New York Law Review

Tag: New York

  • People v. Kirk, 32 Misc. 2d 955 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1962): Interpreting “Falsely Make” in Prescription Forgery Statutes

    People v. Kirk, 32 Misc. 2d 955 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1962)

    A statute prohibiting the false making of a prescription is violated when a person fills in a prescription blank with a fictitious name or the name of a deceased person to obtain narcotics, even if another statute also penalizes the same conduct.

    Summary

    Kirk was convicted of violating Section 889-b of the Penal Law for falsely making a doctor’s prescription. He filled in prescription blanks with fictitious names and the names of deceased individuals to acquire narcotics, which he then provided to an addict. The court reversed the conviction, but the dissenting judge argued that Kirk’s actions clearly fell within the statute’s prohibition of falsely making a prescription, regardless of the existence of another statute addressing similar conduct. This case highlights the importance of adhering to the plain meaning of statutory language and the complexities of overlapping criminal statutes.

    Facts

    The defendant, Kirk, obtained narcotics by completing prescription blanks with a fictitious name and the name of a deceased person.

    He presented these prescriptions to pharmacies and had them filled.

    Kirk then supplied the obtained narcotics to an individual struggling with addiction.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted under Section 889-b of the Penal Law for falsely making a doctor’s prescription.

    The County Court reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s actions of filling prescription blanks with fictitious and deceased names constituted “falsely making” a doctor’s prescription under Section 889-b of the Penal Law.

    Holding

    No, because the court reversed the lower court’s decision, implicitly holding that the defendant’s actions did not constitute falsely making a prescription under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting judge argued that the language of Section 889-b of the Penal Law is clear and unambiguous, stating that anyone “who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit a doctor’s prescription” is in violation of this statute. He stated, “if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is neither need nor warrant to look elsewhere for its meaning”.

    The dissent contended that Kirk’s actions of filling in a fictitious name and the name of a dead person on the prescription blank does indeed constitute the act of falsely making a doctor’s prescription. If he did not thus “falsely make” a “doctor’s prescription,” words have lost their meaning.

    The dissent also addressed the presence of Public Health Law § 3351, subd. 1, par. (a), cl. (4), which also penalizes this conduct, by saying it is “interesting but legally of no consequence”. The dissent mocks that if the defendant had been convicted under the other statute, he would likely argue that section 889-b of the Penal Law is more appropriate for his offense.

  • Dengeles v. Young, 14 A.D.2d 833 (N.Y. 1961): Liability of Administrative Officials for Malicious Acts

    Dengeles v. Young, 14 A.D.2d 833 (N.Y. 1961)

    An administrative official may be held liable for damages resulting from willful and malicious acts, particularly when refusing to perform a ministerial duty after a court order compelling them to act.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether administrative officials can be held liable for damages resulting from the willful and malicious refusal to issue a building permit. The plaintiffs, Dengeles, sought a permit to erect a diner, which was initially denied despite the ordinance allowing restaurants in the area. Even after a court order compelling the issuance of the permit, the officials refused. The court held that the officials could be liable, as their actions were deemed malicious and not protected by immunity, especially after the court order removed any discretionary aspect of their duty. The dissent argued for upholding liability, citing precedent and policy reasons against unbridled administrative power.

    Facts

    The Dengeles sought a building permit to erect a diner in an area where the Town of Hempstead Building Ordinance permitted restaurants.
    Despite the ordinance and previous approvals for similar diner applications, the respondents refused to issue the permit.
    The Dengeles obtained a court order compelling the issuance of the permit.
    The respondents continued to refuse to issue the permit even after the court order.
    The plaintiffs alleged the refusal was willful and malicious.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs initially sought a court order compelling the issuance of the permit, which they obtained.
    After the respondents continued to refuse, the plaintiffs filed a civil action seeking damages for the willful and malicious refusal to grant the permit.
    The lower courts likely dismissed the action, leading to this appeal.
    The Appellate Division’s decision in Matter of Dengeles v. Young (3 A.D.2d 758) found that the inspector “willfully refused to grant the permit, and misled and hindered” the appellants.

    Issue(s)

    Whether administrative officials are immune from liability for damages resulting from the willful and malicious refusal to perform a ministerial duty, specifically issuing a building permit, even after a court order compelling them to do so.

