New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d 601 (2013): Preservation Requirement for Merger Doctrine Claims

    People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d 601 (2013)

    A defendant must preserve a merger argument (that a kidnapping count should merge with another offense) by raising it in the trial court; otherwise, the appellate court will not review the claim.

    Summary

    Hanley pleaded guilty to kidnapping, weapon possession, and reckless endangerment after threatening a woman with a gun. On appeal, he argued that the kidnapping charge should have merged with the reckless endangerment charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that Hanley’s claim was not preserved because he failed to raise it in the trial court, and the merger doctrine does not fall under the “mode of proceedings” exception to the preservation rule. The Court reasoned that the merger doctrine is a judicially-created concept based on fairness, not a fundamental constitutional right.

    Facts

    Kirk Hanley, a college student with a history of mental health issues, planned a school shooting. He acquired a handgun and ammunition and went to City College. He revealed his plan to a female acquaintance, showing her the gun and suicide notes. She alerted a school employee, who called the police. When police approached, Hanley brandished the gun, grabbed a woman, pointed the gun at her head, and threatened to kill her. He eventually released the hostage and was taken into custody.

    Procedural History

    Hanley was indicted on charges including kidnapping, weapon possession, and reckless endangerment. He pleaded guilty to all charges after the court promised a specific prison sentence. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he argued that the kidnapping charge should have merged with the reckless endangerment charge. The Appellate Division refused to address the merger argument because it was not raised at trial and there was no trial record. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant charged with kidnapping and another offense must preserve the argument that the kidnapping count merged with the other crime to have that argument reviewed on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the merger doctrine is a judicially devised concept premised on fundamental fairness and does not implicate any fundamental constitutional concerns that strike at the core of the criminal adjudicatory process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the merger argument was unpreserved. The Court reiterated the general rule that claims of error not preserved by objection in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. The “mode of proceedings” exception is a narrow one, applying only to fundamental flaws affecting jurisdictional matters or constitutional rights at the heart of the process.

    The merger doctrine was created to prevent overcharging in kidnapping cases, where any restraint could technically constitute kidnapping, potentially inflating sentences. As the court explained, the doctrine aims to prevent a “ ‘conviction for kidnapping based on acts which are so much the part of another substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts’ ” (People v. Bussey, 19 N.Y.3d 231, 237 [2012], quoting People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763, 767).

    The Court reasoned that although the merger doctrine is based on fairness and prevents excessive punishment, it is not jurisdictional and does not implicate fundamental constitutional concerns. Therefore, it does not qualify as a mode of proceedings error. The Court noted the consistent view among the Appellate Divisions that a merger claim must be raised at the trial court level. Because Hanley failed to raise the merger argument in Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could not review it.

    The Court emphasized the importance of preservation to allow the trial court to address the issue in the first instance, developing a factual record if necessary. The court considered that defendant offered no justification for deviating from the established view, concluding that the preservation rule applies to a merger claim in a kidnapping prosecution.

  • Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013): Upholding “Internet Tax” Based on Affiliate Solicitation

    Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013)

    A state tax on online retailers with no physical presence in the state is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause if the retailer has agreements with in-state residents who solicit business on their behalf for a commission, creating a sufficient nexus for taxation.

    Summary

    Amazon and Overstock challenged New York’s “Internet tax” arguing it violated the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. The law presumes online retailers solicit business in New York if they have commission-based agreements with New York residents who refer customers, resulting in over $10,000 in sales. The court upheld the statute, finding it constitutional on its face. The court reasoned that the in-state solicitation by affiliates creates a substantial nexus, and the presumption of solicitation is rational and rebuttable. The plaintiffs failed to prove the statute facially unconstitutional.

    Facts

    Amazon and Overstock, online retailers with no physical presence in New York, used “Associates” or “Affiliates” programs. These programs involved compensating New York residents for placing links on their websites that directed users to the retailers’ sites. If a customer made a purchase through the link, the resident received a commission. New York amended its Tax Law to include a provision (the “Internet tax”) presuming that sellers were soliciting business through independent contractors if they had such agreements with New York residents, and the cumulative gross receipts from these referrals exceeded $10,000 during the preceding four quarters.

