New York Law Review

Tag: officer safety

  • People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007): Justifying Minimal Intrusion During Warrant Execution

    People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007)

    When executing an arrest warrant, a minimal police intrusion, such as asking an individual to show their hands, is justified if officers have a reasonable belief that the individual may be armed and dangerous, based on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    During the execution of arrest warrants for a probation violator, officers found the defendant in an apartment with two other men. After discovering weapons near the other two men, officers asked the defendant to show his hands because he was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on them. Upon doing so, a handgun was revealed. The New York Court of Appeals held that asking the defendant to shift his position was a minimal and justified intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a reasonable basis to believe he might be armed and dangerous. This case illustrates the balance between individual privacy rights and officer safety during warrant executions.

    Facts

    Probation officers went to an apartment to execute two felony arrest warrants against a probation violator. Upon entering the apartment, they found three men, including the probationer and the defendant. After arresting the probationer, officers found loaded handguns near the other man on the floor. The defendant was sitting on a couch, fidgeting, mumbling, and sitting on his hands. Officer Groves asked the defendant to shift his position and show his hands. The defendant initially hesitated but eventually complied, revealing a loaded 9mm handgun under his thigh.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the handgun as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the search was a reasonable and lawful security sweep. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during the execution of arrest warrants in an apartment, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to ask the defendant to shift his position and show his hands, given that the officers had already discovered two loaded handguns near the defendant’s companions?

    Holding

    Yes, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable belief that the defendant could be armed and dangerous, justifying the minimal intrusion of asking him to shift his position and show his hands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct under the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished this case from a protective sweep, stating that Maryland v. Buie did not apply because the circumstances did not involve searching for hidden individuals who posed a threat. Instead, the Court emphasized balancing the government’s interest in officer safety against the individual’s right to privacy and personal security. The court applied a dual inquiry: whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances. The court found that asking the defendant to show his hands was justified at its inception because the officers had discovered two loaded handguns near defendant’s companions, and the defendant was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on his hands. The intrusion was minimal – merely asking the defendant to shift his position. The court deferred to the suppression court’s finding of reasonableness, stating “the determination of the suppression court with its peculiar advantages of having seen and heard” the testimony is entitled to great deference (Prochilo, 41 NY2d at 761). The Court concluded that the limited police action was reasonable, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.

  • People v. Mundo, 99 N.Y.2d 55 (2002): Vehicle Search After Removal of Occupants

    99 N.Y.2d 55 (2002)

    Under the New York State Constitution, after a lawful stop of a vehicle and removal of its occupants, a limited search of the vehicle is permissible only if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and an articulable basis to fear for officer safety due to an actual and specific danger, such as a substantial likelihood of a weapon in the vehicle.

    Summary

    Police lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, but the vehicle twice pulled away. During a third attempt to stop the vehicle, the officers observed the defendant, a passenger, making furtive movements in the backseat. After the occupants were removed and patted down, police searched the backseat, found an access panel to the trunk, smelled a chemical associated with cocaine, and discovered a kilogram of cocaine in the trunk. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search, finding the totality of the circumstances created an actual and specific danger to the officers, justifying the limited search. The furtive movements, combined with the driver’s attempts to evade the police, gave rise to a reasonable fear for the officers’ safety.

    Facts

    Two officers observed a vehicle make an illegal right turn on a red light. They activated their lights to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle pulled away as they approached. The officers pursued the vehicle, which stopped again but then drove away a second time. During the third pursuit, the vehicle nearly hit a pedestrian, and officers observed the defendant, a backseat passenger, turning and making a movement as if hiding something. After finally stopping the vehicle, officers removed all occupants and patted them down for weapons.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division modified the conviction on other grounds but otherwise affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the search.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the New York State Constitution, the officers’ search of the vehicle’s backseat after lawfully stopping the vehicle, removing the occupants, and patting them down was justified by an articulable basis to fear for their safety.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s furtive movements in the backseat during the pursuit, combined with the driver’s repeated attempts to evade the police and disregard for public safety, created an actual and specific danger to the officers’ safety, justifying a limited search of the area where the furtive movements were observed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior holdings in People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224 (1989) and People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707 (1997), which established that a vehicle search after the occupants have been removed requires both reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and an articulable basis to fear for the officers’ safety. The Court distinguished this case from Torres, where a search was deemed unconstitutional because there was no specific threat to the officers after the occupants were removed. In Carvey, the presence of a bulletproof vest, combined with furtive movements, created a substantial likelihood of a weapon in the vehicle. The Court in Mundo stated, “Indeed, there may well be circumstances where, following a lawful stop, facts revealed during a proper inquiry or other information gathered during the course of the encounter lead to the conclusion that a weapon located within the vehicle presents an actual and specific danger to the officers’ safety sufficient to justify a further intrusion, notwithstanding the suspect’s inability to gain immediate access to that weapon.” Here, the Court found that the repeated attempts to evade the police, nearly hitting a pedestrian, and the defendant’s furtive movements constituted an articulable basis to fear for the officers’ safety, justifying the limited search of the backseat area. The dissent argued that the majority broadened the exception set forth in Carvey to the point that it consumed the rule, because the officers had already removed the occupants from the vehicle and failed to articulate a specific concern for their safety from a weapon in the car.

