New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Sedacca v. Mangano, 18 N.Y.3d 609 (2012): Limits on Executive Power to Remove Appointed Commissioners

    Sedacca v. Mangano, 18 N.Y.3d 609 (2012)

    When a statute creates fixed, staggered terms for appointed commissioners designed to promote stability and political diversity, a County Executive’s power to remove those commissioners is limited and requires cause, even if the County Charter grants broad removal powers.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Nassau County Executive can terminate Assessment Review Commission (ARC) commissioners before their fixed statutory terms expire without cause. The Court of Appeals held that the County Executive’s power is limited by the legislative intent behind the statute creating the ARC, which sought to ensure stability and political diversity through fixed, staggered terms. Although the County Charter grants the executive broad removal powers, these powers cannot override the specific protections afforded to ARC commissioners by the Real Property Tax Law. The Court emphasized the importance of discerning and applying legislative intent in statutory interpretation to uphold the purpose of the act.

    Facts

    The outgoing Nassau County Executive appointed six ARC commissioners, including the petitioners, to fill vacancies on December 24, 2009. On January 14, 2010, the newly elected County Executive sent letters to all nine commissioners informing them of their removal, citing Nassau County Charter § 203. The County Executive stated his intention to appoint his own commissioners to implement his administration’s policies. The commissioners requested legal representation and an opportunity to be heard.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated a combined declaratory judgment action/Article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the County Executive lacked the power to remove them without cause and requesting attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, declaring that the County Executive had the authority to remove the commissioners without cause. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Nassau County Executive has the authority to remove commissioners of the Nassau County Assessment Review Commission prior to the expiration of their statutory terms in the absence of cause, given the provisions of Real Property Tax Law § 523-b and Nassau County Charter § 203.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative intent behind Real Property Tax Law § 523-b, which established the ARC with fixed, staggered terms for commissioners, demonstrates a desire to protect the commission from political influence and ensure stability. This intent overrides the general removal power granted to the County Executive under the Nassau County Charter § 203, requiring “cause” for removal in this specific case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation, stating, “[i]n matters of statutory . . . interpretation, ‘legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors].’” The Court reasoned that the fixed, staggered terms of ARC commissioners, along with the requirement of political diversity, indicated a legislative intent to insulate the ARC from political influence. It noted that the five-year term exceeded the County Executive’s own term, designed to prevent wholesale changes in membership with each new administration.

    Although Nassau County Charter § 203 grants the County Executive the power to remove appointees, the Court interpreted the phrase “reasons for such removal” within that section to mean “cause” when applied to commissioners serving fixed terms. The Court reconciled the County Charter with the intent of RPTL 523-b, concluding that the commissioners were not essentially at-will employees subject to termination for any reason. The Court also found persuasive that members of the similarly situated Board of Assessment Review could only be removed upon a finding of misconduct. Removing commissioners without cause would render the statutory terms superfluous and frustrate the legislative intent.

    The Court, however, rejected the petitioners’ claim for attorney’s fees, noting that the County’s obligation to provide for the defense of employees did not extend to cases where the employees initiated the action. The court observed that the county code was clear on this matter and did not allow for compensation for the attorney’s fees.

  • People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16 (2009): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Prove Identity

    People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16 (2009)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is inadmissible to show propensity for crime but may be admissible to prove identity if identity is genuinely in issue and the prior acts are sufficiently unique and probative.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of prior bad acts to establish identity. The defendant was convicted of assaulting his wife. At trial, the prosecution introduced testimony from the defendant’s ex-wife regarding similar abusive behavior. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the ex-wife’s testimony was admissible to prove the defendant’s identity because the specific method of abuse was sufficiently unique and because the defendant’s plea of not guilty placed identity in issue. This case emphasizes the narrow exception to the general rule against using prior bad acts to show propensity, focusing instead on their probative value for establishing identity when genuinely disputed.

