New York Law Review

Tag: Open Meetings Law

  • Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006): Determining When University Committees are Subject to Open Government Laws

    Perez v. City University, 6 N.Y.3d 522 (2006)

    A committee within a public university system performs a governmental function, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law, when it exercises responsibilities delegated by the legislature and functions as a proxy for authorized faculty councils.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee are subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law (OML) and Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The Court of Appeals held that these entities do perform a governmental function because they have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the legislature to the CUNY Board, and they function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by the CUNY bylaws. The court further clarified that while the OML does not prohibit secret ballots, FOIL requires a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots.

    Facts

    Petitioners Chong Kim and Aneudis Perez were denied access to meetings of the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee, respectively. Kim was turned away from a meeting where curriculum changes were approved via secret ballot. Perez was barred from an Executive Committee meeting where he sought to deliver a petition. The College Senate, established by the Governance Charter, is responsible for recommending policy on all college matters and formulating academic policy. The Executive Committee organizes the Senate’s work. The CUNY Board of Trustees delegated some of its authority to faculty councils; the College Senate acts in place of this council at Hostos Community College.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing the College Senate and Executive Committee were subject to OML and FOIL. Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the Senate was merely advisory and thus not subject to these laws. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Hostos Community College Senate and its Executive Committee perform a “governmental function” such that they are subject to the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law.
    2. Whether the Open Meetings Law or the Freedom of Information Law prohibits secret ballots by the College Senate.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the College Senate and its Executive Committee have been charged with responsibilities delegated by the Legislature to the CUNY Board and function as a proxy for the faculty councils authorized by CUNY bylaws.
    2. No, the Open Meetings Law does not prohibit secret ballots, but the Freedom of Information Law does because it requires a record of each member’s final vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that both the Open Meetings Law and the Freedom of Information Law aim to ensure transparency in governmental decision-making. The Court stated, “[I]n enacting the Open Meetings Law, the Legislature sought to ensure that ‘public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy’ (Public Officers Law § 100).” They reiterated that these laws should be construed liberally. To determine whether an entity performs a governmental function, the court considers the entity’s authority, power distribution, role, and relationship to affected parties. The Court distinguished this case from purely advisory bodies, emphasizing the Senate’s significant role in policy-making. The court highlighted that the College Senate is the sole legislative body on campus authorized to send proposals to the CUNY Board of Trustees. The court quoted from the lower court decision, stating, “[T]he college senate and the executive committee thereof constitute integral components of the governance structure of Hostos Community College. The senate and its executive committee perform functions of both advisory and determinative natures which are essential to the operation and administration of the college.” (195 Misc 2d 16, 33 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2002]). Regarding secret ballots, the Court noted that while the OML only requires a record of motions, proposals, resolutions, and other matters formally voted upon, the FOIL mandates a record of each member’s final vote, thus precluding secret ballots. The Court concluded that “under the Freedom of Information Law, voting by the College Senate and the Executive Committee may not be conducted by secret ballot.”

  • Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999): Defining “Public Body” Under Open Meetings Law

    Smith v. City University of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 707 (1999)

    An organization comprised of administrators, faculty members, and students authorized to review proposed budgets, allocate student activity fees, and authorize disbursements is deemed a “public body” performing a governmental function and is therefore subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law.

    Summary

    Smith v. City University of New York (CUNY) concerns whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc. is subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law. The Association, Inc. reviews budgets, allocates student activity fees, and authorizes disbursements. After the Association, Inc. held a closed meeting, Smith, a student, sued, claiming a violation of the Open Meetings Law. The Court of Appeals held that the Association, Inc. is a public body because it exercises a governmental function by managing student activity fees, and is therefore subject to the Open Meetings Law. The court emphasized the Association’s decision-making authority and control over student funds.

    Facts

    LaGuardia Community College, part of CUNY, collects student activity fees as a condition of enrollment. The Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., composed of administrators, faculty, and students, manages these fees. The Association, Inc. voted to suspend the student newspaper, The Bridge, after an article containing offensive statements about Jews was published. A subcommittee investigated the newspaper, and the Dean of Student Affairs disapproved a purchase order for the next issue, effectively suspending publication. At a closed meeting on March 30, 1994, the Association, Inc. lifted the suspension but imposed restrictions on The Bridge, including prepublication review. Two individuals, Smith and Maitland, were prevented from attending the meeting.

