpretation of the enabling language is that the Legislature chose to remedy this differential treatment going forward, by continuing to apply the previous statutory scheme to out-of-state convictions occurring prior to November 1, 2006, and applying the statute as amended to out-of-state convictions occurring after that date.” The court rejected the People’s argument that “convictions” in the enabling language referred only to current New York convictions, finding that this interpretation would render the effective date of the statute redundant. The court also noted that their interpretation avoided potential ex post facto issues. The Court further emphasized that the statute itself refers to prior out-of-state convictions. Therefore, out-of-state convictions prior to November 1, 2006, cannot be used to elevate a DWI offense to a felony.

  • People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989): Determining Predicate Felonies Based on Out-of-State Convictions

    People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989)

    When determining if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony in New York, courts generally compare the statutory elements of the crimes, and may only consider the factual allegations in the foreign accusatory instrument when the foreign statute criminalizes multiple acts, some of which would be felonies and others misdemeanors in New York.

    Summary

    Muniz pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree burglary in New York. The prosecution sought to classify him as a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction. The New Jersey statute defined burglary as entering with intent to commit any “offense,” while New York required intent to commit a “crime” (felony or misdemeanor). The Court of Appeals held that the New Jersey conviction could not serve as a predicate felony because “offense” was broader than “crime,” including acts that would only be violations in New York. The court further clarified that the accusatory instrument from the New Jersey case could not be considered, as the statute was not divisible in the way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Facts

    Defendant, Muniz, was charged in Bronx County with attempted second-degree burglary and fourth-degree criminal mischief.
    The People filed predicate felony statements, alleging Muniz was a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction.
    The accusatory instrument from New Jersey alleged that Muniz committed third-degree burglary by breaking and entering premises with the intent to commit a theft.
    Defense counsel argued that the New Jersey conviction should not qualify as a predicate felony because the New Jersey statute criminalized unlawful entries with the intent to commit any “offense,” whereas New York burglary provisions require intent to commit a “crime.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected Muniz’s arguments and found that his prior New Jersey burglary conviction qualified as a predicate felony, sentencing him as a second felony offender.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the “intent to commit an offense” in the New Jersey statute was equivalent to the “intent to commit a crime” required by New York burglary provisions.
    Muniz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New Jersey crime of third-degree burglary, which requires intent to commit any “offense,” is the equivalent of a New York felony, which requires intent to commit a “crime,” for the purpose of determining predicate felony status under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i)?
    If not, whether the trial court could properly consider the factual allegations in the New Jersey accusatory instrument to elucidate the nature of Muniz’s prior crime?

    Holding

    No, because the New Jersey statute’s definition of “offense” is broader than New York’s definition of “crime,” encompassing acts that would not constitute felonies or misdemeanors in New York.
    No, because the New Jersey statute defines a single crime, and is not divisible in such a way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires the foreign conviction to have an equivalent among New York’s felony-level crimes.
    Generally, this determination is made by comparing the elements of the crimes as defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes, and the accusatory instrument underlying the foreign conviction is ordinarily not considered.
    However, the accusatory instrument may be considered when the foreign statute criminalizes several different acts, some of which would constitute felonies and others misdemeanors if committed in New York.
    New Jersey’s definition of “offense” includes acts that are the equivalent of petty offenses or violations in New York, while New York’s definition of “crime” encompasses only felonies and misdemeanors.
    Therefore, it is possible to violate the New Jersey third-degree burglary provisions by acting with the intent to commit a petty offense, without necessarily acting with the level of intent required for a felonious burglary in New York.
    The court distinguished this case from cases like People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson, where the foreign crime could be committed in several different, alternative ways, some of which would constitute felonies if committed in New York and others of which would constitute only misdemeanors. Here, the foreign crime was rendered a felony because of a particular aggravating circumstance (criminal intent), which included, but was broader in coverage than, the analogous aggravating element of the New York felony.
    Quoting People v. Olah, the court stated that “ ‘the controversy did not turn upon [them]’ ” and that it is improper to look to the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument as a means of clarifying the nature of the defendant’s claimed predicate crime.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 61 N.Y.2d 586 (1984): Determining Predicate Felonies for Enhanced Sentencing Based on Out-of-State Convictions

    61 N.Y.2d 586 (1984)

    For a prior out-of-state conviction to serve as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing in New York, the elements of the foreign crime must be equivalent to those of a New York felony, as determined by comparing the statutes, and the accusatory instrument can only be used to clarify, not expand, the statutory charge.

