New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Haynes v. New York Central Railroad Co., 204 N.Y. 303 (1912): Establishing Negligence Based on Excessive Speed in Suburban Areas

    Haynes v. New York Central Railroad Co., 204 N.Y. 303 (1912)

    A railroad company can be found negligent for operating its train at an excessive speed through a suburban area with frequent crossings and pedestrian traffic, creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others lawfully using the public highway.

    Summary

    This case concerns a fatal accident where the plaintiff’s intestate was struck by a train while crossing a public highway. The court addressed whether the railroad company was negligent in operating its train at a high speed in a suburban area and whether the deceased was contributorily negligent. The Court of Appeals held that it was a question for the jury whether the railroad’s speed constituted negligence, given the location and likelihood of pedestrian traffic. The court also found that the deceased’s contributory negligence was a question for the jury, considering the information he had about the approaching train.

    Facts

    The deceased visited a hotel located near a double-track electric railroad on a public highway. He inquired about the next train to Schenectady and was told it would arrive in about ten minutes. The deceased walked onto the hotel piazza. A limited, or express, train traveling at 45-50 mph struck him as he crossed the tracks. The accident occurred near a designated stop for local trains, close to an intersecting highway and several houses. The conductor saw the deceased when the train was 50 feet away. The train blew its whistle 500-600 feet from the crossing and attempted to brake and reverse, but was unable to stop in time.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted a nonsuit, effectively dismissing the plaintiff’s case. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant railroad company was negligent in operating its train at a speed of 45-50 mph in the described suburban location, creating an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians crossing the tracks.

    2. Whether the plaintiff’s intestate was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in attempting to cross the tracks, given his knowledge of the approaching train and the circumstances of the crossing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because given the combination of conditions, the location on a much-traveled road near an intersecting highway and several houses, it was within the province of a jury to determine if running the train at 45-50 mph constituted negligence.

    2. No, because based on the information available to the deceased regarding the approaching train (believing it to be a local), it cannot be held as a matter of law that he was contributorily negligent in attempting to cross the tracks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while such speed might not be negligent in a rural area, the present location was an ordinary suburban road in a thickly settled neighborhood. The railroad was bound to run its cars with due regard for the safety of others lawfully using the public highway. The court emphasized that the degree of care should be measured by the dangers to be apprehended. Considering the possibility of people crossing to reach the intersecting highway, hotel, private houses, or the local train stop, the jury should decide if the train’s speed was negligent. Regarding contributory negligence, the Court acknowledged that less evidence is required in death cases. Given the deceased’s understanding that a train was due in ten minutes, and the inference that he thought it was a local train that would stop, it was reasonable for him to attempt to cross. The Court stated, “Ordinarily, if a person attempts to cross a railroad track after satisfying himself by the exercise of ordinary care that it is a prudent thing to do, he cannot be charged with contributory negligence as matter of law for not again looking in a particular direction.” The Court held that, in view of the circumstances, it could not be held as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily negligent.

  • People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915): Admissibility of Mathematical Probability Evidence

    People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915)

    Evidence based on mathematical probability, particularly when used to establish the improbability of certain events or conditions, is inadmissible when it lacks a foundation in observed data and relies on speculation rather than demonstrable facts.

    Summary

    Risley, an attorney, was convicted of offering a forged document as evidence. The prosecution presented expert testimony applying mathematical probability to typewriter defects to argue the document was altered on Risley’s machine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that such speculative probability evidence, lacking a basis in actual observed data about typewriters and their use, was inadmissible and prejudicial. The ruling underscores the importance of grounding evidence in factual observations rather than theoretical probabilities, especially when expert testimony may unduly influence the jury.

    Facts

    Risley represented Bennett in a patent dispute against Iron Clad Manufacturing. During a trial in February 1911, Risley offered an affidavit. It was alleged the words “the same” had been fraudulently inserted into the affidavit. The prosecution claimed Risley altered the affidavit to strengthen his client’s case after an appellate court highlighted deficiencies in the evidence. The prosecution presented evidence that Risley had accessed the document at the County Clerk’s office shortly before the trial. Samples of typewriting from Risley’s office typewriter were introduced to demonstrate similarities with the altered document.

