New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Matter of Board of Education v. Arlington Teachers’ Ass’n, 22 N.Y.3d 918 (2013): Public Policy Exception in Arbitration

    Matter of Board of Education v. Arlington Teachers’ Ass’n, 22 N.Y.3d 918 (2013)

    Courts will only intervene in arbitration where public policy considerations, embodied in statute or decisional law, prohibit particular matters from being decided or certain relief from being granted by an arbitrator in an absolute sense.

    Summary

    The Board of Education sought to vacate an arbitration award that suspended a teacher for inappropriate electronic communication with a student, arguing the penalty was irrational and violated public policy. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the award. The Court held that while the State has a public policy of protecting children, this policy wasn’t an absolute prohibition preventing arbitration in this case. The hearing officer’s decision to suspend the teacher, rather than terminate her, was deemed rational, considering her remorse and the unlikelihood of repeated misconduct. The court emphasized that disagreement over the appropriate penalty doesn’t justify vacating an arbitral award.

    Facts

    A 36-year-old tenured high school teacher corresponded electronically with a 15-year-old male student outside of school hours. The communications, though personal and potentially romantic in the teacher’s view, were not sexual in nature, and no physical contact occurred. Disciplinary charges were brought against the teacher under Education Law § 3020-a.

    Procedural History

    A hearing officer found the teacher guilty of inappropriate conduct and imposed a 90-day suspension without pay and reassignment. The Board of Education commenced a proceeding under CPLR 7511 to vacate the arbitration award. The lower courts upheld the award. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the arbitration award, imposing a 90-day suspension instead of termination for a teacher engaging in inappropriate electronic communication with a student, violates the public policy of protecting children.

    2. Whether the arbitration award was arbitrary and capricious or irrational.

    Holding

    1. No, because the State’s public policy in favor of protecting children is not an absolute prohibition preventing the arbitration of disciplinary matters involving teachers, and the penalty imposed by the hearing officer was not prohibited by statute or common law.

    2. No, because the hearing officer engaged in a thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances, evaluated the teacher’s credibility, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the suspension and reassignment was an appropriate penalty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that judicial review of a hearing officer’s determination is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511. Moreover, because this was compulsory arbitration, the award “must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious.” The court emphasized that intervention in arbitration is limited to cases where “public policy considerations, embodied in statute or decisional law, prohibit, in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator.” While the State has a public policy in favor of protecting children, this policy does not impose an absolute prohibition on arbitrating the matter. The court found the hearing officer’s decision to be rational and not arbitrary or capricious. The hearing officer considered the teacher’s remorse and the unlikelihood of repeated misconduct. The court emphasized that disagreement over the appropriate penalty does not provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award. The court highlighted that it is not the role of the courts to “refashion the penalty”.

  • Gronski v. County of Monroe, 18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011): Landowner Liability When Control Is Shared

    18 N.Y.3d 374 (2011)

    A landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition extends to situations where the landowner retains or exercises control over the property, even when an independent contractor is also responsible for operations.

    Summary

    John Gronski, an employee of Metro Waste, was injured at a recycling center owned by Monroe County but operated by Metro Waste. A bale of paper fell on him due to allegedly improper stacking. Gronski sued the County, arguing negligence. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming it relinquished control to Metro Waste. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment, holding that a question of fact existed regarding the County’s control over the facility, based on the agreement between the County and Metro Waste and the County’s actual conduct. The County’s retained rights and visible presence raised a triable issue as to whether it exercised sufficient control to owe Gronski a duty of care.

    Facts

    Metro Waste operated a recycling center owned by Monroe County under an operations and maintenance agreement. The agreement assigned responsibility for repair, maintenance, and safety to Metro Waste. However, the County retained the right of access, the right to determine authorized users, access to records, termination rights, and approval of Metro Waste’s annual program manual. Gronski was injured when an improperly stacked bale of paper fell on him. An OSHA investigation cited Metro Waste for regulatory violations related to unsecured stacking.

    Procedural History

    Gronski sued the County, alleging negligence. The Supreme Court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the County had relinquished control to Metro Waste, like an out-of-possession landlord. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County relinquished sufficient control over the recycling center to Metro Waste, such that the County owed no duty of care to Gronski for unsafe conditions on the premises.