    Summary

    Gonzalez was sentenced as a second felony offender in New York based on prior Florida convictions for aggravated assault. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Florida convictions could not serve as predicate felonies because it was impossible to determine if the acts Gonzalez committed in Florida would constitute a felony in New York. The court emphasized that the sentencing court must compare the elements of the foreign statute with those of an analogous New York felony, relying on the accusatory instrument only to clarify the statutory charge, not to broaden it. Since the jury in Florida could have convicted Gonzalez of acts that would constitute either a felony or a misdemeanor in New York, and the record did not clarify which acts formed the basis of the conviction, enhanced sentencing was improper.

    Facts

    Gonzalez pleaded guilty in New York to criminal sale of a controlled substance. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution filed a predicate felony statement based on Gonzalez’s prior Florida convictions. In Florida, Gonzalez had been charged with attempted robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and shooting into an occupied building. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault as lesser included offenses of attempted robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault as charged in the original information. The New York Supreme Court determined that the Florida convictions for aggravated assault corresponded to attempted robbery in the third degree in New York and sentenced Gonzalez as a second felony offender.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Westchester County, sentenced Gonzalez as a second felony offender based on the Florida convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. Gonzalez appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the Florida convictions did not satisfy New York’s requirements for predicate felonies.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Florida convictions for aggravated assault can serve as predicate felonies for enhanced sentencing in New York when the Florida statute encompasses conduct that could constitute either a felony or a misdemeanor in New York, and the record does not clarify the specific conduct underlying the convictions.

    Holding

    No, because it cannot be determined from the Florida statutes or the accusatory instrument whether the jury found that Gonzalez committed acts that would constitute a felony in New York. The accusatory instrument can only be used to clarify, not expand, the statutory charge, and in this case, it did not provide sufficient clarity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a prior out-of-state conviction is a predicate felony in New York only if the foreign crime’s elements are equivalent to those of a New York felony. Citing People v. Olah, the court stated that the determination must be based on the statute under which the indictment was drawn. The court acknowledged an exception to the Olah rule, allowing examination of the accusatory instrument when the foreign statute encompasses multiple acts that could constitute either felonies or misdemeanors in New York. However, the accusatory instrument can only clarify the statutory charge, not expand it.

    In this case, the Florida statute for aggravated assault included both assault with a deadly weapon and assault with intent to commit a felony. The court found that neither subdivision necessarily corresponded to a New York felony. Furthermore, because Gonzalez was convicted of lesser included offenses, and the record did not clarify which specific acts the jury relied upon, it was impossible to determine whether the Florida convictions were for conduct that would constitute a felony in New York. The Court noted, “[T]he allegations of the accusatory instrument may be referred to when necessary to clarify the statutory charge, to limit or narrow the basis for the conviction, but they may not be used to enlarge or expand the crime charged.” Because the prosecution failed to establish that the Florida convictions met New York’s requirements for predicate felonies, enhanced sentencing was improper.

  • People v. Carpenteur, 21 N.Y.2d 571 (1968): Determining Predicate Felonies for Repeat Offender Sentencing

    People v. Carpenteur, 21 N.Y.2d 571 (1968)

    A youthful offender adjudication in another state, based on statutes and policy considerations similar to New York’s, should be considered when determining predicate felonies for repeat offender sentencing, even though the New York statute preventing the use of youthful offender adjudications technically applies only to those made within New York.

    Summary

    Richard Carpenteur pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and was sentenced as a second felony offender based on a prior California conviction. In California, he had been adjudicated a youthful offender. New York law prevents using a youthful offender adjudication as a predicate for multiple offender treatment, but the prosecution argued this only applied to New York adjudications. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Carpenteur was eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York, and California’s determination was based on similar statutes and policies, the California adjudication should preclude using the prior offense for repeat offender sentencing.

