Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)

New York Labor Law prohibiting child labor applies only to commercial enterprises and not to situations where a child assists in the construction of a private, non-commercial residence.

Summary

This case addresses whether the New York Labor Law, specifically prohibiting the employment of children under 16 in construction, applies when a 13-year-old assists his half-brother in building the half-brother’s private home. The court held that the statute’s prohibition applies only to commercial enterprises, not to private, non-commercial activities. The dissenting judge argued that the statute’s plain language prohibits *any* employment of children under 16 in construction, regardless of the commercial nature, and that policy considerations regarding child safety should prevail. The majority’s decision hinged on interpreting the legislature’s intent and the overall statutory scheme.

Facts

The plaintiff, a 13-year-old boy, was helping his half-brother, the defendant, build the defendant’s personal residence. While assisting in the construction, the plaintiff sustained a serious eye injury. The plaintiff argued that the defendant violated New York Labor Law, which prohibits employing children under 16 in construction.

Procedural History

The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, finding that the defendant had violated the Labor Law. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Labor Law did not apply to the non-commercial construction of a private residence. This appeal followed.

Issue(s)

Whether New York Labor Law § 133(1)(e), prohibiting the employment of children under sixteen years of age in the erection of a building, applies to the construction of a private, non-commercial residence.

Holding

No, because the prohibition in Labor Law § 133(1)(e) applies only to commercial enterprises and not to situations where a child is assisting in the construction of a private, non-commercial residence. The legislature intended the law to protect children from exploitation in commercial settings, not to prohibit family members from helping each other with personal projects.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind the child labor laws was to prevent the exploitation of children in commercial ventures. The court considered the overall statutory scheme of the Labor Law, noting that many sections explicitly address commercial activities. The court concluded that applying the statute to non-commercial, private construction would extend its reach beyond what the legislature intended. The court also noted the lack of specific language in the statute that would expressly prohibit a family member from assisting in building a private home. The dissenting judge argued that the statute’s plain language prohibits *any* employment of children under 16 in construction and that the dangers to children are the same whether the construction is commercial or private. The dissent also pointed out that the legislature had made specific exceptions in other sections of the Labor Law for family employment in certain situations, implying that the absence of such an exception in this context was intentional. The dissent argued that the majority was improperly “construing” a statute that was clear on its face. The dissent also argued that policy considerations favored protecting children, even within a family context, from hazardous activities. Judge Burke stated, “the statutory scheme of which section 146 is a part indicates that, when the Legislature wanted to specify ‘ commercial ’ limitations in various situations, it did so (see Labor Law, §§ 130, 131, 132).”