New York Law Review

Tag: Order of Protection

  • Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014): Appeals of Expired Orders of Protection and the Mootness Doctrine

    Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 22 N.Y.3d 668 (2014)

    An appeal from an expired order of protection is not moot if the order’s issuance has significant enduring consequences, even after it has expired.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an appeal of an expired order of protection was rendered moot by the order’s expiration. The court held that the appeal was not moot because the order’s issuance had significant legal and reputational consequences for the respondent, which could be alleviated if the appeal were successful. The court emphasized the impact of the order on future legal proceedings, potential for impeachment, increased law enforcement scrutiny, and damage to the respondent’s reputation. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the appeal as moot and remitted the matter for consideration of the merits.

    Facts

    Veronica P. filed a family offense petition against her nephew, Radcliff A., alleging harassment and assault. Family Court issued a temporary order of protection and, after a hearing, found Radcliff A. guilty of a family offense (harassment in the second degree) and issued a two-year order of protection against him. Radcliff A. appealed the order. The order of protection expired while the appeal was pending.

    Procedural History

    Family Court found Radcliff A. guilty of a family offense and issued an order of protection. Radcliff A. appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal as moot because the order of protection had expired. The New York Court of Appeals granted Radcliff A. leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the appeal of an expired order of protection is rendered moot by the order’s expiration.

    Holding

    1. No, because the order of protection has enduring consequences for Radcliff A. that could be alleviated by a favorable appellate decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by restating the general rule that an appeal is moot unless a decision will directly affect the parties’ rights and interests. However, the court recognized an exception: an appeal is not moot if it will eliminate readily ascertainable and legally significant enduring consequences of the order being appealed. The court found the order of protection had enduring consequences, including that the order of protection on its face strongly suggested Radcliff A. committed a family offense which could influence future sentencing in criminal cases or adverse civil adjudications. Also, the court noted that the order could be used for impeachment purposes and that the order would remain in a police database. Further, the court found the order placed a severe stigma on Radcliff A., potentially impacting his business contacts, social acquaintances, and employment opportunities. The Court of Appeals found that the consequences of the order’s issuance were substantial and enduring enough to prevent mootness. The Court then reversed the Appellate Division and remitted for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

    The court stated: “In this case, the expiration of the order of protection does not moot the appeal because the order still imposes significant enduring consequences upon respondent, who may receive relief from those consequences upon a favorable appellate decision.”

  • People v. Cajigas, 19 N.Y.3d 697 (2012): Intent to Violate Order of Protection as Predicate for Burglary

    People v. Cajigas, 19 N.Y.3d 697 (2012)

    The intent to commit a crime element of burglary can be satisfied by the intent to engage in conduct that would be legal but for the existence of a valid order of protection, excluding violations of the stay-away provision itself.

    Summary

    Norman Cajigas was convicted of attempted burglary based on violating an order of protection. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the intent element of burglary could be satisfied by intending to commit an act that is only illegal because of the order of protection. The Court held that it could, provided the intended act goes beyond simply violating the stay-away provision. The Court reasoned that any crime, including those defined by protective orders, can satisfy the intent element of burglary. The Court also noted the role of prosecutorial discretion in ensuring appropriate charges are filed, especially in cases where the violation might seem minor.

    Facts

    Maria obtained an order of protection against Cajigas after he became abusive. The order required him to stay away from her residence and refrain from contacting her. Cajigas violated the order multiple times, including going to her home. Maria and her daughter moved, but Cajigas continued to stalk her. One day, Maria’s daughter was home alone when she heard someone trying to open the door. She saw Cajigas through the peephole. Cajigas fled after the daughter spoke to him.

    Procedural History

    Cajigas was indicted for attempted burglary and criminal contempt. At trial, the defense argued that the intent element of burglary could not be satisfied by the intent to commit an act that would not be illegal but for the order of protection. The trial court rejected this argument and instructed the jury that the intent element is established if Cajigas intended to violate a provision in the order other than the stay-away restriction. Cajigas was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the intent to commit a crime element of burglary may be satisfied by an intent to commit an act that would not be illegal in the absence of an order of protection.