    Procedural History

    Risley was convicted in the trial court for offering a forged document in evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Risley appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony based on mathematical probabilities to demonstrate the unlikelihood of the defects in the forged document being produced by a typewriter other than the defendant’s.

    Holding

    No, because the mathematical probability evidence presented by the prosecution was speculative and lacked a sufficient foundation in observed data, rendering it inadmissible and prejudicial to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the admission of mathematical probability evidence to be reversible error. The Court emphasized that the expert witness (a mathematics professor) lacked specific expertise in typewriters and did not account for the human element in operating the machine. The Court distinguished this type of evidence from actuarial tables, which are based on observed data. The Court stated the witness’s testimony “was not based upon actual observed data, but was simply speculative, and an attempt to make inferences deduced from a general theory in no way connected with the matter under consideration supply the usual method of proof.” The Court noted that the jury might give undue weight to such complex and seemingly scientific evidence, potentially obscuring other important facts. Therefore, the Court concluded that allowing such speculative evidence was prejudicial to the defendant and warranted a new trial.

  • People v. Tylkoff, 212 N.Y. 197 (1914): Outraging Public Decency with Language

    People v. Tylkoff, 212 N.Y. 197 (1914)

    The utterance of vulgar and offensive language in a public place, without legitimate purpose, can constitute an act that openly outrages public decency under Penal Law § 43, even if the language could also be considered slanderous.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of violating Penal Law § 43 for using indecent language about a woman at a public meeting during a strike. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to an error in the trial judge’s instructions but addressed whether the indictment properly charged an offense. The court held that while the word “act” in the statute could encompass conduct consisting of words, the primary purpose of the statute was to punish public indecency, not slander. Therefore, using vulgar language publicly, without a valid purpose, can be deemed a violation of public decency, irrespective of whether it also constitutes slander.

    Facts

    A strike was ongoing at or near Mineville, New York, and public meetings were held in Heath’s Hall. The defendant, a strike leader, allegedly said of Marta Barkowska, who was encouraging workers to return to work, “she is a whore” at one of these meetings, in the presence of many people.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and convicted under Penal Law § 43. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals initially overruled a demurrer, then reversed the conviction due to an error in the trial judge’s charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the word “act” in Penal Law § 43, which prohibits acts that openly outrage public decency, includes conduct primarily consisting of spoken words.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute’s purpose is to punish public indecency, and conduct composed of words can be just as indecent and offensive as physical acts, especially when uttered publicly and without legitimate purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Penal Law § 21 requires construing statutory words according to their fair import. Unless otherwise restricted, the word “act” is broad enough to include uttering foul and indecent language in a public gathering. The court refuted the argument that this construction would improperly criminalize slander, stating: “The purpose of the statute is not to punish slander but to punish public indecency, and it requires no argument to demonstrate that language which is intensely slanderous may not be indecent at all, and, conversely, that language which is just as indecent as possible may not involve any element of slander.” The court further noted that the determination of indecency should be tested by the prevailing common judgment and moral sense of the community, and may be influenced by the circumstances under which the act occurs. The court acknowledged that determining indecency in words is no more difficult than determining negligence in an act. Judge Hiscock dissented, arguing for a new trial based on the admission of evidence. “It seems to me quite immaterial whether a person, for instance, is guilty of vulgar and offensive actions and physical display or whether he describes such things by vile and expressive language. The statute is in the interest of decent conduct and for the protection of well-behaved people from the offensive conduct of others and it ought to receive a liberal application.”

  • Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N.Y. 430 (1914): Stockholder Liability and Proof of Corporate Debt

    Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N.Y. 430 (1914)

    A judgment against a corporation is not conclusive evidence of corporate debt in a subsequent action to enforce stockholder liability; the plaintiff must independently prove the debt’s existence.