    Facts

    The defendant, Dorm, was accused of assaulting his wife. The prosecution presented evidence that Dorm had previously assaulted his ex-wife in a similar manner, including tying her up and inflicting burns. The victim testified that Dorm had assaulted her over a 12-hour period. The defense argued that the ex-wife’s testimony was inadmissible because it served only to demonstrate Dorm’s propensity for violence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the ex-wife’s testimony. Dorm was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the ex-wife’s testimony was improperly admitted to show Dorm’s propensity for violence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the defendant’s ex-wife regarding prior similar bad acts to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because the identity was not conclusively established by other evidence, and the method of abuse used was sufficiently unique to be probative of identity. Admission of the evidence was not solely to show propensity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while evidence of prior bad acts is generally inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity for crime, it can be admissible to prove identity under the Molineux exception if identity is genuinely in issue and the prior acts are sufficiently unique and probative. The Court emphasized that a simple plea of not guilty places identity in issue unless identity is conclusively established through other evidence. The Court found that the specific manner of abuse described by the ex-wife was sufficiently unique to be probative of identity. The Court noted that the trial court was aware of the defendant’s potential defense strategy based on prior testimony at a probation violation hearing, making the admission of the evidence appropriate at the time. The dissent argued that identity was not truly in issue because the complainant identified her husband as her attacker, and that the evidence was introduced to show propensity, violating People v. Molineux. The dissent emphasized that the People’s summation focused on the defendant’s propensity to abuse women. However, the majority held that because the defendant maintained his innocence, identity was not conclusively established, and the ex-wife’s testimony was properly admitted to prove that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.

  • People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Rebut Extreme Emotional Disturbance

    People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012)

    When a defendant raises the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, evidence of prior uncharged crimes or bad acts is admissible to rebut the defense, provided the evidence is directly relevant and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling his roommate. He raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, claiming the act resulted from a mental illness caused by prior sexual abuse. The prosecution introduced evidence of a prior similar strangulation committed by the defendant to rebut this defense. The New York Court of Appeals held that this evidence was admissible because it was directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance and showed a possible premeditated intent to target gay men, undermining the loss of control element of the defense.

    Facts

    Defendant strangled his roommate, Victor Dombrova, during an argument where Dombrova asked him to move out. Defendant admitted to the police that he “lost it” when Dombrova made sexual advances. He also admitted to a similar prior homicide, strangling Kevin Bosinski in Buffalo after Bosinski made sexual advances towards him. Both Dombrova and Bosinski had been told about the defendant’s history of sexual abuse. The police investigating Dombrova’s death discovered that the defendant was wanted for questioning in Buffalo concerning the Bosinski homicide.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Before trial, he indicated he would raise the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People moved to introduce evidence of the Bosinski homicide to rebut the defense. The trial court granted the motion. The jury rejected the extreme emotional disturbance defense and convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged murder is admissible to rebut the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a murder trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence is directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance, and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Molineux rule, stating that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if it only demonstrates the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged. However, such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a specific material issue other than criminal propensity, such as motive, intent, or absence of mistake. The court applied a two-part inquiry: first, identifying a material issue other than criminal propensity; and second, weighing the probative value against the potential for prejudice.

    By asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant placed his state of mind at the time of the killing directly in issue. The prior homicide was relevant because it tended to disprove the defendant’s claim of a “loss of control.” The court stated, “[t]his highly probative evidence is directly relevant to defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense in that it has a logical and natural tendency to disprove his specific claim that he was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the Dombrova homicide”. The similarity between the two incidents suggested a possible premeditated intent to target gay men. Even though the Bosinski and Dombrova homicides shared strikingly similar characteristics, and it can be argued that the admission of the Bosinski statement is overly prejudicial propensity evidence, “it is equally true that the repetition, duplication and similarity of defendant’s acts have a direct bearing on the question of premeditated intent”. The Court found the evidence highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice. The Court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 544 (2012): Admissibility of Chemical Test Refusal Evidence

    People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 544 (2012)

    Evidence of a driver’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content is inadmissible at trial unless the driver was clearly warned that their conduct would be interpreted as a refusal, especially when the driver has requested to speak with an attorney.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired after the trial court admitted evidence that he refused to take a chemical breath test. Defendant argued he was waiting to speak with his attorney and did not explicitly refuse. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the refusal evidence was improperly admitted because the troopers, after initially granting his request to contact an attorney, did not clearly inform him that his continued insistence on waiting for his attorney would be deemed a refusal. The Court emphasized the need for clear warnings before admitting refusal evidence to show consciousness of guilt.