    Procedural History

    Smith and Maitland sued, alleging the closed meeting violated the Open Meetings Law. The Supreme Court declared the Association, Inc. a “public body,” ordered future compliance with the Open Meetings Law, and annulled actions taken at the closed meeting. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the Association, Inc. was not a public body because it performed merely an advisory function and the funds it managed were segregated from the University’s general revenues. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the Association, Inc. is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College Association, Inc., is a “public body” performing a governmental function, thus subject to New York State’s Open Meetings Law when it allocates student activity fees and regulates student publications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Association, Inc. exercises real and effective decision-making power by managing student activity fees delegated by CUNY and by regulating student publications, it performs a governmental function, making it a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Open Meetings Law, designed to ensure public business is conducted openly, applies to any entity performing a governmental function. The court emphasized that the Association, Inc.’s powers and functions, derived from State law through CUNY’s by-laws, extend beyond a mere advisory role. CUNY delegated its statutory power to administer student activity fees to the Association, Inc., giving it control over the student activity fee budget. The court also noted the Association, Inc.’s power to suspend, regulate, and reinstate student publications, demonstrating its substantial autonomy. While the funds were segregated from CUNY’s general revenues, the court held that mandatory student activity fees, collected by the State to support student activities at a public university, are public funds. Claims regarding the closed meeting itself were deemed time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations, but claims contesting the allocation of funds were timely. The court cited Matter of Panarella v Birenbaum, 32 NY2d 108 and Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 US 819, noting mandatory student fees are public funds. In defining “public body”, the court considered various criteria including the authority under which the entity was created, the power distribution, the nature of its role, and its relationship to affected parties, holding that the Association, Inc. possesses “real and effective decision-making power.” According to the court, “This Association, Inc., therefore, is manifestly not just a club or extracurricular activity.”

  • Gordon v. Village of Monticello, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 124 (1995): Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees Under Open Meetings Law

    Gordon v. Village of Monticello, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 124 (1995)

    A trial court has discretion to award attorney fees under New York’s Open Meetings Law when violations are intentional and flagrant, serving to encourage private citizens to enforce the law and promote government transparency.

    Summary

    This case concerns the awarding of attorney’s fees under New York’s Open Meetings Law. Citizens challenged the Village of Monticello Board of Trustees’ actions of secretly pre-arranging the redistribution of elected positions at a closed meeting, claiming it violated the Open Meetings Law. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the citizens, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court was justified in awarding attorney’s fees due to the intentional and flagrant nature of the violations.

    Facts

    The Board of Trustees of Monticello held a closed, executive session where they decided to create a full-time Village Attorney position and redistribute other elected leadership positions. At a subsequent public meeting, the Board enacted a resolution to create the Village Attorney position. The elected Village Justice was then appointed Village Attorney, the Mayor became Village Justice, the Deputy Mayor became Mayor, and the Assessor was appointed to the Board, effectively redistributing every elected position as pre-arranged in the closed session.

    Procedural History

    Citizens of Monticello sued, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law. The Supreme Court agreed, declaring the Board’s actions illegal and void. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision but reversed the trial court’s award of costs and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding attorney’s fees.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under Public Officers Law § 107(2) given the Board of Trustees’ violation of the Open Meetings Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court was justified in awarding attorney’s fees given the intentional and flagrant nature of the Open Meetings Law violations; the Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erroneously imposed an additional legal requirement onto the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the purpose of the Open Meetings Law: to ensure that public business is conducted openly and that citizens are informed about the actions of their elected officials. The Court noted that the statute should be liberally construed to achieve this purpose, quoting the legislative preamble which states, “It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials.”

    The Court distinguished this case from those involving technical, non-prejudicial infractions or unintentional violations of the Open Meetings Law. Here, the Board of Trustees intentionally circumvented the law to redistribute positions. The Court found the violations to be intentional and deceitful causing obvious prejudice to the plaintiffs. The court stated that “defendants’ actions ‘took place * * * in such a manner as to circumvent the Open Meetings Law quorum requirement’…that defendants later ‘stretched credulity’ in describing their conduct to the court, that there was good cause shown to void the actions taken…and that there had been ‘obvious prejudice’ to plaintiffs as a result of defendants’ intentional and deceitful conduct, an award of fees is justified”.

    The Court of Appeals also rejected the Appellate Division’s requirement of repeated violations or bad faith, stating that the possibility of recovering costs and attorneys’ fees encourages private citizens to bring meritorious lawsuits, thus advancing the statutory policy of government transparency. The court said, “In fact, it is very often the possibility of recovering costs and attorneys’ fees that gives private citizens like plaintiffs the impetus they need to bring meritorious lawsuits to enforce the Open Meetings Law thus advancing the statutory policy of keeping New Yorkers better apprised of the actions of their elected officials.”

