New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Matter of Newcomb v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 N.Y.3d 460 (2016): Burden of Proof in Late Notice of Claim Cases

    28 N.Y.3d 460 (2016)

    A petitioner seeking to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation must initially show that the delay will not substantially prejudice the corporation, after which the burden shifts to the corporation to provide particularized evidence of substantial prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s denial of a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim against a school district. The Court held that the lower courts erred by placing the entire burden on the petitioner to demonstrate a lack of substantial prejudice to the school district caused by the delay in filing the notice. The Court clarified that the petitioner bears the initial burden of showing no prejudice. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the public corporation to provide specific evidence of substantial prejudice. The court found that the lower courts relied on speculation rather than evidence to support the claim of prejudice and that the school district had not met its burden.

    Facts

    A 16-year-old boy was struck by a car. The driver fled the scene. The boy sustained severe injuries. Within days of the accident, the boy’s father reported the details to the boy’s high school within the defendant school district. Counsel for the father requested the police accident file. The police delayed providing the file due to the ongoing criminal investigation. The father’s investigator took photographs of the accident scene within the 90-day statutory period, but these photos did not show a sign, which was later identified in police photos as being owned by the school district. After receiving the police file, the father’s counsel served a late notice of claim on the school district, alleging the sign obstructed the view and caused a dangerous condition.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the late notice would not prejudice the school district. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by denying the petitioner’s motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

    2. Whether the lower courts correctly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner to demonstrate a lack of substantial prejudice to the school district.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the lower courts’ determination of substantial prejudice was based on speculation and inference, not evidence, and the lower courts failed to shift the burden to the school district to provide specific evidence of prejudice.

    2. No, because the court held that while the petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating a lack of substantial prejudice, once the initial showing is made, the burden shifts to the public corporation to demonstrate that the corporation will be substantially prejudiced by the late notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that the decision to grant or deny a motion for a late notice of claim is discretionary. However, the court’s determination must be supported by evidence in the record. The court found the lower courts’ decisions regarding substantial prejudice were not supported by evidence. The court held that a public corporation’s claim of substantial prejudice cannot be based solely on speculation and inference; instead, it requires a factual basis. The court then addressed the burden of proof, ruling that the petitioner must initially show that the late notice will not substantially prejudice the public corporation. Once that showing is made, the public corporation must then provide particularized evidence of such prejudice. The court reasoned that this approach balances the interests of both parties, placing the burden on the public corporation to provide facts which are peculiarly within its knowledge.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the evidentiary burdens in late notice of claim cases in New York. Attorneys should understand that a petitioner must make an initial showing of no substantial prejudice, which might be based on facts such as actual knowledge of the incident by the public entity. It is then up to the public corporation to demonstrate specific ways in which the delay has hindered its ability to defend the claim (e.g., loss of evidence, fading witness memories, or difficulty investigating the scene). The decision reinforces the importance of submitting supporting evidence and distinguishes between a mere inference of prejudice versus demonstrated, substantial prejudice. The Court’s holding should shape how attorneys approach these cases from the initial filing of a motion to the presentation of evidence and legal arguments. Later cases will likely cite this decision when evaluating the sufficiency of evidence related to prejudice.

  • People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017): Permissible Supplemental Jury Instructions Regarding Unanimity After a Defective Verdict

    People v. Morgan, 29 N.Y.3d 517 (2017)