    Facts

    On March 28, 2007, state troopers stopped Defendant for a window tint violation. Smelling alcohol, they asked him to exit the vehicle and administered field sobriety tests, which he failed. Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and given Miranda warnings, as well as chemical test warnings under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(f). He stated he understood but wanted to speak to his lawyer before deciding whether to take the test. At the state police barracks, he was given the warnings twice more, and each time he indicated he wished to telephone his attorney. After a half-hour wait, troopers interpreted his continued request as a refusal and recorded it.

    Procedural History

    At a pretrial hearing, Defendant moved to preclude evidence of his refusal, arguing he never explicitly refused but requested to contact his attorney. The Town Court denied the motion. He was acquitted of driving while intoxicated but convicted of the lesser offense of driving while ability impaired. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a chemical test is admissible when the defendant requested to speak with an attorney and was not clearly informed that further insistence on waiting for the attorney would be deemed a refusal.

    Holding

    1. No, because a reasonable motorist in Defendant’s position would not have understood that his continued request to speak to an attorney would be interpreted as a binding refusal to submit to a chemical test; therefore, Defendant was not adequately warned that his conduct would constitute a refusal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(f) allows for the admission of refusal evidence, but only if the defendant was clearly warned of the consequences of refusal. While there’s no absolute right to refuse the test until consulting an attorney (citing People v. Gursey, 22 NY2d 224 (1968)), police cannot unjustifiably prevent access to counsel if it doesn’t unduly interfere with the matter at hand.

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where a defendant actively frustrates the testing process. Here, the troopers initially granted the request to contact counsel and allowed a significant waiting period. Because the troopers did not explicitly state that the time for deliberation had expired and that his response would then be deemed a refusal, the Defendant was not adequately warned. “Since a reasonable motorist in defendant’s position would not have understood that, unlike the prior encounters, the further request to speak to an attorney would be interpreted by the troopers as a binding refusal to submit to a chemical test, defendant was not adequately warned that his conduct would constitute a refusal.”

    The Court rejected the argument that this holding would require a “litany of additional warnings,” clarifying that police need only show that the defendant declined the test despite being clearly warned of the consequences. The court cited People v. O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270 (1991), approving of an admonition that the insistence of waiting for an attorney would be interpreted as a refusal.

    Finally, the Court found the error was not harmless, as the trial court, acting as the finder of fact, relied on the consciousness of guilt evidence in its decision. “Needless to say, refusal evidence is probative of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt only if the defendant actually declined to take the test.”

  • Martino v. Stolzman, 16 N.Y.3d 906 (2011): Limiting Social Host Liability for Intoxicated Guests

    Martino v. Stolzman, 16 N.Y.3d 906 (2011)

    A social host does not have a common-law duty to prevent an intoxicated guest from leaving their property or to assist the guest in navigating potential traffic obstructions adjacent to their driveway.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of a social host’s liability for the actions of an intoxicated guest after the guest leaves the host’s property. The New York Court of Appeals held that social hosts Michael and Susan Oliver had no duty to prevent Michael Stolzman, an intoxicated guest, from driving away from their New Year’s Eve party. Nor did they have a duty to warn him about vehicles potentially obstructing his view as he exited their driveway. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding no basis to expand the concept of duty to include preventing intoxicated guests from leaving a property or assisting them in navigating public roads.

    Facts

    Michael and Susan Oliver hosted a New Year’s Eve party at their home. Michael Stolzman, after consuming alcohol at the party, left in his truck with Judith Rost as a passenger. Stolzman, while intoxicated, backed out of the Olivers’ driveway and collided with Jennifer Martino’s vehicle, causing severe injuries to both Martino and Rost. Stolzman’s blood alcohol content was .14%, nearly twice the legal limit. He pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated.

