New York Law Review

Tag: Order of Protection

  • Walker v. Walker, 86 N.Y.2d 624 (1995): Enforcing Orders of Protection with Consecutive Jail Sentences

    Walker v. Walker, 86 N.Y.2d 624 (1995)

    Family Court has the discretionary authority to impose consecutive six-month jail terms for separate and distinct violations of an order of protection, up to the statutory maximum for each violation.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a Family Court can impose consecutive jail sentences for multiple violations of a single order of protection. Fred Walker violated an order of protection obtained by his former wife, Emma Walker, by sending her three letters from jail. The Family Court sentenced him to six months in jail for each violation, to be served consecutively, totaling 27 months with prior violations. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court’s decision, holding that the Family Court has the discretion to impose consecutive sentences for separate violations of an order of protection, as this aligns with the purpose of protecting victims of domestic violence and ensuring compliance with court orders. The court emphasized that a contrary ruling would undermine the protective purpose of the statute.

    Facts

    Emma Walker secured an order of protection against her former husband, Fred Walker. Despite being incarcerated, Fred Walker sent Emma Walker three separate letters. Emma Walker filed two petitions alleging that these three letters constituted willful failures to obey the order of protection. After a hearing, the Family Court found Fred Walker in violation of the order of protection for each of the three communications.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court revoked a suspended prior commitment and sentenced Fred Walker to six months in jail for each of the three new violations, to be served consecutively. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s dispositional order, with two Justices dissenting in part. Fred Walker appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the dissent at the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court is authorized under Family Court Act § 846-a to impose consecutive six-month jail commitments for separate, multiple violations of one order of protection.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court is not generally precluded from imposing, in the exercise of prudent and appropriate discretion, a maximum six-month jail commitment for each separate and distinct violation of an order of protection, to be served consecutively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court Act § 846-a does not explicitly prohibit consecutive sentences for separate violations of an order of protection. The court stated that the statute aims to “stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection” (Family Ct Act § 812 [2] [b]). The court rejected the argument that a violator, already penalized, would gain immunity from further sanctions for persistent, separate violations, calling such an approach incongruous and an invitation to violate the order. The court relied on common-law principles dealing with consecutive punishments, noting that courts have long had the discretion to impose consecutive penalties for multiple crimes. Quoting People v. Ingber, 248 N.Y. 302, 304-305 (1928), the court noted that the discretionary power of the court to impose a cumulative sentence remains undiminished as it was at common law. The court emphasized the importance of effective judicial options for punishment and deterrence, particularly when an individual violates an order of protection from jail. The court stated, “[n]othing short of obvious compulsion will lead us to a reading of the statute whereby the pains and penalties of crimes are shorn of all terrors more poignant than a form of words” (quoting People v Ingber, 248 NY 302, 306). The court concluded that disallowing consecutive penalties would elevate form over substance and frustrate the core purpose of Family Court Act article 8, designed to protect victims of domestic violence. Therefore, the court affirmed the Family Court’s authority to impose consecutive sentences, ensuring the statute and the order are not “shorn of all terrors” and reduced to merely a “form of words”.

  • Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461 (1985): Establishing Municipal Liability for Failure to Protect Based on a Special Relationship

    Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461 (1985)

    A municipality can be held liable for failure to provide adequate police protection when a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party, arising from a protective order, police knowledge of the assailant’s violent history, responses to pleas for assistance, and reasonable expectations of police protection.

    Summary

    Dina Sorichetti and her mother, Josephine, sued the City of New York, alleging negligence by the police department for failing to protect Dina from her father, Frank, who violated a Family Court order of protection. The New York Court of Appeals held that a special relationship existed between the City and Dina, based on the order of protection, the police’s knowledge of Frank’s violent history, Josephine’s pleas for help, and her reasonable expectation of police protection. The court found that the police’s failure to act reasonably under these circumstances could establish municipal liability.

    Facts

    Josephine Sorichetti had a history of abuse from her husband, Frank, leading to multiple orders of protection. On November 6, 1975, a final order of protection granted Frank visitation rights with their daughter, Dina, with pick-up and drop-off at the 43rd precinct. On November 8, Frank threatened Josephine and Dina. On November 9, when Frank was late returning Dina, Josephine pleaded with officers at the 43rd precinct to pick up Dina, presenting the order of protection and detailing Frank’s violent history. Despite Officer Hobbie’s warning to Lieutenant Granello that Frank was a violent man, Granello dismissed the order of protection as “only a piece of paper” and told Josephine to wait. Frank attacked Dina shortly thereafter, causing severe injuries. Frank was later convicted of attempted murder.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued the City of New York. Special Term denied the City’s motion to dismiss. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division modified the award. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a special relationship existed between the City of New York and Dina Sorichetti such that the City owed her a duty of care to protect her from her father’s violence, based on the order of protection, the police department’s knowledge of Frank Sorichetti’s violent history, the response to Josephine Sorichetti’s pleas for assistance, and Mrs. Sorichetti’s reasonable expectation of police protection?

    Holding

    Yes, because the order of protection, combined with the police’s knowledge of Frank’s violent history, their response to Josephine’s pleas for assistance, and her reasonable expectation of police protection, created a special relationship between the City and Dina, giving rise to a duty of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a municipality is generally not liable for failure to provide adequate police protection absent a special relationship with the injured party. This case presented such a special relationship. The court emphasized that Family Court Act § 168 provides authority for peace officers to take into custody those who violate orders of protection, obligating officers to investigate alleged violations. The order of protection, along with police knowledge of Frank’s history, Josephine’s pleas for help, and the Lieutenant’s assurances created a reasonable expectation of protection. The court distinguished this case from Riss v. City of New York, noting that in Riss, the assailant was unknown to the police and had not previously indicated a likelihood of violence. Here, the police were well aware of Frank Sorichetti’s violent propensities. The Court noted: “When the police are made aware of a possible violation, they are obligated to respond and investigate, and their actions will be subject to a ‘reasonableness’ review in a negligence action.” The court concluded that the jury could properly consider whether the police conduct satisfied the duty of care owed to Dina.