  • People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707 (1997): Justifying a Vehicle Search Based on Specific Threats to Officer Safety

    People v. Carvey, 89 N.Y.2d 707 (1997)

    When a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and an articulable basis to fear for their safety, they may intrude upon a suspect’s person or personal effects only to the extent necessary to protect themselves from harm; however, specific facts, like wearing a bulletproof vest and furtive movements, can justify a vehicle search even after occupants are removed.

    Summary

    Carvey was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation. Officers noticed Carvey wearing a bulletproof vest and saw him making a furtive movement as if placing something under his seat. After removing all occupants from the car, officers searched the area under Carvey’s seat and found a gun. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was justified because the bulletproof vest, combined with the furtive movement, gave the officers a reasonable basis to believe a weapon was present and posed an immediate threat to their safety. This case clarifies the exception to the rule that a vehicle search is unlawful once suspects are removed and patted down without incident.

    Facts

    At 1:20 a.m., police stopped a car for lacking a rear license plate. An officer noticed Carvey, a passenger in the rear seat, bend down and place something under the seat with his right hand. The officer also observed that Carvey was wearing a bulletproof vest under his sweatshirt. All four occupants were removed from the car. After patting Carvey down, an officer reached into the car under the rear passenger seat and recovered a gun from the spot where Carvey had been seated.

    Procedural History

    Carvey moved to suppress the weapon and his subsequent statements, arguing they were the result of an unconstitutional search. The suppression court denied the motion, finding the stop and subsequent search lawful. Carvey pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, after lawfully stopping a vehicle and removing its occupants, police officers may conduct a search of the vehicle’s interior based on reasonable suspicion of a weapon, when the suspect was wearing a bulletproof vest and made furtive movements.

    Holding

    Yes, because the combination of Carvey wearing a bulletproof vest and his act of placing something under the seat gave the officers a reasonable basis to conclude that a weapon was in the vehicle and presented an actual and specific danger to their safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Torres, which established a narrow exception to the general rule that a vehicle search is unlawful once the suspects have been removed and patted down without incident. The court emphasized that while reasonable suspicion alone is insufficient, facts that lead to the conclusion that a weapon presents an actual and specific danger to officer safety can justify a further intrusion. The court distinguished this case from Torres, where an anonymous tip was deemed insufficient, and People v. Ellis, where bullets found during a frisk provided probable cause for a search. The Court reasoned that a bulletproof vest, unlike an empty holster, demonstrates a readiness and willingness to use a deadly weapon. Combined with Carvey’s suspicious movements, this created a reasonable belief that a weapon was present and posed a threat. As the court noted, “[t]he whole purpose of the wearing of the vest is to make it more feasible to go armed, [and] to enhance the advantage of doing so.” The court emphasized that the intrusion was limited to the area where Carvey had been seated. The court explicitly declined to address whether probable cause to search the entire vehicle existed, as that issue had not been decided below.

  • People v. Carvey, 74 N.Y.2d 907 (1989): Justifying a Search Incident to a Lawful Stop for Officer Safety

    People v. Carvey, 74 N.Y.2d 907 (1989)

    During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer may conduct a limited search of items within the immediate reach of a vehicle’s occupant if it is reasonably necessary to ensure the officer’s safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer’s action of shining a flashlight into a plastic bag at a suspect’s feet during a lawful traffic stop was justified for officer safety. The court reasoned that because the bag was within the suspect’s immediate reach while he was still in the vehicle, a cursory examination was permissible to ensure it did not contain a weapon or other dangerous instrumentality. This case distinguishes itself from cases where the suspect is removed from the vehicle before the search.