    A trial court’s supplemental instruction to a jury after it returns a non-unanimous verdict, directing the jury to resume deliberations, is permissible as long as it does not coerce the jury to reach a specific verdict.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a supplemental instruction, given by the trial court after the jury announced a verdict that was not unanimous, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the trial judge’s instruction, which informed the jury that their verdict must be unanimous and directed them to resume deliberations, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the instruction did not pressure the jury to reach a specific verdict and that, because the jury deliberated for a full day after the instruction, it was not unduly coercive. The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s refusal to read back the defense counsel’s summation, finding the issue unpreserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder and other crimes. During deliberations, the jury indicated that it was deadlocked. After further instruction, the jury announced it had reached a verdict: guilty on some counts, not guilty on others. However, the subsequent polling of the jurors revealed that the verdict was not unanimous. The trial court then instructed the jurors to resume deliberations to reach a unanimous verdict. The jury deliberated for another day and ultimately returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on some counts. The defendant argued that the supplemental instruction was coercive and deprived him of a fair trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the initial non-unanimous verdict and gave a supplemental instruction. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s supplemental instruction, after the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict, was coercive and violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to rehear defense counsel’s summation during deliberations.

    Holding

    1. No, because the instruction was not coercive and did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    2. No, because the issue was not properly preserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Criminal Procedure Law § 310.80, which mandates that if the jury’s verdict is not unanimous, the court must direct the jury to resume deliberations. The court cited People v. Aponte and People v. Pagan to distinguish between permissible and impermissible supplemental jury instructions. The court held that the trial court’s instruction in this case was proper because it did not pressure the jury to reach a particular verdict and it left open the possibility of principled disagreement among the jurors. The court noted that the instruction was not coercive, because it did not overemphasize the need to return a verdict, nor did it suggest the jury was failing in its duty. The absence of “cautionary language” was not considered fatal to the supplemental charge because such language had already been given to the jury two hours earlier.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the permissible scope of supplemental instructions when a jury returns a non-unanimous verdict. Attorneys must be aware of the fine line between encouraging a jury to reach a verdict and coercing them. The court’s holding underscores that a supplemental instruction is permissible if it simply reminds the jury of the unanimity requirement and directs them to continue deliberations. The case also suggests that the content of prior instructions can be considered when evaluating the propriety of supplemental instructions. Moreover, the fact that the jury deliberated for a significant period after the instruction suggests that the court can avoid claims of coercion if the jury deliberates for a substantial amount of time after the instruction is given. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when assessing the impact of supplemental instructions on the jury’s deliberations.

  • Stonehill Capital Management, LLC v. Bank of the West, 28 N.Y.3d 439 (2016): Auction Acceptance Creates Binding Contract Despite Contingencies

    Stonehill Capital Management, LLC v. Bank of the West, 28 N.Y.3d 439 (2016)

    In an auction setting, a seller’s acceptance of a bid forms a binding contract, even if the contract is subject to the fulfillment of certain post-agreement conditions, unless the seller explicitly reserves the right to withdraw before a written agreement is executed.

    Summary

    Stonehill Capital Management won an auction to purchase a syndicated loan from Bank of the West (BOTW). BOTW accepted the bid but later refused to proceed, claiming no binding contract existed because a written agreement was not signed, and a deposit was not submitted. The New York Court of Appeals held that a binding contract was formed when BOTW accepted Stonehill’s bid, even though the parties anticipated a future written agreement and deposit. The court found that these were conditions for completing the transaction, not preconditions to the contract’s formation, and BOTW’s acceptance of the bid, combined with the parties’ conduct, demonstrated intent to be bound. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s ruling, reinstating the trial court’s decision in favor of Stonehill for breach of contract.

    Facts

    BOTW, through its agent, Mission Capital Advisors, conducted an online auction for a portfolio of loans, including the Goett Loan. The Offering Memorandum outlined the bid process, stating that acceptance of a bid required execution of a pre-negotiated asset sale agreement and a 10% deposit. Stonehill submitted a bid, and BOTW accepted it. Correspondence confirmed the sale price, loan details, and closing procedures, including wiring instructions for the deposit. Despite this, BOTW later refused to proceed with the sale, claiming no binding agreement, due to the lack of a signed contract and deposit. Stonehill had worked with the agent, and the agent had sent confirmation that the bid was accepted by BOTW.