    Holding

    Yes, because any crime, including those defined by an order of protection (excluding the stay-away provision itself), can satisfy the intent element of burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the burglary statute requires a trespass coupled with the intent to commit a crime. While People v. Lewis established that the unlawful entry element of burglary cannot be based solely on violating the stay-away provision of an order of protection, it did not preclude the use of other violations of the order to establish the “intent to commit a crime therein” element. The Court emphasized that the People are not required to prove the particular crime the defendant intended to commit inside the structure. The court stated, “aside from a violation of a stay-away provision, conduct that is “prohibited by an order of protection . . . can serve as predicate crimes for the ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element of burglary”.

    The Court acknowledged that burglary charges based on violations of orders of protection could lead to serious felony convictions and prison sentences, potentially disproportionate to the underlying conduct. However, it emphasized that prosecutorial discretion allows the District Attorney to file appropriate charges based on the specific facts of the case. The Court noted that in this case, Cajigas’s persistent and blatant disregard of the orders of protection warranted the attempted burglary conviction.

  • People v. Williams, 19 N.Y.3d 101 (2012): Post-Release Supervision as Part of Determinate Sentence for Order of Protection Duration

    People v. Williams, 19 N.Y.3d 101 (2012)

    For the purpose of determining the duration of an order of protection issued at sentencing, a “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a determinate sentence of imprisonment includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) when calculating the duration of an order of protection. The defendant argued that the order of protection’s expiration date should not include his PRS period. The Court of Appeals held that the term of PRS is part of the “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” as defined in CPL 530.13(4), and therefore the order of protection was correctly calculated to include the PRS period. This decision harmonizes the Criminal Procedure Law with the Penal Law’s inclusion of PRS as part of a determinate sentence.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree assault. At the initial sentencing, the Supreme Court imposed a 13-year prison term and an order of protection effective for three years from the date of the maximum time of incarceration, resulting in an expiration date of May 22, 2022. The Supreme Court did not mention PRS during sentencing, but the commitment sheet indicated a three-year PRS term. On appeal, the Appellate Division vacated the PRS term because it was not part of the oral pronouncement of the sentence. Subsequently, the defendant moved to amend the order of protection, arguing that it should expire in 2019, three years after his calculated release date (accounting for jail time credit), not including the PRS period.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division modified the original judgment, vacating the three-year PRS term due to the sentencing court’s failure to pronounce it orally and remanding for resentencing. At resentencing, the Supreme Court orally sentenced the defendant to a three-year term of PRS and denied the defendant’s motion to amend the order of protection, agreeing with the People that the PRS extended the order’s duration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “determinate sentence of imprisonment actually imposed” in former CPL 530.13(4) includes the mandatory period of post-release supervision (PRS) for purposes of calculating the duration of an order of protection issued at sentencing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Penal Law defines a determinate sentence of imprisonment to include a period of post-release supervision (PRS) as part of the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while former CPL 530.13(4) did not explicitly reference PRS, the Penal Law, specifically sections 70.45(1) and 70.00(6), clearly states that a determinate sentence of imprisonment includes PRS. The Court emphasized that the language of these Penal Law sections is unambiguous: a determinate sentence necessarily includes PRS. To exclude PRS would contradict the Legislature’s intent. The Court noted, “If the Legislature intended PRS to be wholly distinct from a defendant’s determinate sentence, it would not have specified in former section 70.45 of the Penal Law that a “determinate sentence” encompassed PRS “as a part thereof.” Nor would the Legislature have described a “determinate sentence of imprisonment” to “include, as a part thereof, a period of [PRS]” in former section 70.00 (6).” The court also emphasized the importance of including PRS when calculating the maximum expiration date of the determinate sentence to account for potential conditional release and reincarceration during the PRS period. This interpretation harmonizes the statutes, giving effect to the Legislature’s intent to include PRS as an integral component of a determinate sentence.

  • People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005): Clarifying ‘Intent to Commit a Crime Therein’ for Burglary

    5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005)

    The ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element of burglary is not satisfied solely by a defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering a dwelling that the order of protection declares off-limits; however, the element is satisfied if the defendant intended to engage in other conduct prohibited by the order while inside the premises.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. The central issue was whether his intent to violate an order of protection by entering a prohibited dwelling alone satisfied the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, but the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit another crime beyond the unlawful entry. The court reasoned that unlawful entry alone cannot elevate every order of protection violation to burglary, but other evidence demonstrated intent to harass or menace the complainant within the dwelling. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    The complainant allowed the defendant to live with her despite having him arrested for damaging her property. An order of protection was issued requiring him to stay away from her and her home. The complainant allowed the defendant to return, but after another incident where defendant struck her, another order of protection was issued. Subsequently, the complainant took her keys and left. Defendant entered her apartment without her knowledge while both orders were in effect, seemingly by tampering with a window and fire escape. Upon her return, the defendant kicked her and swore at her as she tried to call the police. Her belongings were scattered outside the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree burglary and criminal contempt. At trial, he requested a jury instruction that intent to enter the banned premises alone cannot satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The trial court refused. The jury found him guilty of criminal contempt but was hung on the burglary charge initially. After a supplemental instruction, the jury convicted him of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary can be satisfied solely by the defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering the dwelling prohibited by the order?