    Procedural History

    Amazon and Overstock separately sued the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, alleging that the Internet tax was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaints. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenges but reinstated the as-applied challenges. The plaintiffs then withdrew their as-applied challenges, and appealed the ruling on the facial challenges to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Internet tax violates the Commerce Clause by imposing an undue tax burden on interstate commerce.
    2. Whether the Internet tax violates the Due Process Clause by creating an irrational and irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the state.

    Holding

    1. No, because active, in-state solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue qualifies as demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” satisfying the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause.
    2. No, because there is a rational connection between compensating residents for referrals that result in purchases and the presumption that those residents will actively solicit other New Yorkers, and because the presumption is rebuttable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional on its face under both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
    Regarding the Commerce Clause, the court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s emphasis on physical presence in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota as establishing the limits of state taxing authority. However, the court distinguished the case by finding that the New York statute addressed active solicitation by in-state residents. The court stated, “Active, in-state solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue qualifies as ‘demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence’ under Orvis.” The court noted that vendors are not required to pay these taxes out-of-pocket; they are collecting taxes that are unquestionably due.

    Regarding the Due Process Clause, the court found a rational connection between compensating residents for referrals and the presumption that they will actively solicit other New Yorkers. The court reasoned, “It is plainly rational to presume that, given the direct correlation between referrals and compensation, it is likely that residents will seek to increase their referrals by soliciting customers.” The court also found that the presumption was rebuttable. The Department of Taxation and Finance provided a method for rebutting the presumption through contractual prohibition of solicitation and annual certification by the affiliates.

    The court emphasized that plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the statute was facially unconstitutional. The court stated, “We will not strain to invalidate this statute where plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that it is facially invalid.”

  • People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.3d 581 (2013): Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)

    People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.3d 581 (2013)

    Expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) is admissible to explain a victim’s behavior that might seem unusual, but hypothetical questions must not be tailored to mirror the specific facts of the case to avoid bolstering the victim’s credibility.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) in a case involving multiple sex crime charges. The Court held that while general expert testimony on CSAAS is permissible to explain a victim’s behavior, hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the case improperly bolster the victim’s credibility. However, the Court found the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The case clarifies the boundaries of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases, emphasizing the need to avoid implying an expert’s opinion on the victim’s credibility.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with sex crimes against two 12-year-old girls: AW, the daughter of his girlfriend, and PW, the girlfriend’s younger sister who frequently visited. PW reported the abuse to a school official in May 2007. At trial, both AW and PW testified in detail about the alleged sexual acts. A physician testified that the findings from PW’s examination were consistent with her allegations.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted on all counts after a bench trial. The Appellate Division modified the judgment on other grounds, but otherwise affirmed the conviction, finding the expert testimony admissible. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on CSAAS that included hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the case?

    2. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor tailored the hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the abuse that occurred in this particular case. Such testimony went beyond explaining victim behavior that might be beyond the ken of a jury, and had the prejudicial effect of implying that the expert found the testimony of this particular complainant to be credible.

    2. No, because defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel is without merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that expert testimony on CSAAS can be admissible to explain behaviors of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be expected to understand, particularly why a child may delay reporting sexual abuse. The Court cited People v. Spicola, where it upheld the admission of CSAAS expert testimony to rehabilitate a complainant’s credibility, so long as the expert did not offer an opinion as to whether the victim was actually abused.

    However, the Court found that the expert’s testimony in this case exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor asked hypothetical questions mirroring the specific facts of the alleged abuse. The court stated that such testimony “went beyond explaining victim behavior that might be beyond the ken of a jury, and had the prejudicial effect of implying that the expert found the testimony of this particular complainant to be credible—even though the witness began his testimony claiming no knowledge of the case before the court.”