    Facts

    In 1951, when he was 18 years old, Richard Carpenteur was convicted of robbery in California.
    Instead of sentencing, he was remanded to the California Youth Authority, which is a disposition similar to a youthful offender adjudication in New York.
    California law would not allow this disposition to be used as a predicate for multiple felony offender treatment.
    Carpenteur later pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree in New York.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender in New York based on the prior California conviction.
    He challenged this sentence, arguing that the California adjudication should not be considered a felony conviction for repeat offender purposes.
    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a youthful offender adjudication in California, where the defendant was eligible for similar treatment in New York, can be used as a predicate felony conviction for sentencing purposes in New York, given that New York law prohibits the use of its own youthful offender adjudications for such purposes.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was under 19 at the time of the California offense and eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York. The California court, acting under a similar statute and applying identical policy considerations, concluded the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender. Therefore, it was error to consider the California conviction as a felony in New York for sentencing as a second felony offender.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law generally determines whether an out-of-state conviction can be used for multiple offender treatment, this case presented a unique circumstance.
    The court acknowledged that the defendant’s actions in California would have warranted a felony conviction in New York, but a New York court could also have labeled him a youthful offender.
    Quoting the statute, the court stated that on its face, section 913-n only requires this result where the defendant had been adjudicated a youthful offender “ under the provisions of this title”, that does not mean that we may disregard the California determination.
    The court emphasized that the defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York at the time of the California offense and that the California court’s decision was based on similar statutes and policy considerations.
    Therefore, the court concluded that the California determination should be determinative of the defendant’s status under section 1941, precluding the use of the California conviction for repeat offender sentencing in New York.
    The court noted a revised version of the section recently incorporated into the new Penal Law (L. 1965, ch. 1030, eff. Sept. 1, 1967), a defendant’s previous conviction is not counted unless a sentence of imprisonment in excess of one year was imposed and the defendant was actually imprisoned under such circumstances (§ 70.10, subd. 1, par. [b]). This suggests a legislative intent to limit the use of prior convictions for repeat offender sentencing.

  • People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277 (1963): No New York Forum for Challenging Out-of-State Convictions

    People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277 (1963)

    New York courts will not provide a forum (through coram nobis or habeas corpus) to challenge the validity of a prior out-of-state conviction used to enhance sentencing in New York, unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Wilson, convicted in New York as a second felony offender based on a prior Florida conviction, sought coram nobis relief in New York, arguing his Florida conviction was unconstitutional because he lacked counsel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, reiterating that New York courts will not entertain collateral attacks on out-of-state convictions used for sentencing enhancement unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that while the defendant may have a federal remedy, New York is not obligated to provide a forum to challenge the foreign judgment’s validity.

    Facts

    In 1948, Alfred Wilson was convicted of attempted murder in New York and sentenced as a second felony offender. The predicate felony was a 1931 Florida murder conviction. At sentencing, Wilson admitted the truth of the information regarding his prior felony. In 1962, Wilson filed a coram nobis petition in New York, arguing his Florida conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel or advised of his right to counsel in Florida. He submitted affidavits from Florida court officials and an attorney supporting his claim.

    Procedural History

    Wilson sought a writ of error coram nobis in the New York court where he was sentenced as a second felony offender, challenging the validity of the Florida conviction underlying his enhanced sentence. The lower court denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the denial of coram nobis relief.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State must provide a forum (through coram nobis or habeas corpus) for a defendant to challenge the constitutional validity of an out-of-state conviction used as a predicate for enhanced sentencing in New York.

    Holding

    No, because New York State is under no duty to provide a forum for attacking a foreign judgment, and New York can rely on the face value of the Florida conviction for sentencing purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. McCullough, which established that New York courts will not grant a hearing on the validity of an out-of-state conviction used for multiple offender sentencing unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that coram nobis must be brought in the court that entered the judgment under attack, and habeas corpus is only available when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. The court acknowledged the Second Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. La Near v. La Vallee, which held that a defendant in this situation may seek federal habeas corpus relief without exhausting out-of-state remedies, but stated this did not require New York to revise its own rules regarding collateral attacks on foreign judgments. The court expressed concern about the practical difficulties and burdens that would arise if New York courts were required to examine the validity of criminal judgments from other jurisdictions. The court noted that subsequent offender statutes are constitutional and do not require inquiry into the circumstances of the prior adjudication. As stated in the ruling, “the courts of this State have no alternative but to treat the conviction as an effective predicate for multiple offender punishment under section 1941 or section 1942 of the Penal Law.”