    Holding

    No, because unlawful entry, standing alone, cannot be the predicate crime to satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. However, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit a crime in the apartment other than the trespass itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if unlawful entry alone sufficed, every violation of a do-not-enter provision in an order of protection would be burglary. However, the Court noted that there was evidence that the defendant intended to commit other crimes within the apartment beyond the unlawful entry, such as harassment, menacing, or intimidation, which were separately prohibited by the order of protection. The court cited People v. Mackey, 49 NY2d 274 (1980), stating that the People need only allege and prove a knowing and unlawful entry coupled with an intent to commit a crime therein. The court emphasized that they do not need to allege or establish what particular crime was intended, citing People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174 (1989). The Court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant intended to “harass, menace, intimidate, threaten or interfere with complainant in her apartment” in violation of the order of protection. Judge R.S. Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury and that the defendant did not forfeit his right to appeal this error.

  • People v. Debouse, 6 N.Y.3d 821 (2006): Validity of 100-Year Order of Protection

    People v. Debouse, 6 N.Y.3d 821 (2006)

    A court may issue an order of protection for an extended duration, including one effectively spanning the defendant’s lifetime, to ensure the safety and peace of mind of a kidnapping victim, provided a specific expiration date is set to provide certainty for all parties involved.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could issue an order of protection with an expiration date set 100 years into the future following a conviction for first-degree kidnapping. The court affirmed the order, holding that while the trial court could not know the exact duration of the defendant’s life sentence, setting a definitive expiration date, even one far into the future, fulfilled the purpose of providing certainty to the defendant, the victim, and law enforcement. This allowed the court to effectively issue a lifetime order of protection, maximizing the victim’s safety.

    Facts

    The defendant pleaded guilty to the felony of first-degree kidnapping. The County Court imposed an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 15 years to life. The court also entered an order of protection in favor of the kidnapping victim. Desiring the order to remain in effect for the maximum duration permitted by CPL 530.13 (4)—three years from the date of expiration of the defendant’s life sentence—the court set an expiration date of July 25, 2101, which was 100 years after the date of sentencing.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the issuance of the 100-year order of protection. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs by issuing an order of protection with an expiration date set 100 years in the future, effectively creating a lifetime order of protection, following a conviction for first-degree kidnapping.

    Holding

    No, because setting a definitive expiration date, even one far into the future, fulfills the purpose of providing certainty to the defendant, the victim, and law enforcement, while allowing the court to maximize the victim’s safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 530.13 (4) grants the court discretion to enter an order of protection upon conviction of any offense, and when a defendant is convicted of a felony, the order’s duration can extend to three years from the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment. The court addressed the challenge of determining the duration of an order of protection tied to a life sentence. Acknowledging the purpose of fixing expiration dates, the court quoted People v. Nieves, 2 N.Y.3d 310, 317 (2004), stating that such dates are intended “to provide certainty for defendants, the protected victims and witnesses, and law enforcement authorities who may be called to enforce” the orders. The court found that the 100-year expiration date fulfilled this purpose, even though its practical effect was to create a lifetime order of protection. This approach allowed the County Court to exercise its discretion fully, providing the kidnapping victim with the “utmost safety and peace of mind.” The court also noted a subsequent amendment to CPL 530.13 (5) requiring orders of protection to plainly state their expiration date, further emphasizing the importance of certainty in such orders. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007): Knowledge of Order of Protection Inferred from Signature

    People v. Inserra, 9 N.Y.3d 30 (2007)

    A defendant’s signature on an order of protection is sufficient to infer knowledge of the order’s contents for the purposes of a criminal contempt charge.