    Despite finding this error, the Court deemed it harmless, stating that “the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that, but for the introduction of the erroneous portion of his testimony, defendant would have been acquitted.” Both victims testified in detail, and PW’s testimony was corroborated by medical evidence.

    The Court did not find merit in the defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse and Prior False Allegations

    People v. D’Antuono, 22 N.Y.3d 564 (2013)

    Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior, but a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse are admissible if they suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges.

    Summary

    D’Antuono was convicted of sexual misconduct against a child. The Appellate Division reversed, citing errors in admitting expert testimony and precluding testimony of a witness regarding prior false allegations made by the complainant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while general expert testimony on child sexual abuse is permissible, precluding the testimony of a witness regarding the complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse was reversible error, especially given the lack of corroborating evidence. The court reasoned that such testimony was relevant to the complainant’s credibility and the defense’s claim of false accusation.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his step-granddaughter in 2006 and 2007. The complainant testified that the abuse began in fourth grade while her mother was at work. The mother testified that she discovered the abuse after finding the complainant crying. Sex toys and pornographic videos were found in the defendant’s room. A doctor testified that the complainant’s hymen was intact. The People presented expert testimony on child sexual abuse. Four witnesses testified that the complainant had a poor reputation for honesty. The defense sought to introduce testimony from Martinez, who the complainant had previously accused of sexual abuse, but the trial court disallowed it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony and in permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People’s child abuse expert. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the expert to testify about how an adult sexual abuser may act to gain the compliance of a child victim without using threats or force.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding Martinez’s testimony regarding the complainant’s prior allegations of sexual abuse against him.

    Holding

    1. No, because expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers is permissible as helpful for the jury to understand victims’ unusual behavior, so long as the expert speaks in general terms and does not refer to the specific facts of the case.

    2. Yes, because evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that expert testimony is admissible if it helps to “clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror” (De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307 [1983]). Expert testimony on child sexual abuse is admissible to help jurors understand victims’ unusual behavior. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the proffered testimony of Martinez should have been permitted. Evidence of a complainant’s prior false allegations of sexual abuse is admissible if the prior allegations “suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges” (People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952, 953 [1979]). The Court noted the lack of corroborating evidence and the acquittal on the top count, indicating the jury’s potential skepticism. Thus, precluding Martinez’s testimony was not harmless error. The Court stated, “These statements opened the door to Martinez’s rebuttal, which, if believed, suggested that the testimony of the complainant and her mother were not credible.”

  • M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle, 20 N.Y.3d 533 (2013): Delivery of Deed Requires Acceptance for Deficiency Judgment

    M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle, 20 N.Y.3d 533 (2013)

    For the purposes of determining the timeliness of a motion for a deficiency judgment under RPAPL 1371(2), “consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed” occurs only when the grantee accepts the deed, not merely when the grantor presents it.

    Summary

    M&T Real Estate Trust sought a deficiency judgment after foreclosing on commercial mortgages. The defendants argued that M&T’s motion was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the referee initially mailed the deed to M&T’s attorney. M&T argued that the 90-day period started later, when the referee re-executed and delivered the deed which was then accepted. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 90-day period under RPAPL 1371(2) begins only upon acceptance of the deed by the grantee, reversing the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstating the County Court’s order and judgment.

    Facts

    M&T obtained a foreclosure judgment against James Doyle and Jim Doyle Ford, Inc. At auction, M&T purchased the property and planned to assign the bid to MAT Properties, Inc. The referee executed a deed naming MAT as the grantee and mailed it to M&T’s attorney. Before the deed arrived, M&T’s attorney, learning of a potential higher bidder, told the referee that MAT would not accept the deed and that the documents would be returned, which they were. Later, M&T instructed the referee to record the deed. The referee then re-executed a new deed, which was accepted and subsequently recorded.

    Procedural History

    County Court granted M&T’s motion for a deficiency judgment, holding that the motion was timely because it was filed within 90 days of the re-executed deed. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the 90-day period began with the initial delivery attempt. The Court of Appeals granted M&T leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of RPAPL 1371(2), the “consummation of the sale by the delivery of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser” occurs when the referee (grantor) first executes and mails the deed, or only when the grantee (or its agent) accepts the deed?

