New York Law Review

Tag: Noise Pollution

  • Marvin v. Village of Painted Post, 26 N.Y.3d 306 (2015): Standing in SEQRA Cases and the ‘Special Injury’ Requirement

    Marvin v. Village of Painted Post, 26 N.Y.3d 306 (2015)

    To establish standing in land use matters under SEQRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate a harm that is different in kind or degree from that suffered by the public at large, even if others in the community also experience the harm.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to a water sale and rail loading facility project in the Village of Painted Post, NY, under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The central issue is whether a local resident, John Marvin, had standing to sue the Village based on increased train noise from the project. The lower courts disagreed on whether Marvin suffered a ‘special injury’ distinct from the general public’s. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Marvin’s claims of noise pollution, arising from his proximity to the project and increased rail traffic, were sufficient to establish standing. The court clarified that harm need not be unique to confer standing, but must be different in kind or degree from that experienced by the general public. The court emphasized that to deny standing in this case would effectively shield governmental actions from judicial review and emphasized that multiple individuals experiencing similar harms does not negate the existence of a ‘special injury’ for purposes of establishing standing.

    Facts

    The Village of Painted Post entered into a surplus water sale agreement with SWEPI, LP, for the sale of water and leased land to Wellsboro & Corning Railroad (Wellsboro) for a water transloading facility. The Village determined the water sale was a Type II action and issued a negative declaration for the lease agreement. Construction began, and petitioners, including several organizations and individual residents, initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The petition alleged violations of SEQRA, including failure to consider environmental impacts and improper segmentation of the project review. John Marvin, a resident near the proposed rail loading facility, alleged he was adversely affected by increased train noise. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Marvin submitted an affidavit stating the increased noise kept him awake.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, finding Marvin had standing and the Village had violated SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Marvin lacked standing because the noise he complained of was not different in kind or degree from the public at large, focusing that the source of the noise (i.e. the trains themselves) passed throughout the village. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether John Marvin, a resident near a water transloading facility, has standing to challenge the Village’s actions under SEQRA, based on allegations of increased train noise affecting his quality of life?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Marvin’s allegations of increased train noise constituted a harm different in kind or degree from the general public, thus establishing his standing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the principle from Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk that for standing in land use matters, a plaintiff must show a ‘special injury’ different from the public at large. The court distinguished Marvin’s situation from a scenario where the public experienced indirect effects. Marvin, like those in Save the Pine Bush was directly impacted. The court emphasized that the harm need not be unique, and that the fact that others may experience the same harm does not preclude standing. The court held that the Appellate Division applied an overly restrictive analysis, which would shield government actions from judicial review. The court noted that Marvin’s allegations about train noise were distinct because they were directly related to the increased train traffic.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the ‘special injury’ requirement for standing in SEQRA cases in New York. Attorneys should advise clients that standing is not automatically denied because others experience the same harm. A plaintiff can establish standing by demonstrating a direct, particularized harm resulting from a project’s impacts on their property. It is critical to emphasize the nature and degree of a plaintiff’s injury. This case suggests that if governmental action causes a real injury to a property, even if others in the vicinity are also impacted, standing may be present. When drafting pleadings, attorneys should ensure that the injury is described with enough specificity and that it falls within the zone of interests protected by SEQRA. The Court emphasized the need to avoid overly restrictive interpretations of standing rules to allow for judicial review of governmental decisions.

  • Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409 (1968): Consequential Damages and Noise Pollution After Partial Taking

    Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409 (1968)

    When a portion of a property is taken for public use, the decrease in value to the remaining property due to factors like noise, loss of view, and loss of privacy, all resulting from the public use, can be considered in determining consequential damages.

    Summary

    The State of New York condemned a portion of the Dennisons’ secluded, quiet property to construct a highway. The Dennisons sought compensation for the partial taking, arguing that the new highway caused a loss of privacy, seclusion, and view, as well as increased noise. The Court of Claims awarded damages, considering these factors, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while noise alone might not be compensable, it can be considered as one factor in determining the overall decrease in the value of the remaining property after a partial taking. The court emphasized the difficulty of separating the noise element from other valid elements of consequential damage.

    Facts

    The Dennisons owned a secluded, quiet property in Lake George, New York, characterized by wooded and landscaped land. The property featured tall trees, underground utility services, and a stream, providing privacy and a scenic view. The State condemned a portion of the property to construct a highway, which ran approximately 200 feet from the Dennisons’ residence. The highway embankment stood about 20 feet above the Dennisons’ lawn, obstructing their view, eliminating their privacy, and introducing traffic noise and odors.

    Procedural History

    The Dennisons filed a claim in the Court of Claims seeking damages for the partial taking of their property. The Court of Claims awarded damages, considering the loss of privacy, seclusion, view, and the increase in noise. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in determining consequential damages for a partial taking of property, the court can consider the impact of noise, loss of privacy, and loss of view resulting from the use of the condemned portion, even if noise alone might not be compensable.

    Holding

    Yes, because the courts below did not make a separate award for damages due to noise but rather considered it as one factor in determining the decrease in value to the remaining property along with loss of privacy, seclusion and view. The court reasoned that segregating the noise element from other elements would be practically impossible, and any reduction on remand would be arbitrary and speculative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that consequential damages, which result from the use of the parcel taken, are entitled to consideration in a partial taking case. While the State argued that damages common to the public, such as highway noise affecting properties adjoining a public highway, should be excluded, the court found that the lower courts did not make a separate award for noise. Instead, the court considered noise as one factor in determining the overall decrease in the property’s value. The court emphasized the practical difficulties of separating the noise element from other conceded elements of damage, such as loss of privacy and view.

    The court cited precedent (South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Kirkover) which has recognized that, where there has been a partial taking of property of the kind present here, the noise element may be considered as one of several factors in determining consequential damages. The court also acknowledged the argument that property owners must endure certain inconveniences for the benefits of modern transportation but concluded that the practical difficulties in separating noise damages outweighed any benefit from applying the State’s theory. Chief Judge Fuld, in his concurrence, noted the specific tranquility of the property as a factor distinguishing the case. The dissent argued that the burden is on the claimant to show consequential damages flowing from the taking and that traffic noise is a universal condition of modern life, not unique to the claimant, and should thus be excluded as an element of damage. The dissent further argued that damages from future traffic noise should be segregated or be excluded if the party cannot prove the specific injury to them not shared by the general public.