    Summary

    Assets Realization Company, as assignee of the German Bank, sued stockholders of the Metropolitan Bank to recover a deficiency after the German Bank liquidated the Metropolitan Bank’s assets. The agreement between the banks pledged Metropolitan’s assets to German Bank for advances to pay depositors. After liquidation, a deficiency remained. Assets Realization Co. argued the judgment against Metropolitan Bank conclusively established the debt. The Court of Appeals held the judgment was not conclusive against the stockholders, and the agreement between the banks, interpreted in light of the surrounding circumstances, did not create a personal liability on the part of Metropolitan Bank for the deficiency. The judgment was affirmed, meaning stockholders were not liable.

    Facts

    The Metropolitan Bank, facing difficulties, entered an agreement with the German Bank for liquidation.
    The Metropolitan Bank transferred all its assets to the German Bank.
    The German Bank agreed to advance funds to pay off Metropolitan Bank’s depositors.
    The agreement pledged Metropolitan’s assets as security for the advances.
    After liquidating the assets, a deficiency remained, exceeding the value of the transferred assets.
    The German Bank obtained a default judgment against the Metropolitan Bank for the deficiency, including money advanced, compensation for services, and an amount claimed due on a note.
    Assets Realization Company, as assignee of the German Bank, sued the Metropolitan Bank’s stockholders to recover their proportionate share of the deficiency.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of the defendant stockholders.
    The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment obtained against a corporation is conclusive evidence of the corporation’s debt in a subsequent action to enforce the statutory liability of its stockholders.
    Whether the agreement between the German Bank and the Metropolitan Bank created a debt for which the Metropolitan Bank’s stockholders could be held liable.

    Holding

    No, because a stockholder is not a party to the action against the corporation and should have the opportunity to contest the existence of the debt.
    No, because the agreement, when properly interpreted, did not create a personal liability for the Metropolitan Bank to repay the advances beyond the assets transferred; the German Bank was to look to those assets as the primary and exclusive source of repayment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that stockholders are only secondarily liable for corporate debts when the corporation becomes insolvent. Therefore, stockholders are entitled to contest the validity and existence of the debt before being compelled to pay it. “This claim against a stockholder is not an asset belonging to, or coming through or asserted in behalf of, the corporation. It is given to the creditor as an independent and original remedy.”
    The Court found that the agreement between the banks was a carefully considered and complete statement of their respective rights and obligations. The absence of a specific clause creating a personal liability for the Metropolitan Bank was significant, suggesting the parties intended the transferred assets to be the sole source of repayment. The Court also noted the existence of a separate agreement guaranteeing the German Bank against loss to be executed by certain stockholders (who were also directors) reinforced the idea that the general stockholders’ liability was not relied upon. “If the parties believed that they were laying the foundation for and preserving a deficiency claim against the bank which would be an indebtedness within the limits of a stockholder’s liability, there was no rational, intelligent explanation for this clause.”
    The Court dismissed the argument that the German Bank would not have entered into the agreement without a deficiency claim, noting the German Bank received interest on its advances, compensation for its services, and stood to gain new business from the Metropolitan Bank’s depositors. The court emphasized that the German Bank examined the Metropolitan Bank’s assets and found them to be in good order before agreeing to the arrangement.

  • Horre v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 272 N.Y. 487 (1936): Enforceability of Title Approval Clauses in Real Estate Contracts

    Horre v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 272 N.Y. 487 (1936)

    In a real estate contract requiring title approval by a specific title company, the vendor isn’t obligated to proactively obtain that approval; rather, the clause sets a standard for title quality, and the vendee typically bears the responsibility to engage the title company.

    Summary

    Horre, the vendor, sued to compel Horre, the vendee, to specifically perform a real estate contract that stipulated the title had to be approved and insured by Title Guarantee & Trust Co. The trial court ordered specific performance, but the record didn’t show if the title company had ever been asked to examine the title. The vendee argued that obtaining the title company’s approval was a condition precedent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contract language established a standard for the title’s quality, but didn’t obligate the vendor to proactively seek the title company’s approval; instead, it was the vendee’s responsibility to engage the title company for examination and insurance.