    Holding

    No, the consummation of the sale occurs when the grantee accepts the deed, because acceptance is a necessary component of delivery under New York real property law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Real Property Law § 244, which states that a grant takes effect only from its delivery, and on common law principles requiring both presentment and acceptance for delivery. The court stated, “[t]he delivery of a deed without acceptance is nugatory…An intention to deliver on the one hand and to accept on the other, is necessary to give effect to the instrument.” The court emphasized that no statutory basis exists to treat a referee’s deed differently from other deeds. In this case, M&T’s attorney twice declined to accept the initially delivered deed. The court found this to be “opposing evidence” sufficient to rebut any presumption of delivery in May 2010. Only when the deed was re-executed and then accepted did the transfer occur, making M&T’s motion timely. The court distinguished this case from situations where the grantee accepts and retains the deed without objection, as in Crossland Sav. v Patton. The court emphasized that the key is not merely physical transfer, but the intention to accept the conveyance, quoting Ten Eyck v Whitbeck, “[t]he delivery of a deed is essential to the transfer of title, and there can be no delivery without an acceptance by the grantee”.

  • Gelman v. Buehler, 20 N.Y.3d 534 (2013): Unilateral Partnership Dissolution When Agreement Lacks Definite Term or Particular Undertaking

    Gelman v. Buehler, 20 N.Y.3d 534 (2013)

    Under New York Partnership Law § 62(1)(b), a partnership formed by oral agreement is dissolvable at will by any partner if the agreement does not specify a ‘definite term’ or a ‘particular undertaking’.

    Summary

    Gelman and Buehler, business school graduates, formed an oral partnership to create a search fund, solicit investments, acquire a business, increase its value, and eventually sell it for profit. Buehler later withdrew, and Gelman sued for breach of contract. The New York Court of Appeals held that Buehler’s withdrawal did not constitute a breach because the oral agreement lacked a ‘definite term’ or a ‘particular undertaking’ as required by Partnership Law § 62(1)(b), making the partnership dissolvable at will. The Court emphasized that the agreement’s objectives were too uncertain and lacked a specific termination date.

    Facts

    Geoffrey Gelman and Antonio Buehler, recent business school graduates, orally agreed to form a partnership in 2007. Buehler proposed raising $600,000 to establish a search fund to identify a business with growth potential. The plan involved soliciting further investment, acquiring the target business, and managing it to increase its value until a profitable sale (the “liquidity event”). Gelman agreed, and they anticipated the business plan would take four to seven years. Buehler later demanded majority ownership, which Gelman refused, leading to Buehler’s withdrawal.

    Procedural History

    Gelman sued Buehler for breach of contract. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding no definite term or specific objective. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the “liquidity event” constituted a definite term and the business acquisition and expansion was a specific undertaking. Two justices dissented. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the breach of contract claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the oral partnership agreement between Gelman and Buehler contained a “definite term” within the meaning of Partnership Law § 62(1)(b).
    2. Whether the oral partnership agreement between Gelman and Buehler specified a “particular undertaking” within the meaning of Partnership Law § 62(1)(b).