    Procedural History

    Stonehill sued BOTW for breach of contract in the Supreme Court, which granted Stonehill summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding no valid acceptance occurred. The Court of Appeals granted Stonehill leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether BOTW’s acceptance of Stonehill’s bid created a binding contract, even though a formal written agreement and deposit were not yet provided.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because BOTW’s acceptance of Stonehill’s bid, along with the parties’ communications and conduct, demonstrated their intent to be bound by an agreement to sell the loan, despite the anticipation of a future written agreement and deposit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the general rule that, in auctions, a seller’s acceptance of a bid forms a binding contract unless the bid is contingent on future conduct. The court analyzed the parties’ communications and conduct, emphasizing the Offering Memorandum’s terms, which set the conditions for sale. It focused on the absence of clear language indicating that BOTW could withdraw from the transaction at any time before a formal agreement was signed. The court distinguished between conditions precedent to contract formation and those to performance. The court determined that the signing of a written agreement and the deposit were conditions precedent to performance rather than preconditions for the contract’s formation, and concluded that the “subject to” language used by BOTW did not unequivocally signal an intent not to be bound absent a written contract. Furthermore, the court pointed out that Stonehill had worked through the process to satisfy the post-agreement requirements.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of clear language in auction terms and communications to avoid ambiguity about contract formation. Auctioneers and sellers should explicitly reserve the right to withdraw bids before a formal agreement to ensure no binding agreement arises before the execution of a definitive contract. Legal practitioners should analyze the totality of the parties’ actions and communications to determine their intent. The decision reinforces that simply including terms such as “subject to” in correspondence does not automatically negate the formation of a contract, especially where the context of the auction and the parties’ conduct suggest otherwise. This ruling has practical implications for lenders and loan purchasers as it underscores that acceptance of an offer can create a binding contract and that the terms of the auction are essential to understand the conditions of sale.

  • People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016): Suggestiveness of Lineups When Defendant Possesses a Distinctive Feature

    People v. Perkins, 27 N.Y.3d 435 (2016)

    A lineup is unduly suggestive if the defendant has a distinctive feature, such as dreadlocks, that makes him stand out, even if that feature was not mentioned in the witness’s prior description of the perpetrator.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the suggestiveness of a lineup where the defendant was the only participant with dreadlocks, a distinctive feature. The court held that the lineup was unduly suggestive, regardless of whether the witness mentioned the defendant’s dreadlocks in their initial description to the police. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing the suggestiveness of a lineup. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the lower court erred in determining that a lineup was not unduly suggestive just because the witness had not mentioned the distinctive feature in their initial description. This case highlights the importance of conducting fair lineups to avoid suggestive identification procedures that could lead to misidentification.

    Facts

    After being identified as a suspect, the defendant was placed in photo arrays and lineups. In the relevant lineups, the defendant was the only participant with long dreadlocks. Four robbery victims identified the defendant in the lineups. Two of the victims had described the perpetrator as having dreadlocks, while the other two had not. The Supreme Court suppressed the lineup identifications for the two victims who had mentioned dreadlocks and not for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on whether the distinctive feature was part of the complainants’ descriptions. All four victims identified the defendant in court, but the defendant was acquitted of the robbery counts with respect to two of the victims and convicted of the counts with respect to the others.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the lineup identifications for two victims but denied it for the others. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a lineup is unduly suggestive when the defendant possesses a distinctive feature, even if the witness did not mention that feature in their prior description of the perpetrator?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a lineup’s suggestiveness should be determined by considering all circumstances to determine whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a bright-line rule that a distinctive feature only renders a lineup unduly suggestive if it was mentioned in the witness’s prior description would be unworkable and unwise. Instead, the court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the lineup created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The court found the lineup was unduly suggestive as the defendant was the only person with long dreadlocks. The court referenced its prior decision in People v. Chipp, stating that it must consider all circumstances to determine suggestiveness. The court held that there was no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion. The court held that, as a matter of law, a witness’s failure to mention a distinctive feature in his or her initial description is not necessarily the determinative factor in assessing a lineup’s suggestivity. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, ordered that both lineups should have been suppressed, and remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the standard for determining the suggestiveness of a lineup in New York. Law enforcement must be cautious when conducting lineups and ensure that distinctive features do not make the defendant stand out. Prosecutors must be prepared to establish an independent basis for in-court identifications if a lineup is found to be unduly suggestive. Defense attorneys should challenge lineups where the defendant is the only participant with a distinctive feature, regardless of whether the witness mentioned that feature in their initial description. This case emphasizes that a totality of the circumstances test must be applied. Post-Perkins, courts must consider all factors when assessing the reliability of an identification procedure and not rely solely on the witness’s prior description.

