New York Law Review

Tag: Notice of Termination

  • Employers Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co., 45 N.Y.2d 608 (1978): Termination of Prior Insurance with Supervening Policy

    Employers Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co., 45 N.Y.2d 608 (1978)

    A supervening policy of liability insurance terminates a prior insurer’s obligation to indemnify, irrespective of the prior insurer’s noncompliance with the notice requirements of Section 313 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses which of two insurers is liable for a car accident. Firemen’s policy was set to expire, and they notified the broker of non-renewal, and never billed for subsequent premiums. Employers issued a binder for replacement insurance effective the same date as Firemen’s termination. After the accident, Employers defended and settled the suit but then sought reimbursement from Firemen’s, arguing Firemen’s failed to provide proper termination notices. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Employers policy was in effect at the time of the accident, and a supervening policy terminates a prior insurer’s obligations, even if the prior insurer did not comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313’s notice requirements.

    Facts

    Hacker Oil Corporation had a liability insurance policy with Firemen’s Fund Insurance Company, which was set to expire on October 25, 1968. Before this date, Firemen’s notified Hacker’s broker that it would not renew the policy, and Firemen’s never billed for or received any premiums after this date. The broker then secured a binder on behalf of Employers Commercial Union Insurance for replacement insurance, with the new policy’s effective date set as October 25, 1968. On January 1, 1969, an accident occurred involving a vehicle owned by Hacker Oil Corporation. Employers eventually issued a formal policy effective October 25, 1968 to October 25, 1969.

    Procedural History

    Following the accident, injured parties sued the driver and Hacker. Employers defended them and settled the suit. Employers then sued Firemen’s, seeking reimbursement. The Special Term declared Firemen’s liable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Employers policy was in effect on January 1, 1969, regardless of the status of Firemen’s coverage.
    2. Whether Firemen’s remained on the risk on January 1, 1969, due to its failure to comply with the notice requirements of Section 313 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the procurement of another insurance contract may terminate the insurance previously in effect with respect to any motor vehicles designated in both contracts under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313(1).
    2. No, because when replacement insurance provides uninterrupted continuation of coverage from the instant of expiration of the pre-existing policy, the new insurer bears the risk exclusively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the purpose of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 is to protect the public and prevent motorists from suffering an unanticipated loss of insurance. However, these concerns are met when new coverage is secured, eliminating the possibility of an uninsured period. The insured needs no notice when they have already procured new insurance. The court found no conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of Section 313. The procurement of “another insurance contract” terminates the prior insurance. The court emphasized that Employers undertook the defense of the liability suit without reservation and issued an unambiguous policy. The court stated that insurance binders are common and necessary, and that “courts, recognizing that the cryptic nature of binders is born of necessity and that many policy clauses are either stereotypes or mandated by public regulation, are not loath to infer that conditions and limitations usual to the contemplated coverage were intended to be part of the parties’ contract during the binder period.”

    The court also addressed Firemen’s failure to notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. While Section 313(2) requires an insurer to provide the Commissioner with notice of termination, the statute prescribes no penalty for failure to do so and is informational only. The court acknowledged some cases have held that the derelict insurer remains on the risk until notice is filed with the commissioner. However, the court distinguished those cases, holding that where replacement insurance is actually obtained to continue coverage, the superseded insurer is relieved of the risk, despite the failure to notify the commissioner. The court stated that subdivision 2 itself contemplates that in the first instance ordinarily the terminated insurer will have “been advised by the commissioner that such insurance has been superseded by another insurance contract”.

  • Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 29 N.Y.2d 762 (1971): Summary Judgment and Controverted Facts in Insurance Policy Termination

    Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 29 N.Y.2d 762 (1971)

    Summary judgment is inappropriate when the record reveals a sharply controverted material issue of fact, and neither party has made a proper evidentiary showing to support their motion.

    Summary

    Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend Rose in an action because the insurance policy had expired. The accident occurred after the policy’s stated expiration date, but the Assigned Risk Plan required proper notification of termination. The central issue was whether Lumbermens had properly notified Rose of the policy’s termination as required by the Assigned Risk Plan. Because conflicting evidence existed regarding whether the required 45-day notice was sent, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate for either party. The case was remitted for trial to resolve the factual dispute.

    Facts

    Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. issued an Assigned Risk Policy to Rose, with a stated expiration date of April 15, 1966.
    Rose was involved in an accident on December 3, 1966, after the stated policy expiration date.
    Lumbermens sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend Rose.
    The Assigned Risk Plan required a 45-day notice to the insured before termination could be effective.
    There was a dispute over whether Lumbermens sent the required 45-day notice to Rose.

    Procedural History

    Lumbermens brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment.
    Both Lumbermens and the opposing party moved for summary judgment.
    The lower court granted summary judgment, the specific outcome of which is not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision, the specifics of which are not detailed in the Court of Appeals decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denied both the motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, and remitted the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether summary judgment is appropriate when there is a sharply disputed issue of material fact regarding whether an insurer properly notified an insured of policy termination under the Assigned Risk Plan.

    Holding

    No, because a sharply controverted issue of fact existed as to whether the 45-day notice, required by the Assigned Risk Plan, was sent to the insured, and neither party made a proper evidentiary showing to support their motion for summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while the failure to file a termination notice with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles doesn’t necessarily continue coverage, the Assigned Risk Plan does require specific notification to the insured. The court stated: “the Assigned Risk Policy issued by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. would have continued in full force and effect if the insurer failed to comply with the relevant provisions of the Assigned Risk Plan.”

    Because Lumbermens’ obligation to defend hinged on proper notification, the factual dispute over whether the 45-day notice was sent was material. The court found that the conflicting evidence presented by both parties created a “sharply controverted material issue of fact.” The court noted, “Inasmuch as the record discloses a sharply controverted material issue of fact as to whether a 45-day notice, required by subdivision 2 of section 14 of the plan, was sent to the insured, and neither Lumbermens nor plaintiffs-appellants has made a proper evidentiary showing in support of the motion and cross motion… summary judgment in favor of either side is unwarranted.”

    The court cited CPLR 3212(b) and prior cases, including Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox, reinforcing the principle that summary judgment should be denied when a genuine issue of material fact exists. The court effectively stated that summary judgment is not a tool to resolve factual disputes but to determine if such disputes exist requiring a trial.