    Facts

    William Horre (vendee) and the Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (vendor) entered a contract for the sale of real estate.
    The contract stipulated that the vendor had to provide a title that the Title Guarantee & Trust Co. would approve and insure.
    The deed tendered by the vendor was proper in form and conveyed absolute fee, free of encumbrances except a specified mortgage.
    There was no evidence that the title had ever been submitted to Title Guarantee & Trust Co. for approval or insurance. The contract included an addendum authorizing a specific entity to have the Title Guarantee & Trust Co. examine the title.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the vendor, ordering specific performance of the real estate contract.
    The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
    The Court of Appeals reviewed the appellate division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under a real estate contract stipulating that the vendor provide a title that a specific title company would approve and insure, the vendor is obligated to actively obtain the title company’s approval as a condition precedent to enforcing the contract against the vendee.

    Holding

    No, because the contract’s stipulation regarding title company approval sets a standard for the title’s quality rather than creating an obligation for the vendor to proactively seek approval; the prevailing practice dictates that the purchaser incurs the expense of title examination and insurance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the prevailing custom in real estate transactions where the vendee typically bears the responsibility for examining the title for their own security.
    The court distinguished between the title company acting as an arbitrator on the marketability of the title (which the contract intended) and creating an affirmative obligation for the vendor to obtain approval and insurance.
    The court noted that obtaining approval and insurance by the vendor wouldn’t automatically benefit the vendee or allow them to maintain an action against the title company if the title proved defective. The court interpreted the contract as requiring the vendor to convey a title that the title company would approve and insure at the vendee’s instance, necessitating the vendee to engage the title company for title search and insurance.
    The court referenced the contract addendum, which authorized a specific entity to engage the title company, as evidence that the vendee was responsible for initiating the title examination process.
    The court acknowledged the appellant’s reliance on Flanagan v. Fox, but distinguished it by pointing out that in Flanagan, the title company had actually refused to approve the title, whereas in the present case, there was no evidence the title company had been engaged at all.
    The court stated: “We think the intent of this contract was to make the title company the final judge whether the title was good or bad and thus save the parties from the possibility of long and expensive litigation, but that it was not intended to change the prevailing practice that the purchaser incurs the expense of an examination and insurance of his title”. The court concluded that absent submission to the title company, a good title, as found by the court, would be presumed to be approved and insured by the company if its services were requested.

  • In re троше, 198 N.Y. 143 (1910): Attorney Discipline for Submitting False Pleadings

    In re троше, 198 N.Y. 143 (1910)

    An attorney may be disciplined for knowingly submitting false pleadings or affidavits to a court, even if the attorney claims ignorance of the falsity due to reliance on a clerk.

    Summary

    This case concerns disciplinary action against an attorney, троше, for using false answers in motions to open default judgments. The charges included fraud, malpractice, and suborning perjury. A referee found троше guilty of using false answers on motions to open defaults, but acquitted him on other charges. The Appellate Division approved the referee’s report and suspended троше from practice for two years. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the finding of unprofessional conduct based on троше’s own admissions and record evidence. The court emphasized that троше’s youth and inexperience were the only justification for the leniency shown.

    Facts

    Woodruff brought a replevin action against Samuelson, who reclaimed the merchandise. троше procured Zimmerman as surety on the required undertakings. A stipulation allowed Samuelson to retain the merchandise with weekly payments to Woodruff, failing which, Woodruff could take judgment without notice. Samuelson defaulted, and judgment was entered against him. Suits were then brought against the sureties. The complaints recited these facts, all true and known to троше. Answers were served on behalf of the sureties, denying knowledge or information about the allegations. These answers, drafted in троше’s office, were false. Default judgments were entered after the original answers were rejected. троше then moved to open these defaults, using the false answers and affidavits of merits.

