New York Law Review

Tag: NYC Human Rights Law

  • Albunio v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 475 (2013): Defining “Opposed” in Retaliation Claims Under the NYC Human Rights Law

    Albunio v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 475 (2013)

    Under the New York City Human Rights Law, “opposing” discrimination, for the purposes of a retaliation claim, can include expressing disapproval of discriminatory treatment, even without explicitly using terms like “discrimination,” especially when the context makes clear that discrimination is the issue.

    Summary

    Two New York City Police Department officers, Albunio and Connors, sued the city, alleging retaliation for opposing discrimination against a third officer, Sorrenti, based on his perceived sexual orientation. Albunio, the commanding officer, recommended Sorrenti for a position, but Inspector Hall rejected him after questioning him about his sexuality. Connors filed an EEO complaint on Sorrenti’s behalf. Both Albunio and Connors claimed adverse employment actions followed. The court held that Connors’s EEO filing clearly constituted protected activity, and the jury could reasonably find that Albunio’s statement at a meeting, defending her recommendation of Sorrenti, constituted “opposition” to discrimination, thus supporting their retaliation claims. The court emphasized the broad interpretation required by the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act.

    Facts

    Albunio, as commanding officer, was impressed with Sorrenti and requested he fill a DARE position. Inspector Hall, Albunio’s supervisor, interviewed Sorrenti, asking intrusive questions about his personal life and relationship with another male officer. Hall then told Albunio he “found out some fucked up shit about Sorrenti” and didn’t want him around children, leading Albunio to believe Hall thought Sorrenti was gay and didn’t want him near kids. Hall also spoke to Connors, angrily discussing Sorrenti’s loan to a fellow officer and stating he “wouldn’t be able to sleep at night knowing that Sorrenti is going to be working around kids.” Albunio began to hear rumors she’d be removed. Connors filed an EEO complaint after Albunio was directed to find another assignment.

    Procedural History

    Albunio and Connors sued the City, Hall, and Patrick, alleging retaliation under the NYC Human Rights Law. Sorrenti also sued for discrimination, but his case is not part of this appeal. The jury found the City and Hall retaliated against both plaintiffs and awarded damages. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one Justice dissenting as to Albunio. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the record supports the jury’s finding that Albunio and Connors “opposed” discrimination against Sorrenti based on his perceived sexual orientation, as required to establish a retaliation claim under New York City Administrative Code § 8-107 (7)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Connors filed a discrimination complaint on Sorrenti’s behalf, and there was evidence Hall knew of the complaint and subjected Connors to adverse employment actions afterward. As for Albunio, Yes, because while she did not explicitly accuse anyone of discrimination, her statement at the October 31 meeting, defending her recommendation of Sorrenti after Hall criticized it, could be interpreted by a jury as communicating her disapproval of Hall’s discriminatory treatment, satisfying the “opposed” requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (LCRRA), which mandates a broad and liberal construction of the New York City Human Rights Law in favor of discrimination plaintiffs. As to Connors, the court found the case straightforward, as his filing of a discrimination complaint was undeniably protected activity. As to Albunio, the court acknowledged the issue was closer, as she hadn’t filed a complaint or explicitly accused anyone of discrimination before facing adverse actions. However, the court reasoned that Albunio’s statement at the October 31 meeting, where she defended her recommendation of Sorrenti, could be interpreted as “opposition” to discrimination. The court stated, “[W]hile she did not say in so many words that Sorrenti was a discrimination victim, a jury could find that both Hall and Albunio knew that he was, and that Albunio made clear her disapproval of that discrimination by communicating to Hall, in substance, that she thought Hall’s treatment of Sorrenti was wrong.” The court highlighted the importance of context and the broad reading required by the City Human Rights Law when assessing whether conduct constitutes “opposition.”

  • McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 421 (2004): Attorney’s Fees in Nominal Damages Cases Under the NYC Human Rights Law

    3 N.Y.3d 421 (2004)

    The standard articulated in Farrar v. Hobby regarding attorney’s fees in federal civil rights cases where only nominal damages are awarded also applies to attorney’s fee claims under the New York City Human Rights Law.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, preoperative transsexuals, sued Toys “R” Us for harassment under the New York City Human Rights Law, seeking substantial damages and injunctive relief. The jury found in their favor but awarded only $1 in damages to each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then sought attorney’s fees of approximately $206,000. The District Court, applying the Farrar v. Hobby standard, awarded $193,551 in fees, finding the case served a significant public purpose. The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the applicability of the Farrar standard. The Court of Appeals held that the Farrar standard does apply but that the case could potentially fall within the “significant public purpose” exception, leaving the final determination to the Second Circuit.

    Facts

    Three plaintiffs, identifying as preoperative transsexuals, alleged harassment by Toys “R” Us employees while shopping in December 2000. They filed suit, claiming violations of the New York City Human Rights Law, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodation. They sought significant compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive relief. At trial, plaintiffs’ attorney requested substantial monetary damages but did not pursue injunctive relief.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to a nine-day jury trial in the District Court. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, determining that defendant’s employees violated their rights under the New York City Human Rights Law, but awarded only $1 in damages to each plaintiff. Plaintiffs applied for attorney’s fees, which the District Court granted in large part, applying the Farrar v. Hobby standard. Toys “R” Us appealed the attorney’s fee determination to the Second Circuit, which certified four questions to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is reasonable under New York City Administrative Code § 8-502(f), does New York apply the standards set forth in Farrar v. Hobby, i.e., (a) that ‘the most critical factor . . . is the degree of success,’ and (b) that when a party is awarded nominal damages, ‘the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all’?
    2. If the Farrar standard does not apply, what standard should a court use to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee award for a prevailing party who has received only nominal damages?
    3. If the Farrar standard applies, does Administrative Code § 8-502(f) authorize a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff who receives only nominal damages but whose lawsuit served a significant public purpose?
    4. If New York recognizes `service of a significant public purpose’ as a factor warranting an attorney’s fee award to a plaintiff recovering only nominal damages, would a plaintiff who is the first to secure a favorable jury verdict on a claim of unlawful discrimination against transsexuals in public accommodation be entitled to a fee award even though the law’s prohibition of discrimination against transsexuals in employment has previously been recognized?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the attorney’s fee provision in the New York City Human Rights Law is textually indistinguishable from the federal statutes interpreted in Farrar, and there’s no indication in the legislative history that a different standard should apply.
    2. N/A, as the first question was answered in the affirmative.
    3. Yes, because the Farrar standard allows for fee awards in nominal damages cases where the lawsuit served a significant public purpose.
    4. Yes, because it cannot be said as a matter of law that a court would have abused its discretion in determining that the case served a significant public purpose, given the uncertain state of the law at the time the action was commenced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that because the attorney’s fee provision in the New York City Human Rights Law is nearly identical to comparable federal civil rights statutes, it should be interpreted consistently with federal precedent. The Court cited the general practice of interpreting state and local civil rights statutes in line with federal counterparts when they are substantively and textually similar. It acknowledged the Farrar standard, which holds that while a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is still a prevailing party, an attorney’s fee award is usually inappropriate unless the litigation served a significant public purpose. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the legislative history of the local law mandated a different, broader interpretation, finding no specific intent to deviate from the federal standard. The Court further stated that even though some lower courts had previously held that transsexuals were protected under the law, this case could still have served a significant public purpose by clarifying the scope of the law and educating the public. The dissent argued that the legal principle was not novel, and therefore did not serve a significant public purpose.