New York Law Review

Tag: NYSHRL

  • Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017): Liability under the NYS Human Rights Law for Discrimination Based on Criminal Conviction

    Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, liability for employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction is limited to employers, while aiding and abetting liability can extend to non-employers.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three questions certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The case involved two former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc. who were fired after their criminal records revealed past convictions for sexual offenses. The court held that liability under NYSHRL § 296(15), which prohibits discrimination based on criminal convictions, is limited to employers, as defined by common-law principles that emphasize the power to control the employee. However, the Court found that NYSHRL § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, could extend liability to non-employers, even out-of-state entities, who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc., had prior convictions for sexual offenses. Astro contracted with Allied Van Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of Sirva, Inc. Under the contract, Astro was required to adhere to Allied’s guidelines, which included criminal background checks and automatic failure for employees with sexual offense convictions. After Sirva investigated the plaintiffs’ criminal records, Astro fired them. Plaintiffs sued Astro, Sirva, and Allied, alleging violations of the NYSHRL, among other claims.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied. The court granted summary judgment to Allied and Sirva, holding that § 296(15) applied only to employers and that Allied and Sirva were not the plaintiffs’ employers. The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the NYSHRL.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSHRL § 296(15), prohibiting employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction, limits liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer.”

    2. If § 296(15) is limited to an employer, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” under § 296(15)?

    3. Whether NYSHRL § 296(6), providing for aiding and abetting liability, applies to § 296(15) such that an out-of-state principal corporation that requires its New York State agent to discriminate in employment based on a criminal conviction may be held liable for the employer’s violation of § 296(15).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because NYSHRL § 296(15) incorporates Article 23-A of the Correction Law, which limits liability to employers, both public and private.

    2. Common-law principles, focusing on the employer’s power to control the employee in their work, determine whether an entity is an employer under § 296(15).

    3. Yes, because § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, extends liability to out-of-state non-employers who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that NYSHRL § 296(15) is limited to employers, finding that the statute’s language, legislative history, and incorporation of Article 23-A of the Correction Law all supported this interpretation. Article 23-A specifies that the prohibition applies to applications “at” an employer or to employment held. The Court noted that an employer has to consider exceptions under Correction Law § 752, making it clear that only employers could violate the statute. The court also found that when determining who constitutes an employer, common-law principles would apply, giving “greatest emphasis” to the alleged employer’s power to control the employee in their work. For the aiding and abetting claim, the Court found that § 296(6) applies to any “person,” and is not limited to employers. The purpose of this section, as expressed in legislative history, was to hold liable anyone who aids or abets discriminatory conduct, regardless of their status. The court cited a previous case, *National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights*, where the aiding and abetting provision was applied to a newspaper that was not an employer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of liability under the NYSHRL for employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. It confirms that non-employers can be held liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under NYSHRL § 296(6), even if they are not the direct employer, especially if they have significant control over an employer’s employment practices. Businesses, especially those with contractual relationships that influence employment decisions of other entities, must be aware of this potential liability. Attorneys should use the common-law test, and *GTE* factors, when determining if an entity is an “employer”. Moreover, the case highlights that the NYSHRL’s extraterritoriality provision can extend liability for discriminatory acts committed outside of New York if they impact New York residents.

  • Hoffman v. Parade Publications, 16 N.Y.3d 185 (2011): Impact Requirement for Non-Resident Discrimination Claims

    16 N.Y.3d 185 (2011)

    Non-residents alleging discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) must demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within the respective jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Howard Hoffman, a Georgia resident, sued Parade Publications in New York, alleging age discrimination after his termination. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYCHRL and NYSHRL apply to non-residents whose alleged discriminatory termination was decided in New York City, but whose employment and the impact of termination were outside New York. The Court held that non-residents must demonstrate that the discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York City or State to invoke the protection of these laws, emphasizing that the purpose of the laws is to protect those within New York’s borders.

    Facts

    Howard Hoffman, a resident of Georgia, worked as a managing director for Parade Publications, overseeing accounts in 10 states from an office in Atlanta. Randy Siegel, president and publisher of Parade, terminated Hoffman’s employment via a phone call from Parade’s New York City headquarters. Hoffman never worked in New York, and his responsibilities were geographically limited to the Southern and Southwestern United States.

    Procedural History

    Hoffman sued Parade Publications in New York, alleging violations of the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that a discriminatory decision made in New York City was sufficient for jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a non-resident plaintiff, alleging discrimination under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL, must plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York City or State to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

    Holding

    No, because the policies underpinning the NYCHRL and NYSHRL require that their protections extend to those who inhabit or are “persons in” the City and State of New York, and therefore a non-resident plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within those respective boundaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the NYCHRL is designed to protect the rights and privileges of New York City’s inhabitants. The statute focuses on addressing prejudice and discrimination that threaten the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the city and its residents. The Court emphasized the importance of confining the NYCHRL’s protections to those who work in the city. The Court stated that focusing solely on where the termination decision is made leads to impractical results, expanding the NYCHRL to cover plaintiffs with only tangential connections to the city. The Court reasoned the impact requirement is simple to apply, leads to predictable results, and appropriately confines the NYCHRL’s protections. Similarly, the Court held that the NYSHRL is intended to protect inhabitants and persons within the state. The Court also pointed to the “extraterritorial” provision of the NYSHRL, Executive Law § 298-a, which specifically addresses discriminatory acts committed outside New York against New York residents and businesses, further supporting the view that the law primarily protects those within the state. The dissenting opinion argued that the discriminatory act (termination) occurred in New York City, thus New York courts should have jurisdiction. The dissent emphasized that it would be contrary to the purpose of both statutes to leave it to the courts of other jurisdictions to appropriately respond to acts of discrimination that occurred in New York.