  • People v. Canady, People v. Brown, People v. Young, 31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018): Speedy Trial and the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Exception

    31 N.Y.3d 403 (2018)

    When the prosecution declares readiness for trial and later becomes unready, the time between declarations is chargeable against the prosecution under CPL 30.30 unless the unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’ with due diligence by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the application of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the speedy trial statute. The court considered how to calculate the time chargeable to the prosecution when it initially declares readiness for trial but later indicates it is not ready. The court held that time is chargeable unless the prosecution’s unreadiness stems from an exceptional fact or circumstance, as defined in the statute, and the prosecution exercised due diligence. The case clarifies the burden of proof and the standard for determining when delays are attributable to the prosecution, and also reinforces the significance of prosecutorial readiness.

    Facts

    The cases involved defendants who moved to dismiss indictments based on violations of CPL 30.30. The prosecutions had initially declared readiness for trial but subsequently indicated they were not ready. The specific facts regarding the reasons for the prosecution’s change in readiness varied across the cases.

    Procedural History

    The cases originated in trial courts, with defendants filing motions to dismiss due to speedy trial violations. The trial courts reached different conclusions on whether to grant the motions. Some cases proceeded to the appellate level, with the Appellate Term reversing or affirming lower court decisions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the legal questions regarding CPL 30.30 and the speedy trial calculations.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s declaration of readiness for trial and a subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.

    2. If the time is chargeable, what standard should courts apply to determine whether the prosecution’s unreadiness is excused due to exceptional circumstances?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the time between the declaration of readiness and the subsequent declaration of unreadiness is chargeable to the prosecution.

    2. The prosecution’s unreadiness is excused if it is due to ‘some exceptional fact or circumstance,’ provided the prosecution exercised due diligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court examined CPL 30.30 and its purpose: to ensure a speedy trial. The court emphasized that the prosecution must be ready for trial. The court referenced earlier cases establishing that a declaration of readiness must reflect present readiness and not merely future expectation. The court referenced CPL 30.30(3)(b), which provides an exception if the present unreadiness is due to an ‘exceptional fact or circumstance’.

    The majority held that, after a declaration of readiness, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate that the time should be excluded, because their present unreadiness is due to “some exceptional fact or circumstance” and that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind CPL 30.30 to reduce delays and ensure the prompt resolution of criminal cases. The court also emphasized the importance of maintaining the burden on the defendant to establish the initial speedy trial violation.

    Dissenting Judge Rivera argued that the majority’s interpretation would undermine the intent of CPL 30.30. The dissenting judge stated that the court should adopt the view that the People must demonstrate that “some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial.”

    Practical Implications

    This ruling requires prosecutors to maintain a good faith readiness for trial. Prosecutors must be prepared to explain why they are not ready if they change their position. This case reinforces that prosecutors must act with diligence to secure evidence or prepare for trial. When evaluating a speedy trial claim, the court must determine the extent of any delay. The decision clarifies that the period between a statement of readiness and a subsequent statement of unreadiness must be charged against the prosecution unless there is a valid justification, such as the exceptional circumstances that were beyond the control of the prosecution.

    This case highlights that the prosecutors must be able to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence and that their unreadiness resulted from an exceptional fact or circumstance. This decision should influence how courts analyze similar cases. It clarifies the burden-shifting framework and emphasizes the importance of prosecutorial accountability in ensuring speedy trials.

