New York Law Review

Tag: nuisance

  • Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Standard for Punitive Damages in Intentional Tort Cases

    Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    Punitive damages in tort cases require more than just intentional conduct; they necessitate a showing of malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Summary

    Marinaccio sued Kieffer Enterprises, Inc. (KEI) for trespass and nuisance, alleging intentional diversion of stormwater onto his property causing significant damage. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against KEI. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the punitive damages award, holding that while KEI’s actions were intentional and caused considerable damage, the evidence did not demonstrate the requisite malice or wanton disregard necessary to justify punitive damages. The court emphasized that compliance with regulations and engagement of experts, even if ultimately unsuccessful, negated a finding of criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Facts

    KEI, developing a residential subdivision, diverted water into a ditch that was mistakenly believed to be on KEI’s property but was actually on Marinaccio’s land, without his permission. The mitigation pond was insufficient, leading KEI to install drainage pipes that routed water onto Marinaccio’s property, creating a large flooded wetland. Marinaccio complained to KEI, but was ignored. The flooding caused mosquitos and frogs, which Marinaccio feared, to proliferate on his property. However, Marinaccio refused to allow the Town to clean the ditch on his property which would have alleviated the flooding.

    Procedural History

    Marinaccio sued KEI and the Town for trespass and nuisance, seeking damages. The trial court denied KEI’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages against both the Town and KEI, and punitive damages against KEI. KEI appealed the punitive damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding punitive damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages against KEI for intentional diversion of stormwater onto Marinaccio’s property, constituting trespass and nuisance.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations, which is required to justify punitive damages in tort cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strict standard for awarding punitive damages, stating that it requires “spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” While KEI’s actions resulted in damage to Marinaccio’s property, KEI complied with planning and development laws, worked with the Army Corps of Engineers, and hired experts. This, even if ultimately unsuccessful in preventing damage, demonstrated that KEI’s actions could not be considered wanton or malicious. The court acknowledged that KEI should have ensured the Town obtained an easement from Marinaccio, making them liable for trespass and nuisance. However, “something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” The court found that KEI’s behavior, while not ideal, did not rise to the level of moral turpitude required for punitive damages. The court distinguished between volitional acts and those demonstrating a purposeful or grossly indifferent causing of injury. Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter behavior involving moral turpitude, and KEI’s behavior did not meet this threshold. The court quoted Prozeralik v Capital Cities Communications, 82 NY2d 466, 479 (1993) stating that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages”.

  • Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117 (2003): Establishing Nuisance for Eviction in Rent-Stabilized Apartments

    Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117 (2003)

    A landlord can pursue eviction of a rent-stabilized tenant based on a nuisance created by a guest if the guest’s conduct demonstrates a recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable behavior that threatens the comfort and safety of others in the building.

    Summary

    Domen Holding Co., a landlord, sought to evict Irene and Jorge Aranovich, rent-stabilized tenants, due to the disruptive behavior of Irene’s guest, Geoffrey Sanders. The landlord cited instances of Sanders using racial slurs, making threats, and engaging in altercations with building staff and other tenants. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a high threshold of proof is needed for eviction, the landlord presented enough evidence of a potential nuisance to warrant a trial. The Court emphasized that the notice of termination adequately informed the tenants of the grounds for eviction, and the subsequent evidence elaborated on those allegations.

    Facts

    The Aranovichs were rent-stabilized tenants in a building owned by Domen Holding Co. Geoffrey Sanders, a guest of Irene Aranovich, resided in the apartment. Over several years, the landlord received complaints about Sanders’s behavior. In August 2000, Sanders allegedly used racial slurs and threatened a doorman, Wayne Ellis. In June 1997, Sanders allegedly threatened a visually impaired tenant, Thomas DeRosa. In November 1995, Sanders was involved in an altercation with the building superintendent. The landlord sent Ms. Aranovich notices regarding these incidents, reminding her of her responsibility for her guests’ behavior.