    Holding

    No, because a question of fact exists as to whether and to what extent the County exercised control over the property, based on the agreement and the County’s conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the out-of-possession landlord standard, as no leasehold was created. Landowners owe a duty of care to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition based on their exercise of control. The Court distinguished Butler v. Rafferty, noting that the County, unlike the cotenant in Butler, had supervisory rights and access to the facility. The agreement vested the County with ultimate approval authority over Metro Waste’s operating procedures. County personnel conducted regular tours and inspections. The Court emphasized that focusing solely on the written agreement, as the lower courts did, was error; the County’s actual conduct was also relevant. The Court cited Ritto v. Goldberg, emphasizing that a landlord’s intervention in a tenant’s business operations can create a question of fact as to control, even with a lease transferring possession. Viewing the evidence favorably to Gronski, the Court found a triable issue of fact as to whether the County exercised sufficient control to owe him a duty of care to prevent the dangerous condition. The dissent argued that the County did not intervene to the point of inducing reliance by Metro Waste or its employees, and emphasized the agreement’s comprehensive assignment of responsibility to Metro Waste. The majority countered that reliance is not a distinct element required in all control analyses, especially without a leasehold.

  • People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011): Limits on the Ledwon Rule and Unduly Suggestive Identification Procedures

    People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107 (2011)

    The rule in People v. Ledwon, which holds that a conviction cannot stand when based solely on inherently contradictory testimony from a single witness, does not apply when inconsistencies arise from multiple witnesses or when a witness provides a credible explanation for discrepancies; furthermore, using a translator with a pre-existing relationship with the defendant during a photo array can render the identification unduly suggestive, warranting suppression.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim, Hernandez, identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, discrepancies emerged between Hernandez’s description of the robber and the description given to the police shortly after the crime. Also, Hernandez’s son, Juan Jr., served as translator during the photo array, and it was later revealed that Juan Jr. knew the defendant, a fact not disclosed initially. The New York Court of Appeals held that the discrepancies in testimony did not warrant reversal under People v. Ledwon because the inconsistencies did not arise from a single witness and the victim provided a reason for the differences in description. However, the Court found the identification procedure unduly suggestive due to Juan Jr.’s involvement and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing.

    Facts

    Juan Hernandez was robbed at knifepoint in his apartment building. His son, Juan Jr., called 911 and provided a description of the robber. Detective Koch interviewed Hernandez, with Juan Jr. translating. Hernandez described the robber, but the description did not match the defendant, Delamota, who was later identified as the perpetrator. Juan Jr. later told the detective that he had heard neighborhood gossip that “Sebastian” was the robber. Detective Koch then showed Hernandez a photo array containing Delamota’s picture, and Hernandez identified him, with Juan Jr. translating. Delamota had a functionally impaired left arm. At trial, Juan Jr. admitted to knowing Delamota for a long time prior to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Delamota was indicted for robbery and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the identifications, arguing undue suggestiveness. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defense counsel moved to reopen the suppression hearing after Juan Jr.’s revelation. The motion was denied. Delamota was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the identification procedure unduly suggestive and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s proof was legally insufficient under People v. Ledwon due to conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator’s appearance.

    2. Whether the victim’s identification should have been suppressed because his son participated in the photo array, having known the defendant prior to the identification procedure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the conflicting testimony came from multiple witnesses, not a single witness, and the victim provided a rational explanation for the discrepancies.

    2. Yes, because Juan Jr.’s participation as a translator, combined with his prior knowledge of Delamota, created an unduly suggestive identification procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court clarified the narrow scope of the Ledwon rule. The Court stated, “Ledwon applies in rare cases where the charged crime is established by only one witness who provides inherently contradictory testimony at trial.” Because discrepancies arose from multiple witnesses (the victim and the detective), Ledwon did not apply. The Court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting evidence. The victim’s trial testimony was not internally inconsistent, and he offered an explanation for the differing description he allegedly gave to the detective. The court noted it is up to the Appellate Division to review the weight of the evidence.

    Regarding the identification procedure, the Court found that the trial court erred in denying Delamota’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing. Juan Jr.’s role as translator, coupled with his undisclosed prior relationship with Delamota, created an unduly suggestive situation. “In our view, the suggestiveness cannot be attributed to the victim’s son, but to the detective’s decision to utilize him as the interpreter notwithstanding the possible risks that were involved in this practice.” The Court reasoned that the detective should have used a neutral Spanish interpreter and therefore ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification had an independent basis.

  • Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011): Mandatory Aggregate Trust Fund Deposits for Non-Schedule Awards

    Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011)

    The 2007 amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) require private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of permanent partial disability awards into the Aggregate Trust Fund (ATF), regardless of whether the injury occurred before or after the amendment’s effective date, provided the award is made after July 1, 2007.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the 2007 amendments to New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law mandate private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of non-schedule permanent partial disability awards into the ATF, even if the injury occurred before the amendments’ effective date. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute requires such deposits for awards made after July 1, 2007, regardless of when the injury occurred. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain language and lack of exceptions indicate the legislature’s intent for broad application. The Court rejected arguments of retroactivity, unconstitutional taking, and due process violations.

    Facts

    Claimant Randy Raynor injured his lower back on December 14, 2004, while working for Landmark Chrysler. On June 25, 2008, a workers’ compensation law judge determined that Raynor was permanently partially disabled. The judge directed Landmark Chrysler’s insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Company of New York, to deposit the present value of all unpaid benefits ($196,865.73) into the ATF. Erie Insurance challenged this directive, arguing that mandatory deposits should only apply to awards made under the amended section 15(3)(w) for injuries occurring after the amendment’s effective date.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board upheld the determination, requiring the deposit of the present value into the ATF. The carrier sought full Board review, raising constitutional arguments. The full Board affirmed the decision, stating the statute’s plain language required the deposit and the statute was not impermissibly retroactive or unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) requires private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of a permanent partial disability award into the ATF when the award is made after the amendment’s effective date, but the injury occurred before.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) mandates that if any award made on or after July 1, 2007, requires payment for permanent partial disability, the Board shall compute the present value and require payment into the ATF, regardless of when the injury occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, stating, “As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof.” The Court noted that the legislature specifically chose the date of the award as the trigger for the deposit requirement, not the date of the injury. The court rejected the argument that the statute was impermissibly retroactive, stating, “ ‘A statute is not retroactive . . . when made to apply to future transactions merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events.’ ” The Court distinguished Burns v. Varriale, noting that while ascertaining the present value of future benefits can be speculative, the use of actuarial tables as mandated by Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(5) makes the calculation sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the deposit requirement. The Court dismissed the carrier’s constitutional arguments, finding no violation of the Takings Clause because the statute doesn’t increase the amount owed or appropriate the carrier’s assets. Similarly, the Court found no Contracts Clause violation because the amendment only made mandatory what was previously discretionary. The Court found a rational basis for treating private insurers differently from the State Insurance Fund and self-insurers, justifying the differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the Court rejected the Due Process argument, finding that the carrier had sufficient procedural protections and that the statute served a rational legislative purpose. The Court concluded, “It is for the Legislature to limit the statute, if it so desires.”

  • People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011): Dismissal of Hearing-Impaired Juror & Judicial Discretion

    People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011)

    A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause if the record supports a determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with their ability to serve, especially when no reasonable accommodation is requested or apparent.

    Summary

    Defendant Dean Guay was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his seven-year-old daughter. During jury selection, a prospective juror indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court dismissed the juror for cause over defense counsel’s objection, citing concerns that the juror’s hearing impairment would prevent him from understanding the testimony of child witnesses, who tend to speak softly. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror because the record supported the determination that the hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with the juror’s ability to serve, and no reasonable accommodation was requested.

    Facts

    Dean Guay sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter, Jane, during a week-long summer camp trip. Guay confessed to police, admitting to crawling into bed with Jane and sexually assaulting her. Prior to trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror (venire member 1405) indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court noted the juror had trouble hearing instructions and questions. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the juror for cause, arguing the hearing impairment could cause him to miss critical parts of Jane’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the hearing-impaired juror for cause. Guay was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction with a modification regarding post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause, or whether the court was obligated to accommodate the juror’s hearing impairment.