  • People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 (2003): Admissibility of Excited Utterances in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

    People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302 (2003)

    An out-of-court statement made in response to a startling event is admissible as an excited utterance if the circumstances indicate the declarant was under the stress of excitement and lacked the capacity for reflection.

    Summary

    In People v. Johnson, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a child’s statements as excited utterances in a sexual abuse case. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the child’s initial statements to her parents, made shortly after the alleged abuse, were properly admitted as excited utterances because they were made while the child was still under the stress of the event and lacked the capacity for reflection. The court also determined that even if later statements made at a hospital were improperly admitted, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    The defendant, a bus driver, was convicted of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child for allegedly sexually touching a three-year-old girl on his bus. The prosecution presented testimony from the child’s parents regarding statements the child made to them shortly after the incident, and later at a hospital. The initial statements included the phrase “Señor Bus” and a licking gesture, made within a half hour of the child exiting the bus while crying inconsolably. The later statements, made approximately three hours later at a hospital, included the repetition of the phrase and gesture, and the child pulling her mother’s hand towards her genital area. Forensic testing confirmed the defendant’s DNA on the child’s underwear.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the child’s statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court properly admitted the child’s initial statements to her parents, made shortly after the alleged abuse, as excited utterances.

    2. Whether, if the later statements made at the hospital were improperly admitted, the error was harmless.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the initial statements were made while the child was still under the stress of the event and lacked the capacity for reflection.

    2. Yes, because any error in admitting the later statements was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, focusing on the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The court reiterated that this exception allows for the admission of out-of-court statements made in response to a startling or upsetting event if the circumstances indicate the declarant was under the stress of excitement and lacked the capacity for reflection. The court held that the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay as an excited utterance is left to its sound judgment, which must consider the nature of the event, the time between the event and the statement, and the declarant’s activities in the interim. The decisive factor is whether the circumstances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under studied reflection. Applying this to the facts, the court found no error in admitting the initial statements, given the child’s emotional state and the close proximity of the statements to the event. The court further held that, even if the later statements were improperly admitted because the stress of excitement had sufficiently abated, any error was harmless considering other evidence, including the forensic evidence and the bus matron’s testimony about the altered bus route. The court also cited evidence of physical trauma, supported by the testimony of the child’s mother, which provided overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt, and there was no significant probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if the hearsay statements from the hospital had been excluded. The court referenced the harmless error standard, considering whether the proof of guilt was overwhelming and if there was a significant probability the jury would have acquitted without the evidence. The court cited People v. Edwards, which emphasizes that the decisive factor is whether the remarks were made under the impetus of studied reflection, and People v. Crimmins for the standard of harmless error.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the application of the excited utterance exception, especially in cases involving child witnesses. It emphasizes that the admissibility of such statements hinges on the declarant’s state of mind at the time of the statement. Legal practitioners should carefully assess the totality of the circumstances to determine if the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event, considering the nature of the event, the time elapsed, and the declarant’s activities. This case highlights the importance of establishing the child’s emotional state and the spontaneity of the statements to argue for their admissibility. Furthermore, the court’s analysis of harmless error reinforces the need for a thorough presentation of other evidence. This helps ensure a conviction even if some evidence is later deemed inadmissible. This case supports the argument that the timing of the statement in relation to the event is critical, but the child’s emotional state is paramount. This case is distinguished from others because it involves a child’s statements after an alleged sexual assault. The case underscores the application of the excited utterance exception in the context of child abuse cases, particularly with the standards for assessing harmless error.

  • Henry v. Fischer, 28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017): Preservation of Claims in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

    28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017)

    In prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate adequately preserves a claim regarding the denial of documents or witnesses by requesting them and receiving an adverse ruling, without needing to make repeated specific objections.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in Henry v. Fischer, clarifying the requirements for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings. The case involved an inmate, Henry, who requested documents and witnesses during his disciplinary hearing. When the hearing officer denied some of these requests, Henry was found guilty. The trial court and Appellate Division dismissed Henry’s Article 78 petition, concluding that Henry hadn’t adequately preserved his claims by specifically objecting to the denials. The Court of Appeals found that Henry had preserved his claims by making the requests and receiving unfavorable rulings, without a need for further objections. The Court found this adequate and ordered the case remanded.

