New York Law Review

Tag: one person one vote

  • Franklin v. Mandeville, 32 N.Y.2d 233 (1973): Weighted Voting Plans and the One Person, One Vote Principle

    Franklin v. Mandeville, 32 N.Y.2d 233 (1973)

    While the one person, one vote principle is a guiding ideal for local government apportionment, complete mathematical perfection is not required, and a fair measure of superenfranchisement and disenfranchisement can be tolerated for the sake of preserving local units and ensuring effective governance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a weighted voting plan adopted by the Nassau County Board of Supervisors. The court had previously rejected a prior plan because it excessively disenfranchised residents of the Town of Hempstead. The new plan aimed to address this by distributing voting power among the six supervisors based on population, but with certain adjustments to avoid granting any one supervisor or town absolute control. The court ultimately upheld the revised plan, acknowledging that strict mathematical equality is not always achievable or desirable at the local level, and that preserving the integrity of political subdivisions is a valid consideration.

    Facts

    Following the 1970 census, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors was ordered to create a new apportionment plan after a prior plan was struck down. The board devised a weighted voting system where each of the six supervisors was allocated votes based on the population of their respective town or city: Hempstead (2 supervisors) with 35 votes each, Oyster Bay with 32 votes, North Hempstead with 23 votes, Long Beach with 3 votes, and Glen Cove with 2 votes. A computer analysis was used to determine the allocation. The total number of votes was 130. To prevent Hempstead (representing over 50% of the population) from having absolute control, a majority required 71 votes instead of 66, and a two-thirds vote required 92 votes instead of 87.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs challenged the new weighted voting plan in Special Term, arguing that it contained the same flaws as the previously rejected plan and that weighted voting was per se unacceptable. Special Term agreed and ordered the board to devise a new plan based on multi-member or single-member districts. The Board of Supervisors appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a weighted voting plan for a county board of supervisors is constitutional, even if it does not achieve perfect mathematical equality in representation, when it aims to preserve the integrity of local political subdivisions and ensure effective governance.

    Holding

    Yes, because while the one person, one vote principle is a guiding ideal, complete mathematical perfection is not required at the local level, and a fair measure of superenfranchisement and disenfranchisement can be tolerated to preserve local units and ensure effective governance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized that strict adherence to the one person, one vote principle is more critical at the congressional and state levels than at the local level. Citing Abate v. Mundt and Mahan v. Howell, the court acknowledged that variations from a pure population standard might be justified by state policy considerations such as preserving the integrity of political subdivisions. The court emphasized that local legislative bodies have fewer members and districts, making it more difficult to achieve numerical equality. The court also noted that there are numerous local government units, and flexibility is desirable to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. The court stated, “We now know that if complete mathematical perfection is not achieved at the local level there need be no reason to discard an apportionment plan solely for that reason. It has now become clear that a fair measure of superenfranchisement and disenfranchisement can be tolerated for the sake of the preservation of local units.” The court found that the plan before it comported with the standards set forth in Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors of County of Washington as closely as possible, given the unique situation created by Hempstead’s size and the disparities in population among the other units. The court concluded that the plan allowed Hempstead’s citizens to have a weighty voice in the legislative process while preventing them from always overwhelming the citizens of the other units. The court emphasized that they were not abandoning the one person, one vote principle at the local level, but that the plan before them met a sufficient standard when measured against the law as it now is with regard to local government. The court noted that the revised plan moved close to one person, one vote without granting Hempstead 100% voting power, and the total deviation of 7.3% was tolerable within the contemplation of Abate and other recent cases. The court reversed the judgment and granted the appellants’ cross motion approving the plan.

  • Franklin v. Mandeville, 28 N.Y.2d 68 (1971): Weighted Voting and Equal Protection

    Franklin v. Mandeville, 28 N.Y.2d 68 (1971)

    A county charter provision that permanently restricts the voting power of a town or city’s supervisors, regardless of population size, violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to Nassau County’s weighted voting plan, where the Town of Hempstead, despite having a majority of the county’s population, was restricted from exercising a majority vote on the Board of Supervisors due to a charter provision. The New York Court of Appeals held that the charter provision, which capped the voting power of any single town or city’s supervisors at 50%, unconstitutionally deprived residents of equal representation, violating the one person, one vote principle. The court ordered reapportionment but modified the lower court’s order to delay implementation until after the 1970 census data became available.

