New York Law Review

Tag: New York Labor Law

  • O’Sullivan v. IDI Const. Co., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 1011 (1991): Defining ‘Employed’ Under New York Labor Law for Construction Site Injuries

    O’Sullivan v. IDI Const. Co., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 1011 (1991)

    An individual inspecting a construction site to prepare a repair estimate is not considered an ’employee’ under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) and therefore cannot claim protection under those statutes.

    Summary

    O’Sullivan, a design engineer, was injured while inspecting roof damage on IDI Construction’s building to prepare a repair estimate for his employer, Ziegler Co. The New York Court of Appeals held that O’Sullivan was not an ’employee’ under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) because Ziegler Co. had not been hired to perform any construction work at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that merely being invited to submit an estimate does not transform a potential bidder into an employee. O’Sullivan could only recover if he could prove a traditional negligence claim.

    Facts

    IDI Construction sustained roof damage to one of its buildings. IDI sought repair estimates from several contractors, including Edward M. Ziegler Co., the plaintiff’s employer. O’Sullivan, a design engineer employed by Ziegler Co., went to IDI’s building to inspect the damage. While being shown the damaged area by IDI’s maintenance supervisor, the roof gave way, and O’Sullivan was injured. Ziegler Co. had not been hired to perform any work at the time of the accident.

    Procedural History

    O’Sullivan filed a lawsuit against IDI Construction. The specific rulings at the lower court and appellate division levels are not explicitly stated in this memorandum opinion, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted IDI Construction’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing O’Sullivan’s second cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a design engineer, who is injured while inspecting a building to prepare a repair estimate for his employer, qualifies as a person “employed” to carry out repairs under New York Labor Law §§ 200(1), 240(1), and 241(6), thus entitling him to the protections afforded by those statutes.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s firm had not been hired to perform any construction work on the premises at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff was not a person ’employed’ to carry out the repairs as that term is used in New York Labor Law §§ 200(1), 240(1), and 241(6).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiff’s firm, Ziegler Co., was merely a potential bidder and not an employee at the time of the accident. The court emphasized that the firm had not been hired to perform any construction work. The invitation to submit an estimate did not change the firm’s status from a potential bidder to an employee. As a result, O’Sullivan was not within the class of workers that the Labor Law provisions were enacted to protect, citing Mordkofsky v. V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 573, 576-577. The court stated that O’Sullivan is “entitled to recover only if he can establish the elements of a traditional negligence cause of action.” The court distinguished the situation from one where the firm had already been hired to perform work, stating that, in this case, the firm was in the position of a potential bidder.

  • Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311 (1981): Scope of Liability for Contractors Under New York Labor Law

    Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311 (1981)

    Under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241, a prime contractor is liable for construction site injuries only when the injury arises from work specifically delegated to that contractor, giving them the authority to control the injury-producing activity.

    Summary

    George Russin, an employee of the general contractor, A.J. Cerasaro, Inc., was injured while dismantling a scaffold. He sued prime contractors (Mateo, Picciano, Stellmack) alleging Labor Law violations. The Court of Appeals held that these prime contractors, who had separate contracts with the Village of Endicott (the owner) and no contractual relationship with Cerasaro, were not liable. The Court reasoned that liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 requires the authority to control the activity causing the injury. Since the prime contractors lacked this control over the general construction work, they could not be held liable for Russin’s injuries.

    Facts

    The Village of Endicott contracted with seven individual contractors for the construction of a new clubhouse. A.J. Cerasaro, Inc. was the general contractor responsible for coordinating all work. Russin, a Cerasaro employee, was injured when a ladder he used to descend from a scaffold (being dismantled by Cerasaro) slipped. The ladder was owned by Picciano, a prime contractor for plumbing. The lawsuit was filed against Mateo (electrical), Picciano (plumbing), and Stellmack (HVAC).

    Procedural History

    Russin sued Mateo, Picciano, and Stellmack, alleging violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that as prime contractors, they had no contractual arrangement with the general contractor and therefore could not be liable. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prime contractors, not in privity with the general contractor, can be held liable under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 for injuries sustained by a worker employed by the general contractor during work for which the general contractor was solely responsible.

    Holding

    No, because liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 requires the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury. Since the prime contractors’ contracts were directly with the owner, not with the general contractor, they lacked the requisite control over the general construction work that led to the plaintiff’s injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 200 of the Labor Law codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, but this duty presupposes the authority to control the injury-producing activity. Because the prime contractors’ contracts were with the Village of Endicott, not with Cerasaro, they lacked the authority to control Russin’s work or the dismantling of the scaffolding. The court stated that the 1969 amendments to sections 240 and 241 were intended to shift responsibility for construction site injuries to those parties with control. The court emphasized that while the duties imposed by sections 240 and 241 are nondelegable, the *work* giving rise to those duties *can* be delegated. When work is delegated, the third party obtains the authority to supervise and control it, becoming a statutory “agent” of the owner or general contractor, and thus subject to liability. The court noted: “Under the present Sections 240 and 241 of the Labor Law, the non-delegable duty has shifted from the general contractor and owner to the subcontractor, making him responsible for many things that he has no control of, such as coordination and overall supervision of the work.” The court concluded that the prime contractors were only agents of the owner for their specific contracted work (plumbing, electrical, HVAC) and not for the general construction work. The court stated that imposing a nondelegable duty upon each contractor for all injuries occurring on a job site would be unjust and contravene legislative history. The court limited the liability of a contractor as agent to the scope of the delegated work, or the particular agency created.