    Summary

    Inserra was convicted of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. The information alleged that his name appeared on the signature line of the order. The Appellate Term reversed, finding this insufficient to establish knowledge of the order’s contents. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant’s signature on the signature line of an order of protection is sufficient to allege knowledge of its contents, fulfilling an essential element of criminal contempt. The Court reasoned that the signature implies awareness of the order’s terms, which are typically written clearly and concisely.

    Facts

    Inserra was subject to an order of protection directing him to stay away from his ex-girlfriend and her home, school, business, and place of employment and to refrain from assaulting, stalking, or harassing her. The People presented evidence that Inserra banged on the protected person’s apartment door, shouting and demanding to be admitted, violating the order. The sworn deposition of the police officer stated that he “examined a copy of [the] o[r]der of protection and that the defendant’s name appears on the line for the defendant’s signature.”

    Procedural History

    A Queens County Criminal Court jury found Inserra guilty of second-degree criminal contempt. Inserra appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the information failed to allege he had knowledge of the order’s terms. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the information. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s name on the signature line of an order of protection adequately supports an allegation that the defendant knew of the order’s contents for the purposes of a charge of criminal contempt.

    Holding

    Yes, because defendant’s name on the signature line sufficiently alleges that defendant received and read the terms of the order of protection, enabling an inference that he was aware of its contents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the factual allegations must establish, if true, every element of the crime charged and the defendant’s commission of each. The Court distinguished this case from People v. McCowan, where the defendant was merely informed that “an order” had been issued against him. Here, Inserra’s signature on the order’s signature line suggests he received and read the terms of the order. The Court stated, “defendant’s name on the signature line of the order enables us to infer that he was aware of its contents, which are written on a single page in simple language and clear, legible type.”

    The Court emphasized the pleading standard, stating that, based on the officer’s deposition, the allegations, if true, were sufficient to establish that Inserra violated each element of the crime charged, including his knowledge of the order of protection’s contents. The Court also rejected Inserra’s argument that the information failed to allege a violation by omitting a statement that the protected person was at home when Inserra banged on the door, noting the order prohibited Inserra from going near the protected person’s home, whether or not she was present. The dissent is not discussed as there was none.

  • People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004): Guilty Plea Forfeits Challenge to Order of Protection Validity

    People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569 (2004)

    A defendant’s guilty plea to criminal contempt generally forfeits the right to challenge the underlying order of protection’s validity on appeal, unless the challenge implicates the court’s jurisdiction or a constitutional right.

    Summary

    Konieczny pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt for violating an order of protection. On appeal, he argued the order was invalid because the protected party wasn’t a victim or witness in the underlying bad check case, thus the order was improperly issued under CPL 530.13(4). The New York Court of Appeals held that his guilty plea forfeited this non-jurisdictional challenge. The Court emphasized that guilty pleas mark the end of litigation, and only jurisdictional defects or fundamental constitutional rights survive such a plea. While cautioning against misuse of protective orders, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding the accusatory instrument sufficient on its face.

    Facts

    Defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct related to a bad check charge. Subsequently, an order of protection was issued directing him to stay away from Gary M. Although compliance with the order was a condition of his discharge, the order didn’t specify Gary M.’s connection to the bad check charge. One month later, police found Defendant at Gary M.’s residence, violating the order. He was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Defendant then pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt. Only on appeal did Defendant argue Gary M. wasn’t a victim or witness in the bad check case, rendering the protective order invalid.

    Procedural History

    Defendant pleaded guilty in City Court to attempted criminal contempt. On appeal to County Court, he argued the invalidity of the order of protection, which was rejected because the guilty plea forfeited the claim. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the challenge to the order survived the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s guilty plea to attempted criminal contempt forfeits the right to challenge the validity of the underlying order of protection on the grounds that the protected party was not a victim or witness in the underlying criminal action, when that challenge is raised for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s claim that the order of protection was invalid under CPL 530.13(4) is a statutory violation, not a jurisdictional defect or violation of a fundamental constitutional right, and therefore it did not survive his guilty plea. The information and supporting documents adequately pleaded that the defendant violated a court order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a guilty plea generally ends a criminal case, precluding further litigation on non-jurisdictional defects. Exceptions exist for jurisdictional matters or fundamental constitutional rights. The Court acknowledged concerns about misusing CPL 530.13 to issue protective orders for parties unrelated to the underlying prosecution. However, the Court determined that the defendant’s challenge to the order’s validity didn’t implicate the court’s jurisdiction. The misdemeanor information adequately alleged a violation of a court order, as the order of protection was facially valid and attached to the information. The Court cited People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000), stating that an accusatory instrument should be given a reasonable reading and external factors cannot be used to create jurisdictional defects not evident from the face of the document. The Court distinguished People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133 (1987), where the information failed to address an element of the offense. The Court noted that orders of protection are filed in a statewide registry and are enforced by a myriad of law enforcement agencies and courts throughout the state. For these reasons the court held, “Having pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt on a jurisdictionally valid accusatory instrument, defendant conceded every element of the offense, including the lawfulness of the order of protection, and forfeited his claim that the order violated CPL 530.13 (4).”