    Procedural History

    The Bar Association investigated and presented formal charges to the Appellate Division, which referred the matter to a referee. The referee found троше guilty of unprofessional conduct for using false answers but acquitted him on other charges. The Appellate Division approved the referee’s report and suspended троше from practice for two years. троше appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence supported the finding that троше engaged in unprofessional conduct by knowingly using false answers on motions to open default judgments.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record evidence, including троше’s own admissions, demonstrated that he used the false answers knowing their falsity, to seek to set aside judgments on complaints that were true of his personal knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the proceeding was regularly conducted, and троше’s legal rights were not violated. It stated that it cannot review the Appellate Division’s punishment when guilt is established. The court found ample evidence to sustain the finding, particularly record evidence and троше’s admissions. The court rejected троше’s excuse that he did not know the answers were false, finding it implausible that a lawyer would entrust the drafting of answers to a clerk without reviewing them, especially when moving to open defaults. The court held that троше’s actions were unprofessional, dishonest, and fraudulent. The court quoted the referee’s conclusion that the appellant used these false answers, knowing their falsity, for the express purpose of seeking to set aside judgments upon complaints that were true of appellant’s personal knowledge, and that his effort to induce the court to vacate said judgments was unprofessional, dishonest and fraudulent.” The court concluded that any leniency was due to his youth and inexperience.

  • Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909): Sufficiency of Denial Based on Lack of Information

    Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909)

    A party cannot deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding matters presumptively within their knowledge or readily ascertainable, especially concerning their own prior legal proceedings.

    Summary

    Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of warranty on a violin sale where Freeland acted as an agent. Freeland’s answer included an affirmative defense that Kellogg had previously sued and received satisfaction from the principal, Hey, for the same breach. Kellogg replied that he lacked sufficient information to confirm the prior judgment’s satisfaction. The court found Kellogg’s denial insufficient, as the prior legal action was presumptively within his knowledge. A plaintiff cannot feign ignorance of easily obtainable information, especially concerning the resolution of their own lawsuits. Obtaining satisfaction from the principal bars a second action against the agent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Special Term’s order.

    Facts

    Kellogg purchased a violin from Hey through Freeland, who acted as Hey’s agents. Kellogg alleged Freeland provided a personal warranty on the violin’s quality. Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of this warranty. Freeland’s answer claimed that Kellogg had previously sued Hey in federal court for breach of a similar warranty related to the same violin. Freeland alleged that Kellogg obtained a judgment against Hey, which included damages and costs, and that Hey fully paid and satisfied this judgment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered Kellogg to reply to Freeland’s affirmative defense. Kellogg replied with a denial of sufficient knowledge or information to confirm the judgment against Hey was satisfied. Freeland moved for judgment based on the insufficiency of Kellogg’s reply. The Special Term granted Freeland’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed. Freeland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Kellogg’s reply, denying sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief about the prior judgment’s satisfaction, was sufficient to contest Freeland’s affirmative defense.
    2. Whether settlement and satisfaction from a principal on a breach of warranty claim bars a subsequent claim against the agent for the same breach.

    Holding

    1. No, because Kellogg could not claim ignorance of readily ascertainable facts regarding a prior lawsuit he initiated.
    2. Yes, because obtaining full satisfaction for a breach of warranty claim from the principal necessarily discharges the agent’s liability for the same breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Kellogg’s denial was insufficient because it concerned matters presumptively within his knowledge. The court stated, “It is quite incredible that plaintiff should have had no knowledge concerning the termination of his lawsuit, and equally inconceivable that after the lapse of two years he should neither have received nor sought information on this subject.” The court emphasized that the facts were largely of record and easily verifiable. The court cited numerous cases supporting the practice of treating such denials as frivolous, thereby entitling the defendant to relief. Even if the denial had some force, Kellogg’s admission that the claim against Hey was settled and compromised undermined his case. The court held that settling with the principal for full damages on a warranty claim precludes a second action against the agent for the same claim, even with a purported reservation of rights: “If the claim has been settled, that is satisfied, there is nothing to be reserved as a basis for prosecution of another liable for the same claim.”