    Holding

    No, because the record supported the trial court’s determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with his ability to be a trial juror, and no reasonable accommodation was requested or apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that jury service is a civil right and a privilege protected by the State Constitution. However, this right must be balanced against the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial. Judiciary Law § 510 requires jurors to be able to understand and communicate in English. The court cited People v. Guzman, 76 N.Y.2d 1 (1990), emphasizing that a hearing impairment does not automatically disqualify a person from jury service, and reasonable accommodations should be considered if they allow the juror to fulfill their duties without interfering with the defendant’s rights. However, Guzman also recognizes the trial court’s discretion in determining whether an auditory problem would unduly interfere with a juror’s ability to perform their functions. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion here because the juror had difficulty hearing, the court observed nonverbal cues indicating a lack of comprehension, and the court was concerned about the juror’s ability to understand a soft-spoken child witness. Significantly, no specific accommodation beyond sitting in the front row was requested by the juror or the defense. The Court stated, “[a]s with most juror qualification questions, [this determination must] be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror…during the voir dire.” The Court also noted, “[i]t is imperative that the privilege and duty of jury service be made available to all eligible individuals—regardless of disability—who are capable of performing this civic function. For this reason, a judge should endeavor to make a reasonable and tactful inquiry of any prospective juror who appears to have a hearing impairment and consider offering to provide an assistive amplification device or some other appropriate accommodation available in our court system.”

  • U.S. Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011): Establishes Standard for Vacating Arbitration Awards Based on Evident Partiality

    U.S. Electronics, Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011)

    To vacate an arbitration award based on “evident partiality” under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court must find that a reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party; mere appearance of bias or attenuated relationships are insufficient.

    Summary

    U.S. Electronics, Inc. (USE) sought to vacate an arbitration award favoring Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., claiming the arbitration panel’s chairman, William Sessions, had failed to disclose relationships creating bias. USE argued that Sessions’ son, a Congressman, publicly supported a merger beneficial to Sirius and was politically aligned with a director of USE’s competitor. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the award, adopting the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard. The court found USE’s claims of bias too tenuous and speculative to justify vacating the award, as the alleged relationships were attenuated and lacked a direct connection to the arbitration.

    Facts

    USE had a nonexclusive distribution agreement with Sirius. A dispute arose, leading to arbitration where Sirius prevailed. USE sought to vacate the award, alleging “evident partiality” by the arbitration panel’s chairman, William Sessions. USE based its claim on two points: (1) Sessions’ son, Congressman Peter Sessions, had publicly advocated for a merger between Sirius and XM Satellite Radio, Inc. (XM), and (2) Sessions’ son was a political ally of Congressman Darrell Issa, the director of Directed Electronics, Inc. (DEI), a competitor of USE. USE argued these connections created bias affecting the impartiality of the arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The lower court upheld the arbitration award. The Appellate Division affirmed, but imposed a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for proving prejudice, which the Court of Appeals rejected. The Court of Appeals then affirmed, but clarified the appropriate standard for “evident partiality.”

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitration award should be vacated for “evident partiality” under 9 USC § 10(a)(2) based on the arbitrator’s alleged indirect relationships with parties interested in the outcome of the underlying dispute.

    Holding

    No, because the alleged relationships were too attenuated and speculative to create “evident partiality” requiring vacatur of the arbitration award; a reasonable person would not conclude the arbitrator was biased.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the Second Circuit’s “reasonable person” standard for determining evident partiality, holding that vacatur is warranted “where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.” The court emphasized that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proof. It rejected the Appellate Division’s imposition of a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. The court distinguished the facts from situations involving direct personal or business relationships. The court reasoned that Congressman Sessions’ son’s endorsement of the Sirius-XM merger had no bearing on the breach of contract matter. Moreover, the purported connection between Chairman Sessions and Congressman Issa was deemed too tenuous to impute bias. The court stated, “the interest or bias . . . must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative.” The court emphasized that absent a showing of a direct connection, the allegations amounted to speculation, which is insufficient to vacate an arbitration award.

  • Schenectady County SPCA v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010): Redaction Required for FOIL Requests

    Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v. Mills, 16 N.Y.3d 44 (2010)

    An agency responding to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request must redact a record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Summary

    Schenectady County SPCA requested a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians from the New York State Education Department under FOIL. The Department offered names and city/state portions of addresses but refused to provide street addresses, claiming they could not distinguish between business and residential addresses. The SPCA sought only business addresses. The Court of Appeals held that the Department could not refuse to produce the entire record simply because some of it might be exempt. The court emphasized the duty to redact exempt information when reasonably possible, to fulfill FOIL obligations efficiently.

    Facts

    The Schenectady County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) requested, via email and then formally under FOIL, a list of names and addresses of licensed veterinarians and veterinary technicians in Schenectady County from the Education Department.

    The Department offered a list of names, cities, and states but refused to provide street addresses, stating that it did not provide home addresses for licensed professionals and could not distinguish between business and residential addresses in its computerized files.