    Holding

    1. No, because the alleged temporal framework of the agreement was too flexible and lacked a specific or reasonably certain termination date.
    2. No, because the objectives of raising money, identifying a business, and increasing its value were too amorphous and uncertain to constitute a “particular undertaking.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that Partnership Law § 62(1)(b) allows a partner to dissolve a partnership if the agreement lacks a “definite term or particular undertaking.” The Court found that a “definite term” requires an identifiable termination date, while a “particular undertaking” necessitates a specific objective achievable at a future time. Applying these standards, the Court determined that Gelman’s complaint lacked a fixed period for the partnership’s operation. The alleged sequence of events—raising money, identifying a business, raising more money, operating the business to increase its value, and selling it for profit—was deemed too uncertain to satisfy the statutory requirement. The Court distinguished the case from *St. Lawrence Factory Stores v Ogdensburg Bridge & Port Auth.*, where the agreement identified the specific purpose of developing a retail factory outlet center on a defined property. The Court quoted examples of objectives found to be inadequate, such as the “ ‘development, packaging, production and distribution of theatrical feature films . . . while also involved … in television development and production’ ” and partnerships to acquire, manage, and resell real estate. Because the agreement lacked a definite term or particular undertaking, the partnership was dissolvable at will, and Buehler’s withdrawal did not breach the contract. The Court emphasized that the “error in the Appellate Division’s rationale was that it equated “definite term” with the liquidity event—a possible future occurrence from which an identifiable termination date was not ascertainable at the outset of the partnership.”

  • People v. DeProspero, 21 N.Y.3d 527 (2013): Duration of Search Warrant Authority After Initial Execution

    People v. DeProspero, 21 N.Y.3d 527 (2013)

    The authority of a search warrant does not necessarily lapse upon the completion of a prosecution related to the initial seizure; its validity is measured by the persistence of the probable cause that justified its issuance.

    Summary

    DeProspero pleaded guilty to predatory sexual assault after the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found on a digital camera memory card seized from his residence under a warrant. He argued that the warrant’s authority had lapsed by the time of the forensic examination that revealed the incriminating images, as a prior conviction based on a single image found on his computer had already concluded. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant’s validity persisted because the probable cause for its issuance remained, irrespective of the prior conviction. The court emphasized that the warrant authorized further analysis and examination and the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy.

    Facts

    A warrant was issued on May 4, 2009, to search DeProspero’s residence based on probable cause that he was downloading child pornography. During the warrant’s execution on May 5, 2009, digital media devices were seized. A preliminary examination of DeProspero’s computer revealed one pornographic image, leading to a conviction for possessing a sexual performance by a child in September 2009. After serving his sentence and the expiration of the appeal period, DeProspero requested the return of his seized property in December 2009. The prosecutor learned that the seized devices had not yet been forensically examined. A subsequent forensic examination in January 2010 revealed numerous still-frame images depicting DeProspero engaged in sexual acts with a child, leading to the predatory sexual assault charge.

    Procedural History

    DeProspero moved to suppress the evidence found during the January 2010 forensic examination, arguing the search warrant’s authority had lapsed. The County Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the authority of a search warrant lapses after the completion of a prosecution related to the initial seizure, such that a subsequent forensic examination of seized property requires fresh judicial authorization.

    Holding

    No, because the continued validity of a search warrant and any assumption of custody it authorizes is not necessarily tied to the pendency of any particular prosecution. The duration of a warrant’s authority is more appropriately measured by the persistence of the cause for its issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy against unwarranted intrusion by the state. After the execution of the valid warrant, DeProspero lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the seized items, which were to be retained for further analysis. The court rejected DeProspero’s argument that this expectation was restored after his September 2009 conviction. The court stated, “It is manifest that the continued validity of a search warrant and any assumption of custody it authorizes is not necessarily tied to the pendency of any particular prosecution.” The court emphasized that the probable cause justifying the warrant’s issuance persisted, making the January 2010 examination valid. Furthermore, the court noted that CPL 690.55(2) does not tie the warrant to a specific prosecution. The court also suggested that even if DeProspero’s claim were based on property rights rather than privacy expectations, it would fail because of the warrant’s continued validity and the potential for forfeiture of the seized items. The court acknowledged that while there is no specific time limit on how long property may be held following a lawful seizure, due process requires that the state not retain property beyond the exhaustion of any legitimate law enforcement purpose. However, such a claim was not supported by the facts of this case.

  • Howard v. Stature Electric, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 522 (2012): Preclusive Effect of Alford Plea in Subsequent Proceedings

    Howard v. Stature Electric, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 522 (2012)

    An Alford plea, where a defendant pleads guilty without admitting guilt, will only be given preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding if the issue in the subsequent proceeding was necessarily decided by the plea.

