Tag: New York Human Rights Law

  • Jacobsen v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824 (2014): Employer’s Duty to Engage in Interactive Process for Disability Accommodation

    22 N.Y.3d 824 (2014)

    An employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process to explore reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee generally precludes summary judgment in the employer’s favor on disability discrimination claims under New York State and City Human Rights Laws.

    Summary

    William Jacobsen sued New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), alleging disability discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws after he was terminated following a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis. Jacobsen requested accommodations, including a transfer to a less hazardous location and respiratory equipment. HHC moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that HHC’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding Jacobsen’s requested accommodations created a triable issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. The court emphasized that employers must consider an employee’s proposed accommodations and engage in a dialogue about their feasibility.

    Facts

    William Jacobsen worked for HHC as a health facilities planner since 1979. His job involved site visits to construction projects. In 2005, he was transferred to a location with more frequent site visits and was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis due to asbestos exposure. Jacobsen requested a three-month medical leave and, upon his return, requested accommodations including protective respiratory equipment and a transfer back to the central office where he had previously worked with less exposure to construction sites. These requests were largely unmet, and he was eventually placed on unpaid medical leave and then terminated.

    Procedural History

    Jacobsen filed a complaint alleging disability discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws, as well as gross negligence. The Supreme Court granted HHC’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding a disabled employee’s request for reasonable accommodation precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.
    2. Whether an employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding a disabled employee’s request for reasonable accommodation precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under the New York City Human Rights Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the employer must demonstrate it considered the requested accommodation and engaged in interactions revealing deliberation on its viability to obtain summary judgment on a State HRL claim.
    2. Yes, because the City HRL provides broader protections against disability discrimination, unquestionably foreclosing summary judgment where the employer has not engaged in a good faith interactive process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that both the State and City Human Rights Laws require employers to engage in a good faith interactive process when an employee requests a reasonable accommodation. The court emphasized the individualized standard required by the State HRL, meant to move away from generalized assumptions about disabilities. The court cited the legislative intent behind the HRL amendments, which sought to encourage fair-minded discussion and voluntary integration of disabled employees into the workplace. The court held that HHC failed to demonstrate that it engaged in such a process with Jacobsen. Regarding the City HRL claim, the court noted the employer bears the burden to show the unavailability of any safe and reasonable accommodation. The court pointed to conflicting evidence regarding Jacobsen’s ability to perform his job duties at the central office, and HHC’s failure to adequately consider his request for a respirator. The court stated, “The relevant inquiry is whether the employee was capable of performing the core functions of the employee’s position at the time that the employer refused to accommodate the employee’s disability.” The court concluded that, at the very least, a material issue of fact existed as to whether HHC reasonably accommodated Jacobsen’s disability.
    The Court rejected the argument that Jacobsen’s eventual total disability relieved HHC of liability, stating that the statutes are designed to protect workers from being forced to choose between their health and their livelihood. While the court acknowledged the burden of proof at trial would be on Jacobsen to prove a reasonable accommodation existed under the State HRL, HHC had not met its burden on summary judgment of showing, as a matter of law, that no such accommodation was available. The court explicitly rejected an interpretation of Phillips v City of New York that a good faith interactive process is an independent element which, if lacking, automatically compels summary judgment for the employee. The lack of such a process is a factor in determining whether an accommodation was available.