New York Law Review

Tag: New York Times Co. v. Bell

  • Matter of New York Times Co. v. Bell, 503 N.E.2d 1100 (N.Y. 1986): Balancing Fair Trial Rights and Public Access to Pretrial Hearings

    Matter of New York Times Co. v. Bell, 503 N.E.2d 1100 (N.Y. 1986)

    The public and press have a qualified First Amendment right of access to pretrial suppression hearings, which can only be overcome by specific findings demonstrating a substantial probability that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced by publicity and that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect those rights.

    Summary

    Robert Chambers, charged with murder, sought to close his pretrial suppression hearing to the public and press, arguing that publicity would taint the jury pool. The trial court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that while the public and press have a First Amendment right of access to pretrial suppression hearings, this right is not absolute and can be overcome if the defendant demonstrates a substantial probability of prejudice to their fair trial rights that closure would prevent, and that no reasonable alternatives exist. The Court found that the defendant failed to meet this burden.

    Facts

    Robert Chambers was charged with the murder of Jennifer Levin. Prior to the Huntley hearing (a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant), Chambers moved to close the courtroom to the public and press. He argued that disclosure of any suppressed statement would threaten the impaneling of an impartial jury, violating his right to a fair trial. He proposed providing redacted transcripts after the jury was sworn. The prosecution opposed the closure, asserting that the defendant’s statements had already been substantially disclosed to the public.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to close the courtroom. The media petitioners commenced an Article 78 proceeding to enjoin the closure. The Appellate Division granted the petition and vacated the closure order. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in closing the pretrial suppression hearing to the public and press, based on the defendant’s claim that publicity would prejudice his right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to make specific findings demonstrating a substantial probability that his right to a fair trial would be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent, and that reasonable alternatives to closure could not adequately protect his fair trial rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the tension between the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the public’s and press’s right to access criminal proceedings under the First Amendment. Citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the court recognized the importance of open proceedings to freedom of speech and the press. The Court extended this right of access to pretrial suppression hearings, noting their significance in challenging police and prosecutorial conduct.

    However, the Court emphasized that this right of access is not absolute. A defendant can overcome this right by demonstrating a substantial probability that their right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent, and that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect their fair trial rights. This requires “specific findings” by the trial court.

    In this case, the Court found that the defendant failed to meet this burden. His claims were vague and speculative, and the trial court’s decision was based on the “possibility” of tainted evidence, not a substantial probability of prejudice. Moreover, much of the information the defendant sought to suppress had already been disclosed in his own pretrial motions. The Court cited Press-Enterprise II for the proposition that voir dire can be used to identify jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict.

    The Court rejected remitting the case for further findings, noting that the record did not support the necessary findings for closure. Therefore, the trial court improperly closed the hearing, violating the petitioners’ First Amendment rights. As the Court noted, “By denying public access to the suppression hearing on a ‘possibility’ that there might be tainted, nonpublic evidence that might impair the selection of an impartial jury — which could very likely be said of every suppression hearing in every highly publicized case — the trial court improperly closed the door on petitioners’ First Amendment rights.”