    Procedural History

    Martino and Rost filed separate actions against the Olivers, alleging violations of the Dram Shop Act and common-law negligence. The Supreme Court denied the Olivers’ motion to dismiss the Dram Shop Act claims and for summary judgment on the common-law negligence claims. The Appellate Division modified the order, granting the Olivers’ motion to dismiss the Dram Shop Act claims, but affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claims, finding a factual issue regarding whether the Olivers knew Stolzman was dangerously intoxicated. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the Olivers’ motion for summary judgement.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether social hosts have a common-law duty to prevent an intoxicated guest from leaving their property?

    2. Whether social hosts have a duty to assist an intoxicated guest in exiting their driveway or to warn them of potential obstructions on the adjacent road?

    Holding

    1. No, because requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would inappropriately expand the concept of duty.

    2. No, because vehicles parked adjacent to the Olivers’ driveway did not create a latent or dangerous condition on the Olivers’ property, and foreseeability of the obstruction does not create a duty to warn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Olivers were no longer in a position to control Stolzman once he entered his vehicle and drove away. Expanding the duty of social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would be an inappropriate extension of established legal principles. The Court cited D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 (1987), acknowledging landowners have a duty to control third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to do so, but clarified this opportunity ceases when the guest departs the property.

    The Court also rejected the argument that the Olivers had a duty to assist Stolzman or warn him about potential obstructions, stating that the parked vehicles did not constitute a “latent or dangerous condition” on the Olivers’ property. The Court referenced Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2 NY3d 633, 636 (2004) to underscore that the duty to warn arises only from dangerous conditions on one’s property. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that mere awareness of a potential obstruction does not create a duty to warn, citing Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 785 (1976) to reinforce that “(f)oreseeability should not be confused with duty.”

    The Court effectively limited the scope of social host liability, emphasizing the importance of defined boundaries for duty in negligence cases. The decision clarifies that social hosts are not insurers of their guests’ safety once those guests leave the premises. The ruling aligns with a reluctance to impose overly broad duties on landowners for conduct occurring off their property.

  • Vega v. Restani Construction Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499 (2012): Establishing Negligence for Improper Disposal of Construction Debris

    Vega v. Restani Construction Corp. 18 N.Y.3d 499 (2012)

    A subcontractor may be liable for negligence for improperly disposing of construction debris in a public trash can, leading to foreseeable injury to a park worker tasked with moving the overloaded can.

    Summary

    Minerva Vega, a park maintenance worker, sued Restani Construction and its subcontractor, General Fence Corporation (GFC), for injuries sustained when she attempted to move an overloaded trash can filled with construction debris. The New York Court of Appeals held that Vega was entitled to a trial on the merits of her negligence claim against GFC because GFC failed to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact. The court reasoned that improper disposal of construction debris could constitute negligence and that GFC did not conclusively prove it was not responsible for the debris. The court also found that the risk was not necessarily inherent in Vega’s job or an open and obvious hazard.

    Facts

    Restani Construction was the general contractor for renovations at Loreto Park in the Bronx. GFC was a subcontractor. Vega, a park maintenance worker, injured her shoulder on May 28, 2002, while trying to move a trash can in Loreto Park. A coworker, Jackie Diaz, observed chunks of cement in the can, suggesting construction debris. Vega sued Restani and GFC, alleging negligence caused her injury.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied GFC’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division granted GFC leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether GFC demonstrated the absence of any material issues of fact to warrant summary judgment dismissing Vega’s negligence claim.