  • People ex rel. Third Ave. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 212 N.Y. 472 (1914): Deductibility of Special Franchise Tax in Net Earnings Valuation

    People ex rel. Third Ave. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 212 N.Y. 472 (1914)

    When valuing a special franchise using the net earnings rule, only special franchise taxes actually paid by the corporation during the relevant period can be deducted from gross earnings as operating expenses.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the proper method for valuing a special franchise using the net earnings rule, specifically addressing whether a special franchise tax should be deducted from gross earnings to determine net earnings. The Court of Appeals held that only special franchise taxes actually paid during the period in question can be deducted. Taxes that are unpaid due to ongoing litigation or other reasons should not be considered an expense, as the corporation has retained the funds. This ruling aims to prevent corporations from reducing their franchise tax assessment by including disputed tax amounts as operating expenses.

    Facts

    The State Board of Tax Commissioners was tasked with valuing the special franchise of the Third Avenue Railroad Company. In the process, a dispute arose concerning whether the special franchise tax itself should be deducted from the gross earnings when applying the net earnings rule. The railroad company sought to deduct the estimated amount of the special franchise tax being assessed, even if not yet paid.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially held that all taxes, including the approximate amount of the special franchise tax to be assessed, should be deducted from gross earnings. The Court of Appeals initially expressed disagreement with this view, leading to confusion among counsel and obstruction of tax litigation settlements. This motion for reargument aimed to clarify the court’s position.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when using the net earnings rule to value a special franchise, a special franchise tax that has not been actually paid by the corporation during the period used to determine net earnings can be deducted from gross earnings as an operating expense.

    Holding

    No, because only special franchise taxes actually paid during the period in question represent a real expenditure and should be deducted from gross earnings when calculating net earnings for franchise valuation purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the net earnings rule involves ascertaining gross earnings and then deducting operating expenses. Included in operating expenses are all taxes that have accrued against and been paid by the corporation during the relevant period, including any special franchise tax that has been assessed and paid. However, a special franchise tax that has not been paid is not considered an operating expense and should not be deducted. The court emphasized that if the corporation resists payment through litigation, it cannot fairly claim the unpaid tax as an expenditure. The Court stated, “Only such special franchise taxes as have in fact been paid are, therefore, to be treated as a proper deduction from the gross earnings in valuing a special franchise according to the net earnings rule.” The court’s reasoning rests on the principle that only actual expenditures should reduce the calculation of net earnings, especially when the corporation retains the disputed tax amount. The court also reiterated the need for transparency from the State Board of Tax Commissioners regarding their valuation methods.

  • People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909): Materiality as Essential Element of Attempted Subornation of Perjury

    People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909)

    Attempted subornation of perjury requires the false testimony solicited to be material to the issue in the underlying case; otherwise, it cannot constitute the crime of attempted subornation of perjury.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury for soliciting false testimony in a divorce case. The solicited testimony concerned an act of adultery different from the one alleged in the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the solicited testimony was immaterial to the issue presented in the divorce case. Since materiality is an essential element of perjury, an attempt to suborn immaterial testimony does not constitute attempted subornation of perjury. The Court clarified that an attempt to induce false testimony may be punishable under a separate statute concerning falsifying evidence, but not under the perjury statutes.

    Facts

    Frank J. Gould was the defendant in a divorce action brought by Helen K. Gould. The complaint alleged a single act of adultery committed by Frank J. Gould with an unknown woman in North Sydney, Cape Breton, Canada, on July 25, 1907.
    The defendant, Teal, attempted to procure false testimony from Mabel MacCauslan. Teal solicited MacCauslan to testify that in March 1908, she saw Frank J. Gould coming out of a bedroom in Bessie Van Doren’s apartment in New York City, suggesting adultery between Gould and Van Doren.
    The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery, at a different time and place, and with a different person than the act alleged in the divorce complaint.

    Procedural History

    The defendant, Teal, was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury in the trial court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the case based on exceptions to evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person can be convicted of attempted subornation of perjury based on evidence that the solicited false testimony was not material to the issue in the underlying case.

