New York Law Review

Tag: Objection Requirement

  • People v. Charleston, 56 N.Y.2d 886 (1982): Preserving Objections to Judicial Overreach for Appellate Review

    56 N.Y.2d 886 (1982)

    To preserve a claim of excessive judicial interference for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection that alerts the trial judge to the alleged overreach and provides an opportunity to correct the issue, or demonstrate that such an objection would have been futile.

    Summary

    Charleston was convicted of attempted murder, attempted robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the trial judge’s extensive questioning of witnesses deprived him of a fair trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Charleston failed to adequately preserve the issue for appellate review because his objections were directed at specific questions, not the judge’s overall conduct. The Court emphasized that counsel must alert the judge to the prejudicial pattern of questioning to allow for correction, unless doing so would be demonstrably futile.

    Facts

    Defendant Charleston was convicted on multiple charges after a jury trial. During the trial, the judge actively questioned witnesses. Defense counsel raised objections to some of the judge’s questions. However, the objections were directed at individual questions asked by the judge.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Charleston was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Charleston appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses deprived him of a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. Charleston then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claim of excessive interference by a trial judge is preserved for appellate review when objections are made to specific questions but not to the judge’s general course of conduct, and a motion for mistrial is not made.

    Holding

    No, because to preserve the issue for review, the defense must object to the judge’s overall pattern of questioning or show that such an objection would be unavailing, and a motion for mistrial should be considered to allow the trial court an opportunity to correct the asserted error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a trial judge is entitled to question witnesses to clarify testimony and facilitate the trial’s progress. However, this right is not unlimited. If it becomes clear that the judge intends to exceed their permissible role and assume the advocate’s function, defense counsel must attempt to register some protest to that conduct to preserve the matter for appellate review. The objection must be of a nature to apprise the trial judge that it is their intrusion into the conduct of the trial that is at issue.

    Here, the Court found that while defense counsel objected three times to questioning by the trial judge, the objections were directed to specific questions rather than to the judge’s general course of action or participation as a whole. The Court stated that “after it becomes ‘clear that the Judge intends to exceed his permissible role and assume the advocate’s function’ (53 NY2d, at p 55), it is incumbent upon defense counsel at least to attempt to register some protest to that conduct to preserve the matter for appellate review.”

    The Court recognized the difficulty in objecting to a judge’s conduct, stating that “the greater the Trial Judge’s penchant for participation in the questioning of witnesses, the more difficult will it be for counsel to register objection to the Judge’s conduct for fear of antagonizing him.” However, there was no indication in the record that such a situation existed in this case.

    Because Charleston failed to make an appropriate objection or to move for a mistrial, the Court held that review of his claim was precluded. The court emphasized that by failing to call the judge’s attention to his allegedly prejudicial conduct, the defendant did not offer him an opportunity to alter or correct it.

  • People v. Semione, 235 N.Y. 280 (1923): Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence When Not Objected To and Later Corroborated

    People v. Semione, 235 N.Y. 280 (1923)

    Hearsay evidence, even if initially inadmissible, may be considered by the jury if it is admitted without objection and is subsequently corroborated by the defendant’s own testimony.

    Summary

    Emilio Semione was convicted of murder. On appeal, he argued that the admission of a conversation where he and his co-defendant, De Paulo, accused each other of the crime was prejudicial hearsay. The Court of Appeals affirmed Semione’s conviction, distinguishing it from the reversal of De Paulo’s conviction. The court reasoned that Semione’s counsel failed to object to the hearsay evidence when it was initially introduced and that Semione himself later repeated the substance of the conversation during his cross-examination, thereby making the evidence competent. Furthermore, the prosecutor did not make improper statements regarding Semione’s unavailability as a witness for the prosecution, unlike in De Paulo’s trial. The court found the evidence of Semione’s guilt overwhelmingly convincing.

    Facts

    Semione and De Paulo were indicted for the murder of Luigi Campagna. Shortly after the homicide, Semione and De Paulo were brought together, and each accused the other of committing the crime. Semione initially claimed he was attacked by robbers but later changed his story, blaming De Paulo. He testified that the victim clung to him during the attack, causing blood to cover him. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Semione about whether he accused De Paulo before learning De Paulo had accused him.

    Procedural History

    Semione was convicted of murder. He appealed, arguing that the admission of the conversation where he and De Paulo accused each other was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case, distinguishing it from the companion case of People v. De Paulo, where the conviction was reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of a conversation where Semione and De Paulo accused each other of the crime constituted reversible error, given that the evidence was not objected to and was later corroborated by Semione’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the testimony was received without objection, and Semione himself later repeated the substance of the conversation during his cross-examination, rendering the evidence competent; furthermore, the prosecutor did not make improper statements regarding Semione’s unavailability as a witness for the prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished Semione’s case from De Paulo’s. First, Semione’s counsel did not object to the introduction of the conversation where the defendants accused each other. The court stated, “In such circumstances, the presence in the record of testimony which, if challenged, should have been excluded as incompetent, does not vitiate the judgment.” The court further explained, “The court will not exercise its discretionary power to disregard the absence of objection unless on the whole case there is a reasonable basis for the fear that injustice has been done.”

    Second, the court noted that Semione took the stand and was cross-examined about his prior inconsistent statements. The prosecutor asked him whether he had accused De Paulo before learning that De Paulo had accused him. The court reasoned that this was proper cross-examination to expose Semione’s character and motive. As such, even if the conversation was initially incompetent, it became competent after Semione’s testimony.

    Third, the court emphasized that, unlike in De Paulo’s case, the prosecutor did not make any improper statements suggesting that Semione could not be called as a witness by the prosecution. The court concluded that the evidence of Semione’s guilt was overwhelmingly convincing, and a different verdict would be unthinkable. The court found no reasonable basis to fear that injustice had been done.