    The SPCA clarified it was seeking only business addresses.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the SPCA’s petition to compel production of the list.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted the petition, compelling the Department to produce the list.

    The Department appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an agency responding to a FOIL request may withhold a record entirely because some of the information in that record may be exempt from disclosure, even if the exempt information could be redacted.

    Holding

    No, because an agency responding to a FOIL request must redact the record to remove exempt information if it can do so without unreasonable difficulty, rather than withhold the entire record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Education Department could not refuse to produce the entire list of names and addresses simply because it contained some information (home addresses) that might be exempt from disclosure under FOIL’s privacy provisions.

    The Court reasoned that the SPCA was only seeking business addresses, which the Department did not claim were private. The Court found it “obvious” that the Department should simply delete the home addresses from the list, especially because the SPCA was only seeking business addresses.

    The Court distinguished between creating a new record (which FOIL generally does not require) and redacting an existing one. Citing Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine, 9 NY3d 454, 464 (2007), the court noted that “even when a document subject to FOIL contains . . . private, protected information, agencies may be required to prepare a redacted version with the exempt material removed.”

    The Court criticized the extensive litigation of the case, stating, “It seems that an agency sensitive to its FOIL obligations could have furnished petitioner a redacted list with a few hours’ effort, and at negligible cost.” The Court expressed its hope that the Department and other government agencies would comply with their FOIL obligations more efficiently in the future.

  • Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011): Clarifying ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not categorically barred simply because the injured worker and the base of the falling object were at the same level; the key inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Summary

    Antoni Wilinski, a demolition worker, was injured when unsecured metal pipes toppled onto him after being struck by debris from a nearby wall demolition. The pipes and Wilinski were on the same floor level. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the accident was not elevation-related because the pipes and Wilinski were at the same level. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the “same level” is not a categorical bar to recovery. The Court emphasized that the central question is whether the injury stemmed from inadequate protection against risks involving a significant elevation differential, remanding for a determination of whether a safety device was required here.

    Facts

    Antoni Wilinski was demolishing brick walls at a warehouse owned by 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp. Two unsecured, 10-foot metal plumbing pipes stood vertically on the same floor where Wilinski worked. Earlier that day, Wilinski expressed concern about the pipes being unsecured during the demolition. No safety measures were taken. Debris from the wall demolition struck the pipes, causing them to fall four feet and hit Wilinski, causing injuries.

    Procedural History

    Wilinski sued, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim and denied the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division modified, denying Wilinski’s § 240(1) summary judgment motion and dismissing the § 240(1) claim, relying on Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s modification was proper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) categorically bars recovery for injuries caused by a falling object when the injured worker and the base of the object are at the same level.

    Holding

    No, because Misseritti does not establish a categorical “same level” exclusion; the critical inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holdings regarding Labor Law § 240(1), stating that its jurisprudence centers on providing adequate protection from reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents. The court distinguished Misseritti, emphasizing that the lack of a causal nexus between the injury and the failure of a device prescribed by § 240(1), not the “same level,” was the basis for the Misseritti decision. The Court stated that the “same level” rule ignores the nuances of a § 240(1) analysis. The Court also distinguished the case from other cases, noting that the pipes were not themselves the target of demolition and should have been secured. Citing Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court reiterated that “the single decisive question is whether plaintiffs injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” Here, the height differential between the pipes and Wilinski was not de minimis. The Court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a required safety device. Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s interpretation of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3), stating that the plaintiff need not show that the pipes fell due to wind pressure or vibration. The court also found the defendants failed to show they complied with 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c) regarding continuing inspections.

  • People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012): Limits on De Facto Grand Jury Dismissals

    People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012)

    A prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury due to witness unavailability is not a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization for re-presentation unless the grand jury has fully considered the evidence and charges.

    Summary

    Defendants Davis and McIntosh were indicted for assault after an incident at a nightclub. The prosecution initially presented evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh only, as Davis had not yet been apprehended, but withdrew the case due to witness unavailability. Later, both Davis and McIntosh were indicted by a second grand jury. The Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was not the functional equivalent of a dismissal requiring court authorization before re-presentation, because the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against both defendants.