    Holding

    No, because attempted subornation of perjury requires that the solicited testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury. Since perjury requires that the false testimony be material, soliciting immaterial testimony cannot constitute attempted subornation of perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that materiality is an essential element of perjury. The statute defines perjury as “willfully and knowingly testifies falsely, in any material matter.” Subornation of perjury requires inducing another to commit perjury; therefore, if the person suborned does not commit perjury, the suborner is not guilty of subornation.
    Attempted subornation of perjury, then, requires an act done with the intent to commit subornation of perjury, but failing to do so. The crime of subornation of perjury can only occur if the false testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury.
    In this case, the testimony Teal attempted to procure from MacCauslan was “irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial” to the issue in Gould v. Gould. The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery than the one alleged in the complaint.
    “If false testimony is not material it cannot support an indictment for perjury. The testimony upon which such a charge is predicated must be false ‘in any material matter.’”
    The Court rejected the argument that the testimony might become material if the complaint were amended, stating that the charge of perjury cannot depend on issues or events arising after the testimony is given. The Court also noted that the legislature had provided for cases where the false testimony is immaterial via a statute concerning “Falsifying Evidence.”

  • Berrien, Matter of, 194 N.Y. 327 (1909): Authority of Court to Appoint Trustee for Personal Property Trust

    Matter of Berrien, 194 N.Y. 327 (1909)

    When a trustee of a personal property trust dies, the trust vests in the Supreme Court, which has the authority to appoint a successor trustee and need only provide notice of the application to the beneficiaries as it deems appropriate.

    Summary

    This case concerns the appointment of a trustee for a personal property trust after the original trustees had died. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to appoint a new trustee upon the petition of the life tenants, without providing notice to the remaindermen. The Court held that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction, as the Personal Property Law only requires the court to provide such notice to the beneficiaries as it deems appropriate, unlike the Real Property Law which mandates notice to beneficiaries. The court reversed the lower court’s decision that had vacated the trustee’s appointment.

    Facts

    Joseph Corlies, Sr., died in 1860, leaving a will that created a trust for his two daughters, Cornelia and Emily, with the remainder to their children. The will named his widow and three sons as executors and trustees, granting them the power to sell real estate and convert a portion of the estate into cash for investment. The executors sold a property in 1868, but one executor was absent, leading to questions about the validity of the title. After the deaths of all original executors and trustees, Cornelia’s husband, Earnshaw, was appointed trustee but later died. Years later, in 1907, Edward Berrien was appointed trustee upon the petition of Cornelia and Emily. Emily later sought to remove Berrien, alleging fraud, but the court found no fraud. A dispute arose between Stern (the property owner) and Corn (a potential buyer) regarding the title, leading to further litigation and challenging Berrien’s appointment.

    Procedural History

    Emily Beese petitioned the court for the removal of Berrien as trustee, alleging fraudulent inducement in his appointment. The Special Term found no fraud but vacated the order appointing Berrien, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to make the appointment. This order was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to appoint a trustee for a personal property trust under Section 8 of the Personal Property Law without providing notice to the remaindermen.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 8 of the Personal Property Law vests the trust in the Supreme Court upon the death of a surviving trustee and authorizes the court to appoint a successor, requiring only such notice to the beneficiaries as the court deems appropriate, unlike the Real Property Law which mandates notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the testator’s will contained an imperative power to sell, effectively converting the real estate into personalty as of the date of his death, citing Doane v. Mercantile Trust Co., 160 N.Y. 494. Therefore, the trust should be treated as one involving personal property. Section 8 of the Personal Property Law dictates that upon the death of a surviving trustee, the trust vests in the Supreme Court, which can then appoint a successor. Unlike the Real Property Law, the Personal Property Law does not mandate that the remaindermen (beneficiaries) be brought into court with notice before a trustee is appointed; it only requires “such notice as the court may direct.” The Court emphasized that the statute gives the court discretion to determine what notice is appropriate under the circumstances. The court stated, “It appears to me that the design of the statute was to give the court that power.” While the court acknowledged that providing notice to the remaindermen is generally good practice, it declined to make it a jurisdictional requirement. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to appoint Berrien as trustee.