    Procedural History

    The landlord served a notice of termination and subsequently filed an ejectment action against the tenants. The Supreme Court denied the landlord’s motion for summary judgment and granted the tenants’ cross-motion to dismiss, finding the incidents insufficient to constitute a nuisance. The Appellate Division affirmed, limiting its review to the allegations in the notice of termination. Two dissenting Justices believed a factual issue existed regarding whether Sanders’ conduct constituted a nuisance. The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the landlord’s notice of termination and supporting evidence were sufficient to state a claim for nuisance warranting eviction of the rent-stabilized tenants.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented an issue of fact as to whether Sanders’ presence in the building resulted in a recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable conduct threatening the comfort and safety of others in the building sufficient to constitute a nuisance. The Appellate Division order was modified to deny the cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and remit to Supreme Court for a trial on the issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rent Stabilization Code allows for eviction if a tenant permits a nuisance. Nuisance involves interference with a person’s enjoyment of their land, importing a continuous invasion of rights. The Court determined that the notice of termination adequately informed the tenants of the grounds for eviction, detailing specific incidents of Sanders’s misconduct, including names, dates, descriptions, and police complaint numbers. While the incidents occurred over five years, the Court found that their severity and circumstances supported the landlord’s claim that Sanders displayed intolerance and aggression. The Court distinguished the case from instances where a notice is deficient; here, the notice was adequate, and subsequent submissions were elaborations providing evidence of ongoing nuisance. The Court stated, “While surely a high threshold of proof would be required for eviction, we cannot conclude as a matter of law, as the courts below did, that dismissal of the complaint was warranted.” The Court highlighted that a trial was necessary to determine whether Sanders’s conduct constituted a “recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable conduct threatening the comfort and safety of others in the building sufficient to constitute a nuisance.”

  • Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 116 (2003): Nuisance Claims and Chronic Late Rent Payments

    Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 116 (2003)

    A landlord pursuing eviction based on nuisance must demonstrate the tenant’s actions interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property; chronic late rent payments alone, without aggravating circumstances, are insufficient to establish a nuisance claim.

    Summary

    Domen Holding Co., a cooperative building owner, initiated eviction proceedings against Aranovich, a rent-controlled tenant, alleging that her chronic late rental payments constituted a nuisance under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations. The Civil Court initially dismissed the petition, but the Appellate Term reversed. After a trial, the Civil Court again dismissed the petition, finding no nuisance. The Appellate Term affirmed, as did the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while chronic late payments might support eviction for violating a substantial obligation of the tenancy, the landlord had failed to prove that the late payments interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property, a necessary element of a nuisance claim.

    Facts

    Domen Holding Co. owned shares in a cooperative building. Aranovich was a rent-controlled tenant in the building. Domen Holding Co. repeatedly had to institute nonpayment proceedings and serve rent demands on Aranovich due to her chronic tardiness in paying rent. Domen Holding Co. then brought a holdover proceeding seeking to evict Aranovich based on the argument that her lateness constituted a nuisance.

    Procedural History

    The Civil Court initially dismissed Domen Holding Co.’s petition. The Appellate Term reversed and remitted the case for trial. After trial, the Civil Court dismissed the petition again. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Appellate Division affirmed, and then granted Domen Holding Co. leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether chronic late payment of rent, without additional aggravating circumstances, constitutes a “nuisance” under the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations sufficient to warrant eviction.

    Holding

    No, because Domen Holding Co. failed to demonstrate that Aranovich’s conduct interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property, an essential element of a nuisance claim. The court explicitly stated they were not deciding “whether chronic late payment or nonpayment of rent, when combined with aggravating circumstances, could ever support an eviction proceeding for a ‘nuisance’ within the meaning of the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition because Domen Holding Co. pursued the case as a nuisance claim, not as a violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy. To succeed on a nuisance claim, the landlord needed to show that the tenant’s conduct interfered with the use or enjoyment of their property. The court emphasized that the specific harm alleged by Domen Holding Co. was the repeated need to institute nonpayment proceedings. The court found this might have supported an eviction proceeding based on violation of a substantial obligation of tenancy, as stated in 9 NYCRR 2204.2[a][1]. Because Domen Holding Co. chose to proceed on the basis of nuisance, they were bound to prove interference with the use or enjoyment of property. As the court noted, “Having opted to pursue their remedy in the context of a nuisance case, petitioners were required to establish that respondent’s conduct ‘interfere[d] with the use or enjoyment’ of their property (see, e.g., Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 NY2d 564, 568).” The court found that Domen Holding Co. failed to offer any evidence of such interference. The court explicitly declined to rule on whether chronic late payment, combined with aggravating factors, might constitute a nuisance.

  • Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564 (1977): Defining Nuisance and the Types of Conduct Giving Rise to Liability

    Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 564 (1977)

    Liability for nuisance can arise from intentional and unreasonable conduct, negligence, or abnormally dangerous activities; negligence must be proven when a nuisance has its origin in negligent conduct; and an intentional nuisance requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct.