  • American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Trustees of State University of New York, 79 N.Y.2d 927 (1992): Open Meetings Law and Federal Bodies

    79 N.Y.2d 927 (1992)

    A committee whose powers and functions derive solely from federal law is not a “public body” subject to New York’s Open Meetings Law, even if it operates within a state university.

    Summary

    The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) sought access to meetings of the Laboratory Animals Use Committee (LAUC) of the State University of New York (SUNY) at Stony Brook under New York’s Open Meetings Law. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the LAUC’s powers derived solely from federal law, it was not a “public body” as defined by the Open Meetings Law, regardless of its location within a state institution. The court explicitly did not address any other arguments raised by the Appellate Division.

    Facts

    SUNY Stony Brook established a Laboratory Animals Use Committee (LAUC). The ASPCA sought to attend the LAUC’s meetings, claiming they were subject to the Open Meetings Law. The LAUC’s purpose, powers, and functions were dictated by federal law and regulations concerning the use of animals in research. Federal law requires research facilities to form an Institutional Animal Committee (IAC) responsible for approving animal experiments and ensuring humane treatment standards.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted the ASPCA’s petition, granting access to the meetings. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, finding the LAUC was not subject to the Open Meetings Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but solely on the basis that the LAUC’s power derived from Federal Law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a committee, whose powers and functions derive solely from federal law and regulations, constitutes a “public body” subject to the requirements of New York’s Open Meetings Law.

    Holding

    No, because the Open Meetings Law excludes federal bodies from its scope, and the LAUC’s powers and functions derive solely from federal law, making it a federal body, not a state body subject to the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the definition of “public body” in Public Officers Law § 102(2), which includes entities performing a governmental function for the state or an agency or department thereof. The court reasoned that because the LAUC’s constituency, powers, and functions stemmed exclusively from federal law and regulations concerning animal welfare in research, it could not be considered a state body subject to the Open Meetings Law. The court stated, “It is thus evident that the Open Meetings Law excludes Federal bodies from its ambit.” Even if the LAUC could be characterized as a governmental entity, it was a federal one, outside the scope of the state law. The court dismissed the ASPCA’s reliance on a New York Department of Health regulation, noting that it didn’t grant the animal care committee any powers that would render it a governmental body under the Open Meetings Law. The decision turned entirely on the source of the committee’s authority, not its physical location or connection to a state entity. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the statutory definition of “public body” and avoided broadening the scope of the Open Meetings Law to encompass entities with federal mandates, stating, “The LAUC’s constituency, powers and functions derive solely from Federal law and regulations. Thus, even if it could be characterized as a governmental entity, it is at most a Federal body that is not covered under the Open Meetings Law.”

  • Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (1983): Establishes Presumption of Openness in Unemployment Hearings

    Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, 59 N.Y.2d 378 (1983)

    Unemployment insurance hearings are presumed open to the public and press unless a compelling reason for closure is demonstrated, and affected news media are given an opportunity to be heard.

    Summary

    This case addresses the closure of an unemployment insurance hearing to the public and press. Two attorneys who resigned from the State Attorney-General’s office applied for unemployment benefits. The administrative law judge granted their motion to close the hearing, denying a reporter’s request for a delay to allow counsel to argue against closure. The New York Court of Appeals held that unemployment insurance hearings are presumed open, and closure requires a compelling reason and an opportunity for the news media to be heard. Section 537 of the Labor Law, concerning confidential information, does not mandate closure of hearings, and the Court affirmed the order to provide the petitioner with a hearing transcript.

    Facts

    Two attorneys resigned from the State Attorney-General’s office due to concerns about violating the Code of Professional Responsibility related to a political corruption investigation. They applied for unemployment insurance, which was initially denied. At the subsequent hearing before an administrative law judge, the attorneys moved to close the hearing to the public. A reporter for the Herald Company requested a brief delay to allow the company’s counsel to oppose the closure, but this was denied, and the hearing proceeded behind closed doors. The initial denial of benefits was later withdrawn, and benefits were granted. The Herald Company’s request for a transcript of the closed hearing was denied.

    Procedural History

    The Herald Company initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking to vacate the closure order and obtain access to the hearing transcript. Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petition to the extent of directing that the petitioner be furnished with a copy of the transcript. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unemployment insurance hearing can be closed to the public and press based solely on the possibility that confidential information, as described in Section 537 of the Labor Law, might be disclosed.