    Holding

    No, because GFC failed to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact regarding its alleged negligence in the improper disposal of construction debris.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that GFC did not meet its burden of demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact. GFC argued that putting debris in a garbage can is not an act of negligence and that there was no evidence linking GFC to the concrete in the can. The court rejected this argument, stating that the disposal of construction debris into a public trash can could constitute negligence, distinguishing it from ordinary garbage disposal. GFC failed to provide conclusive evidence that it did not dispose of concrete waste improperly. Mr. Johnson’s affidavit lacked specifics and documentation. The court also noted conflicting evidence regarding public access to the park before Vega’s accident, raising questions about who could have deposited the concrete. The court determined that GFC did not establish that the risk of injury due to moving a very heavy garbage can filled with concrete was inherent in Vega’s work. Vega testified that disposing of construction debris was not part of her job. Finally, the court held that there remained triable issues of fact as to whether the risk that the trash can could be filled with concrete was “ordinary and obvious.” As Vega’s coworker noted, “There was garbage on top of the cement and you couldn’t see the cement chunks.” The court noted that “issue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure.” The court held the lower court correctly denied summary judgement, and Vega was entitled to a trial.

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011): Resentencing Eligibility and Predicate Felonies

    People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011)

    A defendant is ineligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 if they have a prior violent felony conviction within the preceding ten years, regardless of whether they were formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on that violent felony.

    Summary

    Defendants Steward and Wright sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 for drug offenses. The trial courts denied their motions, finding they were ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions within the statutory time frame. The defendants argued that because they were not *adjudicated* predicate felons based on those violent felonies at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses, the violent felonies should not disqualify them from resentencing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony is not required for the exclusion to apply. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute indicates that prior adjudication is only required under a separate provision not applicable here.

    Facts

    Steward was convicted in March 2004 for criminal sale of a controlled substance. He had a 1991 conviction for robbery in the first and second degrees (violent felonies).
    Wright was convicted in May 2005 for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He had two 1994 convictions for attempted robbery in the second degree (violent felonies).
    Neither defendant was adjudicated a predicate felon based on their violent felony convictions at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses.

    Procedural History

    Both Steward and Wright moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009.
    The trial courts denied the motions, finding them ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial courts’ decisions.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must have been formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on a prior violent felony conviction to be excluded from resentencing eligibility under CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i) does not require a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony for the exclusion from resentencing to apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory interpretation of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i). The court emphasized that the statute excludes individuals with a prior conviction for a violent felony offense within the preceding ten years. The defendants conceded they had prior violent felony convictions within that timeframe.

    The court distinguished between CPL 440.46(5)(a) and CPL 440.46(5)(b). The latter provision explicitly requires a prior adjudication for certain offenses to trigger the exclusion, while the former does not. The court applied the principle that “(w)hen different terms are used in various parts of a statute . . . , it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended” (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]). Since paragraph (b) included a “prior adjudication” requirement, but paragraph (a) did not, the legislature intentionally omitted that requirement from paragraph (a).

    The court also addressed the defendants’ argument that Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b) and CPL 400.21(7)(c) limit the term “predicate felony conviction” to only those convictions previously adjudicated. The court clarified that while CPL 400.21(7)(c) requires an adjudication for the term “second felony offender,” the term “predicate felony conviction” itself does not require such an adjudication.

    The court noted that defendants seeking resentencing can still challenge the validity of the underlying prior violent felony convictions. Quoting L 2004, ch 738, § 23, the court stated that a court may “conduct a hearing, if necessary, to determine whether [a defendant] qualifies to be resentenced or to determine *any controverted issue of fact relevant to the issue of sentencing*.” Thus, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders, finding that the defendants were ineligible for resentencing due to their prior violent felony convictions, irrespective of whether they were previously adjudicated predicate felons on those bases.

  • People v. Sosa, 18 N.Y.3d 436 (2012): Determining Eligibility for Resentencing Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    18 N.Y.3d 436, 963 N.E.2d 1235, 940 N.Y.S.2d 534 (2012)

    When determining eligibility for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, the ten-year look-back period for exclusion offenses is measured from the date of the resentencing application, not the date of the underlying drug crime.