  • People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000): Double Jeopardy in Successive Contempt Prosecutions

    People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000)

    A criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by double jeopardy when the defendant was previously prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same underlying conduct of violating an order of protection.

    Summary

    Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two orders of protection: one from City Court and another from Family Court, both ordering him to have no contact with her. Wood made a series of prank phone calls to his ex-wife, which were traced to his residence. He was then held in contempt in Family Court for violating the Family Court order and sentenced to incarceration. Subsequently, he was indicted on criminal contempt charges for violating the City Court order based on the same phone calls. The New York Court of Appeals held that the subsequent criminal prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Family Court contempt proceeding and the criminal contempt charges were based on the same conduct.

    Facts

    Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two “no contact” orders of protection against him. One was issued by Rochester City Court, and the other was issued by Monroe County Family Court. On December 25, 1996, Wood’s ex-wife received eleven prank phone calls, which were traced to Wood’s residence. The ex-wife then initiated a contempt proceeding in Family Court. The criminal charges stemmed from the same phone calls that formed the basis of the Family Court action.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found Wood guilty of willfully violating the Family Court order of protection and sentenced him to six months incarceration. Subsequently, Wood was indicted on multiple counts of criminal contempt and aggravated harassment based on the same phone calls that led to the Family Court contempt finding. The Supreme Court denied Wood’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Wood was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the criminal contempt convictions, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has already been prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same conduct of violating an order of protection.

    Holding

    Yes, because the contempt provision of the Family Court Act is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree, and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater offense after conviction for a lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. If each offense contains an element the other does not, they are not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. The court found that the Family Court contempt provision did not contain an element different from Penal Law § 215.51(c) and that the statutory elements of the Family Court provision were subsumed by those of Penal Law § 215.51(c). Because the same acts violated both orders, Wood could not be guilty of first-degree criminal contempt for violating the City Court order without also being guilty of contempt for violating the Family Court order. The court emphasized that the Family Court contempt provision is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. The court stated, “Comparing the elements, we conclude that the contempt provision of the Family Court Act article 8 is clearly a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. That the People sought to prove a violation of a City Court order and not a Family Court order does not, under these circumstances, alter the double jeopardy analysis under Blockburger.” The court further reasoned that allowing the People to circumvent the double jeopardy bar by prosecuting a criminal action for violation of another court order based on the same conduct would eviscerate the constitutional prohibition. The court recognized that although the Legislature allows parallel court proceedings in different venues in domestic violence cases, the orders of protection in this case had the same purpose.

  • People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996): Admissibility of Evidence to Prove Notice of Order of Protection

    People v. Demczuk, 88 N.Y.2d 771 (1996)

    Notice of an order of protection, sufficient to support a criminal contempt charge, can be established through a combination of written documentation and oral communication, and testimony regarding the oral communication is admissible to prove that notice was given, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement of a criminal contempt charge against the defendant, holding that sufficient evidence existed to establish that the defendant had notice of the contents of an order of protection. The evidence included a written order and a State Trooper’s testimony that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance for his wife’s protection. The court found that the trooper’s testimony was admissible to prove the defendant received notice, not to prove the truth of the judge’s statement. This combination of evidence sufficiently established the elements of criminal contempt.

    Facts

    An order of protection was issued for the temporary protection of the defendant’s wife. The defendant was present when the judge issued the order. A State Trooper testified that the judge informed the defendant about the order’s issuance and its purpose. The defendant was later charged with violating the order of protection, leading to a criminal contempt charge.

    Procedural History

    The County Court order was modified by the Appellate Division, which reinstated the first count of the indictment. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, effectively reinstating the criminal contempt charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether notice of the contents of an order of protection, required to prove criminal contempt, can be established through a combination of the written order and oral communication from the judge, as testified to by a State Trooper.