    Summary

    Copart Industries sued Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) for nuisance, trespass, and air pollution violations, alleging that Con Ed’s emissions damaged cars stored on Copart’s property. The trial court dismissed some claims and merged trespass into nuisance, instructing the jury on nuisance based on negligence and intentional conduct. The jury found for Con Ed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding an intertwining of negligence with the claimed nuisance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, clarifying the elements of nuisance and holding that negligence must be proven when the nuisance arises from negligent conduct, and intent must be proven for intentional nuisance.

    Facts

    Copart Industries leased land adjacent to Con Ed’s plant to store and prepare new cars. Copart alleged that emissions from Con Ed’s plant damaged the cars, requiring repainting and causing dealers to cease doing business with them. Con Ed’s plant produced steam and electricity and had converted from coal to oil fuel prior to the events in question. Copart claimed damages for loss of investment and profit due to these emissions.

    Procedural History

    Copart sued Con Ed in the trial court, asserting nuisance, trespass, and air pollution violations. The trial court dismissed the air pollution claim, merged the trespass claim into the nuisance claim, and instructed the jury on nuisance based on negligence and intentional conduct. The jury found in favor of Con Ed, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that Copart was required to prove Con Ed’s intent to cause damages to establish a nuisance.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that Copart had the burden of proof regarding Con Ed’s negligence and Copart’s freedom from contributory negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because a private nuisance based on intentional conduct requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct.

    2. No, because when a nuisance originates from negligence, negligence must be proven, and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a relevant consideration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court clarified that nuisance is a field of tort liability describing the consequences of conduct (inconvenience to others) rather than a specific type of conduct. Liability for private nuisance can arise from: (1) intentional and unreasonable conduct, (2) negligence, or (3) abnormally dangerous activities. The court emphasized the distinction between nuisance and trespass, noting that trespass involves the invasion of a person’s interest in the exclusive possession of land, while nuisance involves interference with the use and enjoyment of land. When a nuisance is based on negligence, negligence must be proven, and contributory negligence is a valid defense. For an intentional nuisance, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted to cause the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct. The court quoted the Restatement of Torts § 825: “An invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the actor (a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct.” The court distinguished Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., noting that in Boomer, the nuisance was based on an intentional and unreasonable invasion, not negligence, as the defendant had taken all available precautions to prevent dust emissions. Here, Copart introduced evidence suggesting Con Ed operated its plant negligently. Therefore, the trial court’s charge to the jury was proper.

  • Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311 (1970): Liability for Errant Golf Balls and Foreseeability

    Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311 (1970)

    A property owner bordering a golf course assumes a certain level of risk from errant golf balls, and neither the golf course nor the golfer is liable for injuries resulting from an unforeseeable shot given the presence of a natural barrier and lack of prior notice of similar incidents.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, residing next to a golf course, was allegedly struck by a golf ball hit by defendant Lacopo, a trespasser on the course. The plaintiff sued both Lacopo and the country club, alleging negligence and nuisance. The court held that neither defendant was liable. The country club wasn’t liable because the shot was a collateral act by a trespasser, and the design of the course wasn’t a nuisance. Lacopo wasn’t liable because the shot was unforeseeable given the natural barrier of trees and rough between the fairway and the plaintiff’s property, and the plaintiff assumed some risk by living next to the course. The court emphasized that lack of notice, assumption of risk, and lack of foreseeability all contributed to the decision.

    Facts

    Plaintiff’s property abutted the 13th hole of the defendant country club. A 20-30 foot rough and 45-60 foot high trees separated the patio from the fairway. Defendant Lacopo, a trespasser, hit a bad shot that “hooked” and crossed over into plaintiff’s patio, allegedly hitting plaintiff. Lacopo did not shout “Fore!” The rough was dense and the trees were in full foliage at the time.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the golf club for nuisance and negligence in design and the golfer for failure to give a warning. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the country club was liable for the trespasser’s negligent act under a theory of nuisance or negligence in design.

    2. Whether the golfer was liable for failing to give a warning and for hitting a bad shot that injured the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the shot was an abnormal departure from ordinary action constituting collateral negligence and the design of the course did not create a nuisance.

    2. No, because the risk was unforeseeable, the plaintiff assumed some risk by living next to the golf course, and the duty to warn did not extend to the plaintiff in this situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the country club was not liable because the golfer was a trespasser, and the club could only be liable for risks inherent in the performance of an actor permitted to use the land, not for collateral negligence. The design of the golf course was not a nuisance because occasional errant golf balls do not constitute a substantial impairment of the plaintiff’s rights. One who chooses to reside on property abutting a golf course must accept the occasional, concomitant annoyances.