    Facts

    Police Officer Sherlock received a report of an abduction involving men in a grey Volvo. He spotted a matching vehicle and pulled it over. Sergeant Rivera, arriving on the scene, noticed a plastic bag at defendant Carvey’s feet, who was a passenger. Without opening the bag, Sergeant Rivera shined his flashlight through it, suspected it contained marihuana, and ordered Carvey out. A subsequent search revealed a loaded revolver on Carvey’s person.

    Procedural History

    Carvey was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the arrest, arguing the search was unlawful. The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the motion after a Mapp hearing. Carvey pleaded guilty, and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during a lawful traffic stop, Sergeant Rivera exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by reaching into the car and shining his flashlight through the plastic bag at defendant’s feet?

    Holding

    No, because the sergeant’s actions were reasonably necessary to ensure that the bag, which was well within defendant’s immediate reach, did not contain a weapon or some other instrumentality that posed a threat to the officers’ safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the search was justified under the circumstances to protect the officers. The court distinguished this case from People v. Torres, where a search of a bag after the suspect had been removed from the vehicle was deemed unlawful. In Torres, the court found that isolating the suspect negated the need to protect officer safety via an immediate search of the bag. Here, because Carvey was still in the car and the bag was within his reach, the police were justified in conducting the limited examination. The court emphasized the importance of officer safety during traffic stops, stating that the “cursory examination of the bag occurred while defendant was still sitting in the car. Since, at that point, the bag was still within defendant’s reach, the police were justified in examining it.” The court applied the principle that searches incident to a lawful stop must be “reasonably related to the need to protect the officers’ safety”. The court cited Terry v. Ohio in support of the principle that police officers can take reasonable steps to ensure their safety during an encounter with a suspect.

  • People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989): Handcuffing During a Terry Stop

    People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378 (1989)

    The use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a Terry stop into a full-blown arrest if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures to ensure the safety of the officers and the public.

    Summary

    Defendant Allen was apprehended by plain-clothes police officers responding to a radio report of an armed robbery. Allen and three other black males were seen running from the direction of the crime. The officers, identifying themselves, approached the group, who then scattered. Allen led an officer into a dark alley, where he was eventually handcuffed. Before any questioning, Allen spontaneously admitted his involvement in the robbery and moved to suppress this statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that handcuffing Allen in the alley did not automatically constitute an arrest, as the officers’ actions were reasonable to ensure their safety given the circumstances. Therefore, the statement was admissible.

    Facts

    Three plain-clothes police officers received a radio report of an armed robbery in progress involving four black males with multiple guns. Moments later, near the crime scene, they observed Allen and three other black males running away. The officers identified themselves and approached the group, who scattered and fled. Allen led one officer into a dark alley. The officer, concerned for his safety, called for backup. Allen was apprehended while attempting to scale a wall in the alley, then handcuffed and moved to a brighter area for a search and questioning. Allen spontaneously admitted his complicity in the robbery immediately after being handcuffed, but before any questioning occurred.

    Procedural History

    Allen moved to suppress his statements, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause when handcuffed. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and Allen was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the handcuffing of a suspect during a Terry stop, based on reasonable suspicion, automatically escalates the encounter into a full-blown arrest requiring probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because, under the circumstances presented, the police officers were entitled to handcuff defendant to effect his nonarrest detention in order to ensure their own safety while they removed him to a more suitable location to pat him down for weapons.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the application of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into a full arrest. The critical inquiry is whether the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that police officers in rapidly developing and dangerous situations must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety. The court stated, “Where, as here, police officers find themselves in a rapidly developing and dangerous situation presenting an imminent threat to their well-being, they must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety and they should not be expected ‘to await the glint of steel’ before doing so.” In this case, the court considered factors such as the poor lighting in the alley and the officers’ reasonable belief that Allen might be armed. The court found that handcuffing Allen was a justified, limited measure to prevent him from accessing a concealed weapon while being moved to a safer location.

  • People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980): Justification for Protective Pat-Down Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980)

    A police officer is justified in conducting a protective pat-down for weapons when specific and articulable facts, combined with rational inferences, lead the officer to reasonably believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a police officer may conduct a protective search for weapons without probable cause for arrest. The Court of Appeals held that a detective’s actions were justified when the defendant, after being questioned about purchasing a holster, placed his hand in his pocket and refused to remove it. The court emphasized the importance of officer safety and the need to allow officers to take reasonable precautions when they have a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous, even if probable cause for arrest is lacking. The purchase of the holster provided the necessary predicate for the officer’s inquiry and subsequent protective action.