    Summary

    Claimant David Howard sustained a back injury while working for Stature Electric and received workers’ compensation benefits. He was later charged with insurance fraud for allegedly working while receiving benefits and pleaded guilty to insurance fraud in the fourth degree via an Alford plea (pleading guilty without admitting guilt). The State Insurance Fund (SIF) sought to preclude further workers’ compensation benefits based on the guilty plea. The Court of Appeals held that because the plea colloquy lacked any factual basis for the conviction, the SIF failed to prove that the conviction was based on the same fraudulent circumstances alleged in the workers’ compensation proceeding. Therefore, the Alford plea did not prohibit claimant from challenging the workers’ compensation violation.

    Facts

    David Howard, while employed by Stature Electric, Inc., sustained a back injury in March 2003, for which he received workers’ compensation benefits.
    At a workers’ compensation hearing, Howard testified he had no other employment.
    In November 2005, Howard was arrested and charged with insurance fraud, grand larceny, offering a false instrument for filing, and violating Workers’ Compensation Law § 114.
    Howard ultimately pleaded guilty to insurance fraud in the fourth degree via an Alford plea, without admitting guilt, in satisfaction of all charges. The court accepted the plea without factual allocution.

    Procedural History

    At a workers’ compensation hearing, the State Insurance Fund (SIF) sought to preclude Howard from further benefits based on his guilty plea.
    The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge denied the application, finding no factual allocution to determine if the plea matched the carrier’s claim.
    The Workers’ Compensation Board modified, giving preclusive effect to Howard’s guilty plea and finding a violation of Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a.
    The Appellate Division reversed and remitted, holding that the requirement of identicality was not met because Howard made no factual admissions during his Alford plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether claimant’s Alford plea should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent workers’ compensation proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because it cannot be said that the guilty plea necessarily resolved the issue raised in the workers’ compensation proceeding, preclusive effect should not be given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered two factors to determine whether preclusive effect should be given to the Alford plea: (1) whether the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) whether the party attempting to relitigate the issue had a full and fair opportunity to contest it in the prior action, citing Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 (1985). The court emphasized that the party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues, while the party attempting to defeat its application bears the burden of establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
    The court noted, “[f]rom the State’s perspective [.Alford pleas] are no different from other guilty pleas; it would otherwise be unconscionable for a court to sentence an individual to a term of imprisonment” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000]).
    In this case, because the plea colloquy contained no reference to the underlying facts of the insurance fraud conviction, the court could not conclude that the conviction was based on the same circumstances alleged to be fraudulent in the workers’ compensation proceeding. As such, the SIF failed to meet its burden of proving identity of issue, and the plea did not prohibit Howard from challenging the workers’ compensation violation. The court stated, “Here, the plea colloquy preceding claimant’s insurance fraud conviction included no reference to the facts underlying the conviction, so it is impossible to conclude that the conviction was based upon the same circumstances alleged to be fraudulent in the workers’ compensation proceeding.”

  • People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): Sufficiency of Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A defendant is not entitled to reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise sufficiency arguments that are not clear-cut and dispositive.

    Summary

    McGee was convicted as an accomplice of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. The prosecution argued McGee drove the getaway car while his codefendant fired shots at civilians and a police officer. McGee appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was sufficient evidence to corroborate McGee’s admission and that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise arguments that were not clearly dispositive in his favor. The court emphasized that the defense counsel mounted a vigorous defense and that strategic reasons existed for the challenged omissions.

    Facts

    McGee drove a Chevy Equinox while Carr fired shots at civilians and homes. During a high-speed chase, McGee swerved the car, allowing Carr to shoot at Officer Clark. Carr fired two or three shots at Clark, with one bullet hitting the patrol car. McGee and Carr abandoned the vehicle and were apprehended while fleeing on foot. A handgun was found nearby with Carr’s DNA on it.

