New York Law Review

Tag: nunc pro tunc

  • Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. New York State Special Disability Fund, 31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018): Workers’ Compensation Carrier’s Right to Reimbursement from Special Disability Fund After Third-Party Settlement

    31 N.Y.3d 1014 (2018)

    A workers’ compensation carrier may seek nunc pro tunc approval from a court to a third-party settlement, even if the Special Disability Fund’s consent was not initially obtained, provided the Fund’s consent is required under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a workers’ compensation carrier, Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, could retroactively obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent to a third-party settlement under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5). The employee sustained a work-related injury, and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursing the carrier for benefits after a certain period due to the employee’s pre-existing condition. The carrier approved the employee’s third-party personal injury settlement without the Special Disability Fund’s prior written consent. The Court of Appeals held that the carrier could seek court approval nunc pro tunc because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) allows court approval for settlements even if the required consent of the lienor was not initially obtained, aligning the carrier’s actions with the statute’s intent.

    Facts

    An employee of Coca-Cola Bottling Company suffered a work-related injury in March 2007. Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, Coca-Cola’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, paid benefits to the injured employee. The employee was classified as having a permanent partial disability. Due to a pre-existing condition, the Workers’ Compensation Board held that the claim was subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (8), and the Special Disability Fund was responsible for reimbursement after a certain period. The employee also initiated a third-party personal injury action, subject to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1). Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. However, Ace Fire did not seek the Special Disability Fund’s written approval before the settlement.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board determined the employee’s benefits were reimbursable by the Special Disability Fund. The employee filed a third-party personal injury action. Ace Fire approved the settlement of the third-party action. Ace Fire sought retroactive consent from the Special Disability Fund, which was denied. Ace Fire commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking to compel the Special Disability Fund’s consent nunc pro tunc. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed, and the matter was remitted to Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a workers’ compensation carrier can obtain court approval nunc pro tunc under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) to a third-party settlement if the carrier did not obtain the prior consent of the Special Disability Fund, assuming the Fund is a lienor.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) permits a carrier to seek nunc pro tunc approval for a third-party settlement, even without prior consent from a lienor, aligning with the statute’s provisions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed as a whole, and that the various sections should be considered together and with reference to each other. The court noted that the language in Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (1), establishing who may be deemed lienors, is essentially identical to the language in § 29 (5), which refers to entities whose consent to settlement is required. The court reasoned that there was no basis to distinguish the Special Disability Fund, as it is subject to the same rules as other lienors and that the failure to obtain the Fund’s consent can be cured by court order. The court emphasized that the legislature intended for employers to be encouraged to hire disabled employees, and the Special Disability Fund’s purpose is connected to this goal. The court highlighted, “We have repeatedly recognized ‘that a statute . . . must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other.’”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that workers’ compensation carriers, when settling third-party claims, have a potential remedy if they fail to obtain the Special Disability Fund’s consent initially. This allows the carrier to seek court approval after the fact to protect their right to reimbursement from the Fund. This reduces the risk for carriers by providing a mechanism to cure procedural errors and recover funds. The decision reinforces the importance of complying with all requirements under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 and highlights the need for workers’ compensation carriers to consider the interplay between the various provisions of the law when settling third-party actions. Failure to adhere to procedures could impact the recovery of funds. Furthermore, this case impacts how the Special Disability Fund will handle these situations in the future.

  • Aero-Travis Corp. v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 59 N.Y.2d 789 (1983): Priority of Liens After Vacatur and Reinstatement of Foreign Judgment

    Aero-Travis Corp. v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 59 N.Y.2d 789 (1983)

    When a foreign judgment filed in New York is vacated following an intermediate appeal, and subsequently reinstated on further appeal, the judgment creditor’s lien in New York dates from the new filing after reinstatement, not the original filing date; a court cannot retroactively create substantive rights when third-party rights have intervened.

    Summary

    This case addresses the priority of judgment liens when a Texas judgment, initially filed in New York, is vacated upon an intermediate appellate reversal in Texas, and then reinstated by the Texas Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals held that the lien’s priority in New York dates from the refiling of the judgment after reinstatement, not the initial filing. The court reasoned that vacating the original filing nullified the lien, and a court cannot retroactively create a lien to prejudice intervening rights of a third-party judgment creditor.

    Facts

    Republic National Bank of Dallas (the Bank) obtained a judgment in Texas against a debtor and filed an authenticated copy in New York on June 16, 1977. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the Texas judgment on February 23, 1978. The Bank then moved to vacate the New York filing, which was granted on July 28, 1978. The Texas Supreme Court reinstated the Texas judgment on November 7, 1978. Aero-Travis Corp. (the Title Company) docketed its New York judgment against the same debtor on November 21, 1978. On March 30, 1979, the Bank obtained authorization to refile the Texas judgment in New York. The Bank then sought a nunc pro tunc order to reinstate the filing retroactively to June 16, 1977.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the Bank’s motion for nunc pro tunc reinstatement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lien of a foreign judgment filed in New York, which was subsequently vacated after reversal in the foreign jurisdiction and then reinstated on further appeal, dates back to the original filing date or only to the date of refiling after reinstatement, where the rights of a third-party judgment creditor have intervened.