    Facts

    Detective Fougere observed the defendant purchase a holster for a .25 caliber automatic pistol in a novelty shop. The detective followed the defendant and, after identifying himself as a police officer and showing his shield, asked the defendant why he bought the holster. The defendant responded by placing his hand in his coat pocket. Despite being instructed to remove his hand, the defendant refused. The detective then grabbed the defendant’s hand through the coat pocket and felt a gun.

    Procedural History

    The lower court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun as evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the detective’s actions in grabbing the defendant’s hand through his coat pocket, leading to the discovery of the gun, constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the detective had a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant was armed and dangerous, justifying the limited intrusion to ensure the detective’s safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Brown v. Texas, where the only basis for suspicion was that the defendant’s presence in an alleyway “looked suspicious.” Here, the defendant’s purchase of a holster provided a sufficient basis for the detective’s inquiry. While the purchase itself was not criminal, it created a reasonable suspicion that the defendant might possess a gun. The court emphasized that the encounter was not a seizure until the defendant refused to remove his hand from his pocket.

    The court reasoned that the defendant’s act of placing his hand in his pocket and refusing to remove it, when combined with the prior observation of the holster purchase, created a reasonable fear for the detective’s safety, justifying the protective action. The court cited Terry v. Ohio, noting that an officer may take reasonable steps to protect themselves when they have reason to believe they are dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether there is probable cause to arrest. The court stated, “Under those circumstances it is reasonable to infer, as did the courts below, that he grabbed defendant’s hand to protect himself, even though he never expressly so testified. Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Terry v Ohio (392 US 1, 27) he had a right to do so ‘regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.’”

    The court distinguished People v. Prochilo, where there was no indication that the object in the defendant’s pocket was a gun. In this case, the holster purchase directly suggested the presence of a gun, justifying the detective’s protective action. The court concluded that the purchase of the holster, combined with the defendant’s actions, provided sufficient justification for the detective’s actions under CPL 140.50, subd 3.

  • People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964): Legality of Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (1964)

    Police may stop and question a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, as an incident to that inquiry, conduct a limited “frisk” of the outer clothing for weapons if they reasonably believe they are in danger.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police stop and frisk conducted before New York’s “stop and frisk” law was enacted. Detectives observed two men, including Rivera, acting suspiciously in an area known for crime. The men looked into a bar window, walked away, returned, and then rapidly walked away when they noticed the detectives. The detectives stopped Rivera, frisked him, and discovered a loaded gun. The court considered whether the police action of stopping and frisking Rivera was justified under the Fourth Amendment, ultimately holding that, under the circumstances, the stop and frisk was reasonable given the need to protect the officers and maintain public order.

    Facts

    On May 25, 1962, at 1:30 a.m., three plainclothes detectives were patrolling in an unmarked car near 7th Street and Avenue C in Manhattan. Detective Bennett observed Rivera and another man behaving suspiciously for about five minutes. The men repeatedly looked into the window of a bar and grill. Rivera looked towards the detectives’ car, said something to his companion, and both men began walking rapidly away. Detective Bennett described the area as having “quite a bit of crime…Muggings, stick-ups, assaults, larcenies, burglaries.” The detective stopped Rivera and, for his own protection, patted down the outside of Rivera’s clothing, feeling what he believed to be a weapon. He then removed a loaded .22 caliber gun from Rivera’s person.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was arrested and indicted for criminally carrying a loaded pistol and for criminally possessing a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the gun and bullets). The Supreme Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, based on reasonable suspicion, may stop and question an individual in public.

    Whether police officers, incident to a lawful stop, may conduct a limited search (frisk) of an individual’s outer clothing for weapons when they have a reasonable fear for their safety or the safety of others.

    Holding

    Yes, because prompt inquiry into suspicious street action is an indispensable police power in the orderly government of large urban communities.

    Yes, because the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police have a duty to prevent crime and must be able to make prompt inquiries into suspicious behavior. The level of evidence needed for inquiry is less than that required for an arrest. Stopping someone for questioning is not an arrest. The court emphasized, “The business of the police is to prevent crime if they can.” The court recognized the inherent dangers faced by police officers when questioning individuals in public. The court stated, “The answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure to danger could be very great.” Therefore, a limited frisk for weapons is a reasonable precaution to ensure the officer’s safety. The court acknowledged that a frisk is a limited invasion of privacy, but it is less intrusive than a full search. The court balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the need for public safety and the safety of police officers. The Court noted that the constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches, not all searches, and that reasonableness requires a balancing of interests. The court concluded that the precautionary procedures followed by the police in questioning Rivera met the practical demands of effective criminal investigation without being unreasonable.