    Facts

    Jevon Henry, an inmate, faced disciplinary charges for a gang-related assault. At the hearing, Henry requested specific documents, including incident reports and logbook entries, and the testimony of several correction officers and inmates. The hearing officer denied some of these requests. Henry was found guilty and given a two-year sentence in the special housing unit. Henry appealed administratively, arguing he was denied access to requested documents and the hearing officer did not provide an explanation for one inmate’s refusal to testify. When the administrative appeal was denied, Henry initiated an Article 78 proceeding, which the trial court dismissed on the ground that Henry had failed to preserve the issues he sought to raise by proper objection at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    The case began with a tier III disciplinary hearing against inmate Jevon Henry, at the Greene Correctional Facility. The hearing officer denied some of Henry’s requests for documents and witnesses. Henry was found guilty, prompting an administrative appeal and, subsequently, an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, a decision upheld by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal and reversed the lower courts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an inmate, who requested specific documents and witnesses during a prison disciplinary hearing, adequately preserves his claims regarding the denial of those requests for judicial review by making those requests and receiving adverse rulings without further, specific objections at the hearing?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the inmate adequately preserved the claims by making the requests and receiving adverse rulings, without needing to make specific objections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court referenced the due process protections afforded to inmates in disciplinary proceedings, as established in Wolff v. McDonnell, and further clarified in Matter of Laureano v Kuhlmann, noting the right to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court of Appeals emphasized that Henry made the requests for documents and witnesses and the hearing officer denied those requests. Thus, the court held that the lower courts erred in concluding that Henry’s failure to make further specific objections at the hearing constituted a failure to preserve those rulings for judicial review. In doing so, the court noted that, “In sum, the record shows that Henry plainly requested access to specific documents and witnesses, and the Hearing Officer denied some of those requests.”

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies how to preserve claims in prison disciplinary hearings in New York. This means attorneys representing inmates should focus on ensuring their clients’ requests for documents and witnesses are clearly made and that they receive adverse rulings. Specific objections to these rulings during the hearing are unnecessary. The ruling has a significant impact on how similar cases are approached by attorneys. It changes the standard for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings, thus preventing procedural dismissal based on lack of specific objections. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of clearly documenting requests and rulings during the hearing process. The holding is also important because it reinforces inmates’ due process rights, which are a matter of public policy.

  • Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v. Orange County, 27 N.Y.3d 421 (2016): Municipalities Must Adhere to Evaluation Criteria in RFPs

    Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v. Orange County, 27 N.Y.3d 421 (2016)

    A municipality awarding contracts under General Municipal Law § 104-b acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it deviates from the evaluation criteria specified in its Request for Proposals (RFP).

    Summary

    ACME Bus Corp. challenged Orange County’s award of transportation contracts, arguing the county changed the cost evaluation formula outlined in the RFP after bids were submitted, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious decision. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the county’s deviation from its stated evaluation criteria violated its own procurement policy and undermined fairness, potentially suggesting favoritism. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing that municipalities must adhere to the rules established in their RFPs to ensure transparency and prevent the appearance of impropriety in the procurement process, even if no actual misconduct is demonstrated.

    Facts

    Orange County issued an RFP for preschool special education transportation services. The RFP detailed a point-based evaluation system, including a cost category. The RFP specified a percentage-to-points ratio for cost evaluation (e.g., a 10% cost difference would result in a 2-point deduction). ACME submitted a proposal with the lowest cost for some zones but was not awarded the contracts. After bids were received, the county deviated from the RFP’s cost evaluation formula. ACME argued that applying the original formula would have resulted in a higher score for ACME in at least one zone. The county defended its actions as an attempt to ensure the lowest cost was chosen.