    Holding

    No, because the vacatur of the original filing in New York nullified the lien, and the subsequent reinstatement of the Texas judgment did not automatically revive that lien in New York with retroactive effect. The intervening rights of the Title Company, which docketed its judgment while no lien from the Texas judgment existed, take priority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the initial filing of the Texas judgment in New York on June 16, 1977, created a lien equivalent to a New York Supreme Court judgment, pursuant to CPLR 5402(b). However, the subsequent reversal of the Texas judgment and the voluntary vacatur of the New York filing effectively nullified the lien. The court stated, “Following the 1978 vacatur of the filing in New York, that filing was a nullity, all liens evolving therefrom were dissolved…” The subsequent reinstatement of the Texas judgment did not retroactively recreate the lien in New York, especially given the intervening rights of the Title Company, which docketed its judgment on November 21, 1978, when no Texas judgment lien was of record. The court reasoned that anyone searching the records was entitled to rely on the absence of an existing lien. The court rejected the Bank’s attempt to use nunc pro tunc relief to create a new substantive right retroactively. The court explained, “The relief sought by the bank was not to correct any irregularity, mistake, omission or other error; the bank sought the creation of a new lien retroactive to the date of its prior lien which, on its own motion, had been effectively nullified.” The court found the denial of nunc pro tunc relief was mandatory because the Title Company’s rights had intervened. This decision underscores the importance of maintaining a clear record of liens and the principle that judicial actions cannot unfairly prejudice the established rights of third parties.

  • Fishman v. Fishman, 42 N.Y.2d 856 (1977): Amending Judgments Nunc Pro Tunc in Matrimonial Actions

    Fishman v. Fishman, 42 N.Y.2d 856 (1977)

    A court can amend a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct errors, particularly in matrimonial actions, provided the amended judgment aligns with the nature of the action indicated in the original summons.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could amend a divorce judgment to a separation judgment nunc pro tunc (retroactively). The initial summons sought a separation, but the trial court erroneously granted a divorce. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had the discretion to amend the judgment to reflect the relief requested in the summons, namely a separation. Further, the Court noted that a subsequent ex parte California divorce decree obtained by the husband might not be entitled to full faith and credit in New York concerning the wife’s property rights.

    Facts

    The wife commenced a matrimonial action seeking a separation from her husband. The summons served on the husband stated that the relief sought was a judgment of separation, including alimony, child support, and counsel fees. However, the trial court improperly awarded the wife a divorce instead of a separation.

    Subsequent to the New York decree, the husband obtained an ex parte divorce decree in California.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially granted a divorce to the wife, despite the summons seeking only a separation.

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the issues on the merits.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court had the power to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to award a separation instead of a divorce, given that the summons indicated a separation was the relief sought.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 5019(a) empowers the court to correct errors in judgments, and the amended judgment would align with the nature of the action as stated in the summons served on the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the commencement of the action satisfied the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 232(a) regarding service of a summons in a matrimonial action for separation. Although the trial court erred in granting a divorce when the summons sought a separation, the court retained the discretion to amend the judgment retroactively (nunc pro tunc) to grant a separation. The court relied on CPLR 5019(a), which permits courts to correct errors in judgments. The amended judgment would then align with the Domestic Relations Law’s requirement that the judgment be of the same nature as indicated in the summons. The Court also noted that the California divorce decree might not be entitled to full faith and credit in New York regarding the wife’s property rights, citing Estin v. Estin. As stated in the memorandum opinion, “Such corrective action created a judgment which, as is required by the Domestic Relations Law, was of the same nature as was indicated in the summons served personally upon the defendant within the State.”

  • People v. Callaway, 24 N.Y.2d 127 (1969): Right to Appeal When Counsel Fails to File

    People v. Callaway, 24 N.Y.2d 127 (1969)

    A defendant is entitled to a coram nobis hearing if their petition alleges they were prevented from appealing their conviction due to an assurance from their assigned counsel that an appeal would be taken on their behalf.

    Summary

    Callaway sought coram nobis relief, claiming his assigned counsel misled him by assuring him an appeal would be filed, which never happened. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a hearing on such claims. If the court finds the defendant reasonably relied on counsel’s assurance and was thereby prevented from appealing, the defendant should be resentenced nunc pro tunc to allow a new appeal period. This decision reinforced the principle that assigned counsel’s failure to fulfill promises to appeal can warrant coram nobis relief, effectively overruling earlier cases that denied such relief.

