New York Law Review

Tag: obscenity

  • People v. Heller, 39 N.Y.2d 308 (1976): Community Standards in Obscenity Cases

    People v. Heller, 39 N.Y.2d 308 (1976)

    In obscenity cases, the relevant ‘community standard’ for determining whether material appeals to prurient interest or is patently offensive need not be defined as a statewide standard, and reading the statutory definition of obscenity to the grand jury is generally sufficient unless it impairs the indictment’s integrity and prejudices the defendant.

    Summary

    This case addresses the appropriate ‘community standard’ for assessing obscenity under New York law. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the grand jury instructions were adequate despite not explicitly defining the ‘community.’ The court reasoned that the statutory definition provided sufficient guidance, and the grand jury’s function is to determine if a prima facie case exists, not to establish guilt or innocence. A concurring opinion argued against prematurely establishing a statewide standard, suggesting the legislature should define ‘community.’

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for obscenity-related offenses. The specific facts concerning the allegedly obscene material are not detailed in this excerpt, but the legal issue centered on the instructions given to the grand jury regarding the definition of obscenity, particularly the ‘community standards’ component.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a lower court ruling (presumably concerning the validity of the indictment) was appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the grand jury instructions regarding the definition of obscenity were insufficient because they did not explicitly define the relevant ‘community’ whose standards should be applied.

    2. Whether a statewide standard must be applied when considering what constitutes the relevant community.

    Holding

    1. No, because reading the statutory definition to the grand jury is normally sufficient unless failure to do more impaired the integrity of the indictment and created a possibility of prejudice to defendant.

    2. The court did not definitively rule on whether the standard to be applied is State-wide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that reading the statutory definition of obscenity to the grand jury is generally sufficient. The grand jury’s role is to determine whether a prima facie case exists, not to determine guilt or innocence. The court emphasized that the standard is a means of testing the appeal of the material involved to prurient interest in sex. The court concluded that using a community standard could not be said to prejudice the defendant. The concurring opinion argued that the Legislature did not include the word ‘statewide’ in the statutory definition of ‘obscene’ and that the issue of statewide standards should be left to the legislature.

    Judge Meyer, in concurrence, stated, “Whether the standard to be applied is State-wide is not an issue necessary to be determined in this case… though the statutory definition of ‘obscene’ set forth in subdivision 1 of section 235.00 of the Penal Law… the Legislature did not include the word ‘statewide’ in that definition.” He further noted the importance of the Legislature’s role following *Miller v. California*, stating that “it is within the province of the Legislature to determine whether the less stringent test of obscenity laid down in that case should now become the ultimate formula to be applied in New York.”

  • People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973): Specificity Requirements for Obscenity Search Warrants

    People v. Bennett, 33 N.Y.2d 850 (1973)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of obscene materials must describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent the warrant from becoming a general warrant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a search warrant for obscene materials. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity in describing the items to be seized. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court found that this description was too broad and delegated to the police officer executing the warrant the function of determining whether the material was obscene, rendering the warrant invalid. The dissent argued that the warrant was sufficiently specific under the circumstances, especially given the nature of the materials and the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    Facts

    Police obtained a search warrant to search the defendants’ premises. The warrant authorized the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The magistrate had viewed a sample of the films. Based on the search, the defendants were charged with obscenity-related offenses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the motion to suppress, holding that the search warrant was invalid.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “8mm films cut and uncut, depicting males and females in various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation” is sufficiently specific to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

    Holding

    No, because the warrant delegated to the executing officer the determination of what constituted obscenity, which is a judicial function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the warrant lacked sufficient specificity. The warrant’s language authorized the police to seize films based on their own determination of whether the films depicted “various positions of sexual intercourse, sodomy and masturbation.” The Court cited People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160, 164, and People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 38, emphasizing that a warrant phrased in language which delegates to a police officer the function of determining whether material is obscene is invalid. The Court found that the description in the warrant was too broad and did not adequately limit the discretion of the executing officer. The dissent argued that the language of the warrant was considerably more specific than the warrants in Rothenberg or Abronovitz, and that the magistrate had before him a film, a scrap of uncut film, and testimonial data which established probable cause for believing that the defendants’ premises housed a large supply of contraband. The dissent also cited United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268, suggesting that the description was sufficiently specific under the circumstances. The dissent maintained that the warrant told the police, within the limits of the circumstances, exactly what they were to seize. The majority, however, was not persuaded, and reversed the order affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.

  • People v. Matherson, 16 N.Y.2d 509 (1965): Warrantless Seizure of Obscene Material

    People v. Matherson, 16 N.Y.2d 509 (1965)

    A search warrant for obscene materials must describe the items to be seized with particularity; a warrant that allows the police to determine what is obscene is unconstitutional; Judicially unsupervised police seizure of evidence on which convictions are based is unlawful.

