Nowak v. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 821 (1999)
Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), the term “owner” includes owners in fee, even if the property is leased to another entity, and the owner’s ability to control the work or benefit from it is legally irrelevant to liability.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that the City of New York, as the owner of property leased to the New York City Transit Authority, was liable under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a Transit Authority employee during repair work. The court reaffirmed that ownership alone is sufficient to establish liability, regardless of the owner’s control over the work or the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship. The decision emphasizes a bright-line rule for determining owner liability under the statute, prioritizing the protection of workers engaged in elevated risk activities.
Facts
The plaintiff, a structure maintainer for the New York City Transit Authority, was injured when he fell through a canopy attached to an elevated train station owned by the City of New York. The plaintiff was performing repair work at the time of the incident. The City of New York owned the train station but leased it to the New York City Transit Authority.
Procedural History
The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1). The City initiated a third-party action against the Transit Authority. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, and both the City and the Transit Authority cross-moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied the cross-motions. Following a jury trial on damages, the Supreme Court entered judgment against the City and awarded the City full indemnification from the Transit Authority. The Appellate Division affirmed the jury award against the City. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the City of New York, as the owner of the property leased to the New York City Transit Authority, is an “owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), despite lacking direct control over the work or the worker.
Holding
Yes, because liability under Labor Law § 240(1) rests upon the fact of ownership. The court emphasized that the City’s lack of control or the lessor-lessee relationship with the Transit Authority does not negate its responsibility as the owner under the statute.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, specifically Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, stating that “liability rests upon the fact of ownership and whether Eastern had contracted for the work or benefitted from it are legally irrelevant.” The court further explained, referencing Celestine v City of New York, that the Legislature intended to include owners in fee within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1), “even though the property might be leased to another.” The court rejected the argument that the City’s lack of direct control over the Transit Authority’s operations should exempt it from liability, noting that the Legislature has created specific exceptions for certain owners (e.g., owners of one- and two-family dwellings) but not for the City in this context. The court stated, “We therefore decline to exempt the City — which is in fact the owner — from the plain word and reach of the statute, leaving that for the Legislature if it so chooses.” This establishes a clear and consistent application of the statute based on ownership alone. The court also explicitly stated that “To the extent that Robinson v City of New York (211 AD2d 600) may be inconsistent with our holding today, it should not be followed.”