    Regarding the golfer’s liability, the court held that the shot was unforeseeable because of the dense rough and high trees separating the fairway from the plaintiff’s property. The court stated, “Under these circumstances the possibility of an accident could not be clear ‘to the ordinarily prudent eye.’” The court distinguished cases involving highways, where the risk is more foreseeable due to the lack of a significant barrier. The court also found that the duty to warn did not extend to the plaintiff, who lived so close to the golf course that he would likely ignore such warnings. Finally, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant failed to use due care in striking the ball.

    The court emphasized the plaintiff assumed a risk by residing next to a golf course. “Looking back from the alleged injury to the event, we consider it highly exceptional that a player’s conduct would have brought about harm.” The court concluded that to allow a jury to decide the issue would be to substitute surmise and speculation for reason.

    Quoting Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 577: “To constitute a nuisance, the use must be such as to produce a tangible and appreciable injury to neighboring property, or such as to render its enjoyment especially uncomfortable or inconvenient.” Also, “Persons living in organized communities must suffer some damage, annoyance and inconvenience from each other. * * * If one lives in the city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors and confusion incident to city life.”

  • Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47 (1967): Liability for Concentrated Surface Water Discharge

    Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47 (1967)

    An upper landowner is liable when it artificially collects and concentrates surface waters, discharging them in quantities beyond a natural outlet’s capacity onto a lower landowner’s property.

    Summary

    The Buffalo Sewer Authority sued the Town of Cheektowaga to enjoin the town’s discharge of storm water into the city’s sewer system. The town, an upper landowner, constructed a storm drainage system that concentrated surface water and discharged it into the city’s system, causing sewage to back up into city streets and homes. The court held that the town was liable because it artificially collected and concentrated surface waters, discharging them in quantities beyond the city’s system’s capacity. The injunction was modified to require the city to make a fair offer for joint action in storm water disposal.

    Facts

    The Town of Cheektowaga’s Drainage District No. 1 was adjacent to the City of Buffalo. Historically, surface waters from the town drained into the city. In 1958, the town constructed a storm drainage system for Tudor Place, which included receiving basins and pipes. The Buffalo Sewer Authority warned the town that connecting this system to the city’s combined sanitary and storm water sewage system would create a nuisance. The town connected the Tudor Place system without permission, resulting in sewage discharge into city streets and homes due to the city’s system being overburdened.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the Buffalo Sewer Authority, issuing an injunction against the town. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision without opinion. The Town of Cheektowaga then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an upper landowner (the Town of Cheektowaga) is liable for damages when it constructs a drainage system that artificially collects and concentrates surface waters, discharging them onto a lower landowner’s property (the City of Buffalo) in quantities exceeding the capacity of the natural outlet, thereby causing a nuisance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the town artificially collected and concentrated large quantities of surface waters and discharged them into an outlet on the city’s land that was unable to carry them off. The court modified the order to direct a mandatory injunction contingent upon a fair offer by the city for joint action in storm water disposal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the distinction between the general drainage of surface waters and the use of natural waterways for discharge. While landowners have rights to improve their property regarding surface water, they cannot use pipes or ditches to drain water onto another’s property. Quoting Kossoff v. Rathgeb-Walsh, the court reiterated that owners have equal rights to improve their properties, but cannot drain water onto another’s property using pipes or ditches.

    The court distinguished this situation from one involving a natural watercourse, stating that even if the open ditch in question were considered a natural watercourse, the town could not artificially concentrate and discharge waters into the stream in quantities beyond its natural capacity. The court cited Byrnes v. City of Cohoes and other cases supporting this principle.

    The court found the town’s actions inappropriate because they did not involve merely preventing surface water from flowing onto its land, but rather actively collecting and concentrating water and discharging it onto the city’s property. The court recognized the need for a solution due to increasing suburban populations and real estate developments. The court modified the injunction, mandating a fair offer by the city for joint action with the town regarding storm water disposal. The court highlighted that “the town is left at the mercy of the city” without such a provision.

    The court remitted the matter to the Special Term, empowering it to determine the fairness and reasonableness of any proposals submitted by the city and to issue the injunction if the town refused to cooperate in a plan submitted by the city. The court retained jurisdiction until a plan went into operation, reflecting the equitable powers of the court to grant or withhold relief based on reasonable and equitable conditions.