    Summary

    This case concerns the seizure of magazines from a bookstore based on a search warrant. The warrant was issued based on an affidavit describing the magazines as obscene but failed to specifically name or describe them in the warrant itself. The police seized over 1,000 magazines, and the bookstore owners were convicted on counts related to two specific magazines not named in the original affidavit or warrant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the seizure was unlawful because the warrant allowed the police to exercise unsupervised judgment in determining what constituted obscenity, violating constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for the appellants’ bookstore based on an affidavit stating the appellants possessed obscene material and naming specific magazines. The warrant authorized a search for magazines and photographs but did not name or describe the magazines mentioned in the affidavit. During the search, the police seized over 1,000 magazines and calendars and arrested the appellants for violating obscenity laws. The convictions rested on two magazines, “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip,” which were not described in the search warrant or supporting affidavit.

    Procedural History

    The appellants were indicted on 54 counts and moved to suppress the seized material, which the Monroe County Court denied. They pleaded guilty to five counts, and the Appellate Division reversed as to three counts but affirmed the convictions on the remaining two, based on the magazines “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip.” Three counts were previously dismissed by the County Court. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the seizure of the magazines “Nude Circle” and “Photo Field Trip,” which were not specifically named or described in the search warrant or supporting affidavit, was a violation of the appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the seizure of materials not described in the warrant or affidavit allowed the police to exercise unsupervised judgment in determining what was obscene, violating constitutional protections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the seizure was unlawful because the magazines on which the convictions rested were not described in the search warrant or underlying affidavit. The court emphasized that the warrant permitted the police to seize material based on their own judgment of what constituted obscenity, without prior judicial review of the specific items seized. This judicially unsupervised seizure violated the principles established in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), which require judicial oversight to prevent wide police discretion in seizing written material. The court quoted People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, stating, “The basic defect is that the language of the warrant delegates to the police officer executing it the function of determining whether the material is obscene”. The court further noted that the warrant was so broad that it could have permitted the seizure of noted works of art or medical texts simply because they portrayed genitalia. The court found that the seizure was not a valid search incident to arrest because the warrant for arrest concerned different publications, and those publications were not the basis of the convictions. The Court concluded that the judicially unsupervised police seizure of evidence was contrary to both Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals precedent and reversed the lower court’s orders, granted the motion to suppress the seized material, and dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment.

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Judicial Scrutiny Sufficient for Obscenity Warrant Without Prior Adversary Hearing

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A judge’s independent viewing of a film and determination of probable cause for obscenity is sufficient for issuing a seizure warrant without requiring a prior adversary hearing.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prior adversary hearing is required before a warrant can be issued for the seizure of an allegedly obscene film. The New York Court of Appeals held that a judge’s independent viewing of the film, followed by a determination of probable cause, satisfies constitutional requirements. The Court emphasized that judicial scrutiny, not merely a police officer’s assertion, is necessary for issuing warrants related to obscenity. The court distinguished the case from situations involving broad seizures of publications and highlighted the practical difficulties of requiring adversary hearings for warrant applications based on visual media.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted under Section 235.05 of the Penal Law for exhibiting the film “Blue Movie.” A judge attended a public theater showing the film. After viewing the film, the judge determined there was probable cause to believe the film was obscene. Based on this determination, the judge issued warrants for the seizure of the film and the defendant’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the defendant guilty. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, before issuing warrants for the seizure of a film and arrest based on obscenity, the defendant is entitled to an adversary hearing before the issuing judge to contest the film’s obscenity.

    Holding

    No, because independent judicial action of viewing the film and determining probable cause met constitutional requirements; an adversary hearing is not mandated by the Supreme Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the procedure followed—the judge viewing the film and independently determining probable cause—satisfied the requirements established in Marcus v. Search Warrant, which mandates judicial supervision in obscenity cases to prevent seizures based solely on police judgment. The Court distinguished this case from Marcus, where warrants were issued based on a police officer’s conclusory assertions without judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia suggested that a judge’s viewing of the film might be sufficient, without explicitly requiring an adversary hearing.

    The Court further argued that requiring adversary hearings before issuing warrants in obscenity cases presents practical difficulties. Unlike factual disputes where an adversary hearing helps a magistrate determine probable cause, in obscenity cases, the judge has already viewed the film. “But when a Magistrate sees a film, it is not much help to him, or indeed to the parties, in deciding probable cause to have counsel on one side tell him what he has just seen is obscene and on the other that it is not.” The court also distinguished the seizure of a single film as evidence from the wide-ranging seizure of publications that could amount to suppression of expression, as in Marcus. The court found that the New York statute met the standards set forth in Roth v. United States, as it pertained to prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of redeeming social value.