    Holding

    No, because Section 537 of the Labor Law does not mandate closure of unemployment insurance hearings, and a presumption of openness applies unless a compelling reason for closure is demonstrated, and affected news media are given an opportunity to be heard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong public policy in New York of open judicial and administrative proceedings. It noted that exceptions to this presumption of openness must be explicitly stated by the legislature. The administrative law judge argued that Section 537 of the Labor Law created such an exception. However, the court found that Section 537, which protects the confidentiality of information acquired from employers or employees pursuant to the unemployment insurance program’s reporting requirements, does not mandate closure of hearings. The court reasoned that the absence of any provision for closure in Section 622 or its associated regulations, which detail hearing procedures, further supports the conclusion that Section 537 should not be interpreted as a blanket order of closure. The court acknowledged the potential for embarrassment or revelation of sensitive personal information during hearings but suggested that less drastic remedies, such as closing the hearing only during the presentation of specific evidence, could be employed when compelling reasons exist. The Court quoted Matter of Gannett Co. v De Pasquale, 43 NY2d 370, 381, stating that no hearing should be closed before affected members of the news media are given an opportunity to be heard. Regarding the specific facts of the case, the court found that an existing order prohibiting disclosure of Grand Jury matters did not justify closing the entire unemployment compensation hearing. The Court stated, “Merely because some of the testimony before the unemployment compensation hearing might touch on matters relating to the Grand Jury, however, did not justify closing the entire hearing or withholding a transcript of the remaining portions of the unemployment insurance hearing.”

  • Thomas v. Board of Education, Lindenhurst Union Free School District, 56 N.Y.2d 630 (1982): Discretion in Remedy for Open Meetings Violations

    Thomas v. Board of Education, Lindenhurst Union Free School District, 56 N.Y.2d 630 (1982)

    A court has discretion in determining the appropriate remedy for violations of open meeting laws, including the decision whether or not to void actions taken during improperly convened executive sessions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a probationary teacher, Thomas, who was terminated by the Lindenhurst Board of Education during an improperly convened executive session. Thomas sued, alleging violations of New York’s open meeting laws. The trial court initially sided with Thomas, but the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the termination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that even though the executive session violated the Public Officers Law and Education Law, the decision of whether to void the Board’s action rested within the court’s discretion and that such discretion was properly exercised here. The court emphasized that a per se rule requiring reinstatement was inappropriate, and the appellate court did not abuse its discretion.

    Facts

    The Lindenhurst Board of Education held a public meeting on June 4, 1980, during which they moved into an executive session. During that closed session, the Board voted to terminate the petitioner, Thomas, who was a probationary teacher. The Board did not make a public motion identifying the specific subject to be discussed in the executive session prior to convening the session.

    Procedural History

    Thomas brought a proceeding against the Board, alleging that the executive session violated the “open meeting” provisions of the Public Officers Law and Education Law, seeking reinstatement. The Supreme Court initially ruled that the Board’s dismissal of Thomas was invalid and awarded attorney fees. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s decision by reinstating the Board’s original determination to dismiss Thomas. Thomas appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by refusing to order Thomas’s reinstatement after determining that the Board of Education’s executive session was improperly convened in violation of the Public Officers Law and Education Law.

    Holding

    No, because Section 102 of the Public Officers Law gives the court discretion to determine whether to void an action taken in violation of the open meetings law. The Appellate Division expressly stated that it was exercising its discretion in denying reinstatement, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of that discretion. Further, even under the Education Law, which does not explicitly grant such discretion, courts have the power to determine appropriate remedies for violations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Board’s executive session was improperly convened because it violated the requirement under Subdivision 1 of section 100 of the Public Officers Law that a public body may only conduct an executive session “upon a majority vote of its total membership, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or subjects to be considered”. However, the court focused on Section 102 of the Public Officers Law, which states that the decision to void an action taken in violation of the statute is a matter of judicial discretion. The Court stated that the Appellate Division explicitly exercised its discretion in denying Thomas’s request for reinstatement, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of that discretion on the record. The court also extended this discretionary power to violations of the Education Law, even though it lacks explicit language vesting courts with discretion. The Court of Appeals disapproved of the holding in Matter of United Teachers of Northport v Northport Union Free School Dist., which suggested a contrary proposition. The court thus emphasized that while open meeting laws are important, a per se rule requiring reinstatement is too rigid, and the specific facts and circumstances of each case should be considered when fashioning a remedy.