    Holding

    Yes, because the alleged acts of the officials, particularly after the court order, exceeded the scope of any discretionary immunity and could be considered malicious and tortious conduct for which damages are recoverable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while immunity is extended to officials making decisions common to judicial and legislative organs, this does not excuse the intentional misuse of power by administrative officers.
    The court distinguished between discretionary and ministerial acts. The initial determination of whether a diner qualified as a “restaurant” under the ordinance might have involved some discretion. However, given the prior approvals for similar diner applications, this question was effectively settled.
    After the court order compelling issuance, the duty became purely ministerial. The respondents’ refusal to comply could be viewed as a malicious and tortious act.
    The court cited East Riv. Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, stating that if officials determine a party is entitled to a contract but then refuse to enter into it, a court may have cognizance over the matter, even in favor of a private suitor.
    The dissenting opinion emphasized that most jurisdictions hold officials liable for malicious or dishonest acts, transforming otherwise privileged actions into actionable ones.
    The dissent argued that once the court order was issued, any element of judgment or discretion was removed, and the only proper course of action was to obey the order. Refusal at this stage could not be considered privileged.
    The dissent quoted the Appellate Division’s finding in Matter of Dengeles v. Young that the inspector “willfully refused to grant the permit, and misled and hindered” the appellants.
    The dissent highlighted the danger of placing unbridled powers in the hands of administrative officials, arguing it puts rights at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. “For the law to sanction and in fact assist in the willful and malicious use of administrative power to the damage of an individual contributes nothing to increased efficiency in the administrative agencies.”

  • Pansa v. Sitrin, 27 A.D.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967): Determining Timeliness of Zoning Appeal for Permit Revocation

    Pansa v. Sitrin, 27 A.D.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1967)

    The 30-day period to appeal a zoning board decision does not begin to run against a party seeking revocation of a permit until their objections have been formally overruled and they have received notice of that decision.

    Summary

    The Pansas, homeowners, challenged a zoning board decision that approved a permit for Sitrin to build a structure near their property. The Pansas argued the building was a prohibited “warehouse” and violated setback requirements. The Zoning Board of Appeals dismissed their appeal as untimely, claiming it was filed more than 30 days after the permit’s issuance. The court held that for a party seeking revocation of a permit, the 30-day appeal period begins when their revocation request is formally denied and they receive notice, not from the permit’s initial issuance. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to address the merits of the other zoning issues.

    Facts

    Alexander and Ruth Pansa owned a home in a residential zone. Neighbor Sitrin owned commercially zoned property bordering the Pansas’ lot. Sitrin obtained a permit on September 21, 1962, to build what the plans described as a “warehouse.” The Pansas observed construction starting around September 24. On September 26, Alexander Pansa learned of the permit and attended meetings with city officials, Sitrin, and representatives from the Buildings Department, Corporation Counsel’s office, and Planning Commission regarding his objections to the permit. On October 9, 1962, Pansa requested the Planning Commission revoke the permit, but was told a written decision would be rendered, allowing the losing party to appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The city building commissioner issued a building permit to Sitrin. The Pansas appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals, arguing the permit was invalid. The Zoning Board of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely but also ruled against the Pansas on the merits. Special Term dismissed the proceeding based on the untimely appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Pansas’ appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals was timely, considering the zoning ordinance requirement to appeal within 30 days of the “date of the decision.”

    Holding

    No, because the 30-day appeal period for a party seeking permit revocation begins when their objections are formally overruled and they receive notice of that decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that interpreting the zoning ordinance strictly to mean 30 days from the permit’s issuance would be unreasonable, as it could prevent appeals if neighbors only learn of the permit long after its issuance. While applying this timeline to permit applicants might be fair, it is not for those demanding revocation. The court emphasized construing statutes reasonably to protect citizens’ rights. The court stated, “[I]t is the duty of the courts to construe statutes reasonably and so as not to deprive citizens of important rights.” It interpreted the ordinance to mean the 30-day period for seeking revocation begins only after objections are overruled in a “decision” with proper notice. Because the Zoning Board of Appeals and Special Term addressed the merits of the other issues, but the Appellate Division did not, the Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and requested the Appellate Division to amend its order to address the other questions presented, excluding the timeliness of the appeal. This allows for a complete review of all issues in the case.

  • Nuttall v. Simis, 31 App. Div. 503: Officer Liability for Wrongful Civil Service Removal

    31 App. Div. 503

    A public officer who wrongfully removes a civil service employee without a hearing is liable for damages, even after the employee is reinstated via mandamus.

    Summary

    Nuttall, a former volunteer firefighter, was wrongfully discharged from his civil service position by Simis. After being reinstated via mandamus, Nuttall sued Simis for damages resulting from the wrongful removal. The court addressed whether a wrongfully discharged civil service employee, reinstated by mandamus, can sue the officer who removed him for damages, especially when the position was filled in the interim. The court held that Simis was liable for damages, as the removal was a ministerial act of misfeasance that deprived Nuttall of his right to the position and its associated salary. Mandamus provides reinstatement, but not complete remedy.