    The court emphasized the need for objective judgment by judges and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that the film was obscene and prosecution was not barred by the First Amendment.

  • People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 439 (1966): Defining Obscenity and Prurient Appeal

    People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 439 (1966)

    Material is obscene if it is utterly without redeeming social value and appeals to prurient interest, assessed objectively under First Amendment standards.

    Summary

    Richmond County News, Inc. was convicted of violating Penal Law § 1141 for publishing an obscene magazine featuring male models. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the magazine lacked social value and was designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex. The dissent argued that the magazine, while vulgar, did not meet the definition of “hard core pornography” and that the majority improperly assessed the magazine based on its appeal to a specific deviant group without evidentiary support.

    Facts

    The defendant, Richmond County News, Inc., published a magazine containing photographs of nude or nearly nude male models.

    The prosecution argued the magazine was obscene under Penal Law § 1141.

    The magazine was sold in New York State.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at the trial level for violating Penal Law § 1141.

    The appellate division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the magazine published by Richmond County News, Inc. is obscene under Penal Law § 1141 and First Amendment standards.

    Holding

    Yes, because the magazine, depicting nude or nearly nude males, is utterly without redeeming social value and appeals to a prurient interest in sex, thus meeting the definition of obscenity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the test for obscenity articulated in People v. Richmond County News, which requires determining whether the material is “utterly without redeeming social value” and appeals to a “prurient interest in sex.” The court determined the magazine lacked any artistic, literary, scientific, or educational value, emphasizing that its sole purpose was to exploit male nudity for commercial gain. The court found the depiction of male models was designed to stimulate the sexual desires of its viewers, thus appealing to prurient interest. The court distinguished this case from others involving female nudes previously held not to be obscene. It emphasized that the focus must remain on whether “the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex”. The court underscored the importance of protecting the community from obscene publications. Dissent: Chief Judge Fuld argued that the magazine, while vulgar, did not constitute “hard core pornography.” He asserted the majority mistakenly equated “offensiveness” with “prurient appeal”. He noted the pictures were no worse than those of female models previously deemed not pornographic. He also criticized the court for assessing the magazine’s appeal to a specific deviant group without sufficient evidence. He quoted Manual Enterprises v. Day, stating, “the most that can be said of [such magazines] is that they are dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry. But this is not enough to make them ‘obscene’”. Fuld asserted that First Amendment freedoms were too important to surrender to “speculations and suspicions about the prurient appeal of material to some * * * undefined person whose psyche is not known.”

  • People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971): Search Warrant Must Specifically Describe Obscene Material

    People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319 (1971)

    A search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene” materials must particularly describe the items to be seized and cannot delegate to police officers the discretion to determine obscenity, as that determination is reserved for the courts.

    Summary

    Heller was convicted of possessing obscene motion picture films with intent to sell, based on evidence seized under a search warrant. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Heller moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was unconstitutionally broad. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding the warrant was invalid because it failed to particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, a function reserved for the courts.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a warrant to search Heller’s premises based on information from an FBI agent and a State Police investigation suggesting Heller was producing pornographic films and possessed master reels for copying. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” pictures, photographs, and motion picture films. Police executed the warrant and seized reels of film from Heller’s home.

    Procedural History

    Heller was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Justice Shapiro dissented. Heller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the seizure of “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” materials is unconstitutionally general and vague, improperly delegating the determination of obscenity to the executing officers.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s language did not particularly describe the items to be seized and improperly delegated the determination of obscenity to the police, violating the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants particularly describe the things to be seized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the search warrant invalid because it was too general and delegated the determination of obscenity to the police. The court relied on the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. The court reasoned that the term “obscene, indecent and hard core pornographic” was not sufficiently specific and left it to the police officer executing the warrant to determine whether the material was obscene. The court emphasized that determining what constitutes obscenity is a matter of constitutional law reserved for the courts, not law enforcement officers. Citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722, the court stated that “the power and duty of making that determination is conferred upon the courts rather than upon the police.” The court distinguished the case from People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, noting that even specifying “hard core pornography” was insufficient to define specifically in a search warrant what the police are to look for and seize. Because the motion to suppress was incorrectly denied, the judgment of conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered.

  • Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88 (1964): State Authority to Censor Obscene Film Behavior

    Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88 (1964)

    A state may prohibit the licensing of films depicting explicit sexual conduct, similar to its power to regulate public displays of the same conduct, as such depictions are considered conduct rather than protected speech under the First Amendment.

