New York Law Review

Tag: Occupational Disease

  • Collins v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 N.Y.2d 692 (1978): Timeliness of Silicosis Claims Under Workers’ Compensation Law

    Collins v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 N.Y.2d 692 (1978)

    In cases of occupational silicosis, the 90-day period for filing a workers’ compensation claim under Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law begins when the employee knows they are totally disabled due to silicosis and that the disease is related to their employment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the Appellate Division that upheld the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s decision regarding the timeliness of a silicosis claim. The court found that the claim was filed within 90 days of the employee’s knowledge that he was totally disabled due to silicosis and that the condition was caused by his employment. The court reasoned that the 90-day limitation period under Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law commences when an employee knows they are totally disabled as a result of silicosis, or that the silicosis contributed to another condition resulting in total disability, and that the silicosis is work-related. The court emphasized the presumption that required notice was given, absent substantial evidence to the contrary.

    Facts

    Employee Collins worked at an aluminum factory from 1950 to August 28, 1957, and was exposed to silica dust. He underwent surgery in 1954 and was diagnosed with tuberculoma with antraco-silicosis but was told he had nothing to worry about. The employer’s medical director did not believe Collins had silicosis based on X-rays taken from 1954 to 1957. In 1958, Collins learned he had silicosis. He later developed other conditions. Collins filed his compensation claim on July 7, 1969, after a hospital entry suggested he apply for compensation. He died on May 16, 1973.

    Procedural History

    The Workmen’s Compensation Board found the claim was timely filed, that silicosis contributed to Collins’ death, and that the claim was the liability of the Special Disability Fund. The Appellate Division affirmed. One justice dissented regarding the disability compensation award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the employee’s claim for compensation was timely filed within ninety days after he first had knowledge that the disease was totally disabling and was due to the nature of the employment, in accordance with Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
    2. Whether the Board properly determined, based on medical evidence, that the claimant’s occupational silicosis contributed to and caused the decedent’s death.
    3. Whether the claim is the liability of the Special Disability Fund under section 15(8)(ee) of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, rather than the Fund for Reopened Cases under section 25-a of the law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Workmen’s Compensation Board had a right to find, based on a lack of substantial evidence to the contrary, that Collins’ notice was filed within 90 days after he acquired knowledge that his silicosis was totally disabling and was due to the nature of his employment.
    2. Yes, because the testimony and report of an expert consultant on dust diseases furnished substantial evidence in support of the board’s determination as to the cause of death.
    3. Yes, because the employee’s claim was filed in compliance with section 44-a and thus was not “stale”, and it being conceded that there was no advance payment of compensation, there is no predicate to shift liability to the Fund for Reopened Cases under section 25-a.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, which provides an exception to the two-year filing deadline for silicosis claims, requiring the claim to be filed within 90 days after disablement and knowledge that the disease is due to the nature of the employment. The court emphasized that the 90-day limitation begins when the employee knows they are totally disabled due to silicosis or that silicosis contributed to another condition resulting in total disability and that the silicosis is work-related.

    The court noted the presumption under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 21(2), that the required notice was given unless substantial evidence shows otherwise. The court found that the Workmen’s Compensation Board had the right to determine that Collins’ notice was timely because there wasn’t substantial evidence to the contrary. It distinguished the employer’s evidence, an entry in a hospital record, because the entry did not reveal the source of information or that knowledge was imparted to Collins.

    Regarding the cause of death, the court cited Matter of Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, 12 N.Y.2d 414, 416, noting that the testimony and report of an expert consultant on dust diseases constituted substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination.

    Finally, because the claim was filed in compliance with Section 44-a and there was no advance payment of compensation, the court concluded that liability could not be shifted to the Fund for Reopened Cases under Section 25-a, citing Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 369-370 and Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382.

  • Paider v. Park East Movers, 19 N.Y.2d 373 (1967): Defining ‘Occupational Disease’ Under Workers’ Compensation Law

    19 N.Y.2d 373 (1967)

    An occupational disease, for purposes of workers’ compensation, is an ailment resulting from a distinctive feature of the work performed, not merely from the specific location of work or contact with a co-worker.

    Summary

    This case addresses the definition of “occupational disease” under New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Two separate claims were consolidated: one from a cashier exposed to cold drafts, and another from a truck driver who contracted tuberculosis from a co-worker. The Court of Appeals held that neither claimant suffered from an occupational disease because the cashier’s ailment was due to the specific workplace, not the nature of the job, and the truck driver’s illness stemmed from contact with a co-worker, not a distinctive risk of truck driving. This case clarifies that an occupational disease must be intrinsically linked to the nature of the employment itself.

    Facts

    In Matter of Snir, the claimant was a cashier at a department store exposed to cold drafts from air conditioning at her register, resulting in chronic muscle strain. In Matter of Paider, the claimant was a truck driver who contracted tuberculosis from his assigned helper, with whom he shared the truck cab.

    Procedural History

    In Matter of Snir, the Workmen’s Compensation Board found the cashier’s condition to be an occupational disease, which the Appellate Division affirmed. In Matter of Paider, the Board found the truck driver’s tuberculosis to be an occupational disease, but the Appellate Division reversed. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a cashier’s muscle strain, caused by cold drafts at her specific workstation, constitutes an occupational disease.

    2. Whether a truck driver’s tuberculosis, contracted from a co-worker in the truck cab, constitutes an occupational disease.

    Holding

    1. No, because the cashier’s ailment was caused by the specific location of her work, not by an inherent risk of being a cashier.

    2. No, because the truck driver’s illness resulted from contact with a fellow employee and not from a distinctive feature of the occupation of truck driving.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., defining occupational disease as one resulting from the nature of the employment, a hazard distinguishing it from the usual run of occupations. The court reasoned that the cashier’s condition was due to the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace, not the inherent nature of the cashier job itself. As the court stated regarding the Snir case, “Cashiers as a class are not hired with the expectation that the work will be performed in front of a cold air ventilator.” Similarly, the court found the truck driver’s tuberculosis was due to contact with an infected co-worker, not a peculiar risk of truck driving, citing Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., which held that contracting tuberculosis from a co-worker was a general risk, not an occupational disease. The dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation was too restrictive, conflicting with the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Law and previous decisions like Roettinger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., where a butcher’s lung condition was deemed an occupational disease due to temperature extremes, even though such diseases aren’t naturally incident to butchering. The dissent contended that a “recognizable link” between the work environment and the disease should suffice, while the majority emphasized the need for a distinctive risk inherent to the occupation itself, not just the workplace.