    Facts

    Nuttall was a former volunteer firefighter holding a position in civil service.
    Simis, a public officer, removed Nuttall from his position without providing a hearing.
    Nuttall’s position was filled by another person after his removal.
    Nuttall successfully obtained a writ of mandamus, leading to his reinstatement.
    Nuttall then sued Simis for damages suffered because of the wrongful removal, specifically the lost salary during his period of unemployment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of Nuttall, holding Simis liable for damages.
    Simis appealed the decision.
    The appellate court reviewed the case to determine the extent of liability for wrongful removal from a civil service position.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public officer who wrongfully removes a civil service employee without a hearing is liable for damages, even after the employee is reinstated via mandamus.

    Holding

    Yes, because the act of removing the employee without a hearing constitutes misfeasance, entitling the employee to damages for the loss of salary and deprivation of rights. Mandamus is not a complete remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the wrongful removal without a hearing was a ministerial act of misfeasance on the part of Simis, making him liable for damages. The court emphasized that while a public position is not property in the traditional sense, wrongful removal still deprives the employee of a right, specifically the right to the position and its associated salary. The court cited the principle established in Ashby v. White, stating that “where there is a right there is a remedy.” The court also noted that while Nuttall could have sought damages in the mandamus proceeding, he was not obligated to do so, and pursuing a separate action for damages was permissible. Even if Simis acted with good motives, he was still liable for violating the law. The court found that the appropriate measure of damages was the salary Nuttall lost due to Simis’s wrongful act. The court stated, “The loss is the amount of salary of which plaintiff has been deprived by defendant’s, wrongful act.”

  • Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 1863 N.Y. Gen. Term. LEXIS 104 (1863): Legislative Power to Grant Competing Franchises

    1863 N.Y. Gen. Term. LEXIS 104

    A state legislature can grant a franchise that impairs or destroys the value of a previously granted franchise, absent an express prohibition in the original grant.

    Summary

    Fort Plain Bridge Co. sued Smith for building a competing bridge near its own, alleging it infringed on their franchise. The court held that the state legislature’s repeal of a section in Fort Plain Bridge Co.’s charter that prohibited competing bridges meant the company had no exclusive right. Absent an express prohibition in the original grant, the legislature could authorize a competing bridge even if it diminished the value of the original franchise. Furthermore, to claim nuisance, the plaintiff needed to prove special damages distinct from the general public.

    Facts

    Fort Plain Bridge Co. was incorporated with the right to build a bridge and collect tolls. Initially, their charter prohibited any other bridge within a mile. Smith constructed a competing bridge near Fort Plain’s bridge after the legislature repealed the exclusive provision in Fort Plain’s charter. Fort Plain Bridge Co. claimed Smith’s bridge infringed upon their franchise and was a nuisance.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled in favor of Smith. Fort Plain Bridge Co. appealed to the General Term of the Supreme Court of New York, arguing that Smith’s bridge unlawfully interfered with their franchise. The General Term affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the state legislature’s repeal of the exclusivity clause in Fort Plain Bridge Co.’s charter allows the legislature to authorize a competing bridge.
    2. Whether the construction of a bridge without legislative authority constitutes a nuisance that can be challenged by a party who does not suffer specific damages different from the general public.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because after granting a franchise, the legislature can grant a similar franchise to another party, even if it impairs the first franchise’s value, unless expressly prohibited in the original grant.
    2. No, because to maintain an action against a public nuisance, the plaintiff must demonstrate special damages distinct from those suffered by the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge to establish the principle that a state legislature can grant a franchise that diminishes the value of a prior franchise unless explicitly prohibited. The repeal of the exclusivity clause in Fort Plain’s charter removed any such prohibition. The court stated, “Since the case of The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge (11 Peters, 420), it has been understood to be the law, that it is competent for the legislature, after granting a franchise to one person, or corporation…to grant a similar franchise to another…the use of which shall impair or even destroy the value of the first franchise, although the right so to do may not be reserved in the first grant; unless the right so to do is expressly prohibited by the first grant.” Regarding the nuisance claim, the court reasoned that even if Smith’s bridge obstructed navigation, only those who suffered unique damages could bring a cause of action. The court cited precedent that “no one has the right to abate it, or sustain an action for damages occasioned by the erection, unless he has himself sustained some damages not sustained by the rest of the community.” The court acknowledged the possibly unfair outcome, stating, “I am free to say that I would be glad to see the old common law restored, which denied to the legislature the power to take away or impair a franchise granted by it; but the law is settled the other way, and we must conform to it.”