  • Goodwin v. Town of Guilderland, 42 N.Y.2d 166 (1977): Discretion in Enforcing Open Meetings Law

    Goodwin v. Town of Guilderland, 42 N.Y.2d 166 (1977)

    Courts have discretion in determining whether to void actions taken by a public body in violation of New York’s Open Meetings Law, and judicial relief is warranted only upon a showing of good cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforcement of New York’s Open Meetings Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a petition seeking to void actions taken by the Town of Guilderland, holding that courts have discretion to grant relief under the Open Meetings Law and that such relief is only warranted upon a showing of good cause. The court emphasized the importance of public accountability but also recognized that not every violation of the Open Meetings Law automatically triggers enforcement sanctions. The appellants failed to demonstrate the requisite “good cause,” leading to the dismissal of their petition.

    Facts

    The specific factual details of the Open Meetings Law violation are not extensively detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum opinion. However, the core issue revolves around whether actions taken by the Town of Guilderland violated the Open Meetings Law, thus prompting the appellants to seek judicial intervention to void those actions.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where the appellants sought to void actions taken by the Town of Guilderland, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law. The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled against the appellants. The appellants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, effectively upholding the Town of Guilderland’s actions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a violation of the New York Open Meetings Law automatically requires a court to void the actions taken by the public body, or whether the court has discretion to determine if such a remedy is appropriate based on a showing of “good cause”.

    Holding

    No, because the Legislature, in enacting Public Officers Law § 102, subd. 1, vested in the courts the discretion to grant remedial relief, indicating that not every breach of the Open Meetings Law automatically triggers enforcement sanctions; judicial relief is warranted only upon a showing of good cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning centered on the language of the Open Meetings Law (Public Officers Law, §§ 95-106), particularly § 102, which grants courts discretion in providing remedies for violations. The Court emphasized that the law’s purpose is to ensure public awareness and observation of public officials’ performance. However, the inclusion of discretionary language indicates that the Legislature did not intend for every violation to automatically result in the voiding of the public body’s actions. The Court stated, “Inclusion by the Legislature of this language vesting in the courts the discretion to grant remedial relief makes it abundantly clear that not every breach of the ‘Open Meetings Law’ automatically triggers its enforcement sanctions.” The Court further reasoned that “Judicial relief is warranted only upon a showing of good cause (§ 102, subd 1.) Since appellants have failed to meet this burden, their petition was properly dismissed.” This indicates a balancing act between promoting transparency and avoiding unnecessary disruption of governmental operations due to minor or inconsequential violations. The absence of a demonstration of “good cause” for judicial intervention was fatal to the appellants’ claim.

  • Orange County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d 947 (1978): Interpretation of Open Meetings Law

    Orange County Publications, Division of Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Council of the City of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d 947 (1978)

    The purpose and intention of the State Legislature in enacting an open meetings law are interpreted as expressed in the language of the statute and its preamble.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of New York’s Open Meetings Law (Public Officers Law, Article 7). Orange County Publications sought access to meetings of the City Council of Newburgh. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, which held that the City Council was subject to the Open Meetings Law. The court emphasized that the Legislature’s intent is to be gleaned from the statute’s language and preamble, leaving the evaluation of the policy’s merits to the Legislature itself.

    Facts

    Orange County Publications, a newspaper, sought to attend meetings of the City Council of the City of Newburgh. The City Council argued that certain meetings were not subject to the Open Meetings Law. The newspaper contended that all meetings should be open to the public as per Article 7 of the Public Officers Law.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where Orange County Publications likely sought a writ of mandamus or similar order to compel the City Council to comply with the Open Meetings Law. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of Orange County Publications, holding that the Open Meetings Law applied to the City Council. The City Council appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article 7 of the Public Officers Law (the Open Meetings Law) applies to the meetings of the City Council of the City of Newburgh, requiring such meetings to be open to the public.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Legislature’s intent, as expressed in the language and preamble of the Open Meetings Law, is that such governmental bodies conduct their meetings openly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order based on the reasoning outlined in Justice Samuel Rabin’s opinion at the Appellate Division. The Court stated that the interpretation of the Open Meetings Law should be based on the expressed intent of the Legislature in the statute itself and its preamble. The court explicitly avoided endorsing or criticizing the policy behind the law, stating that such evaluations are the exclusive domain of the Legislature. The court acknowledged that there are potential drawbacks and benefits to both open and closed meetings, but that the balancing of these factors is a legislative, not a judicial, function. The court also noted the existence of exemptions within the Open Meetings Law itself (executive sessions), illustrating the Legislature’s ongoing consideration of the practical implications of the law. Judge Cooke concurred, emphasizing the broad public policy expressed by the Legislature in Public Officers Law § 95.