    Holding

    Yes, because notice of an order of protection may be given either orally or in writing, or a combination of both, and testimony regarding the oral notice is admissible to evidence the fact that the statement was made, not for the truth of its content.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the array of evidence presented to the Grand Jury was sufficient to support all elements of the criminal contempt charge. The written order of protection, coupled with the State Trooper’s testimony, established that the defendant had sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and the person to whom it related (his wife). The court clarified that the State Trooper’s testimony regarding the judge’s statements was admissible because it was offered to prove that the statement was made, thereby establishing notice, and not to prove the truth of the statement itself. The court cited People v. Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1103, emphasizing that the evidence was “not for the truth of its content but to evidence the fact that the statement was made.” The court found that this evidence, in conjunction with the written order, satisfied the requirements for establishing notice for a criminal contempt charge. By allowing this combination of evidence, the court emphasizes the importance of ensuring defendants are fully aware of the terms of protective orders. This ruling helps to facilitate prosecutions for violations of such orders, thus enhancing the protection afforded to potential victims. The decision underscores that proving notice does not require strict adherence to formalistic rules of evidence when other reliable means exist to demonstrate actual knowledge of the order’s contents.

  • Parker v. City of Cohoes, 73 N.Y.2d 251 (1996): Special Relationship Exception to Municipal Immunity in Domestic Violence Cases

    Parker v. City of Cohoes, 73 N.Y.2d 251 (1996)

    A municipality can be held liable for failure to provide police protection when a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured party, particularly when an order of protection is in place and the police have direct contact with and make assurances to the victim.

    Summary

    This case concerns the liability of a municipality for failing to protect a woman who was murdered by her husband after police officers responded to a 911 call about a violation of an order of protection. The New York Court of Appeals held that a special relationship existed between the police and the victim, creating a question of fact as to whether the police acted reasonably under the circumstances. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the existence of the order of protection, direct contact between the police and the victim, and the victim’s justifiable reliance on the officers’ affirmative undertaking established the special relationship.

    Facts

    The decedent, Mrs. Parker (Swiggett), had an order of protection against her estranged husband, Anthony Swiggett, due to a history of abuse. On September 5, 1985, she called 911 to report that her husband had violated the order by entering her residence and throwing furniture into the yard. Police officers responded and found the husband at a neighbor’s house. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. The husband denied entering the residence. The officers contacted their supervisor and were advised that they needed to see the husband inside the premises to arrest him for violating the order of protection. The officers told the decedent that they could not arrest her husband based on the information they had but assured her they would act if further problems arose. After the officers left for a meal break, the decedent was fatally stabbed by her husband. He was later found covered in blood with a copy of the order of protection in his pocket.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding sufficient evidence of an affirmative duty to act, knowledge that inaction could lead to harm, and justifiable reliance on the defendants’ affirmative undertaking. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the defendants did not owe a special duty to the decedent and that the police department’s actions were reasonable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a special relationship existed between the Suffolk County Police Department and the decedent, creating a duty of care.

    2. Whether a question of fact exists regarding the reasonableness of the police department’s actions in securing protection for the decedent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the existence of an order of protection, direct contact between the police and the decedent, and the decedent’s justifiable reliance on the officers’ affirmative undertaking established a special relationship.

    2. Yes, because the evidence, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, raised a question of fact regarding the reasonableness of the officers’ actions in securing protection for the decedent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in Cuffy v. City of New York, which outlined the elements of a special relationship: (1) an assumption by the municipality of an affirmative duty to act, (2) knowledge that inaction could lead to harm, (3) direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party, and (4) justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking. The court reasoned that the order of protection satisfied the first two elements, as it constituted an assumption of an affirmative duty of protection and an awareness that inaction could lead to harm. The Court stated, “The order evinces a preincident legislative and judicial determination that its holder should be accorded a reasonable degree of protection from a particular individual” and “is presumptive evidence that the individual whose conduct is proscribed has already been found by a court to be a dangerous or violent person”. The direct contact requirement was met by the officers’ response to the 911 call. The court also found that the officers’ assurances to the decedent, coupled with their presence at the scene, supported a finding of justifiable reliance. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the officers’ actions was a question of fact for the jury, stating that such questions “concerning reasonableness are properly left for the fact finder under an examination of all the evidence.” The court distinguished this case from others where a general duty of police protection was alleged, clarifying that the specific circumstances created a special duty to the victim.