    Summary

    Defendant Sosa applied for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA-3). The prosecution argued he was ineligible because of a prior violent felony conviction within the preceding ten years, which constitutes an exclusion offense under CPL 440.46(5)(a). The Court of Appeals addressed whether the ten-year look-back period should be calculated from the date of the drug crime for which resentencing is sought, or from the date of the resentencing application. The Court held the look-back period runs from the date of the resentencing application. This interpretation aligns with the remedial purpose of the DLRA-3 and the plain language of the statute.

    Facts

    On November 27, 1995, Sosa was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, a violent felony.

    On August 24, 2002, Sosa committed drug-related offenses.

    On March 26, 2003, Sosa was convicted of third and fourth-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance and sentenced as a second felony offender.

    On October 7, 2009, Sosa applied for resentencing under DLRA-3.

    Procedural History

    The resentencing court found Sosa eligible for resentencing, measuring the ten-year look-back from the date of the resentence application. Sosa was resentenced to a seven-year prison term.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing court’s decision.

    The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “within the preceding ten years” in CPL 440.46(5)(a), for determining exclusion offenses under the Drug Law Reform Act, refers to the ten years preceding the commission of the drug offense for which resentencing is sought, or the ten years preceding the resentencing application.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s plain language indicates that the ten-year look-back period extends from the date of the resentence application, not the date of the underlying drug crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of CPL 440.46(5)(a) dictates that the ten-year look-back period should be measured from the present, i.e., the date of the resentencing application. The Court found no textual basis for the People’s argument that the look-back period should extend from the commission of the drug offense for which resentencing is sought.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument that time spent incarcerated should not be included in the look-back period, citing the legislature’s intent that a defendant’s incarceration can be probative of their capacity for a responsible life at liberty. CPL 440.46(3) requires resentencing courts to consider a defendant’s “institutional record of confinement” and prison disciplinary history.

    The court noted that while public safety is a concern, there are also significant costs associated with the extended incarceration of low-level drug offenders. It is within the legislature’s power to determine that a temporally distant violent felony should not automatically exclude an otherwise eligible defendant from resentencing.

    The Court emphasized that the statute allows for judicial discretion to determine whether resentencing is consistent with the dictates of substantial justice, even if an applicant meets the basic eligibility criteria.

    The dissenting opinion argued that “within the preceding ten years” refers to the 10 years preceding the drug felony for which resentencing is sought, and that the majority’s interpretation encourages gamesmanship. The dissent also argued that the 2009 DLRA was remedial only for those who have never committed a second violent felony offense, or whose violent felony offenses were sufficiently remote in time from the drug offense.

  • Yenem Corp. v. 281 Broadway Holdings, 18 N.Y.3d 481 (2012): Establishes Strict Liability for Excavation Damage Under NYC Administrative Code

    18 N.Y.3d 481 (2012)

    In New York City, Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1) (now § 3309.4 of the NYC Construction Code) imposes strict liability on parties undertaking excavation work exceeding ten feet below curb level who fail to protect adjoining structures, regardless of negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York City Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1) imposes strict liability on excavators for damage to neighboring properties. The Court of Appeals held that it does, reversing the Appellate Division. Plaintiff Yenem, a tenant, and Plaintiff Randall, the building owner, sued the defendant developers after excavation work caused structural damage to their building. The Court reasoned that the code provision, originating from an 1855 state law, was intended to shift the burden of protecting adjoining properties to the excavator, imposing absolute liability for resulting damages. The court reinstated summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability.

    Facts

    Defendant JBC, through its subsidiary 281 Broadway Holdings, began developing a commercial and condominium complex adjacent to Plaintiff Randall’s building at 287 Broadway. Defendant Hunter-Atlantic performed the excavation, reaching a depth of 18 feet. During the excavation, 287 Broadway shifted out of plumb. The Department of Buildings found the building leaning approximately nine inches and issued a vacate order, forcing Plaintiff Yenem to close its pizzeria and rendering Randall’s building vacant.