    Facts

    The Town of Hempstead constituted 57.12% of Nassau County’s population.
    Under the existing weighted voting plan, Hempstead’s representatives could cast only 49.6% of the Board of Supervisors’ vote.
    The Nassau County charter (§ 104, subd. 2) stipulated that “nor shall the supervisor or supervisors of any town, or city be entitled to cast more than fifty per centum of the total vote of said board.”
    Two previous attempts to reapportion the board via referendums in 1965 and 1967 failed.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs challenged the weighted voting plan.
    Special Term granted summary judgment, declaring the plan unconstitutional.
    The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Special Term’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a county charter provision that limits the voting power of any town or city, regardless of population, violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the charter provision perpetuates inequality and deprives residents of a town or city with a majority population from exercising a majority vote, regardless of how large that majority might be now or in the future.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the key issue was not merely the existing inequality but the fact that the charter provision mandated and perpetuated it. It stated, “Important as is the fact of the present inequality, it is of even greater moment that inequality in some degree is mandated and, indeed, perpetuated by the charter provision”.
    The court distinguished this case from Abate v. Mundt (25 N.Y.2d 309), noting that the charter provision actively prevented any town or city from achieving majority representation, regardless of population growth.
    The court acknowledged the population growth in Hempstead and Nassau County, highlighting how this exacerbated the inequality created by the charter provision.
    The court ordered reapportionment to address the constitutional violation. However, it modified the lower court’s order to postpone the implementation of a new plan until after the 1970 census data was available. The existing plan was to remain in effect as a temporary measure until then.

  • Blaikie v. Wagner, 26 N.Y.2d 31 (1970): Judicial Elections and the One Person, One Vote Principle

    Blaikie v. Wagner, 26 N.Y.2d 31 (1970)

    The “one person, one vote” principle does not apply to the election of judges, as their function is to apply the law, not to represent particular constituencies, and the volume and nature of litigation, not population, should guide the distribution of judges.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the “one person, one vote” principle applies to the election of judges. The New York Court of Appeals held that it does not. The court reasoned that judges are not representatives of particular constituencies but are meant to apply the law impartially. The allocation of judges should be based on the volume and nature of litigation in different areas, not solely on population. This decision clarifies the distinct roles of the judiciary and the legislature, emphasizing that judicial functions differ significantly from those of representative government.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs argued that the method of electing judges to the New York City Civil Court violated the “one person, one vote” principle. They contended that the distribution of judges should be proportional to the population in each district. The plaintiffs sought to apply principles of electoral districting to the judicial selection process, arguing that unequal distribution of judges based on population diluted their voting power.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled against the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “one person, one vote” principle, which requires legislative districts to be roughly equal in population, applies to the election of judges in the New York City Civil Court.

    Holding

    No, because the function of judges is to apply the law, not to represent particular constituencies; therefore, the principle of equal representation based on population does not govern the allocation or election of judges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “one person, one vote” principle is designed to ensure representative government in legislative bodies, which are responsible for enacting laws that govern all citizens. The judiciary, however, has a fundamentally different role. Judges are not meant to represent particular points of view or constituencies. Instead, their function is to apply the law impartially to the cases before them.

    The court emphasized that the allocation of judges should be based on the volume and nature of litigation arising in various areas, not solely on population. “Population is not necessarily the sole, or even the most relevant, criterion for determining the distribution of state judges. The volume and nature of litigation arising in various areas of the state bears no direct relationship to the population of those areas.” (quoting New York State Assn. of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 153-154).

    The court distinguished between the discretion exercised by the legislature in establishing electoral districts and the discretion required in determining how judges are allocated and chosen. The role of a judge is to apply the law, not to champion a particular cause or represent a specific constituency. The court affirmed the order, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the “one person, one vote” principle should apply to judicial elections.

  • Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94 (1965): “One Person, One Vote” at the Municipal Level

    Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94 (1965)

    The principle of “one person, one vote,” derived from the Equal Protection Clause, applies to elective legislative bodies at the municipal level, requiring substantial equality of population among districts.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of a districting plan for the Common Council of Binghamton, NY. Plaintiffs challenged the existing plan and a subsequent revision, arguing they violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the revised plan failed to meet constitutional requirements because it did not ensure substantial equality of population among the districts. The court emphasized that the “one person, one vote” principle applies to municipal legislative bodies and that the latest official census should be used to determine population for districting purposes.

    Facts

    The City of Binghamton’s Common Council consisted of 13 members, each elected from one of the city’s 13 wards. The 1960 census revealed a significant disparity in population among the wards, ranging from 542 to 11,426 residents. After a court challenge, the Council proposed a new plan (Local Law No. 1 of 1965) to reduce the Council to 7 members elected from 7 new districts, formed by combining existing wards. Even under this new plan, substantial population disparities persisted, ranging from 7,863 to 15,808 residents per district, according to the 1960 census. The Council attempted to justify the plan by using updated population estimates and excluding patients at a state hospital from the population count of one district.

    Procedural History

    Residents and voters of Binghamton sued the Common Council, alleging the districting plan violated equal protection. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the existing scheme unconstitutional. After the Council enacted Local Law No. 1 of 1965, the plaintiffs again challenged it. The trial court found the new plan also unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principle of “one person, one vote” applies to elective legislative bodies at the municipal level.

    2. Whether Binghamton’s Local Law No. 1 of 1965, creating a new districting plan for the Common Council, met constitutional requirements of equal protection.

    3. Whether the city could use its own population estimates instead of the latest federal census data for districting purposes.

    4. Whether the city could exclude patients at a state hospital from the population count for districting purposes.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Equal Protection Clause requires that a person has a substantial right to be heard and to participate through elected representatives in the business of government on an equal basis with all other individuals, regardless of whether that government is at the state or municipal level.

    2. No, because the plan did not provide substantial equality of population among the districts, entailing more than a minor deviation from the “one person, one vote” principle.

    3. No, because the state has mandated that the latest federal census be used to determine population for districting purposes.

    4. No, because excluding the patients from the districting plan without investigating relevant factors like prior residence and voting history was arbitrary and discriminatory.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “one person, one vote” principle, established in prior Supreme Court cases regarding state legislative apportionment, extends to municipal legislative bodies. Local governmental units derive their powers from the state, and if the state must adhere to population-based representation, then so must the municipalities to which it delegates power. The court stated: “[I]f, as seems evident, the thrust of the Supreme Court’s decisions is that it is inherent within the concept of ‘equal protection’ that a person has a substantial right to be heard and to participate, through his elected representatives, in the business of government on an equal basis with all other individuals, no reason or justification exists for differentiating, so far as that right is concerned, between the general governmental business carried on in the highest legislative organs of the State and that conducted, by virtue of a delegation of authority, in municipal law-making bodies.”

    The court found that Local Law No. 1 failed to achieve substantial equality of population among the districts. Even using the city’s own updated population figures, significant discrepancies existed. The court emphasized that the “overriding objective” of any districting plan “must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen.” The court noted that the relatively small population and compact geographic area of Binghamton made it feasible to create a districting plan that more closely approximated equality of representation.

    The court also rejected the city’s use of its own population estimates instead of the latest federal census. It cited the state constitution and various statutes that mandate the use of the federal census for determining population. “[T]he declared policy is readily apparent and reason dictates that the most recent official census be employed in this area as well. Reliance upon such a source will assure periodic, impartial population data on the basis of which an apportionment or districting plan may be initially developed and thereafter regularly revised.”

    Finally, the court held that excluding patients at the state hospital from the population count was arbitrary and discriminatory. The court noted that many of the patients were from the Binghamton area, voluntarily admitted, and entitled to vote. The court cited Davis v. Mann, drawing an analogy to the improper exclusion of military personnel. To treat these patients as if they did not exist is to depart, improperly, from the concept of population-based legislative representation.