    Facts

    Lynn Walker was severely injured in an altercation at a nightclub, allegedly instigated by Davis and joined by McIntosh. McIntosh was arrested shortly after the incident, while Davis was apprehended later. The People began presenting evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh before Davis was arrested, advising the jury that it was a “continued case.” Walker testified that both Davis and McIntosh assaulted her. The People withdrew the case due to witness unavailability and the grand jury’s term expiring. Later, the People presented evidence to another grand jury against both Davis and McIntosh, who were subsequently indicted.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment. Davis was convicted of assault, while McIntosh was acquitted of first-degree assault but convicted of second-degree assault. The Appellate Division reversed the judgments, holding that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was the functional equivalent of a dismissal under People v. Wilkins, requiring court permission before re-presentment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s withdrawal of their case from the first grand jury presentation, due to witness unavailability, constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75, requiring court authorization before re-presentment to a second grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes for McIntosh; No for Davis. The order is reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. As to McIntosh, no, because the proceedings before the first grand jury had not progressed to the point where it had fully considered the evidence and the charges against McIntosh.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Wilkins, which held that a pre-vote withdrawal of charges after the presentation was complete was the functional equivalent of a dismissal. The Court emphasized that Wilkins applies only in limited circumstances where the withdrawal is “fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives underlying CPL 190.75,” such as curtailing prosecutorial excess and maintaining grand jury independence (People v. Gelman, 93 N.Y.2d 314, 319 (1999)). For Davis, since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins is irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn (see People v Santmyer, 255 AD2d 871, 871 [4th Dept 1998]). The Court found that the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against McIntosh because the People intended to present additional witnesses and had informed the grand jury that it was a continuing case. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that the People withdrew their case to find a more compliant grand jury. The court reasoned that the focus should be on “the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge” (Wilkins, 68 NY2d at 274). Because the People withdrew the charges before fully presenting their case, it did not constitute a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization.

  • People v. Ventura, 17 N.Y.3d 675 (2011): Right to Appeal for Involuntarily Deported Defendants

    17 N.Y.3d 675 (2011)

    An involuntarily deported defendant retains the right to have their direct criminal appeal heard by an intermediate appellate court, and it is an abuse of discretion for the appellate court to dismiss the appeal solely based on the defendant’s deportation.

    Summary

    Carlos Ventura and Damian Gardner were convicted of crimes and filed appeals. While their appeals were pending, both were involuntarily deported by federal immigration authorities. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by dismissing their appeals because the defendants were no longer present in the country. The Court of Appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion, emphasizing the importance of intermediate appellate review and the lack of voluntary evasion of justice by the defendants.

    Facts

    Carlos Ventura was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property and other offenses. He filed a timely notice of appeal. Ventura, a legal permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, was paroled to ICE and deported before his appeal was heard. The Appellate Division granted the People’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

    Damian Gardner was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance and filed a timely notice of appeal. Gardner was deported to Jamaica before his appeal was decided. The People’s motion to dismiss Gardner’s appeal was also granted by the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    Both Ventura and Gardner were convicted in trial courts. They both filed appeals to the Appellate Division. In both cases, the Appellate Division granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the appeals due to the defendants’ deportation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases to review the dismissals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by dismissing the direct criminal appeals of defendants who were involuntarily deported while their appeals were pending.

    Holding

    Yes, because criminal defendants have a fundamental right to intermediate appellate review, and dismissing an appeal solely due to involuntary deportation undermines this right, especially when the defendant’s absence is not a voluntary evasion of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 450.10 provides a criminal defendant a right to appeal to an intermediate appellate court. Dismissal of appeals based on the defendant’s inability to obey the mandate of the court is usually reserved for cases where the defendant voluntarily absconds, thereby evading justice. In this case, the defendants’ deportations were involuntary, distinguishing them from cases where appeals are dismissed due to a defendant’s deliberate evasion. The Court emphasized the importance of intermediate appellate review in New York, highlighting the Appellate Division’s unique fact-finding powers and ability to review unpreserved issues. The court noted that while CPL 470.60(1) grants appellate courts discretion to dismiss appeals, this discretion cannot override a defendant’s fundamental right to appellate review. The Court also noted that the defendants continued to prosecute their appeals through counsel. The Court distinguished prior cases, such as People v. Del Rio, because those cases involved appeals dismissed by the Court of Appeals after intermediate appellate review had already occurred. Judge Read dissented, arguing that the Appellate Division has discretion to dismiss appeals, and that the majority’s rule strips the court of this discretion when the defendant is an involuntarily deported noncitizen. The dissent argued that unless the conviction caused the deportation or prevents reentry, the Appellate Division should have the discretion to dismiss the appeal.