    Procedural History

    Yenem and Randall separately sued the defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability under Administrative Code § 27-1031(b)(1). The Supreme Court initially denied Yenem’s motion for summary judgment but granted Randall’s motion. The Appellate Division consolidated the appeals, reversing the order granting Randall summary judgment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s order in Randall and granting summary judgment to Yenem.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-1031(b)(1) imposes strict liability on a party who causes excavation to be made, for damage to adjoining structures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the provision originated from an 1855 state law that imposed absolute liability on excavators for damage to adjoining properties when excavations exceed ten feet below curb level, and this liability remains despite recodification as a municipal ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle that violation of a state statute imposing a specific duty constitutes negligence per se or absolute liability, while violation of a municipal ordinance is merely evidence of negligence. However, the Court acknowledged an exception for Administrative Code sections originating from state law. Analyzing the origin of § 27-1031(b)(1), the Court found its language and purpose “virtually identical” to its state law predecessors, which imposed absolute liability as stated in Dorrity v. Rapp, 72 N.Y. 307, 311 (1878): “When the facts bring the case within the statute, the duty and liability which the statute imposes is absolute and unqualified.”

    The Court emphasized that the provision’s purpose—shifting the risk of injury from landowners to excavators—remained constant despite recodification. The Court quoted the dissent below stating “neither the wording nor the import of the statute was materially or substantively altered” upon recodification. Treating the provision as merely evidence of negligence would defeat the legislative intent. The Court also found the building’s allegedly poor condition irrelevant to the proximate cause analysis, affecting only the measure of damages.

  • Kahn v. New York City Department of Education, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013): Statute of Limitations for Challenging Probationary Teacher Termination

    Kahn v. New York City Department of Education, 20 N.Y.3d 461 (2013)

    A decision by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) to terminate a probationary teacher is considered a final and binding determination on the date the probationary service ends, triggering the four-month statute of limitations for challenging the termination, regardless of any pending internal review procedures.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether probationary teachers, Kahn and Nash, were required to exhaust an internal appeal process before challenging their termination from the NYC Department of Education. The Court of Appeals held that the DOE’s termination decisions were final when their probationary service ended. The internal review process, stemming from a collective bargaining agreement, is an optional procedure and does not extend the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit. Consequently, the teachers’ lawsuits, filed more than four months after their termination dates, were deemed time-barred.

    Facts

    Leslie Kahn, a probationary social worker, received an unsatisfactory performance review and was informed on December 21, 2007, that her probationary service would end on January 25, 2008. Doreen Nash, a probationary secretary, received an unsatisfactory performance review in May 2005, and was notified on June 15, 2005, that her services would be discontinued on July 15, 2005. Both Kahn and Nash initiated internal review procedures under the DOE’s bylaws and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Kahn’s probationary service ended January 25, 2008 and she commenced an Article 78 proceeding September 9, 2008. Nash’s probationary service ended July 15, 2005, and she commenced an Article 78 proceeding September 10, 2008.

    Procedural History

    Kahn: Supreme Court initially denied DOE’s motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. Nash: Supreme Court dismissed Nash’s petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the internal review process provided by the DOE and the CBA must be exhausted before a probationary employee can bring a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to challenge their termination, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.

    Holding

    No, because the DOE’s decision to terminate a probationary employee is final and binding on the date the probationary service ends, and the internal review procedure is an optional process that does not affect the finality of the termination decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763 (1988), which held that a probationary teacher’s termination is final when made, fully terminating employment under Education Law § 2573 (1) (a). The court emphasized that probationary teachers have no constitutional or statutory right to a review of the Chancellor’s decisions to discontinue their services. The right to a review stems solely from the CBA. The internal review procedure, established in the bylaws, is “an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask the Chancellor to reconsider and reverse his initial decision, a decision which is final and which, when made, in all respects terminates the employment of a probationer” (id. at 767). Therefore, the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217(1) begins to run from the date the probationary service ends. The Court rejected the argument that requiring immediate legal action would harm probationary teachers, stating that potentially meritorious claims would be delayed while awaiting the internal review’s outcome without pay or a right to back pay if reinstated. The Court noted that overturning a DOE decision to terminate a probationary employee during the probationary period is rare.