    Summary

    Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. challenged the Board of Regents’ decision to require the removal of two scenes from the film “A Stranger Knocks” as a condition for licensing. The Board deemed the scenes, which depicted explicit sexual behavior, as obscene. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the state’s film licensing statute, as applied to these scenes, violated the First Amendment. The court held that the state has the authority to regulate obscene conduct depicted in films, just as it can regulate similar conduct in public, because films can be viewed as conduct rather than pure speech in certain contexts.

    Facts

    Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. sought a license to exhibit the film “A Stranger Knocks” in New York. The Board of Regents mandated the removal of two scenes due to their alleged obscenity. The first scene showed a man and woman on a beach embracing, leading to a depiction of the woman’s facial expressions indicative of orgasm. The second scene showed the woman astride the man in bed, with movements suggestive of sexual intercourse and the woman displaying similar expressions. This scene was the film’s climax, coinciding with the woman’s realization that the man was her husband’s murderer.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Regents directed the elimination of two scenes from the film as a condition for granting a license. The Appellate Division annulled the Board’s determination. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the state’s motion picture licensing statute, as applied to prohibit the exhibition of scenes depicting explicit sexual conduct, violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.

    Holding

    Yes, because a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is subject to state prohibition to the same extent as the actual conduct would be if engaged in publicly. The state’s power to regulate conduct extends to its depiction on film when the conduct itself is deemed obscene and against public policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects various forms of expression, including films, this protection is not absolute. Films, like conduct, can be regulated when they cross the line into obscenity. The court distinguished between advocating an idea (protected speech) and engaging in conduct (subject to regulation). The court stated, “Films, by their nature, may lie on either side of the division between speech and conduct.” The court analogized the depiction of sexual intercourse on film to public sexual exhibitionism, which the state has the power to prohibit. The court emphasized that the state’s regulation of films is not aimed at suppressing ideas but at proscribing certain behavior that is offensive and destructive of moral standards. The court stated: “It is my view that a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is just as subject to State prohibition as similar conduct if engaged in on the street.” It further explained that, “Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.” The court concluded that the scenes in question were obscene and thus subject to regulation under the state’s licensing statute.

  • People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342 (1961): Obscenity and the First Amendment; “Tropic of Cancer”

    9 N.Y.2d 342 (1961)

    A book can be deemed obscene and outside First Amendment protection if, taken as a whole, its dominant theme appeals to prurient interest, is patently offensive to contemporary community standards, and constitutes hard-core pornography, regardless of some literary merit.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of selling Henry Miller’s “Tropic of Cancer” in violation of New York’s obscenity law. The County Court reversed, finding the book not obscene as a matter of law. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the book was obscene under the statute and the First Amendment. The court held that “Tropic of Cancer” was obscene, finding it appealed to prurient interests, was patently offensive, and constituted hard-core pornography. The court rejected the argument that literary merit protected the book and ordered a new trial on the issue of the defendants’ knowledge (scienter) of the book’s obscenity.

    Facts

    The defendants were convicted after a jury trial for selling “Tropic of Cancer” by Henry Miller. The book contains numerous explicit descriptions of sexual acts and uses offensive language. The prosecution argued that the book was obscene and violated New York Penal Law § 1141, which prohibits the sale of obscene materials. The defendants argued that the book had literary merit and was protected by the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants. The County Court reversed the convictions and dismissed the information, concluding that “Tropic of Cancer” was not obscene as a matter of law and that the jury’s finding on scienter was against the weight of the evidence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether “Tropic of Cancer” is obscene under New York Penal Law § 1141 and therefore not protected by the First Amendment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the book, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests, is patently offensive to contemporary community standards, and constitutes hard-core pornography. The presence of some literary merit does not automatically shield it from obscenity laws.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the three-part test for obscenity derived from Roth v. United States and Manual Enterprises v. Day, requiring the material to (1) appeal to prurient interest, (2) be patently offensive, and (3) constitute hard-core pornography (as interpreted in People v. Richmond County News). The court emphasized its duty to make an independent constitutional appraisal of the book. After carefully reading the book, the court concluded that “it is nothing more than a compilation of a series of sordid narrations dealing with sex in a manner designed to appeal to the prurient interest.” The court found the book to be “devoid of theme or ideas” and filled with “a constant repetition of patently offensive words used solely to convey debasing portrayals of natural and unnatural sexual experiences.” The court explicitly rejected the argument that substantial literary merit could save an otherwise obscene work, stating, “This court will not adopt a rule of law which states that obscenity is suppressible but that well-written obscenity is not.” While acknowledging the importance of scienter, the court remanded for a new trial on that issue because the County Court had also ruled against the weight of the evidence on that point. The court quoted Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, characterizing the book as “dirt for dirt’s sake… and dirt for money’s sake.”