    Procedural History

    ACME initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court challenging the contract awards. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no arbitrariness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted ACME leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Orange County’s deviation from the cost evaluation formula stated in its RFP rendered its contract award arbitrary and capricious.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the county failed to adhere to its own procurement policy and deviated from the RFP’s stated evaluation criteria, rendering the award arbitrary and capricious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Orange County acted arbitrarily and capriciously for two reasons: (1) the county violated its own procurement policy, which required adherence to RFP evaluation criteria; and (2) the deviation gave rise to the appearance of impropriety and potentially favored one bidder. The court reasoned that changing the rules after bids were submitted undermined fairness, contradicted the goals of General Municipal Law § 104-b (ensuring prudent use of public funds and preventing favoritism), and opened the process to the appearance of corruption. The court emphasized that, even absent evidence of bad faith, a municipality must comply with its own rules. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the bidding statute (General Municipal Law § 103) applies, but noted the overarching legislative purposes – protecting public funds and preventing fraud or corruption – were the same under both statutes.

    Practical Implications

    Municipalities must strictly adhere to the evaluation criteria outlined in their RFPs to avoid arbitrary and capricious challenges. Any changes to evaluation methods after bid submission can lead to court challenges and potential reversal of the contract award, even absent evidence of actual corruption. This case emphasizes the importance of clear, unambiguous language in RFPs and following established procedures. Legal practitioners advising municipalities should ensure their clients understand that they cannot change the rules mid-process. Any desire to alter an evaluation process must be addressed by rejecting all bids and reissuing the RFP, not by changing the rules after proposals have been submitted.

  • People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016): Language Barrier and Equal Protection in DUI Investigations

    People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016)

    A facially neutral policy that denies physical coordination tests to non-English speakers does not violate equal protection because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, and does not violate due process because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speaking suspects violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Jose Aviles, who spoke only Spanish, was arrested for drunk driving and not given a coordination test due to his language barrier. The Court held that the policy did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the government’s interests in ensuring test reliability and avoiding administrative burdens. The Court further held that the failure to administer the test did not violate due process because the police have no obligation to provide evidence to assist a defendant.

    Facts

    Jose Aviles was arrested for drunk driving after an accident. He spoke only Spanish and was observed with signs of intoxication. He consented to a breathalyzer test, which registered below the legal limit. Due to his inability to speak English, he was not given a physical coordination test. Aviles was charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that denying him the coordination test violated his equal protection and due process rights.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Aviles’ motion, finding constitutional violations. The Appellate Term reversed, relying on a prior Appellate Division decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    2. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
    2. No, because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Equal Protection, the court found the NYPD policy facially neutral because it applied to anyone unable to understand English, not specifically targeting any suspect class. The Court determined that rational basis review applied because no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated. The court reasoned that the policy was rationally related to ensuring the reliability of coordination tests, which depend on clear instructions, and to avoiding the financial and administrative burden of providing translation services or multilingual officers. The Court noted that the value of coordination tests diminishes with time, making translation impractical. The court also rejected Aviles’ argument that the policy discriminated based on national origin because the policy was based on language ability, not ethnicity.

    On the Due Process issue, the Court found that the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence or performing a certain investigative step. The Court distinguished between the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings and the discretionary, investigative nature of coordination tests. The Court concluded that, even if there were a due process right, it would be outweighed by the state’s interest in efficient and reliable law enforcement.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that facially neutral policies, even if they have a disparate impact, do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. The ruling supports law enforcement’s ability to make practical decisions during investigations, even if those decisions might disadvantage some individuals. Lawyers should anticipate courts applying rational basis review when challenging similar policies. Further, this decision reinforces that the police have no affirmative duty to assist defendants. It also highlights the importance of how the government’s articulated interests are directly linked to the challenged policy. Later cases involving language access may attempt to distinguish this case by arguing intentional discrimination based on national origin if a policy is shown to be a pretext for racial discrimination.