    Facts

    In June 1964, Callaway was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 5-10 years in prison. No appeal was filed.
    In July 1967, Callaway applied for coram nobis relief, alleging his assigned counsel told him “not to worry, that everything would be taken care of in due time” when asked about appealing.
    Callaway claimed he relied on this assurance, causing the time to appeal to lapse.
    Counsel was later disbarred for similar conduct: taking fees for appeals and failing to file them.

    Procedural History

    Callaway sought coram nobis relief in the trial court, which was denied.
    He appealed to an intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the denial.
    He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a coram nobis hearing when alleging they were prevented from appealing due to assigned counsel’s assurance that an appeal would be taken?

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant who fails to file a timely notice of appeal due to reasonable reliance on assigned counsel’s promise to do so is entitled to coram nobis relief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent holding in People v. Ramsey, 23 N.Y.2d 656, and People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, which established that a defendant is entitled to relief when assigned counsel’s actions prevent a timely appeal.
    The court noted prior decisions granting relief where counsel misled an indigent defendant about appeal costs (People v. Ludwig, 16 N.Y.2d 1062) or abandoned an already-instituted appeal (People v. Lamplcins, 21 N.Y.2d 138; People v. De Renzzio, 14 N.Y.2d 732).
    The court effectively overruled prior cases that denied relief for counsel’s failure to fulfill a promise to appeal (People v. Kling, 14 N.Y.2d 571; People v. Marchese, 14 N.Y.2d 695).
    The court stated that if, after a hearing, it is found that the defendant was induced by counsel’s representation to let the appeal time expire, he should be resentenced nunc pro tunc to allow a new appeal period.
    The concurring judges emphasized the fact that the attorney in question had been disbarred for similar conduct.
    The court emphasized the need to protect the defendant’s right to appeal, stating that the resentencing procedure would afford him “an opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal would date from the rendition of the new judgment.” (citing People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 94).

  • Matter of Doherty v. Mahoney, 18 N.Y.2d 494 (1966): Addressing Technical Defects in Election Petitions

    Matter of Doherty v. Mahoney, 18 N.Y.2d 494 (1966)

    Technical defects in election petitions, such as typographical errors or tardy acknowledgments, are not fatal if they do not deceive signatories or raise the possibility of fraud, allowing for corrections nunc pro tunc.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to the validity of a Democratic primary nomination for Assemblyman in the 112th Assembly District due to technical defects in the designating petition and declination. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a typographical error in the candidate’s name and a tardily acknowledged declination were not fatal flaws, particularly since no other candidates had filed and no fraud was suspected. The Court emphasized that corrections nunc pro tunc (retroactively) were appropriate to address these non-deceptive errors.

    Facts

    A designating petition was filed for a Democratic primary candidate for Assemblyman in the 112th Assembly District. Only one petition was filed by the filing deadline. A typographical error appeared in the candidate’s name on the petition. The candidate’s declination was filed on time but acknowledged late.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner, Chairman of the Democratic County Committee, initiated a proceeding to address irregularities after the Secretary of State invalidated the nomination. Special Term directed that the declination be amended nunc pro tunc to correct the acknowledgment issue. The Appellate Division reversed this order. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the Special Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a typographical error in the candidate’s name on a designating petition is a fatal defect when it does not deceive signatories about the candidate’s identity?

    2. Whether a tardily acknowledged declination, filed on time but improperly acknowledged, invalidates a nomination in the absence of fraud?

    Holding

    1. No, because the error was typographical and did not mislead those who signed the petition.

    2. No, because in the absence of any potential fraud, the court can direct that the declination be amended nunc pro tunc to be in proper form.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because only one petition was filed, the Democratic nominee had effectively been selected as per Election Law § 149. The petitioner, as Chairman of the Democratic County Committee, had standing to address irregularities in the nomination process as authorized by Election Law § 330(2). The court emphasized that the typographical error was not misleading to the signatories, referencing Matter of Tricario v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 886, to support the allowance of corrections nunc pro tunc. Regarding the late acknowledgment, the court cited Matter of Battista v. Power, 10 N.Y.2d 867, highlighting that in the absence of fraud, amendments nunc pro tunc are justified to ensure the declination is in proper form. The court’s decision reflects a pragmatic approach, prioritizing the intent of the voters and the absence of fraud over strict adherence to technical formalities, especially when the outcome of the election is not in doubt. The decision rests on the principle that election laws should be liberally construed to achieve substantial compliance, particularly when technicalities do not undermine the integrity of the electoral process. The court’s per curiam opinion underscores the importance of focusing on the substance of the petition process rather than minor procedural flaws that do not affect the underlying fairness and accuracy of the election.