    Procedural History

    McGee and Carr were jointly tried and convicted of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. McGee appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. McGee then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support McGee’s conviction.
    2. Whether McGee was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to dismiss the indictment based on certain sufficiency of evidence claims and other strategic decisions.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was ample independent evidence that a crime was committed, and McGee’s statement was not the only evidence connecting him to the crime.
    2. No, because the arguments not raised by defense counsel were not clear-cut and dispositive in McGee’s favor, and there may have been strategic reasons for counsel’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50 only requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to corroborate a confession. Here, eyewitness testimony and police accounts provided ample independent evidence of the crimes. The court emphasized that a failure to make a significant argument can only lead to a finding of ineffective assistance “when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152 [2005]).

    The court found that the sufficiency arguments McGee claimed his attorney should have raised were not clear-cut and dispositive. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992) to show precedent existed that undermined the argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill or a shared purpose. The court also noted that the attempt to distance McGee from Carr’s actions may have been a strategic decision, even though it ultimately failed. The court noted, “a reviewing court must avoid confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis” (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712 [1998]).

  • White v. Farrell, 20 NY3d 486 (2013): Damages for Buyer Breach of Real Estate Contract

    White v. Farrell, 20 N.Y.3d 486 (2013)

    The proper measure of damages for a buyer’s breach of a real estate contract is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; the price obtained on a later resale is competent evidence of fair market value.

    Summary

    The Farrells sued the Whites for breach of contract after the Whites backed out of an agreement to purchase the Farrells’ lakefront property for $1.725 million. The Farrells sought damages for the difference between the contract price and the eventual sale price to a third party ($1,376,550), plus consequential damages. The New York Court of Appeals clarified that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of the breach. The resale price is evidence of the fair market value. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, which had granted summary judgment to the Whites based solely on the testimony of the Farrell’s real estate agent that the market value at the time of breach equaled the contract price. The case was remanded for a determination of the property’s fair market value at the time of the breach.

    Facts

    The Farrells contracted to sell their Skaneateles, NY lakefront property to the Whites for $1.725 million in June 2005. The contract was contingent on a satisfactory home inspection, resolution of construction-related items, and attorney approval. An addendum removed contingencies in exchange for the Farrells completing enumerated tasks, including drainage system work and a $10,000 credit. The Whites terminated the contract in July 2005, citing unresolved drainage issues. The Farrells sent a time-is-of-the-essence letter, but the Whites did not attend the scheduled closing. The Whites purchased another property on Skaneateles Lake for $1.7 million in August 2005.

    Procedural History

    The Whites sued the Farrells to recover their $25,000 down payment. The Farrells counterclaimed for breach of contract. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Whites, determining the Farrells suffered no actual damages because their real estate agent testified the property’s market value at the time of breach equaled the contract price. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the Farrells leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the proper measure of damages for a buyer’s breach of a real estate contract is (1) the difference between the contract price and a subsequent lower sale price, or (2) the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach.

    Holding

    No, the proper measure of damages is not always the difference between the contract price and a subsequent lower sale price. Yes, because the proper measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach. The resale price is evidence of the fair market value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a seller’s damages are always the difference between the contract price and a later, lower selling price. The Court affirmed the established rule in New York and most jurisdictions is that damages are measured by the difference between the contract price and the fair market value at the time of the breach. The Court noted the resale price is competent evidence of fair market value at the time of breach, particularly when the resale occurs soon after the breach under similar market conditions. The Court emphasized that damages are properly ascertained as of the date of the breach, and the injured party has a duty to mitigate damages. Regarding the real estate agent’s testimony, the Court found that fair market value is a question of fact. In this case, there was conflicting evidence, including the subsequent sale price. The Court remanded the case for a determination of fair market value, considering the resale price, mitigation efforts, and costs to remedy property deficiencies. The court stated, “This is not to say that resale price is irrelevant to the determination of damages; in fact, the resale price, in a particular case, may be very strong evidence of fair market value at the time of the breach. This is especially true where the time interval between default and resale is not too long, market conditions remain substantially similar, and the contract terms are comparable.”